Prevost’s conduct in Plattsburg resulted in an ignominious end to his career in Canada. He was recalled to London to face his critics at a naval court martial but died before he had the chance to clear his name.
When examining Prevost’s actions in Plattsburg, it is important to remember that his first priority throughout the war had been the defense of Canada. Prevost was in charge of the military invasion of the United States as well as being the Governor General of Canada. It appears that the considerations of one function interfered with his ability to manage the other one. In the end, he decided it was better to save his troops than to expose them to risk on enemy territory.
Sir George Prevost
Prevost was well aware that the outcome of his invasion would have an irreversible impact on his career. His orders from the British war secretary read, “You are to occupy American Territory, but be careful not to over-extend your troops.” As historians have pointed out, this in effect meant: if your campaign is unsuccessful you will be held responsible for over-extending your supply line.
A secure supply line was crucial to the success of any invasion. Conquering territory and then being forced to abandon it because of a lack of food, ammunition and supplies was pointless. Roads at this period were scarcely more than muddy cart tracks and could not be used to move the massive amounts of supplies necessary to sustain an army of occupation. The only practical way to move supplies was by water. This may well have been one of the reasons Prevost ordered a retreat as soon as he learned of the defeat of the naval squadron.
It is harder to understand why Prevost wasted so much time before attacking Plattsburg. His army arrived at the Saranac River on September 6, but waited outside Plattsburg for five days. A hesitant commander, Prevost was unwilling to take any risks. He did not want to proceed with the attack until he had the support of the naval squadron under George Downie.
Prevost was apparently a cautious commander. The question that remains however, is this: why did he put so much pressure on George Downie to attack the American fleet, when the British squadron clearly wasn’t ready for battle?
Additional Sources:
www.hq.usace.army.mil
www.thehistorymart.com
www.geh.org
www.historiclakes.org
freepages.history.rootsweb.com/ ~wcarr1
ina.tamu.edu
