Posted on 01/23/2005 6:14:51 PM PST by Retain Mike
The Media
Well, I suppose we'd have a challenge if they existed.
I thought the same thing
I'm sorry, but I see this as so much balderdash. We elected to back off in April of last year. That wasn't a defeat.
We went back in during the winter and destroyed the enemy. That was clearly a victory.
This isn't to say that more battles will definately not be fought there. It is to saw we took one pass and kicked ass later on. Only God knows the future, but this is one American who can recognize a victory when he sees one.
The battle in late 2004 in Fallujah was a route for our side.
I wish folks would quit graying out the victories, and playing up the terrorist myths.
Well, so far we're 2-for-2 against the regionally-feared once mighty Iraqi army, that even Iran couldn't defeat for 8 years. Is there something worse in the region? I doubt it, even if we've armed and trained it.
Actually, this is from the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, the professional journal of the Navy and Marine Corps.
It raises valid points regarding the conflict between victory, restricted rules of warfare and the desire to keep both American and Iraqi civilian casualties to a minimum.
The answer may be that the American Art of War is not yet at the point where you can achieve victory with the unrealistically low casualty rates that are now strived for.
In World War II, the answer to the tactical problem of securing a strongly defended town was to pound it into rubble and let the civilian blood and guts fly and fall where they may.
Ultimate victory in Iraq may require that the dirty work be left to the Shiites and Kurds who will have a choice of wiping out the Sunni thugs by whatever means gets the job done or face a return to their former state of slavery.
...995 of Americans have never even seen these publications, and if the did, 90% wouldn't understand or comprehend the articles.
995 is just a smidgeon shy of a 1,000.
Or it could be 99% that spell check doesn't catch.;}
Which is not to say they are above reproach; this example does not strike me as being tremendously insightful.
Excellent article, Mike. Keiler rightly observes that many tactical victories translate into strategic defeats, because of the failure to follow through with or exploit tactical success. I was disappointed when we backed away from Fallujah last April and allowed the enemy to claim a victory from his defeat. But I am equally proud of the way we finished the job there -- and trust that such bold and decisive action is back to stay.
In fact, the only way the terrorists can adapt to such unmitigated defeats, is to dial down the op tempo dramatically, to keep their own losses within sustainable bounds. They aim at an attack a day for the sake of headlines, without any ability to secure military objectives of any kind. The only reason they do this, is they can't remotely afford to trade 20 hardened supporters for one US soldier.
I understand that US military professionals dislike contemplating the actual cost of US strategic objectives in such terms. But that is the blank reality of it. You can secure the upper hand operationally with clean razzle dazzle and tech. But to defeat the enemy's will you have to kill his fighters, as many of them want it. And that means paying in blood yourself, as long as they do, and more.
The military is doing its job if it gets cost of that exchange into double digits, which it is clearly accomplishing in Iraq. The military cannot perform the political system's job, of mobilizing the will to enforce national policy even when it costs blood. There is no bloodless enforcement of national policy - that is a delusion.
Tactically, the use of firepower could have been greater. But the men did the job with what they were given, rapidly, and with quite limited loss of US lives - and (to their much smaller resources) collosal losses to the enemy. Counting that as any sort of defeat is a perfectionist hallucination.
Perhaps if you were more familiar with the IDF operations in Beirut and Jenin, you would appreciate the author's insight into the applicability of IDF urban tactics to our experience in Iraq.
The author notes the limited scope of IDF objectives in its urban warfare doctrines -- which limited results always leave the enemy intact. The author correctly notes that in both Beirut and Jenin, IDF tactical victories -- because they were limited -- were interpreted as strategic defeats by the IDF's beaten but unvanquished enemies. The applicability to Fallujah in April 2004 is clear, since the insurgents remained alive and in ownership of the city after the Marines withdrew.
In full recognition that April's tactical victory ended as a strategic defeat, Marine leaders launched the second battle for Fallujah with an entirely different objective -- the complete destruction of the enemy and full occupation of the city. And it did so with little more than one-third of the combat power called for by established doctrine -- a daring feat. The author is correct to note that the enemy was a ragtag band, and to speculate that a more powerful force would be required to complete a similar operation in the future against an enemy force of trained regulars. We are known for planning ahead, you know.
Sorry you found the article lacking, but this old Marine infantry officer found it quite informative. We have taken the best of the IDF's successful urban tactics and refined them to meet our different objectives. Semper Fidelis...
The article addressed Fallujah, and I addressed Fallujah.
I am aware of what has taken place in Asia. I'm not happy about it.
Our options are to provide as much help to the victims as we can and leave, or land massive forces there and start a new front.
I believe it would be wiser at this time to forgoe opening up a new front in southern Asia.
We should provide as much direct help to people as we can, and regulate the disbursement of cash to the region in a manor that would prevent as much of the funds as possible, from reaching subversive elements.
I'd apply this to public AND private funds. Relief agencies would just have to buck up and accept the interference. I would never have turned a dime over to the U.N. to disburse. That goes for tangible supplies as well.
First, you’re comparing the population of the US to the number in the "army" of our enemy. Second, it reminds me of a something Ho Chi Minh said, “"You can kill 10 of my men for every one I kill of yours, yet even at those odds, you will lose and I will win."”
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