National interest, not personal diplomacy-Menachem Begin and the peace treaty with Egypt.

Jerusalem Post ^ | 3-24-04 | GERALD M. STEINBERG

[SJackson]

Twenty-five years ago, the leaders of Israel and Egypt – Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat – signed a treaty that ended decades of warfare. The treaty and its implementation are far from perfect, but the framework of peace has been preserved despite differences between Cairo and Jerusalem.

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In the intervening decades, a great deal has been written about this singular accomplishment. Unfortunately, some of these accounts are misleading or based on myths. As a result, the "Camp David formula," to which former president Jimmy Carter attributes the success of the negotiations, is often seen as the key to a successful peace process. However, as both Israelis and Americans learned in July 2000, the direct and intense involvement of an American president is no guarantee of success.

Indeed, the desire of Begin and Sadat to attain what they perceived as their national interests were the keys to this agreement. In contrast, when Yasser Arafat opted to continue the Palestinian war against Israel, there was nothing that president Bill Clinton could do. The personal relationship between Begin and Sadat, which is the subject of many generally shallow analyses (including Carter's), was far less important than their objectives and substantive policies.

In contrast, although Carter's intense involvement helped overcome some obstacles, he was also responsible for the creation of many of the problems. The errors made by the inexperienced Carter and his team led Begin and Sadat to detour around Washington, accelerating the process that led to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. Later, when the Americans came back in to mediate and provide resources necessary to reach an agreement, Carter's problematic and often hostile relationship with Begin could well have led to complete failure.

Carter's often na ve approach was based on the assumption that by satisfying the demands of the Palestinians, the Arab-Israeli conflict would be resolved. Breaking with previous American policy, he was the first to speak about a Palestinian "homeland" and continued to press on this dimension throughout the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations.

Carter's inability to understand Begin was based, in part, on his simplistic transfer of the experience from the US civil rights struggle to the Middle East conflict and Palestinian suffering. Carter's general emphasis on human rights in foreign policy led him to stress what he defined as "the deprivation of Palestinian rights, which was contrary to the basic moral and ethical principles of both our countries."

Carrying the analogy further, Carter saw the key to peace in the form of civil rights for Palestinians, including "the right to assemble and to debate the issues that affected their lives..."

IN CONTRAST, Begin's image was totally reversed. He had dedicated his entire life, decades before he became prime minister, to bringing an end to Jewish suffering, and ensuring that the generations of discrimination, hatred, genocide, and now, Arab terror would not be allowed to prevail.

Begin was convinced that Carter, a man of deep religious conviction and moral passion, would quickly understand the vulnerability of the Jewish nation and the moral justice reflected in Israel's responses. For Begin, it was not Arab suffering that Carter should be addressing, but that of the Jewish people and Israel.

Begin fervently viewed demands for Palestinian self-determination and sovereignty under the leadership of the PLO as tantamount to creating the conditions for the destruction of Jewish sovereignty in Israel. As Begin tried to explain to Carter in their repeated and intense confrontations, that the conflict with the Arabs could not be compared to the civil rights movement, and the attempt to impose this framework was not only misleading but fundamentally immoral.

Begin passionately believed but failed to convince Carter that under these circumstances, personal autonomy was the best possible compromise. Instead, Carter continued to insist that Begin's arguments reflected a refusal to take the necessary steps for peace.

To his credit, in the desire to reach an agreement, Begin was able to overcome Carter's highly distorted image of the conflict, intense personal hostility, romantic images of Palestinian objectives, and secret (bungled) conspiracies between Carter and Sadat.

When Carter falsely accused Begin of having agreed and then reneged on an agreement regarding a settlement freeze that the Americans sought and failed to get on the last night of the Camp David talks, Begin maintained a cool and diplomatic attitude. He understood both the benefits of a peace treaty with Egypt, despite the high cost, and also the dangers of a public fight with the president of the United States.

Less than a year after the treaty was signed, Carter was soundly defeated by Ronald Reagan, but even then, Begin kept his counsel, and never lashed out or sought to even the score. Now, 25 years after these events took place, the time for Carter to recognize these mistakes is long overdue. Perpetuating the myths is not only unjust to Begin's memory, but, as the case of Clinton shows, leads other would-be peace-makers to fundamental mistakes.

The writer directs the program on conflict management and negotiation at Bar-Ilan University. His monograph on the myths of Egyptian-Israeli peace has been published by the Menachem Begin Heritage Center.

[SJackson]

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