Anthrax Sent Through Mail Gained Potency by the Letter

New York Times ^ | Tuesday, May 7, 2002 | By WILLIAM J. BROAD and DAVID JOHNSTON

[Nogbad]

If it was primarily a test,
why would clearly written warning letters be included?
Wouldn't that invalidate the test
(by making it unrepresentative of the actual conditions
that they would be attempting to simulate)?

First of all, I believe it was not a warning, it was meant to scare.

But put that aside.
First and foremost,
let's try to put ourself in the brain
of everyone involved.
(Which I have tried to do from the start)
Having worked in a lab many years ago
I can imagine myself as scientist in charge
asked to provide anthrax for a letter-bomb attack.

Do I just give them my one super-special brand?

Or do I view this as a golden opportunity
to try out all my products
and give them a sample of everything on hand?

Once again, the answer is obvious.

[Fabozz]

"Not sure how you arrived at this. Can you describe in more detail?"

Paper is porous enough for the smallest spores to be sucked right through. Mail sorting machines pick up letters with powerful suction nozzles, which pulls thousands of these fine-grade spores out of the envelope and into the air of the postal facility—that's how the postal workers got infected, even though the attacker sealed the envelopes with tape.

Now, given a sufficient quantity of anthrax in each envelope, the rate at which the spores get pulled out of the envelope is going to be relatively constant—there's only so much time and so many pores for the spores to be drawn through. If you pull the same quantity of fine spores out of each sample, the sample that started out mostly pure (e.g. the Leahy letter) will remain mostly pure, but the sample that started out mostly impure (e.g. the Post letter) becomes even less pure.

[My Identity]

Good thinking, but making microchips or tiny disk drives does not make one good at manufacturing an anthrax weapon.

Don't forget the Far East has world-class chemical and pharmaceutical R&D and production facilities. They send lots of students to the US to study and work, even in our government labs.

Instead of looking for anthrax weapons programs, look at anthrax vaccine R&D activities. A lab doing development work would need to test the vaccines on lab animals. To do so, they need deadly anthrax...in small quantities. Look at off-shore labs, particularly those is SE Asia and Eastern Europe, working on anthrax vaccines. Look at biochem supply houses in the same areas. Once an in-house lab develops a sample material, the marketing guys put it in their catalog so they can make a buck. Even with reasonable controls in place, OBL could have obtained the material by requesting it for government trials, academic research etc. I seem to recall that's how Iraq got Ames, they were "working" on a vaccine.

This is why I believe the source had to be a weapons program. Which means the source is most likely a nation, not a crackpot, or even a band of terrorists like Al Quaida.

If it is a weapons program, you are correct.
But we have only seen tiny samples and material of variable quality.
This is more consistent with multiple samples from multiple sources.
And that is consistent with a world-wide, low-tech, but intelligent operation...hmmmm, al Qaeda?

[Mitchell]

I said: "If it was primarily a test, why would clearly written warning letters be included? Wouldn't that invalidate the test (by making it unrepresentative of the actual conditions that they would be attempting to simulate)?"

To quote Dr. Strangelove: "The whole point of the Doomsday Machine...is lost...if you keep it a secret." For it to work as a deterrent, you have to issue a warning ahead of time, which will put the victims on guard-the warning letters are representative of the actual conditions. For example, we routinely tested the effects of nuclear weapons against targets expecting and prepared for the attack.

This is precisely what I meant. The warning letters suggest that the anthrax was meant as a deterrent, a la Strangelove.

If it was meant as a test, it would have been meant as a test of an actual attack. You don't need to test people's reaction to a warning; if it's a warning, it's a warning. How can it be a test of a warning?

-

Me again: "If it was meant primarily as a warning (deterrence), why did some of the mailings apparently not come with warning letters?"

CBS and ABC get lots of mail, so there's no guarantee one crackpot letter, powder-filled or not, would automatically be remembered. Perhaps the envelope was opened and the letter removed without even noticing the powder-I've worked as a letter answerer for a (small circulation) magazine, and I routinely threw out the envelopes before reading the letters; if I had gotten hundreds of letters a day, I doubt I'd have noticed talcum powder in one of them.

It's hard to say, but it seems that if anybody looked at such a letter, then later, when the known anthrax letters were publicized, they would have realized the similarity. (I agree that they easily might not have noticed the powder to begin with.) As soon as Sean Hannity saw the anthrax letters, he realized the similarity with the crank letters he had received earlier in the year. Why didn't anybody at CBS, ABC, or AMI notice the similarity (after the fact, just like Hannity)?

As for the AMI anthrax, I personally believe that was hand-delivered-no one's ever found a letter or any residual contamination there, and they've certainly looked.

At AMI, wasn't there very widespread contamination throughout the building, including the mailroom and elsewhere? I have no opinion as to the delivery method used there, but it's my understanding that lots of residual contamination was found.

[My Identity]

A warning can be a test.

A test that fails is not much of a warning.

[eno_]

look at anthrax vaccine R&D activities.

It isn't that hard to find anthrax in the wild if you really want some. What distinguished the anthrax letters was weaponization that enhanced dispersal. I don't think a vaccine lab would have any expertise in that.

That "milling" process that makes the anthrax fine and easily dispersed is more of a specialized materials science competency. I don't know enough about it, but if you are really interested in following up that angle, find out who would need the same dispersion characteristics for some other industrial purpose. Maybe somebody bought a machine that is unaccounted for.

[My Identity]

the sample that started out mostly pure (e.g. the Leahy letter) will remain mostly pure, but the sample that started out mostly impure (e.g. the Post letter) becomes even less pure.

Which supports my theory (wink). It's not the presence or absence of small spores that's key, but (a) the presence of detritus in some letters, and (b) the purity of Leahy.

[Betty Jo]

Are you aware of the "Bin Laden Medical Matrix"?

It's the name I have given to the "cyber-telemedicine-biolab-health insurance" mechanism he has put together with some of the wealthiest Muslims in the world!

[My Identity]

It isn't that hard to find anthrax in the wild if you really want some.

Yes, but... they have to test against reference samples. Ames is an important standard.

What distinguished the anthrax letters was weaponization that enhanced dispersal. I don't think a vaccine lab would have any expertise in that.

Ever worked with lab rats (techicians and chemists)? They'll make stuff just for the heck of it, to see if they can. How they got the process is a different matter. The distinguished letter, to my mind, was Leahy. That is the weapon.

That "milling" process that makes the anthrax fine and easily dispersed is more of a specialized materials science competency. I don't know enough about it, but if you are really interested in following up that angle, find out who would need the same dispersion characteristics for some other industrial purpose. Maybe somebody bought a machine that is unaccounted for.

I bought into the "milling" story for awhile, which requires expensive machines and screening capabilities. There is another chemical process (dev'd in the US weapons program) that accomplishes the same thing. There is no detritus because there is no milling.

[Fabozz]

"It's not the presence or absence of small spores that's key, but (a) the presence of detritus in some letters, and (b) the purity of Leahy."

But detritus is exactly what is most prone to settling. Settling might not work well to differentiate small spores from large ones, but it certainly should separate out live organisms and clumps of growth medium. The spore powder is specifically engineered (and evolved, for that matter) to float and resist clumping; settling in a vial should just be that process in miniature.

As for the purity of Leahy, as I said in an earlier post, Leahy is the only unopened letter, and not coincidentally the largest single sample. For all we know, the missing spores from, say, the opened Daschle letter are all as fine as the best Leahy spores, making no real difference between the two. After all, those ultra-fine spores are exactly the ones most likely to aerosolize when the letter is opened.

[My Identity]

detritus is exactly what is most prone to settling. Settling might not work well to differentiate small spores from large ones, but it certainly should separate out live organisms and clumps of growth medium. The spore powder is specifically engineered (and evolved, for that matter) to float and resist clumping; settling in a vial should just be that process in miniature.

The amount of material they were working with was not conducive to this effect. The total amount of material from all letters combined is still just a fraction of an ounce. The amounts are too small for settling to account for the differences in the samples given the coarse handling techniques in the field. Are you aware of any technical discussion related to settling being successfully used in creating weapons-grade material?

As for the purity of Leahy, as I said in an earlier post, Leahy is the only unopened letter, and not coincidentally the largest single sample. But there are no clusters in Leahy. It is pure weapon material. For all we know, the missing spores from, say, the opened Daschle letter are all as fine as the best Leahy spores, making no real difference between the two.

Again, the presence or lack of small spores is not indicative. The Leahy letter is pure, small-screen spore. It is a weaponized, a 10 out of 10. The Daschle letter had large clusters, a wide range of sizes. Only a 7 out of 10. The media samples had lots of debris. Maybe a 3 or 4 out of 10. Settling cannot account for this disparity, given the small quantities involved. Multiple samples from multiple sources does account for it.

[muawiyah]

How about this - the terrorists grew the anthrax from a few spores. When they had enough, they did whatever was needed to get it to resolve into its spore form.

They filled the envelopes themselves (probably only 5 or 6 of them). They then mailed them all at Boca Raton on September 7 or 8. Some of the letters got "lost in the mails" and took longer than expected to get delivered.

At least one of them was miskeyed and the barcode took it on a circuitous route through various buildings in DC. While in transit, all that extra handling ground it ever finer.

This is the least energy cost solution to the dilemma of how this happened.

Compound it with a USPS letter carrier in Staten Island as their co-conspirator, and maybe yet one more person at a rewrap unit in that post office, or maybe in West Palm Beach, where tape could be applied without leaving fingerprints, and there are absolutely no mysteries in this one!

This solution has the fewest inponderables and variables. .

[Ranger]

 

The Tape.  What is interesting about this article is the discussion of the tape which to my knowledge has never been mentioned before.  Why this information is now made public is curious. From it we learn several things. 1.  We know the FBI knows the sequence in which the envelopes are stuffed or more specifically sealed with tape.  Tape is produced under tension and it would be possible to know the beginning and end of the roll.  2.  We should also know if an envelope is missing in the sequence because a chuck of tape might be missing.  One must wonder if all the envelopes were detected especially when the VP and President are put on Cipro before the envelopes are detected in the mail.  What's that all about?  3. It probably also indicates all the envelopes were stuffed at once in a 'glove box' or portable clean room most likely. This is consistent with no fingerprints or other biological matter being reported.   4.  Tape is made in a continuous production run, it is wound, coated with release, re-wound, cut, packed and shipped. By now the source of the tape (3M?, which plant, where it was shipped to (geographically at least), etc.) should all be known to the FBI.  This information has probably been cross referenced with the same information on the envelope and the copier paper of the letter.  The fact that the anthrax hasn't been detected at a lab (other than Ft. Dettrick) would indicate that the glove box or clean room was probably destroyed, or as yet is undetected, though I have always wondered about the NYC the eye, ear and throat lab technician that died.

Settling & Trace Elements.  I'm pretty comfortable with the settling theory to explain the stratification of the samples though the multiple sample theory also has credibility.  I want to point out that they are not mutually exclusive. Both could be true. Multiple samples could have settled and been put into envelopes at the same time.  However let's think about this.  If the Ames strain is in all the envelopes it would tend to indicate settling.  Getting anthrax isn't easy and getting multiple sources of anthrax is even harder.  If the strains were different then it might indicate small samples were removed from multiple containers in a laboratory to avoid detection.  So far as I can tell from the news accounts, there was only one strain detected after all was said and done.  One commentator on this thread discusses signs of trace elements from the mesh screening.  If such trace elements were not evident  or consistent in all the samples then it might lend itself to the theory of multiple sources of anthrax.  Unfortunately the FBI hasn't enlightened us enough to make a conclusion.  They are probably saving that for next month's installment.

Handling & Amount of Anthrax.  There is no reason to think that those that made the anthrax are the same as those that distributed it.  In fact, logic would suggest that they are quite different skill sets.  For example, for a few hundred thousand dollars I'm reasonably sure I could buy an anthrax laden artillery shell from the Ukraine, Cuba, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, N. Korea, Libya or from several mafia sources.  The same could be said for US or UK labs, but in any event the anthrax would need to remain sealed and stored until ready for use.  I tend to subscribe to the theory that Atta brought it back with him in the camera film containers he reportedly had with him coming back from Europe which was reported early on, but it could have been transported in numerous ways.  The fact is he seems to have been contaminated with some anthrax and was trying to get Cipro.  That plus the uncanny coincidences of his travel to known sources of the mailings in NJ and FL can hardly be dismissed as coincidence even by the FBI.

Handling of the envelopes likely squeezed particles out of the envelopes and in all likelihood the particles that left the containment were smaller and could escape easier.  Mail handling equipment would be pushing, compressing and shaking the envelopes which would cause smaller particles to leave the envelope under pressure with handling. In any event, if one assumed the anthrax arrived via Atta and were distributed into the mail after his death, then they were stored somewhere for a period of time. Where?

Limited Amount & the Missing Message?  Why only a small amount to a relatively few important individuals?  Why not a large amount?  Why not a massive junk mail distribution especially when Atta is checking out crop dusters?  You wouldn't check out a crop duster if you only had a little bit to distribute?  The fact is, Atta didn't care about killing innocents.  It makes sense that if he had a coffee can full of this stuff, we'd have seen it thrown in a subway station or football stadium.  If he had had a plane load of it, we would have seen that too.  Instead we only saw a small amount.

Moreover the messages inserted into the letters were likely designed to spread panic and confusion; certainly to get media attention and the undivided attention of the Senate.    If the anthrax attack was a message, it was a muddled message to the general public.  Was it a muddled message to Bush and Cheney who were already on Cipro?  It seems likely that there is more to this message than we have been told.

One off hand theory I've been mulling over is what if the anthrax attack was a 'sample pack',  provided by let's say the Russian mafia or N. Korean sources to Atta along the lines, if you like the samples we'll be happy to sell OBL much more?  This might help explain the limited amount used in the first attack, presuming a follow-on is in the cards.  After all, Dr. Strangelove was right, what is the point if the weapon is a secret?  And why would Atta price out crop dusters if he had already decided to use the mail and unless he planned on getting more anthrax or other goodies?

 

[muawiyah]

These guys didn't need to have a portable clean room to apply the tape. In the initial stages none of it was leaking through the envelopes. That took time. Interesting, however, that they knew this anthrax would penetrate the paper!

What they needed to avoid putting finger prints on the tape was access to a postal rewrap work station. That's the place where they take your flimsily wrapped boxes or flats and "rewrap" them; sometimes it's stuff retrieved from plane wrecks, truck fires, etc.

[muawiyah]

The AMI letter left a trail through three different Postal facilities. It just so happened that AMI mail had to be transferred from one facility to another after it's initial entry and preliminary processing at Boca Raton.

These places were shut down for anthrax contamination clean-up.

[EternalHope]

Thanks for a nicely done analysis.

Was it a muddled message to Bush and Cheney who were already on Cipro? It seems likely that there is more to this message than we have been told.

I don't think the message was muddled at all. Bush and Cheney know exactly what the message was. Hence the ridiculously poor FBI "investigation".

The answer is known (it's not a nutcase, for sure).

[Fabozz]

"The AMI letter left a trail through three different Postal facilities."

I stand corrected then. Thanks.

[okie01]

A very useful summary.

However, I'd advise not putting too much stock in:

"One must wonder if all the envelopes were detected especially when the VP and President are put on Cipro before the envelopes are detected in the mail."

The Cipro given to the Prez and VP on 9/11 was evidently in a pre-prepared "survival kit" held ready for just such emergencies. That there might be a snakebite kit in your camping first aid kit doesn't suggest that you've already been bitten, only that you might be.

In other words, the presence of Cipro in the kit doesn't necessarily mean there was any knowledge of an anthrax threat.

[maestro]

#35)...thoughts......

??Various independent 'cells' of independent 'status' became operational 9-11 to carry out 'pre-planned' scenario levels of 'probes'='attacks'...??

??...The "Center" viewed these operations as a 'sales/marketing/effectiveness' demonstration re: Which 'suppliers' to buy from for future 'all-out' attacks..........??

Frightening thought
IMHO

[Alamo-Girl]

Thanks for the heads up to the debate!!!