Let us be clear about one thing. This is not a war, and it is not very helpful to keep calling it that. Not only does it stoke the predictable panic that followed the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon but it also dignifies the miserable fanatics against whom the struggle has to be waged.
The British have rightly never called the conflict in Northern Ireland a "war", much to the irritation of the so-called Irish Republican "army". If you fight "wars" against terrorists, you appear to justify their cause.
Fortunately that realisation seems to have percolated through in Washington quite quickly, thanks to the heroic performance of people such as General Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, and the military people in the Pentagon. They have cautioned from the start against any exaggerated ideas about what modern soldiers can do against primitive terrorism.
It is not a war, but it is going to be a long and bitter struggle. And the sheer enormity of the crime has triggered a seismic shift in international relations.
On the one hand, it calls into question the trend in Washington towards unilateralism. That was the inevitable result of the US's being the solitary superpower after the cold war ended. The realisation that America is no longer invulnerable in its own backyard, however, has prompted a rethink about the need for allies.
But more of that later. This quantum leap in terrorist violence is also shaking up a host of international relationships and producing some unlikely winners and losers.
Take Russia. President Vladimir Putin is an obvious winner. Although he faced resistance from old thinkers in his security services, it cannot have taken him long to realise that he had everything to gain from throwing in his lot with President George W. Bush.
For a start, it means that his own struggle against terrorism will be seen in Washington as more justified, even if his brutal tactics in Chechnya are still thought counter-productive.
More important in the long run, it will greatly strengthen the argument that Russia must be brought more fully into the security framework of the west.
Mr Putin is a man who monitors public opinion with the intensity of his western counterparts. He knew that the terrorist attacks had produced a new wave of pro-American sympathy in the Russian population, for the first time since the early 1990s. With his popularity waning because of the Chechen stalemate, he needed a new cause.
As for the threat of US intrusion in former Soviet central Asia, his calculation seems to be that, by offering Russian logistical support, he may be better able politely to ask the Americans to leave at the other end.
Mind, several of those central Asian republics will undoubtedly see themselves as winners precisely because they can counterbalance Russia's dominance with greater US involvement. They do not want to remain Russian vassals indefinitely. They also feel threatened by Islamist extremists.
Yet all the central Asian republics have precarious political stability and authoritarian leaders. If they get sucked into a wider regional conflict, triggered by action in Afghanistan, they could be destabilised.
China will not be bothered by such doubts: it looks an obvious winner. Those Republican conservatives in Washington who see Beijing as the real enemy of the 21st century are falling silent. China will not be criticised so publicly for seeking to suppress Islamic unrest in Xinjiang. It has little to lose.
One country that should have been an obvious winner may yet end up a loser because of its own internal divisions. That is Iran. As probably the most ferocious opponent of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Tehran has much to offer an anti-Taliban coalition. Although it can scarcely become a wholehearted supporter of the US campaign without losing all credibility, its benevolent neutrality would be helpful. But the deep division between conservatives and reformers in Iran seems set to prevent it exploiting its advantage.
Israel, on the other hand, could easily be a loser if it does not take care. It has no choice other than to support the US-led coalition, but that leaves it with less influence. The fact that Ariel Sharon, the prime minister, misread the situation so badly in the first days after September 11, and used the terrorist attacks as an opportunity to step up his military actions has weakened his position in Washington even more. It certainly did not help build moderate Arab support for the campaign.
"Mr Sharon does not have a lot of friends in this city at the moment," says Wayne Merry, senior associate at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington. "My impression is that (the Israelis) are under a lot of pressure, but there are efforts to keep that pressure under wraps."
The other traditional US ally in the Middle East that could be badly affected is Saudi Arabia. Its hesitant support for Washington has been obvious. If it is too enthusiastic, it risks a domestic backlash from sympathisers of Osama bin Laden. If it is too hesitant, the US may simply insist, with a similar effect.
The other two key players whose advantage is in the balance are India and Pakistan. India should be the obvious winner. It can point to many links between Islamic militants in the disputed territory of Kashmir and Mr bin Laden's network. Delhi instantly offered the US full access to its air and naval facilities. But it may have overplayed its hand.
As long as Mr bin Laden is the primary focus, Pakistan is critical to the US campaign. Precisely because Washington knows Gen Pervez Musharraf's position is so precarious, the US is determined to be generous in both economic and political support. It does not help for India to be stepping up its demands for a crackdown on Pakistan-based Kashmiri militants.
All of this means a very difficult balancing act for Washington. The complexities may well play into the hands of those who would have America go it alone. Fortunately, Gen Powell seems to be winning the argument so far. The United Nations is being bound into the process, ensuring that the coalition is as broad as possible. That is a very positive sign.
But the tussle between the unilateralists and the multilateralists is certainly not over. If, or rather when, the struggle against terrorism spreads beyond Afghanistan, it will be far more difficult to keep the coalition together and prove that it is the best way of winning the non-war.
quentin.peel@ft.com
Copyright: The Financial Times Limited
My only comment is that what the British have with the IRA is, indeed, terrorism that should not be dignified with the term "war". The militant Arabs are not common criminals: they represent a consistent worldview with its own notion of right and wrong, and they view us as evil. If the British had a system of justice that put the IRA thugs behind bars for life and didn't negotiate with them, their problem would be soon over. Not so in our case. Ours is war, not a police action.