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Curious that you did not cite the Tet offensive to illustrate reality over perception.

Even more curious is your apparent desire to prosecute the war in a manner that satisfies media perception.

Which do you feel is more important at this moment, reality or media's perception?

I cannot for a minute concede that the transparent attempts to paint this
Opera Boufle as a brilliant plan to lure the Iraqis into thinking that we have
Found their next George Washington because he will win Fallujah is anything remotely resembling rality.. Put your tin foil hat on because the explanation is that the Americans have already won but do not want to say so because they want the credit to go to this Baathist general and thus the transition to Irakization will be seamlessly assured.

If you join in this version of reality I can only suggest that you have leaped through the looking glass.

The reality is that Baathists in Fallujah have revolted againt coalition rule. A baathist general
Is selected to bring them to heel and sort out the good baathists from the bad baathists. Right.
I can just hear him now talking the administration to put him in charge, Please, what ever you
Do, Brer Bush, do not throw me into that Fallujah Briar Patch. What the hell do you think
The bad guys were fighting for? The Baathists are celebrating in the streets and the Marines are grumbling. Does that tell you anything? And you accuse me of dealing in illusion over reality?

I object to a feckless policy of vacillation which propery should be called Bluster and Bug out.

I present for your attention a view presented by Strafor. I guess I should have copywrited my posts so I could sue them for plagerism.

I would be interested in your reaction.

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STRATFOR: Geopolitical Diary: Tuesday, May 4, 2004
STRATFOR ^ | May 04, 2004 0603 GMT

Posted on 05/04/2004 12:11:30 AM EDT by Axion

As expected, attention today turned away from Al Fallujah and to An Najaf. Representatives of Iran-based Grand Ayatollah Kazem Hossein Haeri, regarded as Muqtada al-Sadr's mentor, were publicly revealed to be engaged in negotiating between al-Sadr and the United States. The report appeared in the Iran Daily, which means that it is what the Iranians want the world to know. That makes it doubly important. There was little doubt that Shia were attempting to mediate between al-Sadr and the Americans. This article makes it clear that the Iranian government wants to see the process go forward. Naturally, both sides sought to improve their bargaining position by increasing their visible ferocity. Thus, clashes -- including some mortar shelling -- were reported around An Najaf. But it is clear that neither side has the stomach for a fight.

If we look at the Al Fallujah model, the United States essentially turned to a general from the previous regime -- having sacked one who was unacceptable to the Shia -- and has turned the problem of the guerrillas over to him. He in turn has a force of mostly local men under him; they will avoid attacking the rebels, who will in turn avoid attacking the Iraqi force. The United States will pretend that the Iraqi force is under its control and that it is an effective force, while the Iraqis will do what is in their own best interest.

The fighting in Al Fallujah will decline. The United States will not have to lose any more troops, nor will it have to level the city to get at the guerrillas. The guerrillas will have to negotiate some sort of accommodation with the Iraqi forces and the elders of the city, which should not be too difficult. Effective control over Al Fallujah will pass to the Iraqis. U.S. forces, however, will provide a frame that contains all of this. We assume this frame includes limits on the ability of the guerrillas to use Al Fallujah as a base for operations against Americans.

The fundamental question will be whether the guerrillas -- or other Iraqis -- will respect this limitation and, if they don't, what the United States will do about it. Put differently, assuming that there is no massive split between Al Fallujah's population, the guerrillas and the new Iraqi security force -- something we are pretty confident is the case -- and a decision is made to launch attacks, will the United States then launch an attack against the security force it sponsored?

The United States is in the process of transferring effective power over Al Fallujah to the citizens of Al Fallujah, the guerrillas and the security force. This transfer is about a hundred times more real and more significant than any transfer of sovereignty on June 30. The problem is this: What understanding, if any, has been reached with the three elements in Al Fallujah? If we are to believe the Coalition Provisional Authority, then the only thing that has been agreed to is that the Iraqi security force will engage and destroy the guerrillas. We flat out don't believe that will happen, and we cannot imagine that the CPA thinks it will happen. That leaves two possibilities. Either the United States simply transferred power and hoped for the best, or a deeper political understanding was reached during the two weeks of negotiation in Al Fallujah, one that neither side wants to publicize right now.

The Al Fallujah model will clearly be used in An Najaf. U.S. forces will pull back. An indigenous force, commanded by someone acceptable to the Shiite leadership, will move into the city and will retain effective control over it. Al-Sadr will be dealt with by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, but that will depend on internal Shiite politics, not on any U.S. decision. In the end, the United States will have to craft a political agreement with the Shiite leadership concerning the details about An Najaf.

An Najaf is easier than Al Fallujah. Al-Sadr is not the Sunni guerrillas. There is a broad, well-organized Shiite leadership that has an interest in a relationship with the United States. Most of all, any agreements reached in An Najaf can be transferred to the rest of Shiite Iraq. The Shia already have a great degree of internal autonomy. They will get more.

Now, let's look at where things are heading. There has been a transfer of power in Al Fallujah and there will be a transfer of power in An Najaf. The June 30 transfer is increasingly meaningless, but the local transfers are increasingly meaningful. The United States is groping toward an interim solution in which local governance goes back to Iraqis -- even former Baathist generals or guerrillas -- who take responsibility for their towns and regions. The United States has a broad presence in Iraq, but little control. It carries out its mission in the region, is present in Iraq, but not really running things.

It could work, if the Sunnis decide to let it work. But when you add it up, it will mean the partition of Iraq into Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish regions on a piecemeal basis. That is something that is neither in Iran's interest nor in the interest of the Shia -- which means that this solution is not ultimately likely to work not only because of the Sunnis, but also because it violates Shiite requirements. It is a creative solution, but it doesn't get the United States out of the woods by any means.
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1 posted on 05/04/2004 12:11:30 AM EDT by Axion
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