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To: CHARLITE

I'd love to see them try to re-take the Alamo or Alamogordo for that matter. Real short fight. Mexico City would be a burning cinder within twenty minutes.


22 posted on 05/04/2005 5:10:02 PM PDT by Liberty Valance (If you must filibuster, let the Constitution do the talkin')
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To: Liberty Valance
"Real short fight. Mexico City would be a burning cinder within twenty minutes."

What a sensational comment, Liberty!

Thanks so much. It made my sagging day!!

Char :)

29 posted on 05/04/2005 5:16:14 PM PDT by CHARLITE ("People are not old, until regrets take the place of their dreams." - John Barrymore)
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To: Liberty Valance
I agree.........the Mexicans are lucky we didn't take everything south to Mexico City when we had the chance...(see below.) I re-typed this whole article from a piece out of the Tombstone Epitaph newspaper that I used to subscribe to. At the time, it gave me an overview of the Mexican-American war. Perhaps some of you will enjoy it also.

The Colossus of Which?

A Slight Reexamination of Certain Myths About the Mexican War

By: C.F. Eckhardt

Western History Writer

(As printed in the “The Tombstone Epitaph,” 3/99)

In the light of recent ‘politically correct’ television productions about the war between the United States and Mexico in 1846, I feel it’s time for a ‘politically incorrect’ look at a part of the history of that conflict that’s largely ignored.

According to ‘politically correct history’ the United States, ‘The Colossus of the North,’ attacked poor, defenseless Mexico and despoiled her of half her territory. What is invariably ignored is the military equation, relative military and political strengths of the United States, and the Republic of Mexico in 1846 when war was declared.

Mexico had a standing army of 500,000 men and a system of national conscription (a draft) to keep the army at full strength. Over half the Mexican army was Cavalry which was the primary offensive arm of 19th century warfare. In addition, Mexico had a federally controlled, uniformly armed and trained reserve force of another 750,000 men. They were kept up to strength by conscription and, again, more than half of that was Cavalry. Because the army was conscripted rather than voluntary, nearly all of the enlisted men in the Mexican Army were natives of Mexico.

Most of Mexico’s junior officers (the ranks of Captain and below) were natives, and most of them were well educated and highly competent. The Mexican National Military Academy at Chapultepec had been in business a long time. They first trained officers for the Spanish Colonial Army and later for the Army of the Republic of Mexico.

The Mexican senior officers (Majors to Generals) were particularly noted for their experience and competence. Most of the native Mexican senior officers were veterans of the Mexican Revolution, which ended in 1821, and of many, many revolts and would-be counter revolutions that followed it. Many others were foreign soldiers-of-fortune – Vicinte Filisola, an Italian, and Adrian Woll, a German, are names that are very familiar in history, particularly in Texas. These men had seen service as officers with European armies and were very competent.

Mexico had a strong central government – a dictatorship – under a usually competent political and military leader who had ambitions of conquest. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna y Perez de LeBron didn’t call himself ‘The Napoleon of the West’ just to have a nickname.

The United States had an all-volunteer regular army with a nominal strength of about 7,200, but an actual strength of about 6,500. In excess of half its enlisted strength was immigrant, not native, with immigrant Irish making up the majority of the non-native enlistees. The U.S. Army had no Cavalry arm at all(a political choice) since Cavalry was supposed to be the arm of the ‘aristocracy’ and the U.S. was, by choice, an egalitarian nation with no acknowledged ‘aristocracy.’ Instead of Cavalry it had two regiments. One regiment of dragoons who were supposed to go to the fight on horseback, dismount, then fight afoot, and a regiment of mounted rifleman. It also had only one regiment of artillery.

In a point that is always ignored, while half or more of the enlisted strength of the U.S. Army was at least nominally Roman Catholic, there was not a single Roman Catholic Chaplain in the entire army. This was because of a strong anti-Catholic political movement called ‘The American Party,’ but more commonly knows as ‘The Know-Nothings.’ Because of their political party’s actions, they would reply: ‘I know nothing.’

While the Know-Nothings were never able to elect a president, they did have strong representation in Congress. After the war, Zachary Taylor’s running mate, Millard G. Fillmore, was a member of the Know-Nothings and was nominated to swing the Know-Nothing vote to Taylor. Upon Taylor’s death, after only a month in office, he succeeded to the Presidency. This lack of a religious base for half, or more, of the enlisted men in the regular army took its toll in Mexico where the entire population was at least nominally Roman Catholic and the only spiritual counselors available were strong Mexican nationalists.

The U.S. officer corps was almost entirely native. By 1846, junior officers were largely graduates of the National Military Academy at West Point, New York, but the senior officers were not. Most senior officers were Indian War veterans or, in the very highest ranks, veterans of the last ‘real’ war the U.S. fought; the War of 1812. Most of the 1812 veterans had been very young, very junior officers in the conflict more than 30 years earlier.

The state of training in the U.S. Army was deplorable. Because it was so small, and had such a large area to cover, most regiments had never drilled or trained as regimental units. In fact, many regiments had not been assembled in regimental-sized units in as much as ten years. Companies were usually well drilled but most junior officers and many senior officers had never seen more than two companies in one place at one time. Regimental training was almost entirely lacking and the single regiments of artillery, which was split into batteries (six to eight guns and their crews), sections (two guns and crews), and half-sections (one gun and crew) at coastal forts, had not trained or even been assembled as a regiment since 1814.

Although the Constitution provided for an organized national militia force in Article I, Section 8; and for a general militia in Amendment II, there was no national military serve force anywhere in the entire United States. Instead, what ‘militia’ there was, was organized on a county-by-county basis within the individual states, under the nominal but very weak command of each state’s adjutant General. Militia service was entirely voluntary except on the frontier, and even there service in the local militia was more a matter of succumbing to social pressure than anything else. Those who refused to serve, unless they had religious scruples against military service ( like the Quakers), were usually socially ostracized for their refusal.

Militia officers were elected, not appointed. While the state’s adjutant General was an appointee by the governor, and he was usually a political crony, every other officer, including each ‘county colonel’ who had nominal but not actual command over all militia companies organized within a county, was elected. For the most part, except on the frontier where militia officers were usually the most locally experienced Indian fighters, the closest acquaintance militia officers had with ‘military education’ was being force-fed CAESAR’S GALLIC WARS in the original Latin while in secondary school. The ability to memorize and quote Omnia Gallia en tres partes divisa est was hardly a qualification for military command.

The U.S. had, at the time, a very weak central government. The President had no power to ‘call up reserves’ or militia in wartime. He could only ask the governors of the various states to call up their militias and commit them to federal service. Each militia company had the right to decide for itself to go or not to go. Other than that, the President could only call for volunteers, and volunteers were considered militia, not regular army, and so had the right to elect their own officers.

As one regular officer put it, “They never fail to elect the most incompetent buffoon in the regiment as commander.”

As is obvious, when you examine the relative military and political strengths of the two nations in 1846, ‘The Colossus of the North’ is pure myth. The United States had far more to fear from Mexico’s million-plus-man standing army and reserve, and Santa Ana’s ambitions as the self-proclaimed ‘Napoleon of the West’, than Mexico did from the U.S.’s puny 6,500-man standing army with no reserve force….Manifest Destiny mouthings or not.

All right….so what happened?

The great prize in the Mexican War was the west coast of North America. In particular, the Mexican province of Alta California which is now the U.S. state of California. That which was between the ‘settled east’ and California was called ‘The Great American Desert’ and was considered of no real value except in affording access to the Pacific Coast.

Mexico was going to lose California to somebody. That was a foregone conclusion. The only question was, who would get it?

The primary international candidate for possession of California was Great Britain. Britain had west coast bases in Canada and what are now Washington State, and a tenuous territorial claim dating from Sir Francis Drake’s 16th Century landing in the vicinity of Monterey Bay during which he claimed the area in the name of Elizabeth I. Russia, which had a fair military presence in Russian America (now Alaska), and trading posts as far south as California’s Monterey Bay, was a second major candidate. France, which had a military and naval presence in the Pacific and was actively looking to reestablish itself as a colonial power in the Americas, was the third major candidate.

Secondary players were Spain, Prussia, and an indigenous independence movement in California itself. By 1846 Spain, which had lost most of its American empire, only had left in the Americas Cuba, Puerto Rico, and some smaller islands, wanted to reestablish itself as a North American colonial power. Prussia, which had come to dominate the fractious German principalities, was looking to establish its own overseas empire. The indigenous independence movement was strong in California and growing stronger by the day.

In a very distant third place, in everybody’s reckoning, was that silly little republic to the east of California. It didn’t even have a real army, let alone a government strong enough to prosecute a major war against a military power like Mexico.

Most of the smart money was on Britain. According to political thought in Europe, the U.S. could not possibly win a war against Mexico. It could, however, put up a fair fight for at least a while - possibly two or three years. The inevitable result, though, would be the loss to Mexico of at least Texas and probably Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri as well, which had formerly been Spanish territory. While Mexico was embroiled in a war with the U.S., Britain would send naval forces into the Pacific and move troops across Canada, stage them out of Fort Vancouver on the north bank of the Columbia River, and then simply move in and occupy California.

With the Mexican Army tied up in the war in the east resistance would be, at best, minor. When the war with the U.S. ended, Britain would present Mexico with the option of accepting the status quo or taking on a new war with the world’s most powerful navy, and Mexico had no real navy. Its navy was almost entirely made up of mercenaries and a great many of those mercenaries were British.

The sudden, and entirely unexpected, U.S. victory took not merely Mexico but Britain and the entire European world by surprise. Before Britain could react, the U.S. had not only occupied and annexed California, but what are now New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah.

The U.S. had one great strength no one counted on. Volunteers!

Those volunteers, elected officers and all, proved to be far better and more efficient solders than anyone, including the regular U.S. Army, ever guessed they would be. The regular U.S. Army, in the admission of the general commanding on the field (none other than Ol’ Rough an’ Ready Zachary Taylor himself) lost the battle of Buena Vista, which was the decisive U.S. victory in northern Mexico. One of the soldiers approached Taylor on the field and said “Sir, the battle is lost.” Taylor replied, “I know that, sir, and you know that. The volunteers, however, do not know that. Let us see what they can do.”

The much-aligned volunteers won the battle for the U.S., dealing Mexico a serious blow in the north. At about the same time, General Winfield Scott’s forces, which had landed at Vera Cruz, broke through and occupied Mexico City.

With his largest army defeated and demoralized in the north, and his capitol city in enemy hands, Santa Ana capitulated.

The War with Mexico took less than a full calendar year and the U.S. found itself a continent-wide nation.

In spite of all the ‘Manifest Destiny’ mouthings, the U.S. was entirely unprepared to be a continent-wide nation and really had no idea what to do with the half-a-continent it had gained.

Mexico’s overwhelming and totally unexpected defeat, coupled with the humiliating occupation of Mexico City by U.S. forces, was actually one of the best things that ever happened to Mexico in spite of the loss of all its northern territory. It severely damaged the prestige and power of Santa Anna, and he was never again able to exercise the total power he possessed prior to the Mexican War, ‘though he remained the single most powerful political figure in the country.

When, as President of Mexico in 1854, he sold (did not lose, but sold) part of ‘Mother Mexico’ (what is today the southwest corner of New Mexico and the southeast corner of Arizona, known historically as ‘The Gadsden Purchase’) to the United States. Incidentally, he pocketed the proceeds after being driven from power and into luxurious exile in New York.

There, he was a real estate speculator (among other things) and, in partnership with a confectioner named Beeman, the one who introduced the South American delicacy knows as chicle to the U.S. Beeman added sugar to it and called it ‘chewing gum.’

The ensuing power vacuum and interregional power struggle in Mexico paved the way for Napoleon III’s Mexican adventure less than a decade later.

33 posted on 05/04/2005 5:25:11 PM PDT by libertylass
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To: Liberty Valance
Alamogordo

They are getting close, collecting taxes on the streets leading into the El Paso Airport.

53 posted on 05/04/2005 9:10:54 PM PDT by Mike Darancette (Mesocons for Rice '08)
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