The problem with Farah's analysis is that it is conclusory. It is void of analytical content. It discusses only the outcome of the case and the political affiliation of the presidents who nominated the involved judges.
The article contains no discussion of the relative merits of the majority and minority opinions. It does not discuss the hurdles involved in reversing a trial court's finding. It does not probe the question of whether or not civil procedure is equipped to handle "tough cases" (e.g., should there be additional procedural safeguards? If so, when?).
There are certainly arguments on both sides of "legislated from the bench." No analyses beyond the opinions themselves, again, other than conclusory or politically motivated ones, have been brought forth as to whether or not the Palm Sunday legislation was constitutional. If it was, there is a question of whether or not the process used by the Federal Court System adhered to legislative intent. One can see pieces of both sides of this argument in the opinions of the courts. Additional argument and analysis will no doubt be offered in time, as the legal scholars dissect the case. Some will side with the dissent, and find that the courts did practice judical activism, by subverting legislative intent. No doubt, that side lost the case, but it's possible to identify a number of cases where the majority got it wrong, given the benefit of hindsight.
But the plaintiffs didn't ask for that. They wanted to rehash their appellate claims that had been turned down repeatedly in state court.
The courts rule on what is before them, or at least they should.
You're absolutely right.
Excellent post.