Iranian Alert -- November 5, 2003 -- IRAN LIVE THREAD PING LIST

Join Us At Today's Iranian Alert Thread – The Most Underreported Story Of The Year!

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Join Us At Today's Iranian Alert Thread – The Most Underreported Story Of The Year!

"If you want on or off this Iran ping list, Freepmail DoctorZin”

I received this from a student in Iran...

"Hi
Good to know that in the rally against the US yesterday. no former hostage taker joined the rally or made a speech. And one funny thing is that no one in the class even hard-line students, didnt talk about the event.
The Iranian society is gonna forget this."

IRANIANS BOYCOTTED STATE-ORGANISED ANNIVERSARY OF OCCUPATION OF US EMBASSY

TEHRAN, 4 Nov. (IPS)

Iranian refused to take part to the ceremonies the Islamic Republic marked Tuesday celebrating the 24th anniversary of the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran, bringing to stage some 10.000 people, mostly college and primary schools students and basijis students and volunteers, shouting slogans against the United States and its "illegitimate son", Israel.

The demonstrators, bussed by the authorities to Tehran University, marched to the site of former huge US embassy, now a training centre for the Revolutionary Guards, chanted "death to America, death to Israel" and "death to Britain", waved anti-US banners and burned Israeli flags and effigies of Uncle Sam.

On 4 of November 1979, a group of revolutionary students callingthemselves "in the line of the Emam" (Grand Ayatollah Roohollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic revolution), stormed the American embassy in Tehran and held 55 diplomats and staff hostage for 444 days.

As a result, Washington cut off all relations with the newly established Islamic Republic and imposed unilateral sanctions, mostly in the Iranian vital oil sector, thus crippling Iranian economy and isolating it on the international scene.

Today, 13 Aban, corresponding to 4th of November marks three important events: anniversary of the takeover of the former US embassy in Tehran, better known in Iran as the "den of espionage" by the Muslim Students Following the Emam’s Line (1979), anniversary of the exile of the late Founder of the Islamic Republic Emam Khomeini by the ex-Shah (1964) and the Students Day (marking the day in 1978 in which several students taking part in a protest rally against the former Shah were martyred)", the official Iranian news agency IRNA reported about the rally.

Eyewitnesses told Iran Press Service that few ordinary people had come to the demonstrations that were also boycotted by the reformists, highlighted by the absence of any of the surviving students who had stormed the Embassy, most of them calling now for normalising relations with Washington.

Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Nateq Noori, the Speaker of the last Majles who is now an adviser to the leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khameneh'i and Head of the Leader’s Intelligence Office, in an address to the inspirited rally, reminded that the American embassy in Tehran had been Washington’s largest spying base in the Middle East.

He also defended the government’s decision to sign the Protocols to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that would allow international nuclear inspectors full and unrestricted access to all Iranian nuclear sites, installations and projects.

Officials said the decision, signed by Hojjatoleslam Hasan Rohani, the influential Secretary of the Supreme Council on National Security on 21 November with the foreign affairs ministers of Britain, France and Germany in Tehran was blessed by Ayatollah Khameneh'i who, as the leader of the Iranian clerical regime, makes all major decisions on matters of foreign policy.

Commenting on the importance given to the anniversary by the ruling conservatives, Dr. Qasem Sho’leh Sa’di, a veteran and outspoken political dissident and university professor said it was "normal", as the humiliating bowing to International Atomic Energy Agency’s demands for signing the Protocols had "de-sloganised" the Islamic Republic.

"This year, the ruling authorities were even more angry with the Americans, as they had surrendered to IAEA under strong direct and indirect pressures from Washington, using the Europeans for that purpose. The event having deprived the regime from its routine slogans, the authorities were looking for any occasion to save face by repeating them, hence the importance they gave to this year’s anniversary of the occupation of American embassy", he pointed out during an interview from Tehran with the Persian service of Radio France International (RFI).

In answer to a question, Mr. Sho’leh Sa’di, who is also a prominent lawyer and spent 40 days in prison for having questioned the religious and political backgrounds of Mr. Khameneh’i, strongly rejected the officials claim that they had secured important advantages from the European troika, stressing that Tehran had signed the Protocols "unconditionally", as formulated by IAEA’s Board of Directors on 12 September, giving Tehran until the end of October to either sign the Protocols and stop uranium enriching programs or face international sanctions.

Following a marathon five hours meeting with Dominique de Villepin of France, Joschka Fischer of Germany and Jack Straw of Britain, Mr. Rohani announced on 21 October that Iran has accepted the entire demands from the United Nations watchdog on nuclear issues, escaping the transfer of the case to the UN’s Security Council.

"As a prove of what I say, one has to read the commentaries wrote by Mr. Hoseyn Shari’atmadari, the leader-appointed Editor of Keyhan newspaper", he said, referring to the position of the articles of the hard line daily, one of the mouthpieces of Mr. Khameneh'i, describing the Agreement as a "humiliating and insulting to the Muslim Iranian people".

There was no message to the rally by any high-ranking official, but the demonstrators, in an eight-point resolution, warned that Iran could back-track if the other signatories were not to respect their engagements and at the same time backed the authorities for having signed the Protocols.

As the organised rally was ending, a high-ranking delegation from the United Nations human rights Committee arrived in the Iranian Capital for a weeklong visit to Iran, focusing on press freedoms and freedom of expression.

During his visit, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression Ambeyi Ligabo is lined up for talks with senior Iranian government officials and magistrates as well as members of the media and academics.

In a statement, the UN said he would be "gathering relevant information on, among other issues, discrimination and threats or use of violence and harassment directed at persons, including professionals in the field of information, seeking to exercise or to promote the exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression", the French news agency AFP said.

"Ligabo had initially been due to visit the country in July, but the authorities in Tehran postponed the trip in June at the height of anti-regime protests accompanied by arrests of journalists, student leaders and dissidents", Dr. Karim Lahiji, a vice-president to the Paris-based International Federation of Human Rights Leagues and President of the Iranian League of Human Rights in Exile explained.

During his visit, UN sources said Ligabo was expected to also meet with Mrs. Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian lawyer and human rights activist who won the prestigious Nobel Peace Prize for 2003.

The French-based press rights watchdog Reporters Without Borders urged Iranian authorities to use the visit to unconditionally free 11 jailed journalists and lift bans on a number of newspapers.

It also said the rapporteur should be permitted to meet the detained writers, especially those being held in solitary confinement.

More than 100 Iranian newspapers have been shut down and a dozen of prominent journalists were jailed, or forced into exile or silenced by the leader-controlled Judiciary since 2000.

Reporter Sans Frontieres has branded Iran "the biggest prison for journalists in the Middle East" and Ayatollah Khameneh'i as one of the world’s "most dangerous predators of press freedom". ENDS US EMBASSY OCCUPATION 41103.

http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2003/Nov-2003/us_embassy_occupation_41104.htm

"UN rights rapporteur" in Iran for key probe

Tuesday, November 04, 2003 - ©2003 IranMania.com

TEHRAN, Nov 4, (AFP) -- A top United Nations human rights official began a week-long visit to Iran Tuesday to conduct a key probe focusing on press freedoms and freedom of expression, UN officials here said.

During his visit, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression Ambeyi Ligabo is lined up for talks with senior Iranian government officials and magistrates as well as members of the media and academics.

In a statement, the UN said he would be "gathering relevant information on, among other issues, discrimination and threats or use of violence and harassment directed at persons, including professionals in the field of information, seeking to exercise or to promote the exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression."

Ligabo had initially been due to visit the country in July, but Tehran postponed the trip in June at the height of anti-regime protests accompanied by arrests of journalists, student leaders and dissidents.

The intervening period has seen the spotlight focus on more on Iran's human rights record, following the death in custody of Canadian-Iranian photographer Zahra Kazemi and the Nobel Peace Prize win of women's rights activist and lawyer Shirin Ebadi.

During his visit, UN sources said Ligabo was expected to meet with Ebadi -- a woman loathed by Iranian hardliners for her defence of dissidents.

The French-based press rights watchdog Reporters Without Bordersurged Iranian authorities to use the visit to unconditionally free 11 jailed journalists and lift bans on a number of newspapers.

It also said the rapporteur should be permitted to meet the detained writers, especially those being held in solitary confinement

More than 100 Iranian newspapers have been shut down since 2000, amid a crackdown on the reformist press carried out by the hardline-controlled judiciary.

RSF has branded Iran "the biggest prison for journalists in the Middle East".

http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2003/Nov-2003/us_embassy_occupation_41104.htm

Iran’s Judiciary Continues to Hold Iranian-American Professor Dariush Zahedi

11/4/03
Payvand's Iran News

It is over four months now since Dariush Zahedi was arrested in Tehran. Zahedi is an Iranian-American political science professor who teaches at University of California in Berkeley. He had traveled to Iran in June to spend time with his family, as he had done in the past few years.

As a political science professor and researcher, Dariush Zahedi has been very involved and active in Iranian affairs. This is evident from the following

- Zahedi has served as the director of West Coast operations of American Iranian Council.
- Zahedi is the author of the book The Iranian Revolution Then and Now: Indicators of Regime Instability (Westview Press, 2000) and the editor of Iran in the New Millennium: Opportunities and Challenges (AIC, 2001).
- Zahedi’s articles, many related to Iran, have appeared in such journals as Middle East Policy and the Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review.

So it would have been very natural for Zahedi to take advantage of his trip to Iran to gain better insight into Iran’s current political situation. And this is not out of line with Khatami’s declared policy of “people to people exchange” which he has emphasized many times as the best way to create mutual thrust between the people of Iran and United States.

According to the news, the following prompted Zahedi’s arrest:

1- He had traveled to Iran for several years in row right before the anniversary date of the student protests
2- He had met with the nationalist-religious dissident leaders.

None of the above is a surprise! Most people take long vacations during summer holidays. This is especially true of the people in academia. Also, as it was mentioned above, it’s most normal for political scientist to talk to people of politics!

But as it was pointed in the previous article on this issue (Dariush Zahedi, an Iranian-American caught in the infighting of Iran's Information Ministry and Judiciary), the issue here is not guilt or innocence. The issue is the infighting between the two factions in Iran. And this infighting has time and again shown itself as disputes between Iran’s Information Ministry and the Judiciary. In Dariush Zahedi’s case, the Information Ministry has concluded that he is innocent and should be released. However, the Judiciary has claimed ownership of the case and ordered Zahedi held in solitary confinement. But perhaps solitary confinement is a blessing for Zahedi, as now the Iranian parliamentarians are warning that, should the Judiciary’s interrogators be set free on Zahedi, another case of Zahra Kazemi may be in the making (Iran challenged over US professor).

The big question now is what’s going to happen to Zahedi? It depends on what the Judiciary is trying to achieve. One possible scenario is the Judiciary wants to make a deal with the reformist faction over judge Mortazavi who has been accused of murdering Zahra Kazemi. That probably won’t happen as Zahra Kazemi’s case is the best opportunity the reformist camp to settle scores with the Judiciary (Iran reformists denounce judges), and also the case is being watched very closely by Canada.

Another possible scenario is the Judiciary has been holding Zahedi hostage to press for the release of the Iranian journalists held by US forces in Iraq. In fact Rafsanjani has recently complained that Zahedi’s case is receiving a lot of coverage while the case of the journalists is being ignored. (This is certainly not true. There has in fact been a lot more coverage given to the case of the journalists as Zahedi’s case was kept quiet by the family and didn’t make headlines until mid October.) But now that the news has come out that the Iranian journalists have been released by US forces (Iranian journalists freed in Iraq), if this was the game the Judiciary was playing, then there is a chance Zahedi will be released in the next few days.

And then there is another possibility that the very radical hardliners are holding Zahedi hoping to sabotage Iran-US rapprochement. Judging from the fact that most people who have ended up in solitary confinement in Evin have eventually confessed to something, it would be no surprise if Zahedi, breaks, if he already hasn’t, and “confesses” to spying for US! As an Iranian-American who has been pampered living a comfortable life here, I myself am ready to confess to anything with the slightest pressure on my thumb! In fact even the hint of pressing my thumb will do it But Zahedi’s potential appearance on the TV screen and confessing to spying for US will only be another re-run of this often repeated episode, and it will certainly not attract a large audience. The hardliners need to become more creative to attract better crowds! But then again the hardliners could care less about crowds. It’s been a long time the crowds have deserted them, and judging from the way the people have voted, or in the case of the last Council election, not have voted, the demands of the people have nothing in common with the hardliners views. But the hardliners continue to hold both hands tightly around the rudder and are hell-bent on leading the ship to the rocks!

Still it’s unlikely that Zahedi will be kept for long in confinement. He only has a short-term value for the hardliners, and after he has served his purpose he will be freed. Certainly Zahedi is suffering hugely in an Evin solitary cell right now. But then again he is a political scientist with great awareness of what is going on Iran, and even if he was not prepared for the treatment he is receiving, he must have been aware that there are consequences for people who take “people to people exchanges” too seriously and ask too many questions or poke their noses in the “wrong” places.

But there is a plus side to this for Dariush Zahedi. When he returns to his academia life, hopefully very soon, he will have first-hand knowledge about the way the Iranian political factions operate, especially those in the Information Ministry and the Judiciary! And hopefully that will help further his research in his field J

As for the Iranian Judiciary, Zahedi’s case will only serve as another minus! Zahedi’s case is just further evidence that Zahra Kazemi’s brutal killing by her interrogators was not an isolated incident and that we should expect more of the same from the Judiciary as it stands. What the Judiciary will sow out of Zahedi’s treatment is nothing but more shame and disgrace!

About the author:
Ali Moayedian is an Iranian-American residing in San Francisco Bay Area.

http://www.payvand.com/news/03/nov/1017.html

Curbing Nuclear Proliferation
An Interview with Mohamed ElBaradei

Arms Control Today
November 2003

ACT: Obviously, it looks like there’s been some good news this morning coming out of Tehran. I just wanted to get your reaction to Iran’s announcement that it will allow IAEA inspections and suspend its uranium-enrichment activities.

ElBaradei: Yes, it’s encouraging news…[but] I still need to be briefed on Iran’s exact commitment. However, this is in line with their commitment to me last week that they are ready to come with a full declaration of all their past nuclear activities and they are ready to conclude a protocol to regulate their future nuclear activities.

And if the news today is correct that they are also ready to suspend, or apply a moratorium on, their enrichment activities as a confidence-building measure, as called [for] by the [the IAEA Board of Governors] in their decision last month, then I think this will open the way for hopefully a comprehensive settlement of the Iranian issues through verification and through political dialogue.

ACT: If this does play out in term of the details that you are hearing, would this address the fundamental concerns that the international community has about Iran’s nuclear programs?

ElBaradei: Well, I think we still have to verify whatever declaration we will get and make sure that it is comprehensive and accurate. So, that would take care of the past activities. We then also need to have the protocol and make sure that all future activities in Iran would be under our verification. As you know, we never have 100 percent certainty. That’s why we would like to have in Iran and everywhere else a continuous process of inspections, and we need the authority of the protocol to enable us in a country with an extensive knowledge and program to do a comprehensive job.

So yes, if we get a comprehensive declaration and we are able to verify that it is accurate and complete, and if we get the protocol and we are able to implement the protocol in all future activities in Iran, then I think this would be a leap forward in terms of the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.

ACT: Have you discussed the latest talks at all with the [European] foreign ministers?

ElBaradei: I think I am going to have that…either tonight or tomorrow.

Export Controls for Nuclear Weapons Technology

ACT: Switching to another subject, we just read your very interesting article in the [October 16] Economist. You mention that the “sheer diversity of [nuclear] technology has made it harder to control both procurement and sales” of that technology. What steps would you suggest to alleviate this problem?

ElBaradei: You mean in terms of export control or overall?

ACT: Export control or any other steps we can take to deal with this diversity of technology that you mention.

ElBaradei: I think export control is obviously something where we need to continue to tighten the screws. It is becoming more and more difficult; a lot of these items are dual-use, but I think that one possibility is to obviously link arms export controls to the conclusion and implementation of additional protocols. I think it would be particularly good to see an item that could be used toward a nuclear activity that could only go to a country where the [IAEA] applied a comprehensive and in-depth verification through additional protocols. But export control is just one aspect of the problem and, as you saw in the recent Economist, there are lots of things that we need to do, concurrently if you like, because they reinforce each other.

ACT: Can you elaborate a little more on those? What sort of sequence do you envision, and what are the possibilities—political possibilities—of implementing those steps as well as the other suggestions that you made?

ElBaradei: Well, I think that the first thing, which is probably the easiest, is to make sure that countries that are parties of the NPT (nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) have safeguard agreements and additional protocols enforced. I think the second step is to make sure that the export control regime is more inclusive, more transparent. The reporting requirements, for example, are shared. For the international community to be vigilant, for efforts to import items for weapons. Again, as I suggested, we need to look into whether the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle need to be multilateralized, such as enrichment and reprocessing activities. In other words, keep national control from weapons-usable material as far [away] as we can. I think that is a very important measure in the regime. To remove HEU (highly enriched uranium) or limit very much HEU and plutonium from the fuel cycle, and if it were to be used, again, it would be under multilateral control.

That will be a major step forward. That will take time, and we need to think about how to move in that direction. Then, obviously we need to continue—and that was not in my Economist piece—we need to continue to work on drivers or incentives for why countries work to acquire nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction. These are your standard reasons: instability, insecurity, festering disputes, deteriorating economic and social conditions in many parts of the world.

And again, obviously continue to work to delegitimize nuclear weapons. We continue to have nuclear weapons relied on as a weapon of choice. If that policy were to continue, we continue to have countries who are in a security bind, if you like, or perceive themselves to be in security bind to look for acquisition of nuclear weapons. So, we need to delegitimize the nuclear weapon, and by de-legitimizing…meaning trying to develop a different system of security that does not depend on nuclear deterrence. But also, we need at the same time to provide some system of inclusive security where countries do not feel that their security is threatened and they need to provide themselves a deterrent like the big boys. These are issues that we need to look at; they all reinforce each other. There is a relationship between all these measures.

I firmly believe that in the long run you cannot just continue to have the privileged few relying on either nuclear weapons or the nuclear weapons umbrella and others are told, “You cannot have nuclear weapons,” because again we continue to have these failures. We continue to act as simply fire brigades, trying to put a fire out somewhere, and then we discover there is a fire erupting somewhere else. We need to change the whole nonproliferation security environment and with that also have a much more inclusive, comprehensive nonproliferation regime.

Changing the Nonproliferation Regime

ACT: You’re calling for some significant changes. I guess you don’t think that the nonproliferation regime is doing that very well right now. Is that fair to say? Would you characterize things that way?

ElBaradei: I think it is fair to say that it is under a great deal of stress, and if I am asking for significant changes, it is because the world is going through significant changes. A few years back, the terrorist phenomenon was not the major phenomenon we had to face. Efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction were not with the intensity we see in the last few years. The security threats are changing, and with it our response needs to change.

ACT: Now, the steps you called for—are these things the IAEA can implement on its own, or does this need political action by the member states?

ElBaradei: Well, I think we need…first of all, we need the realization by member states that the system we have right now is inadequate and needs to be improved. Once you have that, you know, sinking in, that feeling that you need to change the system, then I think we can move forward. Some of these measures, of course, we can do within the confines on the IAEA. That’s basically the question of more comprehensive safeguards, more intrusive verifications, possibly multilateralizing the sensitive aspects of the fuel cycle.

Other parts, of course, have to be dealt with somewhere else, primarily in the United Nations— developing a better system of collective security or energizing the system of collective security, trying to intervene early in situations of threats of weapons of mass destruction or massive violation of human rights. So, it’s between the agency, between the United Nations, between some of the regional organizations like the European Union, NATO. Everybody has to chip in, I think, and see how we can have a functioning system of collective security where we do not continue to face the threat of countries trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction or particularly nuclear weapons. Right now what we have is countries [having nuclear weapons] because of historical incidents. They developed them in the ‘50s and ‘60s or…that again, that was not meant to be the norm in the future. It was suppose to be a temporary situation. We need to bite the bullet and see how we can move beyond nuclear weapons deterrence, and I think that we have not done that yet.

ACT: Many critics argue that one weakness currently in the nonproliferation regime is that it allows states-parties to withdraw after acquiring the equipment necessary to develop fissile material. Do you have any recommendations for overcoming this problem?

ElBaradei: Well I think, again, the whole system needs to be linked to security. I mean, it is not…we should not and I see undue reliance on saying that countries are in the system and they need to comply. That’s correct. But we also need two things. The system needs to continue to serve their security needs. You cannot expect them to continue to participate as a part of the system if their security is not being served. And the fact that they can withdraw from the treaty…I mean, that’s true, but that doesn’t mean that’s the end of the road.

If you look, I think, in 1992, there was a Security Council meeting at the summit where they had heads of states and government. At that meeting, I think they issued a declaration saying that the proliferation of nuclear weapons—I think weapons of mass destruction—is a threat to international peace and security. What does that mean? That even if a country were to move out of the regime, and there are indications that they are developing weapons, the Security Council is going to come back after them. So yes, countries have a right to opt out of the regime if their supreme national interest, or what have you, is threatened, but that does not mean that the Security Council cannot come back after them—not because they walked out of the regime but because their situation is a threat to international peace and security.

If you want a treaty whereby there is no withdrawal whatsoever, you then have to have a universal treaty. That’s what I am really arguing at the end of the day—that you have a regime which prohibits nuclear weapons, which is universally applied and which is regarded as a peremptory norm of international law, which means that whether you are in or out, you are bound by that regime. But we are still a long way from that because the regime that we have now is not universal: you have countries outside the regime, and even inside the regime are countries, that continue to have nuclear weapons. So under the present regime, countries need to keep this opting-out clause because they might be in a position or their security, as they say, might be threatened by a state, and they need to opt out.

It is clearly a weakness. But we need to deal with [that] short term by saying to those who want to walk out that walking out is not clearly justified or that the Security Council can in fact examine the situation and might come to a different conclusion. And in the long term, let’s work for a universal regime where it is applied and there is no opting out.

Limiting Access to Nuclear Technology

ACT: I had a question about Article IV of the NPT, which was a chief incentive for countries to join the NPT and which provided for the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology. Given the concerns raised about the spread of dual-use nuclear technology, do you think that there is anything that can be done to provide countries with other incentives to belong to the nonproliferation regime? And if so, what would they be?

ElBaradei: To provide other incentives, you mean…

ACT: Yes, because Article IV is suppose to be an incentive, but it’s caused a lot of concern about dual use [for both civilian and military applications] of technologies.

ElBaradei: Well, first of all, we now have everybody with the exception of India, Pakistan, and Israel, and I don’t think these three countries are going to join by simply providing them an incentive, in terms of technology. They already themselves have the technology, in many ways, indigenously developed.
But on Article IV, I don’t think Article IV is a problem. I think the problem under the NPT is that you can have the full gamut of fuel-cycle technologies, and that really is the problem. The concern is not that a country has a power reactor or a research reactor. The concern is that the country might have a reprocessing capability or an enrichment capability, which would enable it to develop nuclear weapon-usable material. And I think in the future one can think of having, in my view, possibly an additional protocol to the NPT, whereby you limit the right of—the individual right of—countries to have certain parts of the fuel cycle.

Again, I come back to the multilateralization of the fuel cycle. So, you can say “Article IV is applicable, we will give you the technology to use it for health, agriculture, medicine, radiotherapy, cancer treatment, water, you can have it for research reactors, you can have a power reactor. But if you need enriched uranium or you need to reprocess plutonium, that should not be under national control, it should be under international control or the very least some sort of multilateral process.” You would continue to provide the technology, you would continue to give countries access to the technology, but you would restrict the parts of the fuel cycle that create the most concern, and these are, in my view, the reprocessing and enrichment and also, possibly, a final repository where you have spent fuel with plutonium in it.

Realizing Article VI Disarmament Commitments

ACT: Getting back to the question of nuclear weapons states and delegitimizing nuclear weapons, what do you think would be some of the most important near-term steps that nuclear weapons states could take toward meeting their Article VI disarmament obligations?

ElBaradei: I think, to start, they need to have a major reduction in their existing arsenals. I read we still have something near 30,000 warheads in existence. That’s absolutely unjustifiable by any scenario of nuclear deterrence. We can still have, I think, the nuclear weapon states can have major, major cuts in their nuclear arsenals to show their commitment toward—to show that they are serious in implementing their commitment under Article VI. We still have the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty), which has always been regarded as a key to the implementation of Article VI, unratified. We still have the FMCT (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty), which would put a cap on fissile materials for weapons. We are not even able to agree on a method to negotiate for the last 10 years.

So, these are to me three clear indicators of the seriousness of the weapon states on moving forward implementing Article VI. Even the CTBT is not really the panacea because, as we know now, we can do a lot of testing through computer simulation and subcritical testing.

So, at the very minimum, at least we have a ban on nuclear testing, we have a ban on producing yet again additional material for weapons, and [we] try to move energetically on getting rid of many of the stockpiles that are still in existence; even if they are not operational, we still need to dispose of all the warheads. When we come to a situation where we have hundreds instead of the thousands we have, then we need obviously to take the second step, and that’s what sort of alternative security regime we will have if we are to dispose completely of nuclear weapons.

But we are not even there yet because we are still far away from reaching this low threshold, which would force us at that time to think of the alternative system, although in my view we need to start thinking today of what kind of world we can have if we do not have nuclear weapons and how we can assure our security. We definitely need a reliable system of security, but a system that does not rely on nuclear weapons, and possibly more of an inclusive system that does not rely on unilateral or preemptive use of force but rooted primarily in the collective security system which we have under the UN Charter. If you have a collective system of security, then you need to develop. Again, the system you have now is almost dormant. You need to deal with the new threats. How do you deal with the possible cheats, even if you ban nuclear weapons? How do you deal with imminent threats of massive abuse of human rights, genocide? You need to have a collective system but also a collective system that is not paralyzed by veto or by [lack of] consensus—a collective system that is dynamic, that even in certain situations has to be preemptive. Given some of the risks right now, we cannot just wait until things happen. You need to take the initiative, and you need to be preemptive. But you need to be preemptive within a collective system and based on an international legitimacy.

ACT: Do you think the nuclear weapons states’ stance on their Article VI commitments has influenced other countries’ decisions maybe to lag in concluding additional protocols to their safeguards agreements?

ElBaradei: Yeah, I think some of the countries have been, frankly, grumbling that no progress on nuclear disarmament has made them rethink their obligations, the urgency of them concluding additional protocols. I heard that argument made here in the [IAEA] by a number of large and small non-nuclear weapons states: Why should we rush into an additional protocol if the weapon states are not energetically pursuing [the] Article VI process?

India, Israel, Pakistan

ACT: Turning to the outliers of the NPT—India, Israel, and Pakistan—they’ve obviously been a persistent concern for nonproliferation advocates. Do you think the NPT can survive without these countries’ membership, and if they choose to stay outside the treaty, is there any progress that can be made short of getting them to sign up?

ElBaradei: I think the NPT can survive—has survived—without them. But I think, ultimately, that the nonproliferation regime will not survive without them. The NPT is a part of the regime, and if we talk about the regime—global, universal, enduring—then it will not survive without the three. Until we manage to bring them into the regime, I think we need to continue to start a dialogue with them. I for one believe that, rather than just trying to continue treating them as pariahs, we need to try and see how we can engage them as partners in an arms control process, maybe not necessarily under or within the framework of the NPT but within the framework of a larger arms control process.

As you probably know, they were supposed to be a part of the FMCT, they were supposed to be a part of the CTBT, [but] they haven’t yet joined either of these. None of them have ratified the CTBT, and we don’t yet have serious negotiations regarding the FMCT. I think we need to engage. I think the policy, right now in my view, the wise policy would be to engage these three countries and not just to continue to treat them as an outsider because, in the long run, we need to get everybody on board. And if we haven’t succeeded to get them through the NPT, we need to think of other ways to get them on board.

North Korea

ACT: Turning to the question of North Korea, in the event that a settlement to this crisis is reached, what do you think needs to be done to verify a freeze or a dismantlement of the nuclear facilities, in terms of technical tools or a political agreement?

ElBaradei: Well, again we do not know what exactly they have right now. We need to go back in the country and do a proper verification. And I think we need at a minimum an additional protocol with the safeguards agreement and possibly some additional rights to ensure that we have a powerful system to detect every aspect of the nuclear program. I think we clearly need all the intelligence information that we can get. We need satellite imagery, which we now use almost as a routine. We need environmental sampling.

I think, with the new technology, the verification system is becoming much more powerful than, say, a decade ago. But we need the authority to apply that system, which means right of access, right of no-notice of inspection, right of getting all the information we need. So, I would say, at the minimum, I think we would need the additional protocol and possibly again, if we go back and discover that we need some additional authority, then we need to make North Korea understand that they should be as transparent as possible.

Again, if I can revert back to Iran for a second, I made the statement in the last couple of months that, you know, sometimes if you have a complex nuclear program that has not been subject to verification and you need to create credible assurance, you cannot just stick to the legal requirements of a safeguard agreement or protocol, but what you are really looking for is absolute comprehensive transparency by the country. If the country is cooperating, if they are claiming they have nothing to hide, they have every interest to work closely with us.

So, the short answer is yes, we need as much authority that we have—at the minimum, additional protocols—but expect that we might ask for an additional measures of transparency by North Korea if we are not able to resolve certain issues through simply [an] additional protocol or safeguard agreement.

ACT: Is there anything you can say about North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program?

ElBaradei: Not really. You hear that they confess to having an enrichment program, you hear again that they have denied that they have an enrichment program. So, the only way to really get the facts is to go back and do verification. At this stage, I am not able to say with any degree of confidence whether they do or do not have a uranium-enrichment
program.

ACT: Technically, as you know, it is much more difficult to verify a uranium-enrichment program. How confident are you that, if you did have access there, you would be able to verify whether or not they had a uranium-enrichment program?

ElBaradei: It’s not easy because, as you said, uranium enrichment could be a very small facility and you cannot detect it through environmental sampling. But we will have to continue to rely on information, intelligence information, satellite monitoring, environmental sampling. But also I think the key to any verification process is to continue doing that. We will never, even after a year or two, be able to say, “We have 100 percent certainty.” We don’t have 100 percent certainty anywhere, and therefore the solution is to be there all the time, and I think North Korea will not be an exception. We will reach a point when we say, “Yes, we believe that we have no indication they have anything undeclared.” But that’s not sufficient. We need to continue to be there all the time, and as I said, if they are cooperative, cooperating with us, if they are showing transparency, then we have a higher degree of certainty, but in all situations, we need to be there all the time. Can I give 100 percent assurance? No, I can’t, in Korea or anywhere else. The answer is that I am there all the time to be able to catch anything which we have not detected previously, and if a country were to be detected in noncompliance, then obviously…then the international community has to react and they have to react strongly to any breach or any
violation.

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/ElBaradei_11.asp

Great post. Thank you.

U.S. Sees Russia Halting Iran Reactor if Need be

November 04, 2003
Reuters
Arshad Mohammed

Russia is likely to stop helping Iran build a nuclear power plant if Tehran fails to disclose its nuclear activities and to allow snap international inspections, a senior U.S. official said on Tuesday.

Iran last month gave the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) what it said was a full declaration of its nuclear activities and agreed to freeze its uranium enrichment and to sign the Additional Protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would allow snap inspections of nuclear sites.

If it keeps its promises, Iran would go a long way toward addressing U.S. accusations that it is using its civilian nuclear program as a front to develop atomic weapons. The IAEA has yet to determine whether Iran's declaration is complete and Tehran has not said when it may sign the additional protocol.

Despite the U.S. accusations, Russia is helping Tehran build an million nuclear reactor in the southern port of Bushehr. Iran, which President George W. Bush has described as part of an ''axis of evil'' along with Iraq and North Korea, says that its atomic program is entirely peaceful.

The senior U.S. State Department official, who insisted on anonymity, said Russia appeared to have ''gotten religion'' on the issue, meaning that Moscow now shares Washington's concerns about the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran.

''They, to some degree, have gotten religion as far as the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear programs and are working with us to try to get them to comply with the IAEA's demands and to put all their facilities back under full international inspection,'' the U.S. official told reporters.

''Until those concerns are resolved, they're trying to avoid having to fish or cut bait on Bushehr. They are hoping Iran will reassure everybody, get back into compliance, and that they can then proceed with Bushehr subject to the safeguards that all spent fuel would be returned to Russia,'' he said.

''I think if Iran backslides on the commitments that it has now made, doesn't follow through, then the Russians would, at the end of the day, however reluctantly, be prepared to halt (the) Bushehr project,'' the U.S. official added.

Tehran and Moscow have been locked in months of talks over the return to Russia of spent nuclear fuel from Bushehr that theoretically could be used to make atomic warheads. Russia expects to sign a deal on this some time before next summer.

The United States has pressured Russia for years to stop supporting the Bushehr project. The issue was expected to come up during Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev's meetings on Tuesday with Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and on Thursday with national security adviser Condoleezza Rice.

''They (the Russians) have, perhaps coincidentally, perhaps not coincidentally, announced that technical reasons means that it (Bushehr) can't be started up until 2005, so they have bought themselves a little more time,'' said the U.S. official.

The official said Tehran was trying to persuade Moscow to pay for the spent fuel rather than simply return it to Russia.

http://famulus.msnbc.com/FamulusIntl/reuters11-04-153319.asp?reg=EUROPE

Caspian Sea Pact Agreed

November 05, 2003
BBC News
BBCi

The five countries bordering the Caspian Sea have agreed a framework treaty in Iran aimed at halting further damage to the sea's fragile environment.

The United Nations-sponsored deal involving Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan seeks to reduce the amount of sewage and industrial waste pumped into the sea.

It also ends nearly 10 years of quarrelling over its oil and gas reserves.

In New York, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan hailed the signing as "a significant step forward for the region".

"By signing this important new treaty the Caspian states are demonstrating their firm commitment to saving the beautiful and resource-rich Caspian Sea," Iranian Vice President Masoumeh Ebtekar said.

World Bank deal

Toxic waste dumping, oil leaks, agricultural run-off, and over-fishing of the caviar-producing sturgeon fish, have all contributed to the Caspian's serious ecological decline.

The sea is soon set to be one end of a pipeline which will transport Central Asian oil to Europe.

The World Bank has approved loans of just over $300m to help the ongoing construction of the pipeline which will run from an oil field off the coast of Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.

It is said to be the longest of its kind in the world.

Engineers have carried out nearly 40% of the work, and the first crude oil is expected to flow in 2005.

The World Bank has said possible risks of the pipeline to the environment have been addressed.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3242441.stm

Iran's Nuke Gambit

New York Post - By Amir Taheri
Nov 5, 2003

REMEMBER you read it here first. Iran is now on course to force its way into the nuclear club within the next two to three years. When it does, it will owe part of its success to a European Union diplomatic maneuver that has spared Iran the prospect of direct confrontation over its illicit nuclear program with the international community.

The maneuver, which led to the signature of a memorandum between the Islamic republic and three EU members in October, appears to have defused the latest crisis.

As things stand, it is almost certain that the International Atomic Energy Agency will soft-pedal the procedure that could have led to a confrontation between Tehran and the United Nations over Iran's alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons.

The European Union has exacted no more than a vague promise from the leadership in Tehran to temporarily halt a secret project to enrich uranium and produce plutonium.

The temporary halt, if it does materialize, may be linked more to Iranian domestic politics than to a sudden desire on the part of the Khomeinist regime to honor the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Iran is already in campaign mode in anticipation of the general election next March. A foreign-policy crisis at this time could upset the the establishment, which appears determined to purge the so-called reformist faction and impose a "Chinese-style" system of political repression and economic opening.

The establishment feared that the nuclear issue might force the European Union to line up behind the tougher Iran policy preached by the Bush administration.

Playing the European card against Washington is a tried and true tactic of the Khomeinist regime. Tehran used it in the 1980s by seizing and then liberating European hostages in exchange for pledges by the European powers not to join U.S.-imposed sanctions against Iran. In the 1990s, Tehran used the same tactic by tempting European oil companies with mouth-watering oil and gas contracts.

One other factor may have contributed to Tehran's decision to play the European card again. The selection of Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian human-rights lawyer, as this year's Nobel Peace laureate is seen in Tehran as a signal that Europe's "soft powers" are ready to help provide a "soft" face for the opposition against the Khomeinist regime. Such an opposition could make it easier for the European powers to win the support of their own public for a policy of regime-change in Tehran.

Thus the piece of paper that Tehran has just signed with three European foreign ministers is unlikely to affect the Khomeinist regime's strategy of building an arsenal of nuclear weapons within the next two to three years.

There is little doubt that the Europeans know this. So, why did the three European wise men, traveling west to east, agree to get the Khomeinist regime off the hook?

Each of the three had his reason:

* France's Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin is desperately looking for any opportunity to show that Paris still has a say in Middle East politics. He would love to be able to claim that his "soft power" diplomacy did in Iran what American "hard power" tried to do against Saddam Hussein in Iraq - and, according to de Villepin, failed.

* German Foreign Minister Joshcka Fischer had a slightly different motive. While continuing his country's close alliance with France, Fischer is also anxious to avoid a situation in which Berlin finds itself alone with Paris. The presence of the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw in the trio helps Fischer avoid such a situation. At the same time Fischer would be able to tell the German public that the Schroeder government is still capable of playing a role in diffusing regional crises.

Fischer and de Villepin also hope to see a change of occupant at the White House in 2005.

* Straw's motives are equally complicated. In his heart of hearts, he knows that the only language that the Khomienists understand and respect is force. But he also knows that Tony Blair's government is passing through its worst crisis since it came to power in '97.

At a moment of crisis over Iran, Blair might find himself facing a choice he wishes to avoid: parting ways with the Americans or risking a political revolt within his Cabinet.

All this means is that the Khomeinist regime may well get yet another chance to have its cake and eat it, too. According to Hassan Ruhani, a mullah who speaks for the High Council of National Security in Tehran, Iran is determined to dot itself with "the entire range of nuclear science and technology at all levels."

Iran's nuclear program started in 1956. The strategic decision to develop nuclear weapons was taken in 1989. The regime has spent an estimated $12 billion on all aspects of this ambitious program so far. It is not something that Tehran will give up after a session of tea and sympathy with the EU trio.

E-mail: amirtaheri@benadorassociates.com

http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/9956.htm

Iran's Nuke Gambit

New York Post - By Amir Taheri
Nov 5, 2003

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1015041/posts?page=11#11

At a moment of crisis over Iran, Blair might find himself facing a choice he wishes to avoid: parting ways with the Americans or risking a political revolt within his Cabinet.

Just damn.

Convenient Concession

Looking beyond the nuke pact.

NRO Online
By Jon Levin
November 04, 2003, 8:21 a.m.

According to a new agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA inspectors will be granted greater access to Iran's nuclear facilities in order to monitor its compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran claims that its nuclear research is only for civilian purposes permitted under NPT. However, Iran's system of nuclear facilities is tailored for nuclear-weapons research and has little civilian benefit. As demonstrated in North Korea, the IAEA is not equipped to overcome the deceptions of a hostile government. Instead, Iran will maintain a façade of cooperation with the inspection regime as cover for its ongoing weapons research.

Iran claims to be pursuing only civilian nuclear research and rightly argues that its ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 entitles it to build a wide variety of nuclear installations. Under that guise, Iran has steadily constructed a range of reactors, laboratories, and fuel-cycle plants. However, while building these facilities is technically legal under NPT, it does not serve Iran's civilian needs, and is functionally useful only for military purposes.

Iran's tenacious commitment to the Bushehr nuclear complex is typical of its nuclear development. According to a July 31, 2003 U.S. State Department release, "Iran's copious oil and natural gas reserves put into question Iran's stated rationale of pursuing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; it currently throws away more energy annually by flaring off natural gas than Bushehr could produce [emphasis added]."

Nonetheless, Iran is still committed to the Bushehr project after nearly 30 years. The German company Siemens began work on two 1200-1300 Megawatt nuclear reactors outside Bushehr in 1974. By 1979 the first reactor was undergoing testing and only two years from completion.

During the 1980s though, Bushehr regressed. In the wake of the Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of the American-backed shah in 1979, the Reagan administration blocked international aid to Iran's nuclear projects and Siemens discontinued work on the reactors. A 1982 fire and a series of Iraqi bombings between 1984 and 1988 caused at least $3 billion in damage to the reactors and reactor housings. In the 1980s Iran tried several times to find new partners for Bushehr but failed to reach agreements with either Siemens or an Argentine-Spanish consortium.

Work on Bushehr only continued in 1995 after Russia agreed to complete the facilities for $800 million. Russia claimed to have included clauses in the 1995 contract allowing for the removal of all spent nuclear fuel to Russia for reprocessing. This was key to allaying U.S. fears that Iran itself would take possession of potentially fissionable material. However, later in 1995 the U.S. discovered a secret annex to the Bushehr agreement contracting Russia to provide Iran with research reactors, fuel fabrication facilities, and a centrifugal uranium-enrichment plant — the very facilities needed to produce weapons-grade nuclear fuel.

Bushehr is now one small part of a wide network of Iranian nuclear sites. In 2002, U.S. surveillance satellites photographed two more nuclear facilities nearing completion. The heavy-water reactor at Arak and the gas-centrifuge array at Natanz will give Iran a viable nuclear capacity independent of foreign help, undermining international institutions' efforts to maintain oversight of Iran's reactors. Likewise, independent fuel-cycle capability will enable Iran to divert enriched uranium or spent fuel to nuclear-weapons programs. In February 2003, Iran acknowledged its intent to construct all of the facilities necessary to produce, use, and reprocess nuclear fuel.

Shockingly, nothing in this litany of nuclear developments contravenes the NPT. It was only IAEA's August 2003 discovery of trace amounts of highly enriched uranium at the Natanz array that raised the possibility of a breach. Enriched uranium was found again in late September at the Kalay-e Electric Company outside Tehran. U.N. officials say the amounts of enriched material detected are insufficient for an atomic device, but that Iran might nonetheless be in violation of the NPT. The Iranian government responded to the discoveries by saying that enrichment is not taking place, and that the detected material came from equipment contaminated when it was delivered.

However, according to a translation by the Israeli defense ministry, Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told Tehran Radio on September 17, 2003 that "young Iranian scientists conduct uranium-enrichment experiments...This is why the Iranian people are so proud." Tellingly, in the October 21 accord with the IAEA Iran offered not to refrain from enrichment, but to cease enrichment.

As long as Iran can keep up its charade of cooperation with the IAEA, it can continue its clandestine research and construction. In effect, the IAEA is Iran's insurance policy against a preemptive attack by Israel or the United States. As long as IAEA inspectors are in Iran, Israel and the United States will be hard-pressed to justify an attack. Once Iran activates a reactor in six months, a year, or two, the costs of an attack will far outweigh the benefits, as radioactive material would be blown into the atmosphere. It is not by coincidence that Israel's 1981 strike against Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor came just before it went "hot," and that North Korea was suddenly emboldened in its rejection of IAEA demands just after it activated its own nuclear facilities. According to Israeli estimates, the Iranian nuclear program will reach a "point of no return" in ten months.

Israel has maintained a studious silence on the possibility of an Osirak-style preemptive strike against Iran since the IAEA discoveries at Natanz and the Kalay-e Electric Company. However, by all indications Israel is proceeding under the assumption that Iran will obtain nuclear arms. Last month, American and Israeli officials leaked that Israeli engineers successfully adapted American-made, submarine-based Harpoon missiles to carry nuclear warheads. While some technicians have questioned the feasibility of modifying harpoons for nuclear payloads, even the possibility of some portion of Israel's nuclear arsenal surviving an Iranian first-strike magnifies Israel's deterrent capability. While Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani's December 2001 threat that "a single atomic bomb has the power to completely destroy Israel" remains true, Iran now confronts the possibility of suffering a massive retaliatory attack.

The United States might decide to follow Israel's lead in this regard and threaten Iran with overwhelming retaliation for a nuclear attack. Given Iran's decades-long sponsorship of terrorism, the United States might elect instead to forcefully prevent a nuclear Iran in accordance with the Bush Doctrine. Whatever the choice, the U.S. can have no illusions that Iran's convenient concession to the IAEA means it has given up its nuclear-weapons development.

— Jon Levin is a researcher at the Investigative Project.

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/levin200311040821.asp

Bushehr is now one small part of a wide network of Iranian nuclear sites. In 2002, U.S. surveillance satellites photographed two more nuclear facilities nearing completion. The heavy-water reactor at Arak and the gas-centrifuge array at Natanz will give Iran a viable nuclear capacity independent of foreign help, undermining international institutions' efforts to maintain oversight of Iran's reactors. Likewise, independent fuel-cycle capability will enable Iran to divert enriched uranium or spent fuel to nuclear-weapons programs. In February 2003, Iran acknowledged its intent to construct all of the facilities necessary to produce, use, and reprocess nuclear fuel.

BUMP

Thanks for the heads up!

State Dept. Says Moscow Restrains Iran

Wednesday November 5, 2003 4:01 AM
By BARRY SCHWEID AP Diplomatic Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) - Russia is pressuring Iran to make good on promises to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection and may halt an $800 million deal to build a reactor for a power plant if Iran backtracks, a senior State Department official said Tuesday.

Russia is viewed as very supportive on the issue, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The pressure is being applied by Moscow through diplomatic channels, in tandem with a similar effort by the European Union, the official said.

Despite a decade of U.S. complaints that Russian technology was helping Iran to try to develop a nuclear weapons program, Moscow has refused to halt the lucrative project.

President Bush renewed U.S. concerns at a meeting at Camp David in September with President Vladimir Putin. But the Russian leader refused to halt plans to build the power plant in Iran.

Putin said Russia would ``give a clear but respectful signal to Iran about the necessity to continue and expand its cooperation'' with international inspectors. Putin said then his country ``has no desire and no plans to contribute in any way to the development of weapons of mass destruction, either in Iran or any other country in the world.''

Since then, Iran has promised to open its facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Under pressure from the agency's board, Iran has handed over what it said was a complete declaration of its nuclear activities.

The IAEA director, Mohammed ElBaradei, has said inspectors were in the process of verifying Iran's submission.

The State Department official said Russia may use delaying tactics as part of its pressure campaign. He said the reactor project would not be completed at least until 2005.

Meanwhile, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev met for several hours Tuesday with Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham. The Russian official planned to meet on Thursday with Condoleezza Rice, Bush's national security adviser.

Abraham, in an interview Monday, said ``progress has been extensive'' in working with the Russians to improve security at their nuclear sites and on a program to safeguard Russia's nuclear material that could be used for weapons was being accelerated.

Renewed criticism of Russia came from Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., said the foundation of U.S.-Russian relations was threatened by ``a creeping coup against the forces of democracy and market capitalism.''

McCain, in a statement he read to the Senate, said Russia appears increasingly to have more in common with its Soviet and czarist predecessors than with a modern state.

``The dramatic deterioration of democracy in Russia calls into question the fundamental premises of our Russian policy,'' McCain said.

McCain's comments drew a quick and strong rebuke from the Russian Embassy in Washington. It characterized the statement as ``a blatant example of the Cold War sentiments still nurtured by some members of the U.S. political establishment.''

``An aggressive invective delivered by Senator McCain under the guise of heartfelt concern for the Yukos company and the fate of market economy and democracy in Russia is an outrageous and direct encroachment on the present and future of Russian-U.S. strategic partnership,'' the statement said.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Russia's richest man, who resigned Monday as chief executive of the petroleum company Yukos, has been jailed on charges of fraud and tax evasion. Khodorkovsky has financed opposition parties, and Putin's critics contend Putin's fellow former KGB officers orchestrated the tycoon's arrest for political reasons.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uslatest/story/0,1282,-3350225,00.html

Iran to Accept Snap UN Nuke Checks
Wed November 5, 2003 10:34 AM ET

VIENNA (Reuters) - Iran's representative to the United Nations atomic watchdog said Wednesday his country would give the U.N. a letter formally accepting tougher, short-notice nuclear inspections within days.
"The letter has been prepared and we are going to hand it over to the IAEA Secretariat," Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency told Reuters in an interview.

Salehi also said Iran had given the IAEA original drawings of uranium-enrichment centrifuge components on which IAEA inspectors had found traces of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium. "They have enough clues now to make their own conclusions," he said.

Iran says the parts were contaminated with the highly enriched uranium before Iran purchased them abroad, an explanation that has met with skepticism among countries like the United States which believe Iran bought or purified the uranium itself for use in a bomb.

A diplomat familiar with the IAEA told Reuters that delivery of the original drawings is significant, because they represent the "building blocks of Iran's centrifuge program."

http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=XVFPXD0ICLXXKCRBAEOCFFA?type=worldNews&storyID=3760578

Freedom ~ Now!

Today: November 05, 2003 at 8:04:53 PST

Iranian Nobel Laureate Given Bodyguards
By ALI AKBAR DAREINI
ASSOCIATED PRESS

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) - Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi has been given bodyguards by police following a number of death threats since she returned to Iran last month, a close associate said Wednesday.

Mohammad Ali Dadkhah, spokesman for the Center for Protecting Human Rights, said Ebadi has received one or two threatening letters a day since a week after the Nobel was announced Oct. 10.

Dadkhah said one of the letters depicted a knife and another threatened, "You will be punished for this prize."

Dadkhah said it was not clear who was sending the death threats but that it appeared to be a warning by extremist groups. He didn't elaborate.

Police have responded by assigning bodyguards to Ebadi, according to Dadkhah. Police have also given her a police car with a driver. The protection was provided after the center, co-founded by Ebadi, wrote to Iran's Interior Minister Abdolvahed Mousavi Lari warning that her life was in danger, he said.

Police officials were not immediately available for comment.

Ebadi, a human rights and pro-democracy lawyer, won the Nobel for efforts that included promoting the cause of women and children in Iran and worldwide. She is the first Iranian and Muslim woman to win the award.

While reformers hailed Ebadi's victory as a "source of pride for Iran and a boost to democratic reforms," hard-liners denounced her as a "Western mercenary."

Gholamreza Hasani, who represents Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in northwestern Iran, has described Ebadi as a "mentally retarded woman with secular thinking."

In her first news conference in Tehran last month as a Nobel laureate, Ebadi demanded Iranian leaders free all political prisoners, including journalists and activists jailed for allegedly insulting the hard-line authorities. She said last week there has been no response from the leadership.

After a daring speech last week at Amir Kabir University where Ebadi praised modern and ancient enemies of the Islamic hard-liners who rule Iran, she made a small but telling gesture: shaking hands with two men, Habibollah Peyman and Mohammad Maleki, both prominent dissidents. Under Iran's Islamic-inspired laws, it is a crime for men and women who are not related to shake hands in public. Possible punishments range from jail to flogging.

On Wednesday, Sajjad Qoroqi, a reformist student leader who helped organize the speech, said authorities have since banned Ebadi, Peyman and Maleki from addressing students at that university for a year "under pressure from Khameneni's representative."

http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/2003/nov/05/110507239.html