Posted on 08/29/2003 4:55:59 AM PDT by snippy_about_it
If I had one of those they roads would be a lot less crowded here.
Yep those scenes of that armoured column driving through Baghdad taking out any vehicles that came close were fascinating.
Armored cruisers could be considered the first step to the battle cruiser. In theory, they were both designed to do the same job: scout for the fleet, destroy enemy cruisers, and operate independently of the battle fleet. Armored cruisers were larger and faster than battleships, but more lightly armed and armored. The larger size came from having larger engines for more speed. Battle cruisers were larger and faster than battleships, had the same armament as battleships, but were lightly armored. Battle cruisers were susposed to be used just like the armored cruisers, however, with those big guns Admirals just couldn't resist putting them in the battle line along side the battleships. The results were disasterous for the battle cruisers. Britian lost three in one day at Jutland during WWI, and in WWII the Bismark finished off the Hood in only 5 minutes .
The German pocket battleships were officially called Armored Ships by the Germans and were designed mainly to be commerce destroyers.
Air Power |
The OV-10 Bronco was a multi-purpose, light attack aircraft acquired by the Marine Corp for observation squadrons to conduct visual reconnaissance missions. The OV-10A is a twin-turboprop short takeoff and landing aircraft conceived by the Marine Corps and developed under an Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps tri-service program.
In October 1964, the Navy awarded a contract to North American to design a Light Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LARA) for the Marine Corps. Two years later, the LARA had developed into a tri-service program to provide a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) aircraft for the United States Armed Forces. The first production OV-10A was ordered in 1966 and its initial flight took place in August 1967. HML-267 accepted the first article for the Marine Corps in February 1968. A total of 356 Broncos were accepted for Navy and Marine Corps use and for foreign military sales.
The OV-10 can be used for short take-offs and landings on aircraft carriers without the use of catapults. With the second seat removed, it can carry 3,200 pounds of cargo, five paratroopers or two litter patients and an attendant. Adding to its versatility is a rear fuselage compartment with a capacity of 3,200 pounds of cargo, five combat-equipped troops, or two litter patients and a medical attendant.
The Bronco's mission capabilities include observation, forward air control, helicopter escort, armed reconnaissance, gunfire spotting, utility and limited ground attack; however, the USAF acquired the Bronco primarily as a forward air control (FAC) aircraft. The Bronco also provides transportation for aerial radiological reconnaissance, tactical air observers, artillery and naval gunfire spotting and airborne controllers of tactical air support operations. Other tasks include armed escort for helicopters and front line, low-level aerial photography.
The first USAF OV-10As destined for combat arrived in Vietnam on July 31, 1968. A total of 157 OV-10As were delivered to the USAF before production ended in April 1969.
The OV-10 Night Observation Gunship (NOGS) was a USMC OV-10A modified to include a turreted FLIR sensor and turreted M-197 20-mm gun slaved to the FLIR aimpoint. Successful in combat in Vietnam, NOGS evolved into the NOS OV-10D, which included a laser designator.
The OV-10D was the result of an improvement program to produce what was referred to as the OV-10D Plus configuration. Begun in 1988, the -10D included the Service Life Extension Program, which comprised a wide range of engineering change proposals to update the aircraft and improve its performance. Some structural changes were made and avionics equipment was added. The aircraft was night vision capable.
Each of the Marine Corps' two observation squadrons had 18 aircraft, 9 OV-10As and 9 OV-10Ds night observation aircraft. There was also a Marine Air Reserve squadron. The OV-10 was phased out of the Marine Corps in 1995.
Although the United States no longer flies the OV-10, other countries continue to operate the Bronco.
Specifications:
Contractor: North American (some say Grumman too)
Primary Function: Multi-Role support Aircraft
Power Plant: Two 715-shp Garrett Air Research turboprops
Crew: Two
Dimensions:
Wing Span: 40 ft 4 in
Wing Area: 291 sq ft
Length: 41 ft 6 in
Height: 15 ft 1 in
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 14,444 lbs
Empty Weight: 6,921 lbs
Performance :
Max Speed: 281 mph
Cruising speed: 223 mph.
Range: 1,240 miles
Service Ceiling: 26,000 ft.
Armaments:
Four 7.62-mm guns, or 4 x 0.50 cal machine guns
And 3,600 lbs. of mixed ordnance consisting of:
AIM-9 Side-winders, rockets, bombs, external gun pods.
All photos Copyright of Global Security.Org
President Bush is a Real Doll
A miniature replica of U.S. President George W. Bush attired in the naval aviator flight uniform, depicting what he wore when he landed on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln to declare an end to major combat in Iraq, is displayed in Hong Kong August 29, 2003 next to an earlier letter from Bush. A Hong Kong toy company has shipped about 35,000 pieces of such one-to-six scale dolls to the U.S. and other countries
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"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today..." remarked Admiral David Beatty to his Flag Captain. Beatty was commander of the Battle Cruiser Fleet at Jutland, and his cool comment belied the scale of the catastrophe. It was 4.26 pm on May 31, 1916 and from the upper bridge of the battle-cruiser Lion he had just seen her sister ship, Queen Mary, disappear in a shattering blast as both main magazines exploded. Twenty minutes earlier another battle-cruiser, the Indefatigable, had vanished in a sheet of smoke and flame and, although Beatty did not know it at the time, the Lion herself had narrowly missed a similar fate only by flooding her Q turret magazine with sea water.
At the Battle of Jutland, the greatest sea battle of all time, the British Navy would lose three battle-cruisers carrying over three thousand men in less than three hours. It was not bad luck, it was bad management: the result of the Navy's inability to manage a complex system from design through to execution. For the roots of the disaster lay in the design of the ships over a decade earlier. Thus the problem was systemic and Beatty's puzzled comment represents one of the more dramatic instances of the bewildered reaction of a CEO to symptoms of systemic problems in the field.
Battle-cruisers like the Lion were the pride of the Navy. Known affectionately as the "big cats", they were armed almost as heavily as battleships and could reach speeds of over 27 knots. In the pursuit of speed and firepower, however, protection had to suffer and the battle-cruisers had only thinly-armoured decks. Their speed, their designers thought, would keep them out of trouble. Their thin armour and emphasis on speed created an aura of risk-taking and, not unlike our modern day astronauts, the sailors who served on them enjoyed high status.
The compromises designed into the battle-cruisers were compounded by modifications made to them to accommodate the Navy's peacetime gunnery practices. Managers usually try to optimize the variables that they can measure most easily, and the Navy was no exception. They had developed a cult of rapid fire, for rate of fire was easily measured and as a "benchmark" it allowed intense gunnery competition among all ships and squadrons in the fleet. In their efforts to feed the guns with charges from the magazines, however, gun crews began to eliminate the anti-flash baffles that slowed the process. At first they left the flash doors open but over time, as word spread about the performance benefits of the practice, some were removed completely. Protection is hard to test in peacetime and no one realized that the battle-cruisers were now dangerously vulnerable. If a shell were to penetrate the main turret armour, the resulting explosion was likely to flash down the ammunition hoist to the main cordite stores in the magazines below.
The third systemic factor which sealed the fate of the battle-cruisers at Jutland was the way they were deployed. If speed was critical and deck armour thin, then the battle-cruisers would do best in high-speed encounters at relatively close range, where the flat trajectory of enemy fire would encounter their thicker side armour. This was not to be the case. It had been a century since the British Navy had fought its last major sea battle at Trafalgar and Nelsonian initiative was not common among the senior officers. The technology of naval warfare had changed enormously and was largely untested in combat. There was horror of losing a ship and this conservatism was abetted by the recent introduction of the wireless and the organizational centralization that accompanied it. As a result, the battle-cruisers were held in a long range gunnery duel in line of battle, where their speed was of little help and their decks were exposed to plunging projectiles fired on high trajectories. On May 31, 1916 the systems loop had closed and disaster was at hand. Perversely, in their efforts to preserve the battle-cruisers from destruction, their commanders had actually made them more vulnerable to catastrophe.
G.I. George!
KEWL!!!!
I've been far too busy to get the 2nd half completed.
I should be able to get them done after Labor Day.
The story of my life....
GLOOM, DESPAIR AND AGONY ON ME....
Back in the post-Vietnam Army I had my armorer take out the ground mounted .50 cal for some familiarization fire. I found out just too late the guy didn't have a clue you had to set the head space and timing and apparently had never been taught the skill. So, not even the M-2 is completely soldier proof.
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