-- General Maxwell Taylor - Angered by the way the media covered the Tet Offensive.
VOA Director Robert Reilly wrote a two-page report of our excellent progress in Iraq, widespread popularity, and the relative lack of violence.
The optimism of his first-hand account is drowned out by the Leftist chorus of shrieking fairies--the same bunch who angered General Taylor.
A friend of Reilly's sent an email from another friend, an airborne commando veteran who's fascinating assessment follows:
Great read. It reflects what many of my colleagues are saying...the job is not finished, but we are winning at every encounter with the bad guys...however, casualties can’t be the measure of our success...after all, one of my planning buddies pointed out, the UN said there would be 500,000 casualties in the first three days of fighting...we aren’t even close to that on either side...from the US planning perspective, 14,000 was the estimated number of casualties...if Bush thought that was an acceptable trade to take down the threat of Saddam, then he certainly isn’t going to flinch at the daily deaths reported so widely by the national news sources, especially when he is getting objective reports that detail how well things are really going on the ground.
I still haven’t seen anyone connect the dots yet about isolating Iran using Iraq and Afghanistan as a US controlled buffers that restrict overland travelin and out of Iran. The Iranian trained terrorists now find it much more difficult to travel to the Syrian/Lebanon staging ground for Hamas and the rest of the Muslim murderers who plot the destruction of Israel from that safe haven. The strategy from day one after September 11 was to isolate Iran and its hate-mongering Mullahs despite the suspicion of the Saudi’s and their complicit funding of terrorism through Islamic charities. On the East, Afghanistan and Pakistan form a boundary that requires deception, planning, and more difficult travel routes in order to infiltrate those countries. The presence of US technology overhead is a constant threat to the terrorists and their safe passage into target populations of their destination. The same is true on the West...Iraq is now dominated by a US presence that make a traverse of the northern route to Syria impossible without deception and better planning on the part of the Iranian terrorist groups. This strategy is showing some results in the Syrian-Jordan area as intercepts of terrorist convoys disguised as regular commercial truck traffic has been greatly increased. The best example of that is the Syrian border conflict a few weeks back where the Syrian border guards tried to assist the smugglers in running the border and paid the price for their belief that we would let these guys roll into safe haven without a fight.
Our strategy of isolating Iran will never be acknowledged by DoD, but I’m sure you recognize your favorite SECDEF, our man Rummy, as a critical thinker in the evolution of this policy of isolating our enemies...can you spell containment?...same strategy, just a different application for a different enemy.
Another reason for the removal of Saddam was the need for a staging ground for US forces outside of Saudi Arabia. PSAB (Prince Sultan Air Base) is now a ghost town compared to what it was five months ago. The US presence in Saudi has been reduced considerably because our forces are now using airfields in the western deserts of Iraq. This has not been lost on Syria or Iran. We can strike Syria with enough airpower to render their entire military capability useless in less than 15 minutes. In the case of Iran, we have three directions from which we can assault their airspace. They only have enough airpower to oppose one assault corridor...and most of that is focused on the southern route since that has been the traditional assumption of entry from Qatar and Bahrain. The east and west routes are lightly defended relative to the south...and from the north, it is an open door to Tehran if we chose to stage out of one of the ‘Stans where we now have a formidable logistics presence.
In any analysis of this strategic plan of isolating Iran, one must conclude that it is remarkable in its flexibility and brilliant in its simplicity. Best of all, it is based on solid military science and tactical considerations that require political patience, military discipline, and the determined focus of strong leadership on winning the war by eliminating the bad guys and governments that support them.
Following the dedication of the green beret (in foreground), Congressman Patrick Kennedy (left) and Maxwell Taylor Kennedy present Major General William Tangney with a bust of President Kennedy
Participating in the Memorial Day ceremony were Major General William P. Tangney, commanding general of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg; Congressman Patrick J. Kennedy from Rhode Island, who recently rededicated the Kennedy Center and School; Maxwell Taylor Kennedy, named by his father Robert F. Kennedy in honor of his close friend General Maxwell Taylor.
Confederate Civil War general Robert E. Lee has not had a good press in recent years. A number of historians have written books designed to topple him from his lofty pedestal. Focusing on Lee’s personal life, his attitude toward slavery, his military ability, and on the erstwhile Confederacy’s Lee “cult,” Duty Faithfully Performed ably counters these revisionist criticisms.
John M. Taylor contributed to With My Face to the Enemy: Perspectives on the Civil War and is the author of numerous works of history and biography, including Semmes: Rebel Raider, While Cannons Roared: The Civil War behind the Lines, and William Henry Seward: Lincoln’s Right Hand, the subject of a recent PBS documentary. His biography of his famous father, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, has recently been reissued under the title An American Soldier: The Wars of General Maxwell Taylor. Mr. Taylor is also a frequent contributor to historical journals and the Washington Times. He lives in McLean, Virginia.
After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June which recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Alien Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a ClA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.8
[Had JFK put as much juice into doing Castro as he did doing Marilyn we would not be hearing about the 50th anniversary of Castro "leading the attack on the barracks"--Castro sent eighty kids with pistolas to be hosed by soldiers with machine guns.]
TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
19 September 1961
MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL LEMNITZER
The President has asked me to pass the attached list of questions to you for transmission to General Power.
He would like General Power to respond to these questions at their meeting tomorrow, September 20th.
Maxwell D. Taylor
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STRATEGIC AIR PLANNING
Question # 1. I understand the strategic attack plan now contains 16 “options.” I gather the impression, however, that such option merely indicates an increase in the size force that is launched. Is it possible to get some alternatives into the plan soon, such as having alternative options for use in different situations? For example, the present plan is based on the “optimum mix” concept. Is it now possible to exclude urban areas or governmental controls, or both, from attack? If not, how soon could you develop a plan which contains such options? Can whole areas, such as China, or the European satellites be eliminated from attack? If so, at what risk?
Question # 2. Berlin developments may confront us with a situation where we may desire to take the initiative in the escalation of conflict from the local to the general war level.
a. Could we achieve surprise (i.e., 15 minutes or less warning) under such conditions by examining our present plan?
b. How would you plan an attack that would use a minimum-sized force against Soviet long range striking power only, and would attempt to achieve tactical surprise? How long would it take to develop such a plan?
c. Would it be possible to achieve surprise with such a plan during a period of high tension?
d. Would not an alternative first strike plan, even if only partially successful when implemented, leave us in a better position than we would be if we had to respond to an enemy first strike?
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e. What second strike capability would probably be left to the Soviets after such an attack, assuming full, and partial, success?
f. Is this idea of a first strike against the Soviets long-range striking power a feasible one?
Question # 3. A surprise attack aimed at destroying the long-range striking power of the USSR would leave a sizeable number of MRBMs facing Europe.
a. Would the inclusion of these MRBMs in the initial attack so enlarge the target list as to preclude tactical surprise?
b. If so, is it possible to plan an immediate follow-on attack which would strike these targets before the first attack was completed? In particular, would our European land and sea-based air forces be suitable for this task?
Questions # 4. I am concerned over my ability to control our military effort once a war begins. I assume I can stop the strategic attack at any time, should I receive word the enemy has capitulated. Is this correct?
Question # 5. Although one nuclear weapon will achieve the desired results, I understand that, to be assured of success, more than one weapon is programmed for each target. If the first weapon succeeds, can you prevent additional weapons from inflicting redundant destruction? If not, how long would it take to modify your plan to cover this possibility?
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Question # 6. What happens to the planned execution of our strategic attack if the Alert Force is launched and several hours later it is discovered that it has been launched on a false alarm? How vulnerable would we be, and how soon would the U.S. be in a position to attack the USSR?
Question # 7. After the Alert Force has been launched, how do I know that our remaining forces are being used to best advantage. Are these follow-on forces automatically committed to predetermined targets, or do we have means of getting damage assessments to direct their attacks?
Question # 8. Give the European situation, some of SACEUR’s tactical fighters now scheduled for atomic attacks may be employed for conventional support of ground forces instead. Can other forces take over the responsibility of hitting SACEUR’s atomic targets without jeopardizing the success of the plan materially?
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A retired Army colonel was in Berlin when the Wall went up in August. He was sent to check the nationality of the crews in the East German tanks. He reported they were Russian. He believes this factored into the non-response of U.S. forces.
Castro began his Communist training ca. 1946--yet was allowed to establish a base for Communist operations.
The Chinese now have two sigint installations there, and it was said Castro moved his biowar operation to Venezuela when Habitat for Morons was there.
Between Kennedy and Carter and Clinton it's a wonder we're not in a gulag breaking rocks.