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On a related topic, here is a choice rarity.

Have you ever wondered what points an experienced special ops strategist would make about the anthrax letters?

Here are some comments by the late Theodore G. Shackley, CIA covert operations specialist, counterinsurgency expert and low-intensity warfare strategist extraordinaire. They're from Still the Target, a book he wrote in the aftermath of 09-11-01, about how people can protect themselves against the risk of terrorism.

To tie this to the discussion, Shackley was very close to some of the Iran-Contra principals - Thomas Clines et cetera - and there are rumourly suspicions that Shackley had still some unrevealed rôle in Iran-contra.

In an early chapter of the book, Shackley analyses Pres Bush's actions against terrorism. He is positive about Bush's high-level strategy.

Here is a short passage. It's what Ted Shackley says about President Bush's handling of the problem of maintaining popular support for a long drawn-out war. This is the only place I found in the book where he mentions the anthrax letters.

Excerpt from Still the Target, by Theodore G. Shackley
With Khan's commentary after the excerpt

Sustaining Popular Support

President Bush and his administration, mindful of the lessons of Vietnam, decided early in the war to sustain popular support for their protracted war strategy. As a result, the President and his cabinet appeared regularly at scheduled events -- at news conferences, TV talk shows, visits to airports, federal agencies, and the Ground Zero sites in New York and Washington, in order to keep the nation informed on what was being done to fight the war.

The popular response to these efforts was overwhelmingly supportive. Sadly, however, a small anti-war movement developed, primarily under the guise of anti-globalization. The debate that this produced had to proceed, unpleasant though it may have been, for this is democracy at work.

A more significant blemish on the Bush performance chart developed from the anthrax issue. The handling of this matter can, at best, be described as inept. No one in government was prepared for what happened. The experts did not envision "someone" sending expertly processed anthrax spores through the mail. Nor did the scientific gurus anticipate that the spores would pop out of letters during post office processing and infect postal workers.

What is now clear is that the following five lessons have been learned from the nation's anthrax experience to date:

Medical scientists thought they knew anthrax. But they now say they overestimated the death rate for those infected and had no idea how many spores a person must inhale to develop the disease.
Procedures for communicating about unfolding events proved inadequate for reassurance of a frightened public.
Federal, state and local governments were unprepared for the close collaboration required in an investigation combining the medical and the criminal.
Laboratories were unexpectedly swamped with samples that had to be tested for anthrax spores.
In the special case of anthrax, there was a misunderstanding of the difference between the goals of terrorism and the goals of warfare. In short, warfare seeks to conquer territories and capture cities. The terrorist wants to hurt a few people and scare a lot of people in order to make a point.

The FBI, as of January 30, 2002, was taking the position that a single person is most likely responsible for the anthrax mailings that killed five people. This person has laboratory experience and probably has or has had legitimate access to dangerous germs. This conclusion is based on the fact that the perpetrator selected the highly virulent Ames strain of anthrax to use in the mailings. The FBI summarizes its position by saying, "The killer has the technical knowledge and/or expertise to produce a highly refined and deadly product."

Khan's Annotated Commentary on this passage by Theodore G. Shackley

In the commentary below, <<TGS>> is shorthand for << Theodore G. Shackley >>.

* TGS says, "The handling of this matter can, at best, be described as inept."

<< At best... inept >>? That means that it's probably worse than << inept >>. But what is worse than inept? Utterly confuzed? Downright negligent? Maybe even criminally responsible? What?

** TGS says, "The experts did not envision "someone" sending expertly processed anthrax spores through the mail."

Two remarques:

- Why did TGS put the word "someone" in scare quotes? The quotes look out of place. What do they mean? Is TGS with subtlety hinting that he has an idea who the someone is, that it's not really a mysterious "someone"?

- Nota bene - TGS acknowleges that the spores were << expertly processed >>. He does not mince words over that.

*** From TGS's lesson 5, one can infer that he views the anthrax mailings as part of some organised, purposeful terrorist action, not just something done by a single deranged person of pathology.

**** As a set-off or contrast, TGS states the FBI's view << that a single person is most likely responsible for the anthrax mailings....... >> Throughout this paragraph, he with care delineates the FBI's public position as distinct, and, I infer, different, from his own.

***** Why does TGS not mention the anthrax mailings in his chapter on biological and chemical weapons? If the mailings were important enough to mention in the early chapter where he sets the theme and the context, why does he completely ignore them when he discusses in detail the subject of terrorists' use of biological weapons?

****** Why does TGS choose to bring up the anthrax mailings only in the context of how to sustain public support for the war? It's the sole mention of the mailings. Why is the section on how to sustain public support for the war the particular spot in the book where TGS discusses the mailings?