If Bush were to use tribunals to try citizens or to punish other crimes, then you might have some reason to object. But the fact of the matter is, the tribunals are legal, constitutional, a common tool in every war, and even acknowledged in international law. (As a matter of fact, combatants not in uniform can be executed without benefit of even a trial before a tribunal, according to the Geneva Conventions.)
For all of our Constitutional scholars here: This order relates to the trial of enemies of the United States, fighting without uniform and attacking civilian and non-military targets, or giving aid and comfort to the same, in a time of war.
For all our reading comprehension scholars here: This order states that any person who is not a citizen of the US is subject to these trials by secret tribunals, if the president, and the president alone, has determined that the individual may be one that is thought to: have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy and it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to this order.
In other words, it applies to every person who is not a citizen. They can, each and every one of them, be executed based on secret evidence and a plurality (not unamimous) of opinion of the military tribunal.
Should this be the international model, or should this sort of power reserved only to us good guys? The US oil executives in Nigeria, and the camera happy tourist in Oman, would like to know.
Interestingly, if one believes that the constitutionality of this sort of military tribunal is established by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), then the distinction that Bush's Executive Order draws between citizens and non-citizens is arguably irrelevant, from the standpoint of constitutional permissibility. One of the accused in the Quirin case, a man by the name of Haupt, while of German descent, contended that he was a naturalized American citizen (although this issue was apparently not free from doubt).
Given the basis for its ruling, the Court found it unnecessary to address the matter of Haupt's putative American citizenship. In this regard, I direct your attention to this passage from the Quirin decision:
"Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war. Cf. Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U.S. 612, 615 , 617 S., 618. It is as an enemy belligerent that petitioner Haupt is charged with entering the United States, and unlawful belligerency is the gravamen of the offense of which he is accused."
317 U.S. at 37-38.