To a Platonist, "separable form" is an inherently self-contradictory term
Exactly what Aristotle says: "It's impossible for the ousia to be separate from the ousia. For how could the formal ousia be separate from the ousia of things?" (Metaphysics 991b.1) Self-contradictory then, to both the Aristotelian and Platonist.
Aristotle knows that this problem doesn't disappear with the removal of Plato's forms. He considers form in thought as separate and that without fallacy. So, the idea of transcendence must be qualified. That is, the problem persists because as soon as any thinker posits transcendence, that thinker is still committed to show how it is related. I won't play Voegelin's Aristotle and eliminate that distance altogether with a reduction. At the other extreme of a reductive collapse is the complete alienation from what is transcendent.
Your "digression" into abiogenesis has triggered a storm of words (something unusual about it) that has pointed out the need for understanding at what point something can be considered transcendent.
At a more appropriate time I'd like to return to this aspect of monism and dualism--all to work up to the important distinction between created and uncreated existence.
Again, thanks for your reply.
When will there be a more appropriate time, cornelis? I'd very much like to have your thoughts on the issues of monism/dualism, of created and uncreated existence. This would actually return us back to the main theme of this thread. Please do post here, if you feel like writing.