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Five weapons that bilk the taxpayers
Counterpunch ^
| Eric Miller and Beth Daley
Posted on 02/06/2002 2:12:57 AM PST by Arkle
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To: Long Cut
The F-22 deters, defends, attacks
The F-22 Raptor, developed at Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the replacement for the F-15 Eagle air-superiority fighter and will become operational early this century. It combines stealth design with the supersonic, highly maneuverable, dual-engine, long-range requirements of an air-to-air fighter, and it also will have an inherent air-to-ground capability, if needed. The F-22’s integrated avionics gives it first-look, first-shot, first-kill capability that will guarantee U.S. air dominance for the next three decades.
First flight of the Raptor occurred on Sept. 7, 1997. F-22s are currently undergoing flight tests at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif.
The purpose of the F-22 program is to develop, field, and support the next-generation, air-dominance fighter weapon system, and to establish the standard for acquisition excellence.
Air dominance, provided by the F-22, guarantees freedom of maneuverability for ground, air, and naval forces. It protects militarily important infrastructures, such as command and control facilities, power grids, and factories, while increasing the efficiency of other military operations.
The airframe will be built of titanium, aluminum, composites, steel, and other materials. Titanium and both thermoset and thermoplastic composites will comprise the largest percentage of materials, 30 and 26 percent respectively.
The balanced design of the F-22 incorporates performance (supercruise, maneuver advantage, acceleration), reliability, maintainability and supportability (high readiness, self-sufficiency, reduced support), survivability (low observability), integrated avionics, optimum payload, and affordability (low life-cycle cost, reduced deployability costs).
21
posted on
02/06/2002 9:03:12 AM PST
by
vannrox
To: chainsaw
The Project On Government Oversight
POGO Main Page Defense Investigations Back to
Fighting With Failures Series April 20, 2001
Fighting with Failures Series:
Case Studies of How the Pentagon Buys Weapons
Crusader Howitzer
The Crusader is an armored, mechanized vehicle slated to become the Army's next-generation, 155mm, Self-Propelled Howitzer cannon and its companion re-supply vehicle.
Short Cuts on the Way to Acquisition:
- The Crusader’s systems engineering was, to a large extent, not completed until after the acquisition program was launched. In a recent report, the General Accounting Office noted Crusader officials saying that United Defense did not develop a good preliminary design of the system until 1998, about eight years after the Department of Defense launched the program.
- The Crusader originally was to have relied on a revolutionary technology, a liquid propellant for firing weapon projectiles. Two years into product development, the Crusader’s contractor, United Defense Limited Partnership, determined that the liquid propellant was too risky and would cost an additional $500 million to develop.
- Another change to the Crusader’s design came after the Army altered its mission. The new Crusader’s weight requirement has been reduced from 55 to 38 tons. The GAO said this lighter weight could require unacceptable trade-offs related to the degree of crew protection, the time the vehicle spends on the firing line, and whether the Crusader is a tracked or wheeled vehicle.
- Rather than delay the milestone decision to enter the next development phase - program officials were concerned a delay would adversely impact the program’s momentum - the Army decided to allow a modification of testing. Instead of live-fire testing of the most advanced prototype, the Army now intends to meet testing criteria by using a combination of data from live firings of a previous design that blew up when it was tested.
- In response to funding reductions, the Army is making critical program scheduling decisions that will compress the program’s schedule beyond its already-compressed schedule under the streamlined acquisition process.
Shortcomings:
- The Crusader program is expected to take over 14 years and cost over $4 billion to develop. In all, the cost to obtain 480 Crusaders is expected to total $11.2 billion, or $23.3 million each.
- The Crusader is expensive and does not mesh well with the Army’s far-term vision of a lighter, more mobile force.
- Weight remains a major problem for the Crusader. The Crusader is nearly twice the weight of the system that it replaces, the Paladin. The Crusader and its fully loaded resupply vehicle have a combined weight of 110 tons, too much to lift even on the military’s largest transport plane, the C-5B, without waiving flight rules.
- The Crusader’s autoloader has no backup. If the autoloader fails, the Crusader howitzer will be unable to fire because the cannon cannot be hand loaded.
- Total Number of Systems: 480; Total Program Cost: $11.17 billion; Average Unit Cost: $23.28 million.
POGO’s Fighting with Failures Series documents Pentagon shortcuts in testing and operational requirements that have resulted in weapons that do not work, that waste taxpayer dollars, or that are not suitable for combat.
Sources: Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Report, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, March 2001; Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288, March 2001; Army Armored Systems: Advanced Field Artillery System Experiences Problems With Liquid Propellant, GAO/NSIAD-95-25; Army Armored Systems: Meeting Crusader Requirements Will Be a Technical Challenge, GAO/NSIAD-97-121, June 1997; “Army’s Big Gun Must Lose Some Weight,” Washington Post, November 25, 1999.
Back to POGO Main Page
22
posted on
02/06/2002 9:08:03 AM PST
by
vannrox
To: Long Cut
|
BOEING-SIKORSKY
RAH-66 COMANCHE STEALTH HELICOPTER
The Boeing Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche is the world's most advanced helicopter and the cornerstone of the U.S. Army's Force XXI aviation modernization plan. The Comanche makes use of the latest advancements in aerospace technology, including stealth which has until now been confined to airplanes. Abilities The sophisticated design of the Comanche helicopter allows it to dash to a speed of 175 knots, then cruise at a steady 165. The futuristic propulsion and navigation design also allows the helicopter to execute snap turns in 4.5 seconds and fly sideways or backwards at an incredible 70 mph! With a tremendous power output of 1,432 horsepower from each of it's turboshafts, the Comanche climbs at a rate of 1,418 feet per minute. Firepower The Comanche can go to war with up to 14 "Fire and Forget" Hellfire anti-tank missiles, which, once fired, are programmed to control their own flight to their targets. The helicopter can also deploy up to 56 rockets (70mm), or 28 Stinger air-to-air missiles, to attack fixed and rotary-wing targets. Alternatively, it can carry two 430-gallon ferry tanks to self-deploy over 1,260 nm, or crashworthy 230-gallon tanks for more than four hours of combat endurance. Adding to its already immense firepower, the Comanche also stows a three-barreled, 20 mm turreted nose mini-gun that can shoot 1500 rounds per minute. To maintain its low "stealth" profile, the Comanche features a fully retractable missile armament system, enabling it to hide missiles and rockets in I-RAMS (Integrated Retractable Munitions Systems) bays.
Inside Comanche Designed using computer databases, Comanche redefines the helicopter in terms of power, maneuverability, technological sophistication, and materials engineering. Twin LHTEC-800-LHT-801 turboshaft engines drive an advanced five-blade, bearingless main rotor which further enhances high performance and agility in air-to-air combat. Its FANTAIL anti-torque tail rotor system lets Comanche execute amazing maneuvers near impossible for other helicopters. Comanche also features reconfigurable, fault-tolerant digital missions electronics and on-board diagnostics, Longbow fire-control radar, triple-redundant fly-by-wire flight control and simple, remove-and-replace maintenance. A wide-field-of-view, helmet-mounted display provides flight information, night vision sensors and a sight system for use with weapons.
 |
The Helmet Integrated Display and Sight System (HIDSS) is a biocular helmet-mounted
display for flight information and night vision sensors and a sight system for use with weapons. Each crewmember has a helmet providing acoustic and impact protection and a magnetic helmet
tracker on a removable frame. The HIDSS can combine flight symbology with sensor images to
allow aggressive flight maneuvering at night. Display: Bi-Occular, FOV 53° x 30° CRT High resolution tester 1023 line rate. |
In addition, the RAH-66's Hands On Grips controls literally let pilots fly and perform mission tasks with one hand - a first-ever achievement in a helicopter. The Comanche also breaks new ground in the use of high technology composites to satisfy both Low Observable Technology requirements and aggressive weight and cost specifications. Stealth Warrior in the Digital Battlefield Its on-board computing capability enables Comanche to acquire, process, analyze and disseminate an amount of information unsurpassed by today's helicopters. Comanche's low radar signature, high technology composites, special acoustics design, and a buried exhaust system, make it less observable than today's premier attack and armed reconnaissance helicopters. Add to this new generation of passive long-range, high-resolution battlefield sensors, digital interconnectivity, to share data with other members of the combined arms team, produces a completely integrated targeting, and communications weapon system, facilitating the delivery of quick, coordinated responses to tactical situations with minimal work for the pilot.
REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS
Congressional Budget Office - March 1997
DEF-19 CANCEL THE ARMY'S COMANCHE HELICOPTER PROGRAM
Annual Savings Five-Year
Savings from (Millions of dollars) Cumulative
the 1997 Plan 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
Budget Authority 3 190 255 397 440 1,285
Outlays 64 200 265 348 416 1,293
The Army fields about 6,000 helicopters, some of which are approaching the end of their 20-year useful service life or have exceeded it. About 2,000 of the helicopters--the OH-58 Kiowa scout helicopters and the AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters--are Vietnam-era aircraft that the Army plans to replace with the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter. The Comanche will fill both the reconnaissance and the attack roles that those two helicopters now perform. The Comanche program, when it was conceived in 1983, was intended to develop one aircraft that, in two different configurations, could replace not only the Vietnam-era scout and attack helicopters described above but also the UH-1 utility helicopters of the same vintage. The Army originally planned to buy more than 5,000 Comanches of various configurations. The utility version was dropped in 1988, however, because the program had become too costly. Since then, the Comanche program has included only the attack and scout version, and the quantity has been reduced further, from a planned purchase of more than 2,000 aircraft to just under 1,300. The helicopter is still in the development stage, which will continue at least through 2004. As recently as 1992, the Army had planned to start buying Comanches in 1996, but it has since delayed the start of production until 2005. These changes in the objective and size of the program have caused the cost of each Comanche helicopter --expressed in 1997 dollars--to more than double since the program began, from $11 million in 1985 to $26 million based on the Army's 1996 estimate. Furthermore, the Comanche has become more expensive to acquire than the Army's current generation of attack helicopter, the AH-64 Apache, which is bigger and heavier than the Comanche. That cost increase is significant, particularly in a helicopter whose development was originally justified on the basis of its being inexpensive to purchase, operate, and maintain. Indeed, the Comanche's high cost calls into question the prudence of pursuing this as-yet-undeveloped aircraft instead of continuing to buy existing helicopters such as the Apache or later models of the Kiowa. Some analysts have questioned the wisdom of continuing the Comanche program. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report published in 1992 noted not only the increase in the cost of buying the Comanche but also the potential for maintenance costs to increase to three times the original estimates. Those factors, plus the risk of additional cost increases as technical issues are resolved, caused GAO to question the Army's underlying rationale for the Comanche program. In addition, the Comanche, which was conceived at the height of the Cold War, will no longer need to counter threats of the same scale or sophistication as those it was designed to thwart. Indeed, the Comanche is now so similar in capability to the Apache--the aircraft it is supposedly designed to complement--that whether it has a unique role to play in Army aviation is unclear. Without a mission that existing Army helicopters cannot perform, it is hard to justify the continued development of an aircraft that is more expensive to acquire than existing helicopters. Based on these various concerns, this alternative would provide other means for filling the Comanche's role, at reduced cost. It would cancel the RAH-66 program, thereby saving $2.4 billion in budget authority over the next five years. Some added costs, however, would be associated with buying more helicopters of other types. The Army has already purchased enough Apaches to fulfill the attack role assigned to 13 of its 18 divisions. During Operation Desert Storm, Apaches performed their missions without scout helicopters, and this alternative accordingly would provide no replacements for the aging Kiowas currently assigned that role in those divisions. The Army, however, needs to replace the aging Cobras assigned to the attack aviation units of the remaining divisions. Armed scout helicopters, known as Kiowa Warriors, were used effectively in the Persian Gulf and could replace the Cobras still in service. The Congress has supported purchasing those aircraft in the past, and the Army has bought a limited number (406). This alternative would buy 18 armed scout helicopters in 1998 and 24 each year thereafter, leading to a total procurement of 519 by the end of 2005. After taking into account the cost of buying those helicopters and canceling the Comanche, net savings compared with the 1997 plan would total about $1.3 billion in both budget authority and outlays over the 1998-2002 period. The primary disadvantage of adopting this alternative would be the loss of the new aviation technology incorporated in the Comanche. Some analysts would argue that the threats the Comanche is likely to face would not demand the very sophisticated stealth, avionics, and aeronautic technologies slated for the new helicopter, but others would support the program as a way to maintain the U.S. lead in helicopter technology. Some of the Comanche's new technologies are already being incorporated into current U.S. helicopters such as the Apache. Abandoning the RAH-66 program, however, would mean that the Army would have to rely on helicopters designed in the 1960s and 1970s for years to come.
 |
23
posted on
02/06/2002 9:15:13 AM PST
by
vannrox
To: Long Cut
B-1B Lancer
The B-1B is a multi-role, long-range bomber, capable of flying intercontinental missions without refueling, then penetrating present and predicted sophisticated enemy defenses. It can perform a variety of missions, including that of a conventional weapons carrier for theater operations. Through 1991, the B-1 was dedicated to the nuclear deterrence role as part of the single integrated operational plan (SIOP)
The B-1B's electronic jamming equipment, infrared countermeasures, radar location and warning systems complement its low-radar cross-section and form an integrated defense system for the aircraft.
The swing-wing design and turbofan engines not only provide greater range and high speed at low levels but they also enhance the bomber's survivability. Wing sweep at the full-forward position allows a short takeoff roll and a fast base-escape profile for airfields under attack. Once airborne, the wings are positioned for maximum cruise distance or high-speed penetration. The B-1B holds several world records for speed, payload and distance. The National Aeronautic Association recognized the B-1B for completing one of the 10 most memorable record flights for 1994.
The B-1B uses radar and inertial navigation equipment enabling aircrews to globally navigate, update mission profiles and target coordinates in-flight, and precision bomb without the need for ground based navigation aids. Included in the B-1B offensive avionics are modular electronics that allow maintenance personnel to precisely identify technical difficulties and replace avionics components in a fast, efficient manner on the ground.
The aircraft's AN/ALQ 161A defensive avionics is a comprehensive electronic counter-measures package that detects and counters enemy radar threats. It also has the capability to detect and counter missiles attacking from the rear. It defends the aircraft by applying the appropriate counter-measures, such as electronic jamming or dispensing expendable chaff and flares. Similar to the offensive avionics, the defensive suite has a re-programmable design that allows in-flight changes to be made to counter new or changing threats.
The B-1B represents a major upgrade in U.S. long-range capabilities over the B-52 -- the previous mainstay of the bomber fleet. Significant advantages include:
- Low radar cross-section to make detection considerably more difficult.
- Ability to fly lower and faster while carrying a larger payload.
- Advanced electronic countermeasures to enhance survivability.
Numerous sustainment and upgrade modifications are ongoing or under study for the B-1B aircraft. A large portion of these modifications which are designed to increase the combat capability are known as the Conventional Mission Upgrade Program. In FY93, The Air Force initiated CMUP in FY1993 to improve the B-1’s conventional warfighting capabilities. The $2.7 billion CMUP program is intended to convert the B-1B from a primarily nuclear weapons carrier to a conventional weapons carrier. Capability will be delivered in blocks attained by hardware modifications with corresponding software updates:
- Initial conventional capability was optimized for delivery of Mk-82 non-precision 500lb gravity bombs
- Current capability (Block C) also provides delivery of up to 30 Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs) per sortie for enhanced conventional capability against advancing armor. Initial capability achieved in September 1996 with FOC in August 1997. The upgrade consists of modification for B-1B bomb module from the original configuration of 28 500-pound bombs per unit to 10 1,000-pound cluster bombs per bomb rack. The modifications apply to a total to 50 refitted bomb racks -- enough to equip half the B-1B fleet.
- Block D integrates the ALE-50 repeater decoy system, the first leg of the electronic countermeasures upgrade, and JDAM for near precision capability and adds anti-jam radios for secure communication in force packages. FY96 and FY97 Congressional plus-ups are being used to accelerate JDAM initial capability by 18 months (1QFY99). Congress has provided extra funding to allow a group of seven aircraft to be outfitted and ready a full 18 months early, with the first three JDAM equipped aircraft to be ready by December 1998, and the last of those seven aircraft are planned to arrive at Ellsworth AFB by Feb 99.
- Block E upgrades the current avionics computer suite and integrates Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD), Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) and Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) for standoff capability (FY02)
- Block F improves the aircraft’s electronic countermeasures’ situational awareness and jamming capabilities in FY02
Background
The B-1B is a modified B-1A with major revisions in offensive avionics, defensive avionics, weapon payload, range, and speed. These modifications were made to incorporate certain technological advances that had occurred between the original B-lA contract award in 1970 and the LRCA competition in 1980. Improvements consist primarily of off-the-shelf technology such as a new radar, new generation computers, expanded ECM capabilities, reduced RCS, and avionics compatibility with the ALCM. The wing sweep is restricted to 60 which limits the maximum speed to just above supersonic. Rockwell also estimated range increases for the modified B-1.
Differences between the B-1B and its predecessor, the B-1A of the 1970s, are subtle, yet significant. Externally, only a simplified engine inlet, modified over-wing fairing and relocated pilot tubes are noticeable. Other less-evident changes include a window for the offensive and defensive systems officers' station and engine housing modifications that reduces radar exposure. The B-1B was structurally redesigned to increase its gross takeoff weight from 395,000 to 477,000 pounds (177,750 to 214,650 kilograms). Still, the empty weight of the B-1B is but 3 percent greater than that of the B-1A. This added takeoff weight capacity, in addition to a movable bulkhead between the forward and intermediate weapons bay, allows the B-1B to carry a wide variety of nuclear and conventional munitions. The most significant changes, however, are in the avionics, with low-radar cross-section, automatic terrain-following high-speed penetration, and precise weapons delivery.
Prior to 1994 B-1B fleet had never achieved its objective of having a 75-percent mission capable rate. In 1992 and 1993 the B-1B mission capable rate averaged about 57 percent. According to the Air Force, a primary reason for the low mission capable rate was the level of funding provided to support the B-1B logistics support system. Concerned about the low mission capable rate, a history of B-1B problems, and the Air Force's plans to spend $2.4 billion modifying the B-1B to become a conventional bomber, the Congress directed the Air Force to conduct an Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) from June 1, 1994, through November 30, 1994. The purpose of the ORA was to determine whether one B-1B wing was capable of achieving and maintaining its planned 75-percent operational readiness rate for a period of 6 months, if provided the full complement of spare parts, maintenance equipment and manpower, and logistic support equipment. During the ORA the test unit achieved an 84.3-percent mission capable rate during the test period. The ORA demonstrated that, given a full complement of spare parts, equipment, and manpower, the Air Force could achieve and sustain a 75-percent mission capable rate for the B-1B. The Air Force projects that the entire B-1B fleet will reach a 75-percent mission capable rate by 2000 by virtue of numerous on-going and future reliability, maintainability, and management initiatives. However, as of mid-October 1999 the Air Force wide mission capable rate of the B-1 had fallen to 51.1 percent -- mainly because of maintenance problems and a shortage of parts. Over the previous 12 months, the Kansas Guard had maintained a mission capable rate of 71.1 percent for the 10 usable aircraft assigned to it.
The basis for the projection of useful life of the B-1 is the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP). The useful life of the structure is assumed to be the point at which it is more economical to replace the aircraft than to continue structural modifications and repairs necessary to perform the mission. The limiting factor for B-1’s service life is the wing lower surface. At 15,200 hours, based on continued low level usage, the wing’s lower skin will need replacement. Current usage rates, operational procedures, and mishap attrition will place the inventory below the requirement of 89 aircraft in 2018, while the service life attrition will impact around 2038.
The first B-1B, 83-0065, The Star of Abilene, was delivered to the Air Force at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, in June 1985, with initial operational capability on Oct. 1, 1986. The 100th and final B-1B was delivered May 2, 1988. The Air Force has chosen to fully fund the operation of only 60 B-1Bs for the next few years, compared with plans to fund 82 beyond fiscal year 2000. In the short term, the Air Force has classified 27 of 95 B-1Bs as "reconstitution aircraft." These aircraft are not funded for flying hours and lack aircrews, but they are based with B-1B units, flown on a regular basis, maintained like other B-1Bs, and modified with the rest of the fleet. B-1B units will use flying hours and aircrews that are based on 60 operational aircraft to rotate both the operational aircraft and the reconstitution aircraft through its peacetime flying schedule. These 27 aircraft will be maintained in reconstitution reserve status until the completion of smart conventional munition upgrades. At that time, around the year 2000, there will be 95 aircraft providing an operational force of 82 fully modified B-1s. The B-1 will complete its buy back of attrition reserve by the fourth quarter of FY03, and re-code six training aircraft to attain 70 combat-coded aircraft by the fourth quarter of FY04.
During the Cold War, heavy bombers were used primarily for nuclear deterrence and were operated solely by the active duty Air Force. According to the Air Force, the National Guard's part-time workforce was incompatible with the bombers' nuclear mission because of a requirement for continuously monitoring all personnel directly involved with nuclear weapons. With the end of the Cold War and increased emphasis on the bombers' conventional mission, the Air Force initiated efforts to integrate Guard and reserve units into the bomber force. As part of its total force policy, the Air Force assigned B-1B aircraft to the National Guard. Heavy bombers entered the Air Guard's inventory for the first time in 1994 with a total of 14 B-1Bs programmed by the end of fiscal year FY 1997 for two units, the 184th Bomb Wing (BW), Kansas, and the 116th BW, Georgia. The 184th completed its conversion in FY 1996 at McConnell Air Force Base (AFB), Kansas. After a long political struggle that involved resisting the planned conversion from F-15s and an associated move from Dobbins AFB near Atlanta to Robins AFB near Macon, the 116th began its conversion on 1 April 1996. The unit completed that process in December 1998. All the bombers in both units were configured for conventional, not nuclear, missions.
Prior to 1994, the B-1B fleet operated out of four bases: Dyess Air Force Base, Texas; Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota; McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; and Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. In 1994, the Air Force realigned the B-1B fleet by closing the Grand Forks Air Force Base and transferring the aircraft at McConnell Air Force Base to the Air National Guard. With the transfer, the B-1B support structure, including spare parts, was distributed to the two remaining main operating bases. The concentration of aircraft and repair facilities at Dyess and Ellsworth Air Force Bases resulted in improved support capabilities, which improved mission capable [MC] rates.
On 26 March 1996 it was announced that the 77th Bomb Squadron would return to Ellsworth. On 1 April 97, the squadron again activated at Ellsworth as the geographically separated 34th Bomb Squadron completed its transfer to its home at the 366th Wing, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. By June 1998, the 77th had six of its B-1Bs out of the reconstitution reserve. This number ballanced those lost by the 34th BS.
Upgrades
Cockpit Upgrade Program (CUP) - Current B-1 cockpit display units are not capable of supporting graphic intensive software modifications. The CUP installs a robust graphic capability via common display units throughout the front and aft stations. This program increases B-1 survivability by providing critical situational awareness displays, needed for conventional operations, keeping pace with current and future guided munitions integration, enhancing situational awareness, and improving tactical employment.
Link-16 – Providing Line-of-Sight (LOS) data for aircraft-to-aircraft, aircraft-to-C2, and aircraft-to-sensor connectivity, Link-16 is a combat force multiplier that provides U.S. and other allied military services with fully interoperable capabilities and greatly enhances tactical Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence mission effectiveness. Link-16 provides increased survivability, develops a real-time picture of the theater battlespace, and enables the aircraft to quickly share information on short notice (target changes). In addition to a localized capability, the B-1’s datalink will include BLOS capability increasing flexibility essential to attacking time-sensitive targets.
B-1 Radar Upgrade is a candidate Long Term Upgrade that would improve the current Synthetic Aperture Radar resolution from three meters to one foot or better, allowing the B-1 to more autonomously and precisely Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, and Assess enemy targets with guided direct-attack or standoff munitions (JDAM/JSOW). Finally, the upgrade would replace older components that will be difficult to maintain due to obsolescence and vanishing vendors.
Specifications
|
| Primary Function: |
Long-range, multi-role, heavy bomber |
| Builder: |
Rockwell International, North American Aircraft |
| Operations Air Frame and Integration: |
Offensive avionics, Boeing Military Airplane; defensive avionics, AIL Division |
| Power Plant: |
Four General Electric F-101-GE-102 turbofan engine with afterburner |
| Thrust: |
30,000-plus pounds (13,500-plus kilograms) with afterburner, per engine |
| Length: |
146 feet (44.5 meters) |
| Wingspan: |
137 feet (41.8 meters) extended forward, 79 feet (24.1 meters) swept aft |
| Height: |
34 feet (10.4 meters) |
| Weight: |
Empty, approximately 190,000 pounds (86,183 kilograms) |
| Maximum Takeoff Weight: |
477,000 pounds (214,650 kilograms)
|
| Speed: |
900-plus mph (Mach 1.2 at sea level) |
| Rotate and Takeoff Speeds: |
210 Gross - 119 Rotate kts / 134 kts Takeoff
390 Gross - 168 kts Rotate / 183 kts Takeoff |
| Landing Speeds: |
210 Gross - 145 kts
380 Gross - 195 kts |
| Range: |
Intercontinental, unrefueled |
| Ceiling: |
Over 30,000 feet (9,000 meters)
|
| Crew: |
Four (aircraft commander, pilot, offensive systems officer and defensive systems officer) |
| Armament: |
|
| Date Deployed: |
June 1985 |
| Unit Cost: |
$200-plus million per aircraft |
| Inventory: |
100 total production
93 total current inventory Active force, 51 PMAI (69 actual)
ANG, 18 PMAI (22 actual)
Reserve, 0
AFMC, 2 (Test) Deployment
|
Sources and Resources
- General Accounting Office Reports
- ANNEX F Common Solution/Concept List (U) Air Force Mission Area Plan (MAP) [as of 11 July 1997 - Rev 10] - Detailed and comprehensive Air Combat Command descriptions of weapon system modernization efforts required to satisfy known needs.
- Air Force White Paper on Long-Range Bombers 01 March 1999
- B-1B Systems Program Office - Wright Patterson Air Force Base Ohio
- Conventional Mission Upgrade Program The B-1B CMUP
- B-1B FACT BOOK North American Aircraft NA 95-1210 - CHG 5 - 20 July 1995
- B-1 Bomber Offensive Avionics @ Boeing
- B-1B Aircraft Software Home Page @ Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma
- AN/ALQ-161A Electronic Countermeasure System
- JDAM Homepage
- B-1B Air Combat Command Factsheet
News
- Air Combat Command releases B-1B accident investigation report : Jun 12, 1998
- ACC commander defends role of B-1 : Jun 8, 1998 (AFNS) -- The B-1 can carry more bombs, go faster, and fly just as far as any other bomber, so it's going to be a workhorse, said Gen. Dick Hawley, Air Combat Command commander, during a visit here recently.
- GPS, JDAM communication upgrade kits ready for B-1B Released: May 4, 1998 (AFNS) -- A new weapon will make the B-1B Lancer more lethal and bring the Air Force weapons arsenal into the 21st Century.
- B-1B drops its first guided joint direct attack munition Released: Mar 10, 1998
- Dyess 'stands down' B-1B flying operations Released: February 20, 1998
- B-1B accident investigation report released Released: December 9, 1997
- Air Combat Command moves up safety stand down day Sep 20, 1997 (AFNS) -- At approximately 3:20 p.m. MDT on Sept. 19 a B-1B from the 28th Bomb Wing at Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D., crashed 25 miles north of Alzada, Mont. All four crew members were killed in the crash.
- Robins team delivering on B1-B modification program 970823 -- The air logistics center is working on a modification program which allows a new cluster bomb to be dropped from the B-1B bomber.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/b-1b.htm
Created by John Pike
Maintained by Webmaster
Updated Wednesday, October 13, 1999 9:35:11 AM
24
posted on
02/06/2002 9:28:33 AM PST
by
vannrox
To: Arkle
Eric Miller
Eric Miller has varied experience in teaching, staff and curriculum development, and media production. He has been a classroom teacher in the Ithaca City School District in upstate New York for the past five years. Miller holds an M.A. in education from the University of California at Santa Cruz and a B.A. in cinema from the State University of New York at Binghamton. He is a certified teacher in both New York and California, with a specialization in cross-cultural language and academic development.
In addition, Miller is the assistant director of Project Look Sharp, a media literacy initiative based at Ithaca College that supports teachers in the integration of media literacy into their classroom curricula. Media literacy skills include the ability to access, analyze, critically evaluate, and produce communication in a variety of forms, emphasizing the political, social, and economic implications of media messages and stressing the importance of using media effectively and wisely.
25
posted on
02/06/2002 9:32:54 AM PST
by
vannrox
To: Arkle
Nuclear missiles are much cheaper indeed. I wonder what this author thinks about arming the US solely with nukes. Next time terrorist strike, there won't be F22 precision attack luxury, it's going to be the plow them all nukes. I'm all for it.
To: rdww
I believe they have, especially after Afghanistan. Such a bird would STILL need modifications to make it suitable for the rigors of combat, however. Combat aircraft(and their avionics) get treated far rougher than passenger aircraft in general use. If any company could do it, however, Boeing could.
U.S. aircraft manufacturers cannot be praised enough for their products, civilian OR military.
27
posted on
02/06/2002 4:16:20 PM PST
by
Long Cut
To: vannrox
AWESOME POST! And the bio on the author pretty much sums it up for HIS credibility on this issue. Obviously not a military vet of any kind, and no experience in any defense industry or procurement. Yet, someone thought he had views worth publishing. Sad.
The media need to realize that not every opinion is valid, or worthy of note.
28
posted on
02/06/2002 4:20:16 PM PST
by
Long Cut
To: vannrox;Long Cut
Thanks for the info. Nice pics of the Raptor! When I posted this I was hoping for some more info on these projects.
As far as Miller's credentials go, I was alarmed to see a mention of Ithaca college in his resume. Obviously he's a leftist if he writes for Counterpunch, but I'm not sure if he has to be a fully paid-up member of what Eisenhower called "the military-industrial complex" to be entitled to an opinion on how his tax dollars are spent. At least pieces like his provoke a debate on the subject, even if he's wrong on almost everything.
29
posted on
02/07/2002 2:01:34 AM PST
by
Arkle
To: Arkle
Oh, he is entitled to an opinion. But the opinion itself is not entitled to be heard if it is completely wrong. My complaint is with the media, who assume that an opinion is valid BECAUSE it is contrary, not because it stands up on its own. Some people are of the opinion that the Earth is flat. They have that right. But do we really need to have a debate about it?
I reiterate, not all opinions are valid, or worthy of inclusion.
My opinions on brain surgery, for example, would not be valid.
30
posted on
02/07/2002 2:12:43 PM PST
by
Long Cut
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