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Posted on 10/07/2003 12:00:10 AM PDT by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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During the final months of the Second World War, the belief that Hitler might flee the German capital of Berlin to a fortified Alpine position in the south was a serious consideration within SHAEF. This position became known as the German National Redoubt, or Alpenfestung (Alpine Fortress) as it was called by those Germans involved. According to Allied Intelligence, this Redoubt would hold considerable foodstuffs and military supplies built up over the preceding months and would even include entire weapon production facilities. Hitler would rely upon his personal guard, the fanatical Shutzstaffel (SS), and chosen Wehrmacht units, to man the carefully prepared defensive positions. Within this fortified terrain, Hitler would be able to forestall any Allied victory and cause tremendous difficulties for the occupying Allied forces throughout Germany.  General Dwight Eisenhower While the German capital was considered the natural and expected target for the Allied armed forces since their arrival on the beaches of Normandy in June of 1944, Berlin was relegated to secondary status in the closing months of the war. Eisenhower instead sent the bulk of his forces through the centre of Germany, and cut the remaining German territory in half to prevent further German forces from withdrawing into this allegedly fortified alpine zone, before ordering his armies to swing south and overrun the Redoubt zone itself. While the Russian Red Army was waging its historic battle for Berlin in late April and May of 1945, the Allied armies were sent charging into southern Germany, attacking a Redoubt that simply did not exist. This last statement obviously requires some explanation. The National Redoubt, specifically as early Allied intelligence described it, filled with crack SS units and complete with hundreds of defensive positions linked by a maze of tunnels, did not exist. Bradley stated in his postwar memoirs that the Redoubt "grew into so exaggerated a scheme that I am astonished we could have believed it as innocently as we did. But while it persisted, this legend of the Redoubt was too ominous a threat to be ignored." During his postwar interrogation, the German officer placed in charge of the Redoubt defences, General Georg von Hengl, believed that the Allies suffered from what he termed as "Redoubt psychosis." Eisenhower had pointed out after the war that his staff was soundly professional and not a "group of people that gives way to hysterical emotion." Yet SHAEF was concerned enough about the Redoubt to give this possible threat as one of three reasons to shift their main thrust away from Berlin to Southern Germany in April 1945. Eisenhower, in his final report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, stated that although the Redoubt was ultimately not to be the final seat of the Nazi government; . . . the possibility remained that it would still be the scene of a desperate stand by the fanatical elements of the armies [once Germany had been cut in two by the Allies] together with those which might retreat northward out of Italy . . . The conquest of the Redoubt area thus remained as an important objective of the Allies, despite the collapse of the rest of Germany . . . In the event of determined resistance, its reduction would constitute a formidable problem . . .  The "National Redoubt", or Alpenfestung, extending some 240 miles in length and 80 miles in depth, comprised the western half of Austria, with small portions of Germany to the north and Italy to the south. It was bounded on the north by the Bavarian Plains, on the south by the Dolomites and Carnic Alps, on the west by the Swiss frontier and the Rhine Valley, and on the east by the Lageneurt Basin and the eastern extremity of the Niedere Tauern. Within it lay Berchtesgaden and Hitler's "Eagle's Nest" that was to serve as the command post.  It is also interesting to note the reaction of SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, British General Kenneth Strong, whose post-war comments are key to understanding the hold the Redoubt would come to have on the Allied intelligence network. Strong was considered one of the best intelligence officers in the Allied forces, yet even he stated that considering the complete shock achieved by the Germans with the Ardennes Offensive, he was loathe to take any more chances with the Germans, even if the Redoubt proved a myth.66 Stephen E. Ambrose, a historian with a long and scholarly interest in Eisenhower and the Second World War, described some of the early intelligence produced by SHAEF concerning the Redoubt to be "the worst intelligence reports of all time, but no one knew that in March of 1945, and few even suspected it." Bearing in mind the advanced state of collapse within the German Reich during the final months of the war, the question of why SHAEF considered the Redoubt a more pressing concern than capturing the German capital remains.  Berchtesgaden Eisenhower's decision to abandon a northern advance to Berlin and instead target those remaining German forces in the south was explained in a variety of ways. Many of the reasons supplied by SHAEF are identical to those given for targeting the Redoubt zone in the south. For example, the capture of the Remagen bridge and the subsequent capture of the Ruhr, which gave the Allies a considerable beachhead into central, not northern, Germany, while removing a significant number of divisions from the German Order-of-Battle from the north. As well, the future zones of occupation, which placed Berlin deep in the future Russian zone, also placed the remaining German forces massing in the Redoubt area in the future American zone. Thus, if the Redoubt were to become operational, it would be primarily an American problem. Bradley pointed out after the war that leaving Berlin to the Russians should never have been an issue. The Americans wanted to clear out their zone of occupation, not the Russian zone. Also in Part One, Eisenhower appeared convinced that the Germans had only three remaining avenues of resistance available; a falling out among the Allies, the Werwolf-Guerrilla movement, and the National Redoubt. The National Redoubt, also rumoured to be the base of operations for the Werwolf movement, was also to be in the south. Thus, Eisenhower was able to address all three of these remaining avenues of resistance by shifting his forces south. While the Redoubt did not take the form SHAEF was expecting, this is not to say there was nothing in the area at all, and most certainly the Redoubt zone itself did pose a particular military threat. The natural terrain of the area heavily favoured the defender. There were some defensive positions completed on the northern approaches and the southern defences, originally designed for the Italian theatre, were complete. Thus, with a determined force and a little time to prepare, the Redoubt zone would be a significant problem for attacking forces.  Berchtesgaden Indeed, the Wehrmacht had made extensive surveys of the Alpine area. Most were done in 1943 as Italy was knocked out of the war and the Allies were landing forces in southern Italy. The Wehrmacht was ordered to do extensive planning for a defence in depth of the southern Italian Alps, believing that the Allies would move swiftly up the Italian nation. The Allies faltered, however, and Hitler was able to rush considerable German forces into Italy, holding the Allied armies far away from the alpine approaches. As the Allies slowly inched their way up the Italian peninsula between 1943-1944 these original plans for such defences began to once again gain credence. As a result, the construction of a defence in depth with fortified positions and stores of equipment was begun in early 1944. These positions were completed and ready for use that same year. Although they originally had no relation to the Redoubt plan as a whole, both the Germans and the Allies would later see their existence as perfectly fitting in with the feared Redoubt. By 1945, the Italian campaign forced the Allied troops to fight in increasingly mountainous terrain, where their superiority in material and equipment was largely negated. During the Allied Chiefs of Staff Conference on February 5th, 1945, it was concluded that the terrain so favoured the defending Wehrmacht forces that it would be possible for the Germans to withdraw ten divisions to other fronts (approximately one-third of their forces) and it would not give the Allies a significant advantage.  Any discussion of the Redoubt must take into consideration where Eisenhower was getting his information about the proposed Alpine Fortress, and it is here that the most serious miscalculations lie. The various intelligence services that provided the Allied commanders with their data regarding German intentions have become, in the post-war decades, the favoured target for any discussion regarding the Redoubt. Both the military and civilian intelligence sections failed to properly recognize the Redoubt for the chimera it truly was. It should be noted that the failure of the intelligence systems was not that they were reporting the Redoubt threat, as all information on the enemy's situation and possible future actions was important, but that they should have been able to prove that it did not exist in the manner that was feared. As late as May 1st, 1945, less than a week before the unconditional surrender of the German forces, some of the Allied intelligence summaries were concerned that activity was increasing in the Redoubt zone, yet admitted that the reports coming in were still inconclusive and unconfirmed.  Berchtesgaden The Allied intelligence system during the war, according to some involved, was flawed. Some of the more spectacular failings include, for example, the hedgerows of Normandy. Here the Germans slowed the Allies to a crawl even after the British warned the Americans that this unique terrain had been used to great effect by the British and French forces in their evacuation from France in 1940, and these warnings went largely unheeded. As well, there was also the failure of intelligence officers to warn the Allied forces during Operation Market-Garden that considerable German armoured forces were in the area undergoing re-fitting. Also, there was the failure in intelligence to foresee the German Offensive through the Ardennes during the months of December 1944 and January 1945. In every instance it was later discovered that enough evidence existed to show the German intentions, particularly in the Ardennes, but was simply not properly seen for what it was. The blame for such failures certainly cannot be placed upon any specific individual, but possibly on the inexperience of the Allied system when dealing with such problems. The fog of war notwithstanding, it should be noted that such criticisms come not only from historians with the luxury of hindsight, but several key individuals involved with Allied Intelligence writing after the war. So voluminous was the intelligence provided, that one former intelligence officer stated that its quantity eventually spoiled the Allied Command. The shock of the Ardennes Offensive, however, coming when the Germans were considered incapable of carrying out such an attack, appeared to have prepared the Allied command and their intelligence networks for the Redoubt myth. As stated, Strong later wrote in his memoirs that his own "view about the National Redoubt, was that it might not be there, but that we nevertheless had to take steps to prevent it being established. After the Ardennes, I was taking no more chances with the Germans." Considering the complete surprise achieved by the Germans, it is perhaps more easily explainable that the Allies would believe the Germans capable of another logistical miracle, this time in the Alps.  Berchtesgaden As early as February 18th, 1945, SHAEF also concluded that "there [was] some slight evidence of a determination to hold an inner fortress in the Austrian Alpine provinces." Included in this early report is the determination to track certain German units, specifically: [w]here panzer, panzer grenadier, parachute, and especially SS divisions are concentrated, however, fanatical resistance will undoubtedly be met with. Indeed, any abnormal concentration of divisions should provide good evidence of the area where Nazi leaders plan to make a stand. This tracking of specific German units in order to determine where the Nazi leadership may force a final stand would become key to the Redoubt. This report also makes clear that, in the opinion of SHAEF, the capture of Berlin itself would not lead to a collapse of German resistance. Finally, they stated that while the actual readiness of the Redoubt was not known, "[t]he extent of the area held and the duration of German resistance would depend on how swiftly the Allies could penetrate this difficult country."  Churchhill at the Fuhrerbunker In their own intelligence report of March 20th, Bradley's 12th Army Group stated that "[f]ield fortifications are reported in progress . . . [with] artillery depots [also being] reported," along with a wide variety of other supplies being sent into the alpine zone. One week later, the 12th Army went into even greater detail, and stated that: the [fortifications included] numerous vaults embedded in the natural elevations of the ground. Since April 1944 an increasing amount of ammunition has been coming into the vaults, with nothing leaving . . . A considerable amount of ammunition has also been stored above ground. . . Ground sources report an underground factory . . . (possibly for making flying bombs), [and another] underground factory . . . for the production of Messerschmidt engines and possibly for V-weapons . . . Ground sources report food supplies for 20,000 persons for 18 months, with arms and ammunition for an even longer period are stored in the erchtesgaden area. Each day about 450 trucks with supplies [were] going towards Berchtesgaden. One of the worst intelligence summaries concerning the Redoubt was submitted by SHAEF in their Weekly Intelligence Summary of March 11th, 1945. Within this report, Allied intelligence laid out the physical description of the proposed Redoubt, which they believed consisted of most of Austria, parts of Southern Germany and Northern Italy. Here, they stated that: defended both by nature and by the most efficient secret weapons yet invented, the powers that have hitherto guided Germany will survive to organize [their] resurrection; here armaments will be manufactured in bombproof factories, food and equipment will be stored in vast underground caverns and specially selected corps of young men will be trained in guerrilla warfare, so that a whole underground army can be fitted and directed to liberate Germany from the occupying forces.  Heinrich Himmler This report expressed concern that "the main trend of German defence policy does seem directed primarily to the safeguarding of the alpine zone." As well, it stated specifically that air reconnaissance showed at least twenty sites of activity within the proposed Redoubt zone that appeared suspicious in nature, including fortifications and other preparations. SHAEF also continued to track German troop deployments, specifically that: considerable numbers of SS and specially chosen units are being systematically withdrawn to Austria; that a definite allocation of each day's production of food, equipment and armaments is sent there; and that engineer units are being engaged on some type of defence activity at the most vital strategic points . . . It seems reasonably certain that some of the most important ministries and personalities of the Nazi regime are already established in the Redoubt area. This report is fascinating considering the complete overreaction to the Redoubt myth as seen in post-war light. While many of these suspected Redoubt facilities were not found in photoreconnaissance missions, some others were, thus adding to the confusion at SHAEF.
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<=== Mash This
View of the Platterhof shortly following the April 1945 bombing and the end of the war. Note the camouflage patterns applied to the roofs and walls - a futile attempt to disguise the buildings from aerial attack (Hitler's Berghof was similarly camouflaged). (U.S. Army photo)
The Platterhof, later renamed General Walker Hotel, was the centerpiece of the Armed Forces Recreation Centers Berchtesgaden 'resort'. Hitler's Eagles Nest is up the mountain behind the viewer in this picture.
Mercy . . . part II is going to require a second read. What an operation!
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