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That mission was considered a disaster because of the numbers lost when America was no longer used to losing troops. They accomplished their objectives that day though on a very trying mission- no armor would've kept those Black Hawks from being shot down.

Exactly right.

However, if the extraction of the force and downed blackhawks had gone quicker, there would have been significatly fewer casualties.

There was plenty of armor (Pak, Malaysian, Italian, Kuwaiti/UAE), thousands of troops (Paki, U.S. QRF)and plenty of attack helicopters (Italian Mangusta & U.S. QRF Cobras) available in Mogadishu. Since June, the U.S. QRF had completed numerous no-notice and pre-planned operations. The QRF always included contingency planning and exchange of liaison elements with allied elements. Allied armored units were always included as either part of the plan or immediately put on stand-by and in some cases immediately staged forward with attached liaison officers monitoring command freqs.

In contrast, the special ops leaders failed to conduct more than the most rudimentary coordination with the U.S. QRF and did nothing at all with the allied forces. As a result, when things went brown, the QRF and allies had to go from a standing start--where are they? what route are they using? how do we communicate? fire control measures? enemy situation? etc etc.

The best soldiers in the world were let down by their own leaders. It would have been nice to have the armor--we asked for it the first time in July--always better to own the asset you need, but with a little more thinking and planning and coordinating and a little less hubris and arrogance, the combat power needed to help was right around the corner.

There's a principle of war called unity of command and some old advice about never underestimating your enemy--both were disregarded.

I tell ya what. I agree with the overall assessment- Sir.

And please note, I use Sir as a mark of respect. I have grown used to the fact that you are an officer and I realize we think along different lines.

But for me, I see a lot of errors being made at all levels of the command. For instance, the topping up of canteens and the wearing of the back plate of the personal body armor.

To me, I can understand- as an enlisted man- how these things happen. But, also as an EM, I realize that the little gaps in leadership is where the problems are magnified.

It is convenient for us to blame Clinton. But Clinton didnt' tell those guys not to fill their canteens.

Personally, I see the mission as a success. PR-wise, no. But they accomplished what they set out to do and did it under very adverse circumstances. For me, it's a little bit personal because I bunked next to the guy in basic that made the 'we kicked ass' comment. You can only blame your commanders so much. This soldier, even after having been shot, still saw the mission as a success.

I think the entire mission could have been better arranged. But at the end of the day, the guys on the ground are still the ones responsible for making do with the situtation they've been handed. I think Task Force Ranger aquitted itself well.