The FReeper Foxhole Remembers The Hurtgen Forest (Nov - Dec 1944) - Sep. 16th, 2003

Army Historical Foundation ^ | Robert S. Rush

[SAMWolf]

Lord,

Keep our Troops forever in Your care

Give them victory over the enemy...

Grant them a safe and swift return...

Bless those who mourn the lost.
.

FReepers from the Foxhole join in prayer
for all those serving their country at this time.

God Bless America
...................................................................................... ...........................................

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Hell in the Forest:

The 22d Infantry Regiment in the Battle of Hurtgen Forest

On 16 November 1944, the 4th Infantry Division attacked into the Hurtgen Forest as one of the ten divisions participating in Operation Queen, a combined offensive by the First and Ninth U.S. Armies to seize the Rhine River crossings into Germany.

As one of the infantry regiments of the 4th Division, the 22d Infantry spent 18 days in November and early December 1944 in the Hurtgen Forest. In a battle many believed mattered little in the big picture, the 22d suffered 2,773 casualties, or 85% of its normal complement of 3,257 soldiers, to take one village and 6,000 yards of forest. Each rifle company went into action averaging 162 soldiers. Seven days later the rifle companies averaged 87. Even this number required 42% replacements. By the end of the battle, losses of the rifle companies reached an estimated 151% of their original strength.

Although the 22d Infantry suffered these very heavy casualties, the U.S. Army's practice of replacing casualties while units were still in combat kept the unit from ever falling below 75% strength. Total replacements amounted to 1,988 soldiers. GEN Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr vonGersdorf, chief of staff for the German Seventh Army, called the fighting in the Hurtgen worse than anything he had seen on the Russian Front, and compared it in intensity to the battles of attrition conducted during the last two years of World War I.

The terrain and weather negated the impact of American superiority in aviation and armor and made the battle an infantryman's fight from beginning to end. Although massive amounts of artillery fire assisted the forward movement of the regiment, the infantry still had to take the ground. The entire ergion was crossed by a series of ridges running north to south. The area was thickly wooded with great hardwood and fir trees standing 75 to 100 feet tall. The bodies of the firs hugged close to the ground and interlocked with their neighbors, making it appear as if the forest were a sea of green, which th mid-day sun seldom broke through, leaving an eerie twilight effect. This combination of terrain and vegetation forced wheeled vehicles and tanks onto the few trails and firebreaks running through the woods. Almost nothing is worse for an infantryman's morale than to be wet and cold and to know he has little chance of drying out. Throughout November, temperatures in the Hurtgen remained near freezing, with a seemingly never-ending mizture of snow, sleet and rain.



The 22d was neither poorly trained nor led. LTG J. Lawton Collins, the VII Corps Commander and later the Army Chief of Staff, considered the 22d one of the premier infantry regiments in the European Theater of Operations. It had been formed in 1940 and at the time of the Hurtgen battle, most of its officers at the company level and above had been with the regiment since 1942. By all accounts, the regiment's commander, COL Charles T. Lanham, and his battalion commanders, were effective leaders. Officers at the platoon level were primarily Officer Candidate School graduates who had joined the unit after it had landed at Utah Beach. Many of the enlisted soldiers, especially the NCOs, had been with the unit during its training in the United States and Britain.

The attack began at 1245 hours on 16 November. Although the 22d made good gains during the first day, it fell short of its initial objectives. Then, as one soldier stated, "all hell broke loose." During the next two days, every battalion commander was killed or wounded as were many of the small unit leaders. Gains were measured in yards as German artillery pounded the advancing Americans. Mines blocked the muddy roads and the injured had to be hand-carried 1,500 yards back to the Regimental aid station. Tanks and other vehicles could not get forward to help the infantry. German counterattacks supported by armor limited the advance. Some companies were down to 50 effectives and the 2d Battalion in the south was particularly hard hit. The attack paused again the next day to clear the rear areas of German infiltrators and to put in a bridge across a stream so that supplies could be moved forward to the beleagured units. In the early morning of 22 November, the 3d Battalion executed a left hook around the German defenses and advanced about 500 yards, cutting the road leading into the village of Grosshau. In the south, the 2d Battalion was hit by two counterattacks, one tank supported. The American tanks could not get through the thick woods and it was up to the infantry to defeat the attack, but with heavy casualties. The open southern flank was so serious that on ecompany from the 1st Battalion and an ad hoc organization of 100 replacements were sent to hold the line there. The 23rd and 24th were days of comparable rest, while the regiment refittred and reorganized while waiting for the 12th Infantry to secure the southern flank. Turkey sandwhiches and "luke cold coffee" went forward to the rifle companies of Thanksgiving Day, the 24th. This was the only hot meal to be served to the soldiers of the line during the 18-day battle.



The 22d Infantry, heavily reinforced by armor, artillery and engineers, launched its attack to seize Grosshau on 25 November. The 3d Battalion again executed a left hook and found its initial move to the forest edge north of Grosshau easy. It then took three hours for the tanks to make their way through the woods and come on line with the infantry. By that time, the Germans were waiting. Six tanks were destroyed in a matter of minutes and the infantry was driven back into the trees by a massive artillery barrage. The 2d Battalion also made it to the edge of the woods south of Grosshau, but not before sustaining heavy casualties. Nine battalions of artillery, ranging from 105mm to 240mm howitzers, then fired against the village, but to little effect against the German soldiers safely ensconced in the cellars. More leaders in the 22d fell on this day than on any other day of battle. The following day was quiet except for one company committed to close the gap between the 2d and 3d Battalions. After gaining its objective it was thrown back by a German tank supported attack boiling out of Grosshau.

The one Medal of Honor awarded to a member of the 22d during World War II occured the following day when another company attacked close to the breach. PFC Marcario Garcia, while acting as a squad leader, single-handedly knocked out two machine guns that were holding up the attack. Another company rushed to assist the assaulting company in holding the ground gained. At the end of the day, combined strength of both units stood at 70 soldiers, or less than two full-strength platoons. By 27 November, more than half of the regiment's soldiers had fallen; almost as many replacements (1,640) had arrived as there were soldiers in the rifle companies at full strength.



On the morning of the 29th, the 3d Battalion attacked north and then east around the German defenses in Grosshau, cutting the road leading from the village to the town of Gey, located on the Roer plain. During the 3d Battalion's advance, COL Lanham received orders to take Grosshau by direct assault. Only the company that had been holding the line between the 2d and 3d Battalions was in position to make the attack. It was rapidly pinned down with heavy casualties and remained in that predicament for three hours until an American tank force from the south appeared to take some of the pressure off the infantry. The fight for Grosshau continued house to house into the night and was finally declared secure just before midnight.

There was no pause after Grossau, although there was now a break in the woods and soldiers could see the sunlight. The 22d continued its push to the edge of the forest overlooking the Roer plain. Because of the regiment's weakened state, the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion was attached to seize a line of departure for the 5th Armored Division south of the 2d Battalion. But it and the 2nd Battalion met extrememly heavy fire when they advanced across the open fields. Both made it to the far woodline, but had to pull back because there were not enough men to hold the line.



On 1 December, the two battalions again attacked under a horrific artillery barrage. The 46th, after making some gains, was forced back to its line of departure. The 2d Battalion was hit by a counterattack and the reserve company was rushed forward to stabilize the line. The fighting strength of the 2d Battalion was down to 124 soldiers in its three rifle companies, or just about two-thirds of a full-strength company. COL Lanham organized a last-ditch regimental reserve composed of headquarters, service, and anti-tank soldiers, which totaled about 100 men.

Before the regiment could continue the attack the following day, the 3d Battalion was hit by a German counterattack from Gey and had one of its companies overrun and enemy soldiers penetrate up to the command posts of the 1st and 3d Battalions. Rather than withdraw, Lanham committed his reserve and told his units to "hold on and fight." The German penetration was shortly wiped out by infantry and tanks. The line was restored. Because of its heavy losses, MG Raymond O. Barton, the 4th Division commander, requested that the 22d be relieved "because the had attacked until there was no attack left in them." The next day, the 330th Infantry, 83d Infantry Division, began relieving the 22d on the line. Just prior to the relief, on eof the 1st Battalion's companies was hit by another German attack. It was partially overrun, but the headquarters elements of the three rifle companies, as well as soldiers from the heavy weapons company, closed the breach. Later during the day the German Luftwaffe sortied and about 30 German aircraft bombed and strafed the area, but with few American casualties. The 22d pulled out of the forest on 3 December and headed for Luxembourg. Its battle in the Hurtgen Forest was over.



The 22d Infantry entered the Hurtgen Forest expecting a low-cost success. Instead, the regiment fought its way through the woods virtually unsupported in a battle of attrition against three German divisions and elements of two others. Although the 22d suffered more casualties than any other unit in the Hurtgen, it lost no ground that was not immediately rcovered. The last days of the battle saw fresh German battalions breaking through decimated companies of the 22d, only to be cut off, killed or captured by other equally understrength companies rushed into the battle. During the battle, the 22d captured 764 Germans. There is no existing casualty figures for German units, outside of those captured. However, it must be assumed that Herman casualties were at least as high, if not higher, than those of the 22d. German companies suffered the same fate as the 22d's, but they lacked the ability to regenerate and were burned in the flame of Hurtgen.

The regiment kept fighting as long as it contained soldiers who had trained together in the United States or who had significant previous combat experience with the regiment. These veterans provided a pool of competent soldiers to replace the junior officers and NCOs when they either became casualties or were promoted during the battle. As long as there were veterans around whom the replacements could coalesce, the regiment moved forward. The loss of these small unit leaders quite possibly dealt a more deadly blow to the regiment's ability to attack than did the loss of the commanders of every rifle company and battalion. The backbone of the regiment was the soldiers, officers and enlisted, who had trained together in the United States.

[snippy_about_it]

'Tis a strange place where normal thinking holds no sway.

LOL.

Neither does logical thinking. I tried it and it failed as always. I don't know why I even bother.

[Darksheare]

Well, it was worth the attempt.
Logical thinking often imbalances the furies that control 'that realm', and will often lead to many an amusing meeting.

[snippy_about_it]

Good morning Jinxy.

[snippy_about_it]

Good Morning w/w.

I'm getting ready to read the thread at lunch today. I've heard of it of course, however I know today I will learn the details. :)

[SAMWolf]

I still European Air War on my machine.

I've played all three Half-Life games and am waiting for Half_life 2. Good series. I liked Opposing Force best

For a good tongue in check game, play "No One Lives Forever"

NOLF2 just came out, on my list of games to get.

[Darksheare]

Waiting on Half-Life 2 as well.
Saw the 'game engine demonstartor' demo and am waiting for it to launch.
Fall '03..

NOLF, gonna have to look it up.

[SAMWolf]

It's a first person shooter, but done tongue-in-check, it's a fun game.

[SAMWolf]

How and why so many wonderful young people were sacrificed and for what purpose poses an interesting question. It has been said that the battle for the Hürtgen Forest was based on a plan that was grossly, even criminally stupid. There does not appear to be any arguments to the contrary. The statement that, "The months-long battle of the Hürtgen Forest was a loser that our top brass never seemed to want to talk about" seems to say it all. Who can be blamed? Probably no one person in particular, but just about everyone who had anything to do with its planning or its implementation.

Headquarters personnel from battalion on up to Corps and Army found themselves good billets and seldom strayed near the front. Of course there were notable exceptions, but in general the American officers handing down the orders to attack and assigning the objectives had no idea what it was like at the front. Combat veterans said that only on the rarest of occasions was any officer above the rank of captain or officer from the staff ever seen.

The first step down the road to this disaster can be traced to the following order:

COMBAT UNITS ARE AUTHORIZED TO BASE DAILY REPLACEMENT REQUISITIONS ON ANTICIPATED LOSSES FORTY EIGHT HOURS IN ADVANCE TO EXPEDITE DELIVERY OF REPLACEMENTS. TO AVOID BUILDING UP OVER STRENGTH, ESTIMATES SHOULD BE MADE WITH CARE. SIGNED EISENHOWER.

This order was based on the necessity of providing replacements for battle losses in time to insure that the initiative would not be lost in battle situations where the enemy was on the run but might recover if replacements were not quickly available. Unfortunately, the order enabled inept staff officers to bring in replacements at such a fast pace that companies and even divisions could take tremendous losses that only could be acceptable because of this replacement policy. The officers making these decisions were never close enough to the front lines to be in danger themselves so they were always around to continue to make more costly mistakes.

At the Hürtgen Forest battle, it was Generals Bradley and General Hodges who were responsible for these costly mistakes. They used this procedure but failed to put into place any checks to determine if this policy could be causing excessive loss of troops. This was the weakness of the plan and unfortunately, no one ever bothered to check it out.

The blame for this catastrophe was a failure of the generals at the highest levels. The officers from the level of captain down to freshly commissioned lieutenants and enlisted men from sergeants down to the newest recruits, performed and died with such courage that all Americans should be forever proud of them. Taking the time to read this account and consider its implications might diminish the possibility of this type of disaster happening again. Then again, maybe not.

Ernest A. Herr

[Darksheare]

I know, I've seen it and eyeballed it a few times.
I'll just have to see what it's current price is.
(I'm a penny pincher when it comes to such things..)

[snippy_about_it]

Thank you SAM for the story of the The Hurtgen Forest.

It was a miserable place to fight, not that there are any good places, but some better than others I expect.




Grosshau, Germany 1944

[snippy_about_it]

RAY, BERNARD J. (POSTHUMOUSLY)

RANK AND ORGANIZATION: First Lieutenant, U.S. Army, Company F, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division.



PLACE AND DATE: Hurtgen Forest near Schevenhutte, Germany, 17 November 1944.

ENTERED SERVICE AT: Baldwin, New York

BORN: Brooklyn, New York

G.O. # 115, 8 December 1945

CITATION: He was platoon leader with Company F, 8th Infantry, on 17 November 1944, during the drive through the Hurtgen Forest near Schevenhutte, Germany. The American forces attacked in wet, bitterly cold weather over rough, wooded terrain, meeting brutal resistance from positions spaced throughout the forest behind mine fields and wire obstacles. Small arms, machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire caused heavy casualties in the ranks when Company F was halted by a concertina type wire barrier.

Under heavy fire, 1st Lt. Ray reorganized his men and prepared to blow a path through the entanglement, a task which appeared impossible of accomplishment and from which others tried to dissuade him. With implacable determination to clear the way, he placed explosive caps in his pockets, obtained several bangalore torpedoes, and then wrapped a length of highly explosive primer cord about his body. He dashed forward under direct fire, reached the barbed wire and prepared his demolition charge as mortar shell, which were being aimed at him alone, came steadily nearer his completely exposed position.

He had placed a torpedo under the wire and was connecting it to a charge he carried when he was severely wounded by a bursting mortar shell. Apparently realizing that he would fail in his self imposed mission unless he completed it in a few moments, he made a supremely gallant decision.

With the primer cord still wound about his body and the explosive caps in his pocket, he completed a hasty wiring system and unhesitatingly thrust down on the handle of the charger, destroying himself with the wire barricade in the resulting blast. By the deliberate sacrifice of his life, 1st Lt. Ray enabled his company to continue its attack, resumption of which was of positive significance in gaining the approaches to the Cologne Plain.

[snippy_about_it]

Great additional info on the Generals and who was "in charge". Are you reading my mind?

[Darksheare]

Ouch.
Split second decision to save the rest of the group and complete the task at hand by detting himself.
God grant him peace for his decision, I'm sure it was pretty hard to make.

[snippy_about_it]

God grant him peace for his decision, I'm sure it was pretty hard to make.

Amen, Darksheare.

Thanks.

[SAMWolf]

The original should be pretty cheap now unless the bumped up the price with the release of NOLF2.

[SAMWolf]

With the primer cord still wound about his body and the explosive caps in his pocket, he completed a hasty wiring system and unhesitatingly thrust down on the handle of the charger, destroying himself with the wire barricade in the resulting blast. By the deliberate sacrifice of his life, 1st Lt. Ray enabled his company to continue its attack, resumption of which was of positive significance in gaining the approaches to the Cologne Plain.

I never cease to be amazed at the quality of men this country produces.

[SAMWolf]

Yeah, you'd almost swear it was a Monty operation wouldn't you.

[SAMWolf]

The Hürtgen Forest, covering roughly fifty square miles just south of ancient city of Aachen along the German- Belgium border, was described by those who were there, as a "weird and wild" place. It was not a primeval forest but it was hand planted in modern times at the order of the German General staff to take the most advantage of every hill and valley using the thick spruce and balsams squat limbs to the ground like football linemen challenging advance. Here "the near one hundred feet tall dark pine trees and dense tree-tops gave the place, even in daytime, a somber appearance which was apt to cast gloom upon sensitive people." It was like a green cave, always dripping water, the firs interlocked their lower limbs so that everyone had to stoop, all the time. The forest floor, in almost perpetual darkness, was devoid of underbrush. Add to this gloom, a mixture of sleet, snow, rain, cold, fog and almost knee deep mud. This was to be setting for the most tragic battle of World War II.

After the war, German General Rolf van Gersdorff commented, "I have engaged in the long campaigns in Russia as well as other fronts and I believe the fighting in the Hürtgen was the heaviest I have ever witnessed." Still, the Germans were delighted that the Americans wanted to throw their weight into an attack against dug-in troops in a forest where the American preponderance of artillery and command of the air would be of little value. Also, delighting the Germans was that the Hürtgen Forest was of little military value and, if lost to the Americans, could be flooded since the Germans held flood control dams above the level of the forest. It was a battle that the Germans really couldn't loose.

Both German and American troops fighting here had to share these deplorable conditions: exposed to incessant enemy fire, fighting daily without relief, receiving little support from their own artillery, drenched in frequent rain, and without the possibility of changing clothes. Forsaken as they were they had no choice but to hold out and die in hopeless resignation. Oddly enough, one-half of the Americans who fought here had German - American ancestry which meant that three quarters of all the combatants in the Hürtgen Forest were either German or of German origin.

When American troops (the 78th Division), who had fought in Sicily, Italy, Normandy and Holland, finally took the forest, they said they had never seen anything that could compare to this for the amount of shattered military equipment scattered throughout and the countless American bodies.. They saw the 112th Regiment's dead, still by their vehicles in the snow, telephones and maps intact in the bunker Command Post, on top of which a Tiger tank had squatted, shooting the Yanks as they emerged. They referred to this as death valley. What the British staff officer said after inspecting the Somme battlefield in France during the First World War could have very well applied here. He cried out, "My God: Did we really send men to fight in this?"

Those that fought the battle from the American side were mostly from the high school classes of 1942, 1943 and 1944. They were to pick up the battle and move on after the classes of 1940 and 1941 had driven this far to the German border but now were too few in numbers to press on. These mostly still teenagers included championship high school football teams, class presidents, those that had sung in the spring concerts, those that were in the class plays, the wizards of the chemistry classes, rich kids, bright kids.

There were sergeants with college degrees along with privates from Yale and Harvard. America was throwing her finest young men at the Germans. These youths had come from all sections of the country and from every major ethnic group except the African - American and the Japanese - American. Due to an Army policy in force at the time, these two groups did not participate in this battle.

The training these young men had gone through at State-side posts such as Fort Benning was rigorous physically but severely short on the tactical and leadership challenges that the junior officers would have to meet. British General Horrocks (one of the few generals, if not the only general to do so) made a surprise front line visit to the 84th division and described these young men as "an impressive product of American training methods which turned out division after division complete, fully equipped. The divisions were composed of splendid, very brave, tough young men." But he thought it was too much to ask of a green divisions to penetrate strong defense lines, then stand up to counter attacks from first-class German divisions.

And he was disturbed by the failure of American division and corps commanders and their staffs to ever visit the front lines. He was greatly concerned to find that the men were not even getting hot meals brought up from the rear, in contrast to the forward divisions in the British line. He reported that not even battalion commanders were going to the front. Senior officers and staff didn't know what they were ordering their rifle companies to do. They did their work from maps and over radios and telephones. And unlike the company and platoon leaders, who had to be replaced every few weeks at best, or every few days at worst, the staff officers took few casualties, so the same men stayed at the same job, doing it badly.

When Capt. John O'Grady of Ninth Army's Historical Section visited the Forest in late November, he sent back a memorandum to Ninth Army: "On 23rd November the battalion was attacking a superior German force entrenched on an excellent position. The only thing that higher headquarters contributed to the debacle was pressure, and God only knows where the pressure started, perhaps Corps or perhaps Army. It had the effect of ordering men to die needlessly."

O'Grady was furious: "Tactics and maneuver on battalion or regiment scale were conspicuous by their absence. It never seemed to occur to anyone that the plan might be wrong; but rather the indictment was placed on the small unit commanders and the men who were doing the fighting. The companies went into battle against the formidable Siegfried Line with hand grenades and rifle bullets against pillboxes. The 84th Division walked into the most touted defensive line in modern warfare without so much as the benefit of a briefing by combat officers."

These were the magnificent kids of the American high school classes of 1942, 43 and 44 and while thousands of German soldiers were executed for desertion during this time period, only one American soldier was executed for the same offense, remarkably demonstrating the patriotism and devotion to duty of this group. That this patriotism and devotion was so abused and never recognized even to this day should be cause for a heavy heart. If there ever were a group of Americans for whom a tear should be shed, this would be the group.

Ernest A. Herr

[Prof Engineer]

1782 Great Seal of US used for 1st time

Woo Hoo!

[Light Speed]

Hurtgen forest...the primary battle zone...just 20 miles long by 10 miles wide,

Nick names abounded..such as.."Green Hell","A Hell of Icicles"..."The Death Factory".

After reading the intro to todays Foxhole...noticed some important info as per the U.S. frontal power projection seen at Hurtgen.

Military types convey the reality of a 3-4 to 1 strength required to dislodge an entrenched and organized defender.
This math proved true at Hurtgen.

During Hurtgen..the use of recon coupled with Tank Destroyers paid strong dividends..but the cost was high.

The M-10 T.D.[Tank Destroyer]..with its specialized 76mm gun and special armor peircing round was devasting..but the thin skinned U.S. T.D.'s were no match in a slugfest with German armor or anti tank rounds.
The M-36 Jackson T.D. made its appearence in theatre..with its 90mm gun..it packed a wollop..and nearly blinded tank crews in their open turrets.

Something i noticed in research today about Hurtgen was the injury factor from exploding ordinance in the tree's.

Soldiers tried there best to move and allign themselves with formations of varied scale....while wood splinters and shrapnell shredded them like something from a civil war period advance into 'Cannister fire'..or 'Grape shot'.

So many were wounded and trying to stay in cohesion..with little possible evac option for surgery.

Movement near Hurtgen and inside it meant recieving flank fire and ambush.

To free up roads and minimze ambush..units were told to hold the line..the injured had to cope.

The weather was unmerciful..the cold rain..the damp.
Hurtgen Forrest carries the analysis of bad choice making...yet the Command of the U.S. Forces in ETO learned their Men could fight..improvise and endure.

M-10 T.D. on left..M-36 on right

M-36