I see no necessity:
The objectivist assumes that he (and to this point, only he) possess free will. He cannot provide a shred of verifiable evidence that he does. But neither can anyone provide a shred of verifiable evidence that he does not. So, he states the axiom: I have free will. Not out of objective necessity does he state this, but only out of a subjective preference over determinism.
Given this axiom, a question arises: Do other persons possess free will? Looking for verifiable evidence in affirmative support, the objectivist finds none (post 378). In fact, the objectivist can find no verifiable evidence to support the assertion that any living being or any other matter/energy combination possess free will. He does observe that other persons exhibit complex responses to stimuli. And he knows that he is not able to predict the responses with any regularity. He realizes, however, that people are the most complex combinations of matter/energy he has observed, and that his inability to predict the responses of other people with any regularity reflects his lack of understanding of the complex combinations and workings of the matter/energy that people are composed of. The objectivist has no verifiable evidence or logical necessity in affirmative support of his assumption that the complex responses of other persons to stimuli result from free will in humans, just as he has no verifiable evidence or logical necessity in affirmative support of the assumption that weather (the complex response of the atmosphere to stimuli) results from free will in the atmosphere. Assuming that other persons have free will is not necessary for the objectivist to interact with, respond to, and study other people, just as assuming that the atmosphere has free will is not necessary for him to interact with, respond to, and study the atmosphere.
The objectivist is able to conduct himself as a rational being---observing, hypothesizing, and rejecting invalid conclusions---without extending the axiom that he has free will to anyone or anything outside of himself; there is no logical necessity to do so. Additionally, since neither he, nor anyone else, can provide objectively verifiable evidence that others either do or do not have free will, there is therefore both no objective evidence and no logical necessity that requires him to prefer the theory that the complex response of other persons to stimuli is the result of free will over the theory that the complex response of other persons to stimuli is the result of determinism. One can only conclude that the assumption made by the objectivist that other persons have free will is the result of personal preference, not necessity.
I guess you had no choice but to feel that way.
The objectivist assumes that he (and to this point, only he) possess free will. He cannot provide a shred of verifiable evidence that he does.
That's why it's an axiom.
But neither can anyone provide a shred of verifiable evidence that he does not. So, he states the axiom: I have free will. Not out of objective necessity does he state this, but only out of a subjective preference over determinism.
No. If in fact we are all products of determinism, it doesn't matter what we think. But we all are convinced that we think, so the axiom covers the situation. If we're wrong, it doesn't matter anyway.
Given this axiom, a question arises: Do other persons possess free will? Looking for verifiable evidence in affirmative support, the objectivist finds none (post 378 ). In fact, the objectivist can find no verifiable evidence to support the assertion that any living being or any other matter/energy combination possess free will. He does observe that other persons exhibit complex responses to stimuli. And he knows that he is not able to predict the responses with any regularity. He realizes, however, that people are the most complex combinations of matter/energy he has observed, and that his inability to predict the responses of other people with any regularity reflects his lack of understanding of the complex combinations and workings of the matter/energy that people are composed of.
Well, that's evidence. If you don't think it's iron-clad, that's not a problem. It's the only evidence we have. And the "I have free will" axiom is one which they too can invoke; hence we all have free will. Again, if we're wrong, it doesn't really matter; but if we're right, we can proceed with discussions such as this.
Assuming that other persons have free will is not necessary for the objectivist to interact with, respond to, and study other people, just as assuming that the atmosphere has free will is not necessary for him to interact with, respond to, and study the atmosphere.
No. If I thought that you were truly incapable of reason (like the atmosphere) I wouldn't attempt to reason with you, as I don't with the atmosphere.
One can only conclude that the assumption made by the objectivist that other persons have free will is the result of personal preference, not necessity.
Not my conclusion at all.