Nuclear fallout for Pakistan
By Pervez Hoodbhoy
Many in Pakistan have rallied to defend the country's bomb-makers (needlessly and incorrectly called "scientists" although they are technologists and have not created any new science). This is even after abundant proof that they have freely spread nuclear weapons secrets and equipment around the globe.
Some vociferously argue that, by not having signed the NPT, the bomb-makers are blameless since they broke no law or treaty by sharing nuclear secrets with other parties. But this legalistic argument is weak, unconvincing, and insufficient to prevent serious damage to Pakistan.
For over 15 years Pakistan had repeatedly assured the world that it was a responsible nuclear power whose nuclear weapons were solely aimed at deterring nuclear India.
It rejected accusations of having proliferated nuclear weapon technologies. These angry denials coincided, as we now know, with the surreptitious activities of our bomb-makers.
In other words, we were all taken for a ride. The enormous credibility gap this creates will surely be a handicap for all leaders of Pakistan, present and future.
The transfers to North Korea are relatively prosaic. Having developed the bomb, Pakistan needed missiles to deliver them. North Korea was willing to supply them, for a price. Like the URENCO centrifuges, all Kahuta had to do was put them together and stick a star and crescent on them.
But the real problem is considerably more serious. For years, Pakistan's powerful Islamic parties have openly embraced the bomb, chanted slogans in praise, and even paraded cardboard replicas through the streets.
For them, it is more than just a means to defend Pakistan's national frontiers - it belongs to the entire Muslim ummah. In doing so, they borrowed from the prison notes of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the first person to have written of the need for an Islamic Bomb.
The notion of sharing the 'bomb' for ideological reasons has caused more alarm than the profit motive, as has been ascribed to explain the activities of Dr. A.Q. Khan and his cohorts.
From the inception of the bomb programme, the Pakistani establishment sought to turn its nuclear successes into larger gains. For one, it wanted - and gained - the support of hundreds of millions of the Muslims the world over by claiming to provide a Muslim "success story" (that this involved replicating a sixty-year-old technology for mass destruction is a sad commentary on the state of the Muslim world).
For another, it enabled Pakistan to enjoy considerable financial and political benefits from oil-rich Arab countries. Among others, Libya reportedly bankrolled Pakistan and may even have supplied raw uranium.
After Pakistan successfully tested in May 1998, the Saudi government gave an unannounced gift of four billion dollars worth of oil spread over a period of five years to help Pakistan tide over difficulties caused by international sanctions.
Whatever utility such a strategy may have had in previous years, to promote an Islamic bomb in the post-9/11 world is both military folly and a political suicide. Unfortunately, some pan-Islamists and those who work in the country's nuclear establishment seem incapable of realizing this.
While it is inconceivable that any Muslim country will request Pakistan for nuclear weapons, there is little doubt that some non-state actors are more enthusiastic.
One recalls that two years ago highly placed members of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission wanted to play their role in the jihad against America. In a fit of Islamic solidarity they went to Afghanistan and met Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. It is difficult to believe that they were the only ones so inclined.
For the moment the efforts of some Pakistani bomb-makers to peddle nuclear secrets appear to have been stymied. But merely by having tried to do so, and invoking solidarity with the ummah, they have put Pakistan in mortal danger.
This could have horrific consequences. Imagine, for example, the situation arising from an atomic explosion in some American city. A superpower, blinded with grief and rage, would be sure to exact a terrible price.
Mere suspicion might form the basis of action. It is quite possible that the Americans would bomb Pakistan first - perhaps with nuclear weapons - and look later for justifications.
Iraq stands as a reminder of America's genocidal fury and the desire to avenge 9/11. The subsequent non-discovery of weapons of mass destruction has been shrugged off by George Bush and his neo-con cabal.
The fallout from the escapades of Dr. Khan and others is certain to affect the level of secrecy and opacity that Pakistan's nuclear establishment has tried so hard to maintain.
Editorials and articles published in influential US newspapers suggest that intense pressure will surely be applied by the US government. The demands would likely include on-site inspection and monitoring of Pakistani fissile material production at the enrichment facility at Kahuta and elsewhere, the plutonium production reactor at Khushab, and all centres where nuclear materials are processed and stored.
Pakistan is certain to strongly resist this demand and, for the moment, may even partially succeed. However, as a compromise between allowing some transparency and avoiding the accusation of having sold out to the Americans, it is possible that the government may secretly allow the installation of cameras and various sensing devices in nuclear installations and an audit of fissile materials.
In the longer term one can expect more direct pressures. This could include economic sanctions - or even military action - if the political situation changes dramatically.
This could happen if Pakistan's cooperation with the US in fighting Al Qaeda falters, or if an Islamic group is successful in eliminating General Musharraf and his replacement is considered to be an Islamic radical. One must then expect a determined effort to put Pakistan's nuclear weapons under international (read: United States) control.
It is time to give up the fantasy of a Bomb for the ummah, and time to rein in Pakistan's bomb-makers. Their illegitimate nuclear commerce has created a nightmare for the reputation, safety, and security of their own country.
It is difficult to know what Dr. Khan meant when he said he had acted out of "good faith". One wonders what kind of faith allows for putting instruments of mass murder on sale in the open market.
The writer is professor of physics at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.