The mainstay of the German defense was its artillery. When the battle opened, General Hans Schmidt, the 275th Division Commander, controlled 25 pieces of motorized artillery (9 105mm, 6 150mm, and 10 122mm howitzers) plus had within his sector another 106 field pieces ranging in size from 88mm to 210mm, for at total of 131 tubes of artillery, not counting mortars, versus 96 pieces of artillery, counting corps artillery, that could support the 4th US Division. Schmidt's division also had twenty-one assault guns, twenty-two 75mm anti-tank guns and one 88mm anti-tank gun. And for the first time in months, the Germans had a good supply of ammunition. This was just the beginning strength. As units cycled into the battle, more artillery and more German regiments entered the line between the 22d and its objective, Grosshau. North and south of Grosshau were the I and III Battalions of the 1055 Regiment of the 89th Division and the II Battalion of the 1058 Regiment, 344th Volksgrenadier Division, was positioned in the center. While these regiments were from different divisions, the 275th commander, General Schmidt, remained in overall command of the sector. When the American attack resumed on 20 November, fresh German units faced them.
It appears throughout the battle that newly arrived German units acted as counter attack forces until they too became exhausted. On 21 November, the 344th VG Division replaced the 275th VG Division. The original 344th had been destroyed in the German retreat across France and rebuilt in October from remnants of the 344th and they had little time to train together. The surviving infantry soldiers of the 275th transferred to the 344th.
The 344th had no experience in woods fighting and was unfamiliar with the terrain. It is no wonder that only six days later, the 353d VG relieved the remnants of the 344th. This was the 353d's second stint in the Hurtgen, since it had been relieved by the 275th VG in early October so that it might reconstitute. Again the remaining infantry of the relieved division was absorbed by the incoming division. Quite possibly some of the German soldiers transferred to the 353d VG had been in that division before it was pulled out for reconstitution, remaining in the woods with the each successive headquarters.
The 22d met in turn, units of four German divisions during its eighteen day ordeal in the forest. When Grosshau fell on 29 November, the 22d Infantry reported that there were German units in the town from almost every division in the LXXIV Corps. As noted in Figure 8, the 250 captured prisoners represented four different divisions, eight different regiments, and forty-seven different company-sized elements. The regimental intelligence officer reported that he could not find a complete squad.
The morale and overall quality of the German forces facing the Americans in the Hurtgen was low. The units were a hodgepodge from everywhere. Intermingled as they were, therut. In their hopeless resignation some became fatalists, others sought consolation in religion. After collapse of the confidence in its leadership, the troops, in point of fact, continued fighting only for their personal security.
German division commanders in the Hurtgen sector ordered their soldiers not to retreat or surrender. The option to retreat closed; many preferred to surrender than face their superior's wrath for retreating.
Although many expressed a desire to surrender, fear for their families held many lower ranking German soldiers in place. During this period of the war, it was standard practice for German officers to require their soldiers to sign loyalty oaths. German soldiers also faced the threat of their families imprisonment in concentration camps if they deserted. Some divisions posted names of those who had deserted or been captured and used them as warnings to other soldiers in the division not to surrender.
Additional Sources:
www.5ad.org
www.hurtgen1944.homestead.com
www.army.mil
members.aeroinc.net
