Of course he expected a war. He sent an invasion force. The flagship Powhatan was given to Lt. D.D. Porter on the personal order of Lincoln, kept secret even from the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War. Once the Powhatan got underway, it painted over the ship's name and disguised itself and flew British colors. It was clearly not a peace mission and it clearly did not expect a welcoming committee. Lincoln issued orders designed to break an existing armistice. The orders issued by Lincoln were acts of war. The South Carolina commissioners were lied to. In his subsequent message, Lincoln lied to the Congress about his knowledge of the armistice and about the actions taken. Congressional inquiries about the armistice were stonewalled by the Lincoln administration.
Moreover, the sworn testimony of Colonel Baldwin, quoted more fully below, shows that Lincoln was told point blank that the actions he took would lead to certain war.
If you do not take this course, if there is a gun fired at Sumter -- I do not care on which side it is fired -- the thing is gone.”
“Oh,” said he, “sir, that is impossible.”
Said I, “Sir, if there is a gun fired at Fort Sumter, as sure as there is a God in heaven the thing is gone. Virginia herself, strong as the Union majority in the convention is now, will be out in forty-eight hours.”
“Oh,” said he, “sir, that is impossible.”
Said I, “Mr. President, I did not come here to argue with you; I am here as a witness. I know the sentiments of the people of Virginia, and you do not. I understand that I was to come here to give you information of the sentiments of the people, and especially of the sentiments of the Union men of the convention. I wish to know before we go any further in this matter, for it is of too grave importance to have any doubt of it, whether I am accredited to you in such a way as that what I tell you is worthy of credence.”
Said he, “You come to me introduced as a gentleman of high standing and talent in your State.”
Said I, “That is not the point I am on. Do I come to you vouched for as an honest man, who will tell you the truth?”
Said he, “You do.”
“Then,” said I, “sir, I tell you, before God and man, that if there is a gun fired at Sumter this thing is gone.
[Walt] As he said in 1864, he didn't control events, events controlled him.
It was Lincoln who made the decision to order acts of war and Lincoln who issued and signed the orders.
Lincoln subsequently was unable to control the Radical Republican congress. Certain events controlled him, especially the Confiscation Acts.
In Galaxy Magazine, April 1872, p. 526, Gideon Welles related how this Lincoln modus operandi continued to the end. At his last cabinet meeting on April 14, 1865, Lincoln expressed his desire to accomplish the Reconstruction process while Congress was out of session, thereby eliminating Congress from the process, just as he had done to start the war. At the start of the war, Lincoln was able to convene an army but was conveniently unable to convene a Congress. On April 14, 1865 he related a plan to bypass the Radical Republicans in Congress. He was shot that night and died the next day.
He [Lincoln] thought it providential that this great rebellion was crushed just as Congress had adjourned, and there were none of the disturbing elements of that body to hinder and embarrass us. If we were wise and discreet, we should reanimate the States and get their governments in successful operation, with order prevailing the the Union reestablished, before Congress came together in December. This he thought important. We could do better; accomplish more without than with them.
In his special message of July 4, 1861 to Congress, seeking to justify his illegal actions and to obtain Congressional forgiveness, Lincoln lied repeatedly. He gave false information and he withheld information. His lies and omissions were relevant and material. Below is one documented example of a Lincoln Lie.
The first return news from the order was received just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was, that the officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been transferred from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of the late administration, (and of the existence of which, the present administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had only too vague and uncertain rumors, to fix attention) had refused to land the troops.
Lincoln told Congress the administration only had uncertain rumors of some quasi armistice. Let us review some official records.
O.R. Series 1, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 355-6
WASHINGTON, January 29, 1861.
TO JAMES GLYNN, commanding the Macedonian; Captain W. S. WALKER, commanding the Brooklyn, and other naval officers in command; and Lieutenant ADAM J. SLEMMER, First Regiment Artillery, U. S. Army, commanding Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Fla.:
In consequence of the assurance received from Mr. Mallory in a telegram of yesterday to Messrs. Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler, with a request it should be laid before the President, that Fort Pickens would not be assaulted, and an offer of such an assurance to the same effect from Colonel Chase, for the purpose of avoiding a hostile collision, upon receiving satisfactory assurances from Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase that Fort Pickens will not be attacked, you are instructed not to land the company on board the Brooklyn unless said fort shall be attacked or preparations shall be made for its attack. The provisions necessary for the supply of the fort you will land. The Brooklyn and other vessels of war on the station will remain, and you will exercise the utmost vigilance and be prepared at a moment's warning to land the company at Fort Pickens, and you and they will instantly repel an attack on the fort.
The President yesterday sent a special message to Congress commending the Virginia resolutions of compromise. The commissioners of different States are to meet here on Monday, the 4th February, and it is important that during their session a collision of arms should be avoided, unless an attack should be made or there should be preparation for such an attack. In either event the Brooklyn and the other vessels will act promptly.
Your right, and that of the other officers in command at Pensacola, freely to communicate with the Government by special messenger, and its right in the same manner to communicate with yourself and them, will remain intact as the basis on which the present instruction is given.
J. HOLT,
Secretary of War.
ISAAC TOUCEY,
Secretary of the Navy.
O.R. Series 1, Vol 1, Part 1, page 357-8
PENSACOLA HARBOR, FLA., February 7, 1861.
Colonel L. THOMAS, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Army:
SIR: I have the honor to report that I arrived on this station yesterday in the U. S. steamer Brooklyn, with Company A, First Artillery. I met orders here which prevent the landing of my company or the reenforcement of the garrison of Fort Pickens at present. Yesterday I landed at Fort Pickens, assumed command of the forces on the station, inspected the defenses, and had a consultation with Lieutenant Sleemer. I am compelled to remain on board the Brooklyn for the present, and can, of course, only give general instructions to Lieutenant Slemmer. I am sorry to inform the Department that I found Fort Pickens in a very inefficient state of defense. At the time Lieutenant Slemmer removed his command to Fort Pickens there were only forty guns mounted in the fort. At present there are fifty-four in position. The accompanying sketch indicates the position and class of guns now in position; total, fifty-four of all kinds.
Lieutenant Slemmer has with him only forty-six enlisted men for duty, and thirty ordinary seamen from the yard at this station, and the latter are entirely untrained, insubordinate, and of but little use in case of attack. There are fifty-seven embrasures that are unprovided with cannon, and are only about seven feet from the bottom of the ditch, and at present but few of them have only the common wooden shutter, presenting only a slight obstacle to an enemy. There are only very imperfect means of barricading them. Such as they are, however, I have given orders to be immediately employed.
Lieutenant Slemmer has been obliged to employ his command in getting guns into position and in barricading the embrasures. He is obliged to keep one-half of his men under arms every night, and they are nearly all exhausted with fatigue. The guns and carriages and implements are all old, and nearly unserviceable. I have made a requisition direct on the Department for the necessary supply of guns, carriages, and ammunition. The supply of this last is very inadequate. There is no ammunition for the columbiads, no cartridge bags for them, nor flannel to make any. In fact, had it been the intention of the government to place the fort in the state to render its defense impossible, it could not have been done more efficiently that it has been done. The post is without any medical officer, and if it is intended to defend it there should be an Engineer officer sent at once to the station. I trust that the Department will immediately order that the supplies requested be sent. There are no bunks either for the hospital or for the troops, and but little bedding for the sick. I request a supply may be sent. There are plenty of provisions for the present, although I should like some desiccated vegetables and supplies for the officers. I would mention that all of the troops will be compelled to live in open casemages, and many of them will soon be on the sick-list.
The seceders have a considerable force in and about Pensacola; what number I am unable to say positively, but they are estimated at about 1,700 men. They are disorderly, and very unwilling to be controlled. Their leaders, from what I can learn, I believe are sincere in their intention to observe the armistice, but their ability to control the men under their command is very doubtful. They are engaged in erecting batteries, are making sand bags, &c. They have plenty of means of transportation their troops to Saint Rosa Island, and can attack the fort on all sides at once. At present there is not one trained man to a gun within the fort. Should the enemy decide to attack, it is exceedingly probable that he might succeed in penetrating into the fort before my company could be landed or any succor could arrive from the fleet. I should therefore urge upon the Department the necessity of the fleet taking up a position such as to prevent the landing of any forces within one and a half miles of the fort; this would give time to provide for the defense of the work and the landing of the troops from the fleet; otherwise we may have the mortification and disgrace of seeing the fort taken by a body of untrained troops under our very noses.
Should the armistice be broken, my company, all the marines, and as many sailors as may raise the garrison to four hundred men should be immediately landed. All of the advantages of the present armistice are entirely on the side of the seceders. I would therefore urge upon the Department the necessity of immediately re-enforcing the garrison. The two additional companies ordered to Forts Taylor and Jefferson are not immediately required for the defense of those works. In fact, in their present state, and with the forces now in them, they would be stronger than Fort Pickens will be when garrisoned with four hundred men. Captain Meigs kindly offered his services, if necessary, to assist in the defense of this place, and I request the Department that he may be ordered to repair to this place.
Lieutenant Slemmer has done all that it has been possible to do with the small force under his command. His resolution to defend his post at all hazards evinces the highest moral courage on his part, but at the same time I must state that with any amount of vigor on the part of the assaulters his defense would have been hopeless. His resolution has probably been the means of preserving Fort Pickens from the seceders.
Yours, &c.,
I. VOGDES,
Captain, First Artillery.
P. S.-I must not be understood as recommending any violation of the existing armistice, but the collection of an amount of troops on the station as may be necessary for the defense should anything occur to rupture the present armistice.
FORT PICKENS, FLA., February --, 1861.
O.R. Series 1, Vol. 1, Part 1, Page 440-1
Message of the President of the United States, in answer to a resolution of the Senate requesting information concerning the quasi armistice alluded to in his message of the 4th instant.
JULY 31, 1861.- Read, ordered to lie on the table and be printed.
To the Senate of the United States:
In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 19th instant, requesting information concerning the quasi armistice alluded to in my message of the 4th instant, I transmit a report from the Secretary of War.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
JULY 30, 1861.
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
July 29, 1861.
The Secretary of the Navy, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of the 19th instant, requesting the President of the United States to "communicate to the Senate (if not incompatible with the public interest) the character of the quasi armistice to which he refers in his message of the 4th instant, be reason of which the commander of the frigate Sabine refused to transfer the United States troops into Fort Pickens in obedience to his orders; by whom and when such armistice was entered into; and if any, and what, action has been taken by the Government in view of the disobedience of the order of the President aforesaid," has the honor to report that it is believed the communication of the information called for would not, at this time, comport with the public interest.
Respectfully submitted.
GIDEON WELLES.
The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
John B. Baldwin, testimony given in Washington, D.C. on 10 February 1866; in Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1866)
Regarding His Interview With Abraham Lincoln on 4 April 1861
Washington, D.C., February 10, 1866
John B. Baldwin sworn and examined by Mr. Howard:
Question. You are now speaker of the Virginia house of delegates?
Answer. I am.
Question. Are you a native of Virginia?
Answer. I am.
Question. Have you resided in Virginia during the war?
Answer. Yes, sir; I have resided all my life in Staunton, Augusta county.
Question. I think you were an original Union man?
Answer. I was; the most thorough-going I ever knew.
Question. Were you a member of the so-called secession convention in Virginia?
Answer. I was.
Question. Did you attend all its sittings?
Answer. I did.
Question. Open as well as secret?
Answer. I did attend its sessions, except after the ordinance of secession had passed; I was withdrawn by other duties a good deal from the session; but I was kept advised, and aware substantially of all that passed.
Question. Did you sign that ordinance?
Answer. I did.
Question. Can you tell what has become of it, or where it is now deposited?
Answer. I have understood that it is in the city of Washington, in the possession of government, having been taken when the Union troops entered Richmond.
Question. Did you make a journey to Washington before the firing on Fort Sumter?
Answer. I did. I came here on the night of the 3d of April, 1861; I was here on the 4th day of April, 1861.
Question. Did you have an interview with President Lincoln?
Answer. I did have a private interview with him, lasting perhaps an hour.
Question. Do you feel at liberty to state what transpired at that interview?
Answer. I do sir; I know of no reason why I should not.
Question. Have the goodness to state it.
Answer. On the 3d of April, 1861, I was in the convention. I was called out by Judge Summers, a member of the convention, who informed me that there was a messenger in Richmond, sent by Mr. Seward, asking him (Summers) to come to Washington, as the President wanted to have an interview with him, and stating that if for any reason he was unable to come, he would be glad if the Union men of the convention would select and send on some communication with them. Mr. Summers told me that he and a number of other members of the convention, Union men (calling their names over), had concurred in the opinion that I was the proper man to go, and that he wanted me immediately to get ready and return with the special messenger. I consented to come. A Mr. Allen B. Magruder, who was at that time a lawyer in the city of Washington, turned out to be the messenger. We came to Washington, and arrived here about breakfast time. I went to Mr. Magruder’s house. About 10 or 11 o’clock we called at the Department of State, and I was introduced to Mr. Seward. Mr. Magruder informed him that I was the gentleman selected by the members of the Virginia convention - the Union men - in accordance with his request, and that I came indorsed by them as a person authorized to speak their sentiments. Mr. Seward said he would not anticipate at all what the President desired to say to me, but would take me immediately to his house. We went to the President’s house, and I was taken to the audience chamber. The President was engaged for some time; and at last Mr. Seward, when the President became disengaged, took me up and introduced me to him in a whisper, indicating, as I thought, that it was a perfectly confidential affair. As nearly as I can recollect, the language he used was, “Mr. Baldwin, of the Virginia convention.” Mr. Lincoln received me very cordially, and almost immediately arose and said that he desired to have some private conversation with me; he started through into the back room, opening into the other room; but on getting in there, we found two gentlemen sitting there engaged in writing, and he seemed to think that that would not do, and passed across the hall into a corresponding small room opposite, and through that into a large front room - immediately corresponding with the private audience hall - in which there was a bed; he locked the door, and stepping around into a space behind the bed, drew up two chairs, and asked me to take a seat. Mr. Seward did not go in with us. As I was about sitting down, said he, “Mr. Baldwin, I am afraid you have come too late.”
“Too late for what?” said I.
“Said he, “I am afraid you have come too late; I wish you could have been here three or four days ago.”
“Why,” said I, “Mr. President, allow me to say I do not understand your remark; you sent a special messenger to Richmond- ”
Question. You got the request to Mr. Summers on the 3d of April?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you started-
Answer. Within three hours.
Question. And you arrived on the morning of the 4th?
Answer. Yes; and my interview with Mr. Lincoln was about 11 o’clock that day. Said I, “I do not understand you; you sent a special messenger to Richmond, who arrived there yesterday; I returned with him by the shortest and most expeditious mode of travel known; it was physically impossible that I or any one else, answering to your summons, could have got here sooner than I have arrived; I do not understand what you mean by saying that I have come too late.”
Said he, “Why do you not all adjourn the Virginia convention?
Said I, “Adjourn it! How? Do you mean sine die?”
“Yes,” said he, “sine die; why do you not adjourn it; it is a standing menace to me, which embarrasses me very much.”
Of course you will understand that I do not pretend to recollect the language at all, but this is about the substance of it. Said I, “Sir, I am very much surprised to hear you express that opinion; the Virginia convention is in the hands of Union men; we have in it a clear and controlling majority of nearly three to one; we are controlling it for conservative results; we can do it with perfect certainty, if you will uphold our hands by a conservative policy here. I do not understand why you want a body thus in the hands of Union men to be dispersed, or why you should look upon their sessions as in any respect a menace to you; we regard ourselves as co-operating with you in the objects which you express to seek; besides,” said I, “I would call your attention to this view: If we were to adjourn that convention sine die, leaving these question unsettled in the midst of all the trouble that is on us, it would place the Union men of Virginia in the attitude of confessing an inability to meet the occasion; the result would be, that another convention would be called as soon as legislation could be put through for the purpose.
Question. Was the legislature of Virginia then in session in the same city, Richmond?
Answer. Yes, sir; that is my impression. Said I, “As soon as the necessary legislation can be gotten through, another convention would be called, and the Union men of Virginia could not, with a proper self-respect, offer themselves as members of that convention, having had the full control of one, and having adjourned without having brought about any sort of settlement of the troubles upon us. The result would be that the next convention would be exclusively under the control of secessionists, and that an ordinance of secession would be passed in less than six weeks. “Now,” said I, “Sir, it seems to me that our true policy is to hold the position that we have, and for you to uphold our hands by a conservative, conciliatory, national course. We can control the matter, and will control it if you help us. And, sir, it is but right for me to say another thing to you, that the Union men of Virginia, of whom I am one, would not be willing to adjourn that convention until we either effect some settlement of this matter or ascertain that it cannot be done. As an original proposition, the Union men of Virginia did not desire amendments to the Constitution of the United States; we were perfectly satisfied with the constitutional guarantees that we had, and thought our rights and interests perfectly safe. But circumstances have changed; seven States of the south, the cotton States, have withdrawn from us and have left us in an extremely altered condition in reference to the safe-guards of the Constitution. As things stand now, we are helpless in the hands of the north. The balance of power which we had before for our protection against constitutional amendment is gone. And we think now that we of the border States who have adhered to you against all the obligations of association and sympathy with the southern States have a claim on the States of the north which is of a high and very peculiar character. You all say that you do not mean to injure us in our peculiar rights. If you are in earnest about it there can be no objection to your saying so in such an authentic form as will give us the force of constitutional protection. And we think you ought to do it, not grudgingly, not reluctantly, but in such a way as that it would be a fitting recognition of our fidelity in standing by you under all circumstances - fully, and generously, and promptly. If you will do it in accordance with what we regard as due to our position, it will give us a stand-point from which we can bring back the seceded States.”
I cannot follow the conversation through; but he asked me the question, “What is your plan?”
Said I, “Mr. President, if I had the control of your thumb and forefinger five minutes I could settle the whole question.”
“Well,” said he, “that would seem to be a simple process.”
Said I, “I can settle it as surely as that there is a God in heaven, if you just give me the control of your thumb and forefinger for five minutes. To let you understand how earnestly I believe it, as God is my judge, if I could get the control of that thumb and forefinger for five minutes, I would be willing, unless my weak flesh would fail me, that you should take me out within the next five minutes and knock me on the head on Pennsylvania avenue.”
“Well,” said he, “what is your plan?”
Said I, “Sir, if I were in your place I would issue a proclamation to the American people, somewhat after this style: I would state the fact that you had become President of the United States as the result of a partisan struggle partaking of more bitterness than had usually marked such struggle; that, in the progress of that struggle, there had naturally arisen a great deal of misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the motives and intentions of both sides; that you had no doubt you had been represented, and to a large extent believed, to be inimical to the institutions and interests and rights of a large portion of the United States, but that, however, you might, in the midst of a partisan struggle, have been more or less (as all men) excited at times, occupying the position of President of the United States, you had determined to take your stand on the broad platform of the general Constitution, and to do equal and exact justice to all, without regard to party or section; and that, recognizing the fact without admitting the right, but protesting against the right, that seven States had undertaken to withdraw themselves from the Union, you had determined to appeal to the American people to settle the question in the spirit in which the Constitution was made - American fashion - by consulting the people of the United States and urge upon them to come together and settle this thing. And in order to prevent the possibility of any collision or clash of arms interfering with this effort at a pacific settlement, I would declare the purpose (not in any admission of want of right at all, but with a distinct protest of the right, to place the forces of the United States wherever in her territory you choose) to withdraw the forces from Sumter and Pickens, declaring that it was done for the sake of peace, in effort to settle this thing; and that you were determined, if the seceded States chose to make a collision, that they should come clear out of their way and do it. “Sir,” said I, “if you take that position there is national feeling enough in the seceded States themselves and all over the country to rally to your support, and you would gather more friends than any man in the country has ever had.”
He said something or other, I do not recollect what, but it created the impression upon me that he was looking with some apprehension to the idea that his friends would not be pleased with such a step, and I said to him, “Mr. President, for every one of your friends whom you would lose by such a policy you would gain ten who would rally to you and to the national standard of peace and Union.”
Said he rather impatiently, “That is not what I am thinking about. If I could be satisfied that I am right, and that I do what is right, I do not care whether people stand by me or not.”
Said I, “Sir, I beg your pardon, for I only know of you as a politician, a successful politician; and possibly I have fallen into the error of addressing you by the motives which are generally potent with politicians, the motive of gaining friends. I thank you that you have recalled to me the higher and better motive of being right; and I assure you that, from now on, I will address you only by the motives that ought to influence a gentleman.”
Question. You drew a distinction between a politician and a gentleman?
Answer. Yes, sir; he laughed a little at that. He said something about the withdrawal of the troops from Sumter on the ground of military necessity.
Said I, “That will never do, under heaven. You have been President a month to-day, and if you intended to hold that position you ought to have strengthened it, so as to make it impregnable. To hold it in the present condition of force there is an invitation to assault. Go upon higher ground than that. The better ground than that is to make a concession of an asserted right in the interest of peace.”
“Well,” said he, “what about the revenue? What would I do about the collection of duties?”
Said I, “Sir, how much do you expect to collect in a year?”
Said he, “Fifty or sixty millions.”
“Why, sir,” said I, “four times sixty is two hundred and forty. Say $250,000,000 would be the revenue of your term of the presidency; what is that but a drop in the bucket compared with the cost of such a war as we are threatened with? Let it all go, if necessary; but I do not believe that it will be necessary, because I believe that you can settle it on the basis I suggest.”
He said something or other about feeding the troops at Sumter. I told him that would not do. Said I, “You know perfectly well that the people of Charleston have been feeding them already. That is not what they are at. They are asserting a right. They will feed the troops, and fight them while they are feeding them. They are after the assertion of a right. Now, the only way that you can manage them is to withdraw from the means of making a blow until time for reflection, time for influence which can be brought to bear, can be gained, and settle the matter. If you do not take this course, if there is a gun fired at Sumter -- I do not care on which side it is fired -- the thing is gone.”
“Oh,” said he, “sir, that is impossible.”
Said I, “Sir, if there is a gun fired at Fort Sumter, as sure as there is a God in heaven the thing is gone. Virginia herself, strong as the Union majority in the convention is now, will be out in forty-eight hours.”
“Oh,” said he, “sir, that is impossible.”
Said I, “Mr. President, I did not come here to argue with you; I am here as a witness. I know the sentiments of the people of Virginia, and you do not. I understand that I was to come here to give you information of the sentiments of the people, and especially of the sentiments of the Union men of the convention. I wish to know before we go any further in this matter, for it is of too grave importance to have any doubt of it, whether I am accredited to you in such a way as that what I tell you is worthy of credence.”
Said he, “You come to me introduced as a gentleman of high standing and talent in your State.”
Said I, “That is not the point I am on. Do I come to you vouched for as an honest man, who will tell you the truth?”
Said he, “You do.”
“Then,” said I, “sir, I tell you, before God and man, that if there is a gun fired at Sumter this thing is gone. And I wish to say to you, Mr. President, with all the solemnity that I can possibly summon, that if you intend to do anything to settle this matter you must do it promptly. I think another fortnight will be too late. You have the power now to settle it. You have the choice to make, and you have got to make it very soon. You have, I believe, the power to place yourself up by the side of Washington himself, as the savior of your country, or, by taking a different course of policy, to send down your name on the page of history notorious forever as a man so odious to the American people that, rather than submit to his domination, they would overthrow the best government that God ever allowed to exist. You have the choice to make, and you have, in my judgment, no more than a fortnight to make it in.”
* * *
"Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our present differences, is either party without faith of being in the right? If the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with His eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal of the American people."
A. Lincoln, 3/4/61
You went to a lot of trouble, but the fact is plain that President Lincoln thought the loyal southerners would assert themselves.
Very few people at the start expected a long war; this is pretty well accepted.
Walt
There's no doubt that Lincoln was a master politician. He had the power under the Militia Act to raise an army. He was under no compunction to call for the return of Congress at all, but he -did- call a special session for 7/4/61, which he didn't have to do.
Walt
Never happened; most of the tariff money was collected in the north in any case.
Walt