[Wallace T.]

The North gained great strategic advantage in 1861 when it captured West Virginia, kept Maryland in the Union by force, overcame the pro-Confederate governor of Missouri, and pushed Kentucky into neutrality and later into the Union camp. The very emphasis on states' rights that the Southerners treasured was part of their downfall. By deciding to fight a defensive war, Jefferson Davis and his cabinet permitted the Union to seize the initiative in the Border States. Remember that in the early months of the war, many citizens and politicians in the "lower" North, from central and southern Illinois to New Jersey and New York City, favored a peaceful parting of the Southern states. Even some abolitionists were not opposed to the independence of the South.

Leaders more aggressive than Lee and Jackson were in the beginning of the Civil War would have taken the war into Pennsylvania and Ohio in 1861 and 1862 and forced the Union to relinquish its claims to the Southern states.

[Tallguy]

Leaders more aggressive than Lee and Jackson were in the beginning of the Civil War would have taken the war into Pennsylvania and Ohio in 1861 and 1862 and forced the Union to relinquish its claims to the Southern states.

I don't see how this could have happened. The First Battle of Bull Run showed that both armies were not ready for prime time. Deep offensive thrusts were beyond their abilities. Neither side had, as yet, as significant riverine force of steam gunboats to support extended operations in 1861. By 1862 the Confederacy could not marshal sufficient forces to hold the line against widely separated attacks in the western theater. If we assume that the border states had 'gone with the Confederacy' then the military predicament would have been even worse.

[SunkenCiv]

"Leaders more aggressive than Lee and Jackson were in the beginning of the Civil War would have taken the war into Pennsylvania and Ohio in 1861 and 1862 and forced the Union to relinquish its claims to the Southern states."

Antietam was in 1862, and that approach was Jackson's and Lee's. Politically, I don't think there was much support in the CSA for an invasion. It wasn't until the fall of New Orleans that the prospect for invasion and defeat for secession started to change the politics of it.

I agree with you, that the only shot the CSA had was in making military victory for the Army of the Potomac (or even being able to hold on to D.C.) look difficult to impossible, in order to undermine northern support for the war, and lead to an armistice and separation. That had to take place early on. Even a different outcome at Gettysburg may have been too late -- or, like Antietam, would have been too costly for the ANV to follow up.

Mobility was pretty good in the Civil War, and sending back the wounded while pressing on after Gettysburg would have been practical, but only if the AofP had been mauled and in full flight (a la 1st Bull Run). Of course, Vicksburg would still have fallen, so changing northern political support would have been the only long term objective of pressing on. England was building ships for the Confederacy, but neither France or the UK would have entered the war (on either side).

Meade didn't pursue the offensive (a hypothetical Day Four) as he probably should have, but the AofP had suffered plenty of casualties, even considering a larger initial force. Had there been a way to close the back door, Lee's forces might have been attacked, forced into flight westward, trapped, and annihilated, thus perhaps ending the war in 1863.

Or, perhaps Sherman's march would still have been necessary.