As I said, ask a WEST POINT GRADUATE.
As for Pickett's Charge, that was a sound plan. Lee had been repulsed on both flanks of the Union Line. Strategy assumed the Federal Line would be weakest at the center.
The charge wasn't executed properly by Longstreet.
For starters, that's a tactical decision, not a strategic decision. Strategy is the decision to invade the North, which approach to take to Washington, etc. But once the armies were engaged at Gettysburg, you're talking tactics, not strategy.
And your point is incorrect anyway. For Lee to have assumed that Meade did not reposition any of his forces during the night and ensuing morning was reckless. Particularly since the union rear areas through which the reserves would move was not within Lee's observation.
Meade had the tremendous advantage of interior lines, as well as excellent observation of the Confederate troops once they left the treeline. That made it much easier for him to reposition his reserves or to shift troops as needed to meet Lee's frontal assault.
Even if the attack had been pressed home more quickly, and even if Longstreet had provided better flank protection, there were too few men involved to 1) deal a hammer blow to the middle, 2) guard the flanks of the attacking divisions, and 3) resist the inevitable counterattacks by Union reserves. Given the number of troops committed and the tactical advantages held by the Union, the Charge was a dumb, desperate move. Too few men attacking too many, with the defenders having the advantage of terrain and reserves.
Lee's best chance to win that battle was on the second day. Early in the day, he should have sent a division or two from Longstreet's corp in a deep envelopment around the Round Tops. Had he done that, then hit Sickles' exposed Corps later in the day and pressed on as he did to LRT, the flanking Rebel division would have collapsed the entire left flank of the union line.