"...And for all the heightened security fears in recent months, the FBI has yet to uncover any evidence of a particular Al Qaeda plot inside the United States, much less being able to identify any "sleeper cells" or operatives who might be in a position to carry them out.
Still, officials say, the "totality" of the threat environment seems troubling.
Thanks for posting this DLN.
You are very welcome, Steve.
An IH poster posted this article a few days ago:
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Warning on ease of making N-arms
Patrick Walters, National security editor
08nov04
THE US and other nuclear powers had exaggerated the difficulty of building nuclear weapons and urgent steps must be taken to prevent terrorist groups getting hold of highly enriched uranium, a leading US nuclear security expert has warned.
William Potter, from the Monterey Institute for International Affairs, says governments have failed to appreciate the changed nature of the nuclear threat.
Despite their public rhetoric, most government actions to monitor, deter, and counter nuclear proliferation continued to focus primarily on nation states as the key threat.
"One of the most damaging conceptual failures has been the tendency of US and Russian decision-makers to exaggerate the difficulty of fabricating crude nuclear weapons," Professor Potter said.
"Contributing to this tendency is the mistaken assumption that terrorists would seek to design a nuclear weapon to meet the same rigorous military specifications required by national governments."
Professor Potter will deliver a keynote address at the Asia-Pacific Nuclear Safeguards and Security conference to be opened by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in Sydney today.
Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is also scheduled to address the conference, which aims to build a regional consensus on ways to prevent the spread of nuclear terrorism.
Professor Potter said terrorists would almost certainly choose the most simple nuclear weapons design in which two spheres of highly enriched uranium (HEU) were slammed together.
"A terrorist organisation could probably build such a weapon if it had access to less than 50kg of HEU," he said. "A sophisticated delivery vehicle would not be required – a truck or cargo ship would suffice, and the weapon might even be assembled at the target sight."
He said a new non-proliferation strategy was needed in which securing, consolidating, and eliminating HEU is the most urgent task.
The guiding policy should be to move to a world in which "fewer countries retain HEU, fewer facilities within countries possess HEU, and fewer locations within facilities have HEU present."
Professor Potter said immediate actions to address the problem should include repatriation of Soviet and US-origin HEU at present under inadequate safeguards in many countries and acceleration of plans to convert research reactors currently running on HEU to run on low-enriched uranium, or alternatively, be shut down.
Mr Downer said he would discuss a range of nuclear issues, including Iran's nuclear program, with Dr ElBaradei.
"While the risk of nuclear and radiological terrorism is less than attack by conventional means, the awful consequences of nuclear terrorism make it imperative the global community take this emerging threat seriously," he said.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was under pressure following North Korea's announced withdrawal from the treaty and its determined pursuit of nuclear weapons, he said.
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,11317282%255E2702,00.html