June 10, 1997, Tuesday
CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
HEADLINE: TESTIMONY June 10, 1997MANSOOR IJAZ, CHAIRMAN CRESCENT INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LP
HOUSE JUDICIARY CRIME BANNING TRANSACTIONS WITH TERRORIST COUNTRIES
House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime
Hearing on H.R. 748 "Prohibition on Financial Transactions With Countries Supporting Terrorism Act"
Tuesday, June 10, 1997, 10:00am
Room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building
Testimony of Mansoor Ijaz
Chairman
Crescent Investment Management, LP
New York, New York 10017
Complete Written Testimony on H.R. 748
Thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Crime present here today for inviting me to submit views on how legislative body might consider avenues that constructively engage Islamic states which have demonstrated histories of supporting inappropriate activities, some of which must clearly be categorized as terrorism. In the process I advocate, we might find mechanisms that modify their behavior patterns in ways that contribute to protecting American national interests rather than pursuing outdated and ineffective policies of containment which have produced precious few results thus far. For the purposes of this discussion, I will limit my remarks to our bilateral relations with the Sudan, a country we have labeled as a chief sponsor of Islamic terrorism since the early 1990's.
I come before the subcommittee first and foremost as a born American equally concerned about the proliferation of terrorism and extremism, regardless of its ideological form, throughout the world today. As an adherent of the Islamic faith, I am even more concerned about the potentially debilitating consequences for American-Muslims from America's increasingly hostile and standardized policy response of economic sanctions and containment towards problem areas in the Islamic world. We must take great care to avoid demonizing adherents of a religion which is the fastest growing geopolitical force in the world today, a religion that is also the faith of over 7 million Americans who are contributing greatly to the social, economic and political fabric of the United States. We must take great care not to stigmatize the children of American-Muslims whose heritage is Pakistani, Afghani, Syrian, Sudanese, Algerian, Palestinian, Iranian or Iraqi because of the actions of a few whose motives arc born of hatred that has less to do with ideological differences than with their own internal failures and shortcomings.
Again and again, we have witnessed America's failure to cope with the many faces of Islam in the aftermath of the Cold War. Whether in Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Somalia, the Sudan and perhaps in the future even oil powers such as Saudi Arabia, America's inability to effectively deal with Islam's many dimensions represents one of the most serious vacuums in our ability to provide for our own national security. In fact, my appearance here today is demonstrable evidence that Americans of the Islamic faith can play an integral role in defining solutions which might reduce rather than increase tensions with those in the Islamic world we see as a threat to our national interests.
(snip)It should be noted here for the record that while I strongly support American efforts to isolate and contain the regimes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muhammar Gadafi in Libya, two cases that amply demonstrate why America's apprehension of Muslim leaders with the "God complex" (i.e., those who use Islam's monotheism for inappropriate political motives) is justified, we must find more creative ways that do not also punish the people of Iraq and Libya for their frailty and inability to rise up against these dictatorial forces.
The Sudan, however, represents a case where in our zealousness to contain Islamic fanaticism, and its by-product of terrorism, we may have overplayed our hand. We have failed to see the potential benefits from engaging Sudan's Islamists on. three different levels: first, the value of their efforts to modernize Islam; second, enlisting Sudan's Islamic movement to help us in our fight against global extremism, in particular where it 'relates to Islamic extremism and terrorism in countries vital to our geo-political interests; and third, the value of Sudan's relationships going forward with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeda, Afghanistan and other countries that are now and will be in the not-so-distant future vital to our economic interests,
(snip)One of the key areas of past controversy has been the activities of Sudan's External Intelligence Department. The unbridled flow of Afghan Arabs and other undesirable characters into and out of the Sudan took place in large measure under the guidance of the External Intelligence Department - until its director was replaced in the wholesale house-cleaning of senior government ministers and technocrats that took place last year. In fact, there is now high-level cooperation between the Sudan and many Islamic countries to stop, or at least properly track, the movements of a significant number of radical and revivalist Muslims.
(snip)
The Sudan case study smacks of America's worst qualities: arrogance, bullying, cynical misinterpretation and believing what we want to bear rather than looking at the hard facts. America has a choice, this legislative body has a choice; we can continue to sanction and ratchet up pressure on countries where we have little leverage and run the risk of demonizing Islam as a religion. In that case, we may have more to worry about with American-Muslims rising up to have their voices heard en-masse and creating an environment in which the funding for radical Islamic movements will occur right in our own backyard. Or we can try a more engaging approach that does not compromise our principles but seeks to draw out elements that genuinely want to contain radical Islam from within the revivalist Islamic movements of the world, Whether the Sudan represents such potential, or whether they are the engine of radical Islam, I am not qualified to judge. But I am convinced after a year'-long study of the situation that America can design a more creative policy approach if we have the political courage to break ,With the mentality of unilateral economic sanctions as the only deployable "stick".
We should engage Dr. Turabi to be our bridge to the radical fringe of Islam, to explain to them that we are not the demons they seek to portray us as - this would show American vision. We should send our FBI teams to Khartoum at their invitation to sift through and analyze the data on terrorism and then make objective recommendations to the Sudanese on how best to atone for the sins of the past - this would show American fairness. We should send Ambassador Bill Richardson to see SPLA opposition leader John Garang and persuade him that making peace aid sharing in the oil and, grain wealth of the country, something Khartoum would be willing to do if America. brought him to the table, would be far better than endlessly and purposelessly carrying on civil war - this would demonstrate America's power in the only way it should, creating peace and prosperity for those who have never known it.
Los Angeles Times
September 30, 1998
Metro; Part B; Page 7; Op Ed Desk
PERSPECTIVE ON TERRORISM;
OLIVE BRANCH IGNORED;
MANSOOR IJAZ
(snip)
One such effort at private citizen diplomacy resulted in a meaningful counterterrorism offer from Sudan's militant Islamic government to U.S. authorities in April 1997, an offer which, if acted on in a timely manner, could have prevented potential Sudanese chemical weapons malfeasance from taking root, checked U.S. military assets from being deployed without more credible evidence of wrongdoing and possibly reduced the threat we Americans now face from an even more angry Islamic radical fringe.
In April 1997, I hand carried the offer from President Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir, Sudan's military strongman, to Rep. Lee Hamilton of Indiana, ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee. In the letter, which is now part of the Congressional Record, Bashir stated, "We extend an offer to the FBl's counterterrorism units and any other official delegations . . . to come to the Sudan and work with our External Intelligence Department in order to assess the data in our possession and help us counter the forces your government and ours seek to contain."
The reasoning behind my approach to Bashir was simple: If Sudan was genuinely not harboring terrorists or fomenting radicalism after its decision in 1996 to expel Osama bin Laden, the alleged Saudi mastermind of the Tanzanian and Kenyan bombings, the only way to prove Khartoum's complicity or innocence was to invite America's premier institutions that fight global terrorism into the country to have an unobstructed look.
(snip)
The Sudanese were willing to explore rapprochement through me because of my sensitivities to Islam enveloped in a deeply rooted commitment to American ideals. Such sentiments were relayed to President Clinton in an August 1996 "olive branch" letter from Sudan's ideological leader, Hassan Turabi.
The counterterrorism offer was a factor in last October's decision by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to order U.S. diplomats back into Sudan after an 18-month hiatus based on security concerns--a decision that was reversed three days later when National Security Advisor Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger and Defense Secretary William Cohen presented evidence alleging Sudanese malfeasance in chemical warfare agents--evidence they have now admitted was inconclusive and circumstantial.
(snip)