Interesting analogy, the shells and all. I still can't tell what anyone is talking about, amortized cost, unit cost at sell or life cycle cost. I can't tell what the descriminants are - how I would chose among alternatives.
Your story about the racing shells brings up another important consideration. There is a famous story of an Israeli general in the early 1970's who was being shown a new American tank cannon site. The site was expensive and required a great deal of field maintenance. He was asked if the Israeli Army would find it was worth the expense and trouble. His answer was telling.
If the site significantly improved the probability of achieving a first round kill, the Israeli Army would find a way to acquire and field it, if it merely reduced the first round miss distance, it was worthless. Israeli tank gunners generally hit their targets on the second round, so if all the new site did was improve miss distance it was worthless.
What the general did was identify a performance threshold - incremental improvements in performance are nice, but only worth the cost if they provide a decisive edge in combat. Your shell was something like that. A Sears-Roebuck aluminum canoe might have looked a lot like a racing shell, but the extra money spent produced a decisive edge in competition.
Bobby Riggs won a lot of proposition bets by challenging opponents to a contest in which he would use a broom instead of tennis racket. Skill counts, too. American forces are generally better trained and displined than their adversaries and the difference is telling.
1981
When development of the F-22 began in 1981, the Air Force intended to purchase 648 aircraft at an estimated total program cost of $99.1 billion -- making it the most expensive weapons system in history. The program began to meet what was perceived as a growing threat of Soviet air power and to replace the F-15 fighter.
1991
The Air Force announces the F-22 as the winner in the next generation fighter contest.
Two contracts totaling $10.91 billion ($9.55 billion for the airframe and $1.36 billion for engines) were awarded for [the F-22 and F-119]
1993
In 1993, the Air Force planned to purchase 648 F-22s at a per plane cost of $84 million in 1995 dollars.
In 1993, the Department of Defense identified seven countries -- China, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea and Cuba -- that pose potential threats to the United States. Estimates vary as to the quantity and quality of these countries' respective air forces. The General Accounting Office estimated that these potential adversaries, with the exception of China, possess air forces ranging from a low of 188 to a high 460 aircraft.
1994
In 1994, procurement was reduced to 442 aircraft, with an estimated cost of $73.5 billion in fiscal year 1995 dollars. This raised the per plane cost to $91 million.
As of December 31, 1994, $11.9 billion had been spent on the F-22 program.
1995
The Congressional Budget Office report entitled "Reducing the Deficit" concluded in February 1995 that cancellation of the F-22 program would result in a five-year savings of $14.5 billion dollars.
1996
The anticipated total program cost of the F-22 is $73.5 billion for 442 aircraft.
1998
The Air Force plans to procure 438 production F-22s, and production is scheduled to run through 2013.
The site has only sparse info after 1999, but it should give you a general idea of what's going on. You can extrapolate for current procurement plans.