Though I also disagree with Mr. Rumsfeld on some logistics matters, he is, in my view, of the same calibre of person as was George Marshall.
One of the differences between George Marshall and Don Rumsfeld, is that Marshall meant to build up our military strength and thus our capabilities, while Rumsfeld means to do things on the cheap, with McNamara-like efficiency tables, that has reduced capabilities, despite the appearance of high-tech adventures.
Marshall understood how much, we needed more of a logistics buildup, and he picked people to be in command, even before our direct involvement against the Japanese and Germans, who had experience with such buildups: Andrews, Eaker, Arnold, Eisenhower ...
They understood, that there would be, not only human loss, but loss of supplies and mishaps, by the several thousand tons, and several hundred ships and thousands of planes and tens of thousands of vehicles.
Rumsfeld is extra-sensitive to waste, because idle supplies are defined by the leftists as waste.
For the last three decades, the liberal media have lampooned the Pentagon for waste. Rumsfeld has tried and succeeded at keeping that "ball - and - chain" from wrapping around the general war plan in Iraq.
Yet, that has caused much more parsimonious decision-making that has hurt us, by ordering up several thinly supported missions, that have resulted in losses, both men and logistics, again, caused by not having enough backup support.
Shortages in World War II, were often because we did not have items in supply, despite an all-out effort. Shortages in this war in Iraq, are often because the supply has been restricted, by orders from the top.
If General Marshall had found that contracts had not been let, to make armored cars, he would have promptly replaced, despite his personal calibre, a Major Rumsfeld.
Still, Mr. Rumsfeld should stay, because, though he can be stubborn and resistant, he is more capable of learning what needs to be done, than many other possible replacements, even the few on the short list.
President Roosevelt needed General Marshall, to do the work that Roosevelt understood, needed to be done, but Roosevelt also understood, that he, Roosevelt, did not know much about, in the details.
We needed a producer and operator, and that is who we had.
Now, with Rumsfeld, we have an operator who is short on the producing side; but that, is much of the Bush Admnistration's doing.
They should correct it. We need many more aircraft, C-17's and small observation. The former to handle the loads, and to replace possible losses, and the latter to increase the observation and thus survivability of ground troops.
We are seriously short on both types of aircraft in the system.
We need to be able to move wide and fast, but the politicians in the Bush Administration have been sitting on the problem, because they are afraid for their own political hides.
That is a problem of the President. His job to run political interference.
They're having difficulty shedding a "lean and mean" philosophy that has been mistakenly been transferred to the supply (and production) side of lean and mean ops.
Lean and mean operations do not mean, that you can get by with less in the logistics train, especially in a high tech environment that requires ever more logistics support.
Mr. Rumsfeld should get a medal for proving a theory of just-in-time supported combat operations, can be ordered up and succeed; but, then, put the medal on the shelf and call up the aircraft plants and get with the program. Because we need holding and staying power, and also, we need more than a scheduled series of shotgun blasts.
We need sustainance.
George Marshall understood that very well. We need backup in the supply chain, with which to make a new branch, for unexpected needs.
That particular requirement, was the reason why Andrews, Eaker, Arnold, and Eisenhower were picked by George Marshall.
Eash man, during peacetime, had demonstrated the ability to expand the logistics to meet unexpected needs.
For Eaker, the responsibility of taking a peacetime Army Air Force and suddenly expand it and jump it over the ocean, so that upon its arrival in Europe and in Africa, it had expanded even while enroute, to become major air groups and air depots ... he had shown during exercises in the United States and elsewhere, before the war.
Yet, during the war, their came along various math wizards who helped to make the supply system more efficient.
Now, because of such scientific arrangments, we know more of what is where and why and where it's headed.
Yet the pipelines, though more scientific in efficiency of their flow, are under pressure by politicians to be made of smaller diameter.
That, in a peephole, is the problem that has got to get wrung out of the thinking. It is restricting operations support executives.
Your post reminded me of Winston Churchill and his re-directing money to produce "tanks" (the name being chosen to hid what he was really building).
You nail alot of points. But the experience in occupied Europe do not translate into occupied Iraq and Afghanistan.
This is smelling like an imperialstic invasion not a war for the right things. This is a corporate carve-up. ( and all you guys who dine on dividends and stock gains can shoot me down )