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You sound just like another disruptor and since you're new here I have to wonder if you have two screen names. LOL

Shakir information comes down on both sides of the argument. But there's no taking away from the fact that Shakir is Iraqi. Whether he's fedayeen is the only argument. Regardless, an Iraqi was present during at least on 9/11 planning meeting.

Care to explain that away? Care to explain a few hundred other links away? Be my guest. You can't.

That an Iraqi was present during some meeting is not in any way proof of Baghdad's involvement. 15 of the 9/11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, others from the UAE, Egypt and Lebanon. Yet none of those countries' governments were held responsible, for good reasons.

And nice of you to cherry pick among those links but there this as well for a more complete picture:

Al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the government of Iraq.

According to the 9/11 Commission report, quoting from an email from Clarke to former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger on November 4, 1998:

This passage led Clarke, who for years had read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons, to speculate to Berger that a large Iraqi presence at chemical facilities in Khartoum was "probably the direct result of the Iraq-al Qida (sic) agreement". Clarke added that VX precursor traces found near al Shifa were the "exact formula used by Iraq."

KEAN: We gave weight to the testimony. And it's the same belief that President Clinton had, the same belief that Sandy Berger has. But there are a whole bunch of people on the other side who dispute that finding, who say there is no independent collaborative evidence that those chemicals were there.

And this is a debate that goes on. We were not able to come to a conclusion on that debate. We could say that there is no evidence that we found--independent evidence--that those chemicals were there. But I can tell you that the belief of people we all respect, from the president of the United States, President Clinton, down through Sandy Berger and down through Cohen, believe very, very strongly that they were right to target factory and in fact it was what they thought it was.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/357lnryy.asp?pg=2

That part that Iraq and al Qaeda reached an understanding of non-aggression and that they would collaborate on weapons development is based on a US Attorney's Office for the Southern District of NY indictment, and while it led Clarke to speculate, this language was dropped however with a superseding indictment the same year. (Commsssion Report p.128)

The passage in the Report reads:
"Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda-save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against "Crusaders" during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract them into his Islamic army.53

To protect his own ties with Iraq, Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad's control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin's help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy.54" (Report p.61)

OK, "reportedly" and "there are indications that" Saddam tolerated Bin Laden stopping actions against him. That's it? Doesn't sound very illegal to me.

Interesting question though: who "reported", and what are those "indications"? The Report doesn't say, but why do I have the strong feeling those reports were coming from the same source that led us to believe there were WMD all over Iraq: Chalabi's INC, and ultimately foreign secret services? Bingo, the pre-War Intelligence report says just that:

"Contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida were an important factor in determining whether Iraq would have cooperated, assisted, or directed al-Qaida in any terrorist operation against U.S. interests. However, the intelligence reporting used to create the finished papers often came from foreign government services whose reliability was questioned by the CIA. For instance, some of the contacts between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida were reported to the CIA by foreign government services or XXXXXXXX groups opposed to the Iraqi government. The raw intelligence reporting from the CIA detailed the questionable nature of reporting by countries or groups that clearly opposed the Iraqi regime. (p.326)

According to that Report those CIA sources with questionable reliability were: the INC, Italian newspapers, and the Italian secret service. Oh boy.

And if you're going to quote from the section that the 9/11 Commission got wrong, why didn't you quote from this one? Oh, that's right. It doesn't support your seemingly ignorant position that there was no relationship.

Then there is the interesting case of Ahmad Hikmat Shakir — an Iraqi VIP facilitator who worked at the international airport in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Citing "a foreign government service," page 340 of the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on pre-Iraq-War intelligence indicates that, "Shakir claimed he got this job through Ra'ad al-Mudaris, an Iraqi Embassy employee" in Malaysia.

Let's see what else page 340 of that report is saying (the parts that aren't blacked out at least):

CIA judged in "Iraqi Support for Terrorism", however, that al-Mudaris’ XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX that the circumstances surrounding the hiring of Shakir for this position did not suggest it was done on behalf of the IIS.
The CIA’S reluctance to draw a conclusion with regard to Shakir was reasonable based on the limited intelligence available and the analysts’ familiarity with the IIS.

So neither the CIA nor the pre-war Intellignece Committee were drawing conclusions? So shouldn't Deroy Murdock then, me thinks.

On January 5, 2000, Shakir greeted Khalid al Midhar and Nawaz al Hamzi at Kuala Lampur’s airport. He then escorted them to a local hotel where these September 11 hijackers met with 9/11 conspirators Ramzi bin al Shibh and Tawfiz al Atash. Five days later, according to The Weekly Standard’s Stephen Hayes, Shakir disappeared.

Shakir, the Iraqi airport greeter, was arrested in Qatar on September 17, 2001. On his person and in his apartment, authorities discovered documents connecting him to the 1993 WTC bomb plot and “Operation Bojinka,” al-Qaeda’s 1995 plan to blow up 12 jets simultaneously over the Pacific.
Interestingly enough, as a May 27, 2004 Wall Street Journal editorial reported, Ahmed Hikmat Shakir's name appears on three different rosters of the late Uday Hussein's prestigious paramilitary group, the Saddam Fedayeen. A government source told the Journal that the papers identify Shakir as a lieutenant colonel in the Saddam Fedayeen.

As I already pointed out the Fedayeen Shakir is a different Shakir. The 9/11 Commission Report is right.

Below is a rare photograph of Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani. He was Consul and Second Secretary at Iraq's Czech embassy between March 1999 and April 22, 2001. He long has been suspected of meeting with September 11 ringleader Mohamed Atta, most likely on April 8, 2001. Perhaps at other times, too. While skeptics dismiss this encounter, Czech intelligence found Al-Ani's appointment calendar in Iraq's Prague embassy, presumably after Saddam Hussein's defeat. Al-Ani's diary lists an April 8, 2001, meeting with "Hamburg student." Maybe, in a massive coincidence, Al-Ani dined with a young scholar and chatted about Hegel and Nietzsche.
http://freerepublic.com/focus/news/1254304/posts?page=1

Irrelevant what some diary lists for April 8. Atta traveled to Prague on June 2 by bus from Germany and then flew from Prague to Newark the next day. See 9/11 report p.224.

For your convenience I'm quoting a whole section (p.228):

Atta's Alleged Trip to Prague
Mohamed Atta is known to have been in Prague on two occasions: in December 1994, when he stayed one night at a transit hotel, and in June 2000, when he was en route to the United States. On the latter occasion, he arrived by bus from Germany, on June 2, and departed for Newark the following day.69

The allegation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001 originates from the reporting of a single source of the Czech intelligence service. Shortly after 9/11, the source reported having seen Atta meet with Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, an Iraqi diplomat, at the Iraqi Embassy in Prague on April 9, 2001, at 11:00 A.M. This information was passed to CIA headquarters.

The U.S. legal attaché ("Legat") in Prague, the representative of the FBI, met with the Czech service's source. After the meeting, the assessment of the Legat and the Czech officers present was that they were 70 percent sure that the source was sincere and believed his own story of the meeting. Subsequently, the Czech intelligence service publicly stated that there was a 70 percent probability that the meeting between Atta and Ani had taken place. The Czech Interior Minister also made several statements to the press about his belief that the meeting had occurred, and the story was widely reported.

The FBI has gathered evidence indicating that Atta was in Virginia Beach on April 4 (as evidenced by a bank surveillance camera photo), and in Coral Springs, Florida on April 11, where he and Shehhi leased an apartment. On April 6, 9, 10, and 11, Atta's cellular telephone was used numerous times to call various lodging establishments in Florida from cell sites within Florida. We cannot confirm that he placed those calls. But there are no U.S. records indicating that Atta departed the country during this period. Czech officials have reviewed their flight and border records as well for any indication that Atta was in the Czech Republic in April 2001, including records of anyone crossing the border who even looked Arab. They have also reviewed pictures from the area near the Iraqi embassy and have not discovered photos of anyone who looked like Atta. No evidence has been found that Atta was in the Czech Republic in April 2001.

According to the Czech government, Ani, the Iraqi officer alleged to have met with Atta, was about 70 miles away from Prague on April 8-9 and did not return until the afternoon of the ninth, while the source was firm that the sighting occurred at 11:00 A.M. When questioned about the reported April 2001 meeting, Ani-now in custody-has denied ever meeting or having any contact with Atta. Ani says that shortly after 9/11, he became concerned that press stories about the alleged meeting might hurt his career. Hoping to clear his name, Ani asked his superiors to approach the Czech government about refuting the allegation. He also denies knowing of any other Iraqi official having contact with Atta.

These findings cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that Atta was in Prague on April 9, 2001. He could have used an alias to travel and a passport under that alias, but this would be an exception to his practice of using his true name while traveling (as he did in January and would in July when he took his next overseas trip). The FBI and CIA have uncovered no evidence that Atta held any fraudulent passports.

KSM and Binalshibh both deny that an Atta-Ani meeting occurred. There was no reason for such a meeting, especially considering the risk it would pose to the operation. By April 2001, all four pilots had completed most of their training, and the muscle hijackers were about to begin entering the United States.

The available evidence does not support the original Czech report of an Atta-Ani meeting.70

Do you understand? There is basicaly not the slightest chance Atta was in Prague on April 8th. The Iraqi ambassador is now in US custody, you can bet he got agressively questioned. He denies, like everyone else in custody.

Conclusion: there's still no credible evidence for a "relationship" al-Qaeda-Saddam, other than Saddam and Osama being in a state of cold war. Just lots of grasping at straws.