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Probably so. From an excellent article I read many years ago by Claire Sterling, who was a big fan of Massood, it was evident that the two wild cards in the Afghan war were Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The CIA probably would have backed Massood, but the Pakistani security agencies insisted that we back Hekmatyar, a huge troublemaker. The Pakistanis in turn were heavily influenced by the Saudis, who were pouring in money to support the radicalization of Pakistan and the region.

The worst threat at the time, however, was the Soviet Union, with its long history of expansionism and its 20,000 nuclear warheads. We had little choice but to work with what we had.

Official Documents leading to Russian involvement in Afghanistan

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a13.htm

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives

Excerpted

On December 12, the Politburo met and formally ratified the proposal to intervene. Gromyko chaired the meeting, after having co-signed the proposal together with Ustinov and Andropov. Konstantin Chernenko wrote out, by hand, a short protocol accepting the proposal—entitled “Concerning the
Situation in ‘A’”—and had all Politburo members present sign their names diagonally across the text. Kosygin, who almost certainly would have opposed an intervention, was not present. Kirilenko signed after some hesitation. Brezhnev, who entered the room after the brief discussion was
finished, added his name, in quivering handwriting, at the bottom of the page.10

Two days later, the General Staff operative team, headed by Marshal Akhromeyev, was in place in Termez, Uzbekistan (USSR), near the Afghan border. A group from the operational team arrived at Bagram airforce base outside Kabul on December 18.

The main operation started at 3 pm sharp on Christmas Day: airborne troops from the 103rd and 105th air divisions landed in Kabul and in Shindand in western Afghanistan, and units from the 5th and 108th
motorized rifle divisions crossed the border at Kushka and at Termez. Just before nightfall on December 27, Soviet paratroopers, assisted by two KGB special units, attacked Amin’s residence at Duraleman Palace, and, after overcoming stiff resistance from the Palace Guards, summarily executed the president and several of his closest aides. It was—we were told in Lysebu by the men who devised it—a well-organized and successful operation, in which all the “strategic objectives” were reached on time.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a13.htm

New Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

Concerning the Situation in “A”: New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, by Odd Arne Westad

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives

>>The worst threat at the time, however, was the Soviet Union, with its long history of expansionism and its 20,000 nuclear warheads. We had little choice but to work with what we had.

The younger generation of Socialist Democrats in this country has no concept of that whatsoever.