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You keep referring to Madison's intent. 1) You need to define this, with a quote so I know what you're talking about.

Are you referring to "original intent" and are you saying that "original intent" is "sole intent"? In other words, are you saying it was Madison's intent that the Commerce Clause be used exclusively for the purpose for which it was written and no other? 2) I'll need to see proof of that if that is your claim.

The original intent of the meaning of "to regulate" was "to facilitate" commerce. But as early as the late 1800's, "to regulate" included "to ban". Are you saying that Congress cannot ban commerce because Madison didn't originally write the Commerce Clause to ban commerce, but to facilitate commerce?

In 1824, in Gibbons v Ogden, Chief Justice (and Founding Father) John Marshall stated, "The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government."

Seems to me he's saying that IF completely intrastate activity affects other states, Congress may interfere.

James Madison was still alive in 1824. Why didn't he comment on this? Why didn't he say, "Hey! That wasn't my intent! My intent was interstate commerce only!"

I think this is a pretty good Madison quotation:

"It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States

....

The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over the governments of the particular States. If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained."

The implication I draw from that excerpt, and other Madison writings, is that few apprehensions regarding the new commerce power were entertained because it was generally understood to be related to trade policies among the states and with foreign nations and the tribes. It was generally understood that that was a fairly narrow, "defined" power.

It was also understood that more amorphous powers, those many things "which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State" would be State powers.

As noted above, Madison did not even expect for the feds to have tax collectors in every part of every state, let alone regulators of all types.

He thought that the powers of the federal government would "be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce." I just really fail to see how homegrown cannabis plants or machine guns for personal consumption fit that description.

Do those things really "affect other states" as in your quotation?

Well, the Congress, the left wing of the Court, and Scalia say that if the Congress says they affect other states, they affect other states. Thomas and I disagree. More from his dissent:

Respondents are not regulable simply because they belong to a large class (local growers and users of marijuana) that Congress might need to reach, if they also belong to a distinct and separable subclass (local growers and users of state-authorized, medical marijuana) that does not undermine the CSA’s interstate ban. Ante, at 6—7 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The Court of Appeals found that respondents’ “limited use is distinct from the broader illicit drug market,” because “th[eir] medicinal marijuana … is not intended for, nor does it enter, the stream of commerce.” Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (CA9 2003). If that is generally true of individuals who grow and use marijuana for medical purposes under state law, then even assuming Congress has “obvious” and “plain” reasons why regulating intrastate cultivation and possession is necessary to regulating the interstate drug trade, none of those reasons applies to medical marijuana patients like Monson and Raich.

California’s Compassionate Use Act sets respondents’ conduct apart from other intrastate producers and users of marijuana. The Act channels marijuana use to “seriously ill Californians,” Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2005), and prohibits “the diversion of marijuana for nonmedical purposes,” §11362.5(b)(2).4 California strictly controls the cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical purposes. To be eligible for its program, California requires that a patient have an illness that cannabis can relieve, such as cancer, AIDS, or arthritis, §11362.5(b)(1)(A), and that he obtain a physician’s recommendation or approval, §11362.5(d). Qualified patients must provide personal and medical information to obtain medical identification cards, and there is a statewide registry of cardholders. §§11362.715—.76. Moreover, the Medical Board of California has issued guidelines for physicians’ cannabis recommendations, and it sanctions physicians who do not comply with the guidelines. See, e.g., People v. Spark, 121 Cal. App. 4th 259, 263, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 840, 843 (2004).

This class of intrastate users is therefore distinguishable from others. We normally presume that States enforce their own laws, Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988), and there is no reason to depart from that presumption here: Nothing suggests that California’s controls are ineffective. The scant evidence that exists suggests that few people–the vast majority of whom are aged 40 or older–register to use medical marijuana. General Accounting Office, Marijuana: Early Experiences with Four States’ Laws That Allow Use for Medical Purposes 22—23 (Rep. No. 03—189, Nov. 2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01389.pdf (all Internet materials as visited on June 3, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). In part because of the low incidence of medical marijuana use, many law enforcement officials report that the introduction of medical marijuana laws has not affected their law enforcement efforts. Id., at 32.

These controls belie the Government’s assertion that placing medical marijuana outside the CSA’s reach “would prevent effective enforcement of the interstate ban on drug trafficking.”