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Posted on 05/24/2003 11:59:43 PM PDT by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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a North Vietnamese invasion was stopped and then turned back by US airpower The year 1972 produced notable US battlefield victories in Vietnam, most of which, however, now are virtually forgotten. The American military managed to prevail in these struggles despite serious weakness caused by the US exodus from Southeast Asia. The 1972 battles marked the final major US engagements of the Vietnam War. Moreover, they illumined the future of the Air Force more than anyone imagined at the time.  Spring 1972 saw an onslaught of regular North Vietnamese units into South Vietnam, with Hanoi hoping to deliver a knockout punch to end its long war of conquest in the South. US politics had put the Air Force in the position of having to compensate for drastic reductions of ground forces. Faced with this challenge, USAF responded with a mass movement of troops and equipment and fearsome attacks with new systems, all of which were key factors in halting the invasion. North Vietnam's patient and practical leaders had for several years observed the steady decline in American strength in the South. Then, on Good Friday, March 30, 1972, the Communists struck, launching a series of military drives collectively known as the "Easter Offensive." Hanoi sought an outright military victory in order to establish Communist control over South Vietnam, drive US forces from the South, and prevent the re-election of President Richard Nixon. They called the action the "Nguyen Hue Offensive" in honor of a Vietnamese hero who had inflicted a massive defeat on Chinese forces in 1789.  NVA artillery in action, April 1972 Hanoi's desire for a military victory was understandable; the North Vietnamese had been fighting for decades, and a clear-cut triumph on the battlefield would be far more satisfying than one won at the negotiating table in Paris. Moreover, Communist strategy might have had a personal edge to it: The architect of the offensive was Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, whose questionable tactics in the Battle of Khe Sanh and the Tet Offensive in 1968 ended in bloody debacles costing North Vietnam some 100,000 casualties. These events vitiated Communist offensive capabilities for almost four years, but Giap rebuilt his forces. He created a new kind of North Vietnamese army built in the Soviet image-that is, well equipped with tanks, artillery, and, most importantly, an anti-aircraft system that could be taken into the field. The Easter Offensive was a massive conventional attack. Giap committed to the battles 14 regular divisions, 26 regiments, and a massive amount of supporting armor-more than 600 T-54, T-55, and the amphibious PT-76 tanks. By comparison, the German Army launched the Battle of the Ardennes with 19 divisions and 950 tanks. The North Vietnamese ground forces also were fully equipped with artillery, including the dangerous and effective 130 mm and 152 mm artillery pieces and huge 160 mm mortars.  An AC-130 Spectre gunship. These aircraft were on station over An Loc for the entire battle and proved highly effective against the NVA attackers. Even so, the key element of Giap's arsenal was a vastly expanded anti-aircraft system that traveled along with invading forces. The flak weapons included 23, 37, 57, 85, and 100 mm guns. Supplementing the familiar SA-2 surface-to-air missiles were deadly man-portable SA-7 Strela heat-seeking missiles, for which totally new tactics had to be devised. On the eve of the Easter Offensive, Giap's confidence in his ability to gain military victory was high, but not unreasonably so, given the great decline in the number of American ground forces in South Vietnam. The US land component had shrunk from 550,000 troops at the height of the war in 1969 to only 95,000. During the same period, the strength of US air and naval forces fell to about one-third of their previous peak levels. This across-the-board decline in power reflected the American policy of Vietnamization and disengagement. The United States wished to negotiate a face-saving settlement with North Vietnam that would permit withdrawal of all ground forces. At the same time it sought to arm and train South Vietnamese forces so that they could defend their country against the North. This policy was pursued in the context of the so-called Nixon Doctrine, which stated that the United States would provide military aid to Asian countries under Communist assault. The aid would include air and naval forces if required but would under no circumstances involve US ground forces-a reversal of policies advocated for so long by President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.  A column of T-54 tanks destroyed during the initial assault on An Loc, April 1972 Unfortunately, there was a fatal flaw in Vietnamization. South Vietnamese forces were trained in the American style of war in which, whenever possible, US planners would use overwhelming airpower to destroy enemy resistance before sending in US ground forces for battle. Though strengthened in recent years, South Vietnam's air force (VNAF) was too small to provide such support. It did not have the correct training and equipment. Moreover, it lacked helicopters and the transports to provide the air-mobile forces and prompt, generous air resupply to which the South Vietnamese Army had become accustomed. Because these elements were lacking, only the best-led units of the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) were capable of resisting the Communist assault. The quality of ARVN leadership varied and was often dependent upon the extent and expertise of US advisors still in the field. In the months before Easter 1972, the Communist buildup had been noted, but Washington and Saigon underestimated the scope, magnitude, and character of the coming attack. Thus, the North Vietnamese achieved considerable tactical surprise. Hanoi's invading forces thrust into three of South Vietnam's four military regions. Just as Hitler had used clouds and low ceilings to mask the advance of German armor in the Battle of the Bulge, so did Giap count on bad weather hampering USAF reconnaissance and air strikes.  An NVA T-54 killed near the center of the city by the 8th Regiment of the 5th ARVN Division In Military Region I, more than 40,000 North Vietnamese troops swarmed southward through the DMZ and eastward from camps in Laos. By April 2, the enemy had captured all intervening fire-support bases and was moving directly on Quang Tri City, the provincial capital. Interdiction by US Air Force fighter-bombers and B-52 bombers slowed the advance, but Quang Tri City was evacuated May 1. The enemy then reorganized for a drive on Hue. In Military Region II, 20,000 Communist soldiers surged out of Laotian and Cambodian sanctuaries to attack the major cities of Kontum and Pleiku. The intent was to cut Pleiku off, then drive on to split South Vietnam in half. South Vietnamese troops fought well, stiffened by US advisors. Kontum, however, was cut off and surrounded. The city was sustained by a massive aerial resupply effort. In addition, the Communist military attack failed. US Air Force B-52s and tactical fighters combined with TOWtoting US Army UH-1s to defeat the northern invaders in the field, despite a monumental effort by huge numbers of North Vietnamese tanks and artillery. In Military Region III, one regular North Vietnamese division and two Viet Cong divisions-some 30,000 men combined-sallied from their Cambodian salient to attack An Loc and Loc Ninh in hopes that a quick victory would lead to a drive down Highway 13 to Saigon itself.  An ARM defender at An Loc. Using M-72 LAW missiles, such defenders knocked out several North Vietnamese tanks. The Easter Offensive engaged the full weight of USAF's in-theater forces which, though much reduced, were still formidable. The B-52 force, which had proved to be key in the relief of Khe Sanh four years earlier, had been reinforced. There were 53 of the heavy bombers at U Tapao RTAB, Thailand, and 85 at Andersen AFB, Guam. By the end of May, another 33 BUFFs were deployed against the attackers, bringing the force total to 171 B-52s. Despite three years of Vietnamization, some 102 Air Force fighters remained in South Vietnam--64 F-4s, 15 A-1s, and 23 A-37s. These were supplemented by 15 AC-119 gunships. Also on hand outside of South Vietnam were 91 F-4s and 16 F-105 fighters, 10 B-57s, and 13 AC-130 gunships based in Thailand. (An AC-130 would fall victim to a Strela, the first loss of its type.)
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TANKS! It's always about TANKS....
It's lunch time here so I am going to read your history lesson now. I'll be back later. :)
This is a very ...to the point critique by Baker;
I saved it to a folder : )
U.S. airpower chopped the NVA in logistical transit,...SOME ARVN units actually fought well...like Lam Son 719.
Yet as Baker points out...no cohesion..personal rivalry...units sitting and doing nothing.
I think the mental movement order that is nominal and easy to grasp by U.S. command structure...was too much for the South Vietnamese forces.
Seems like ARVN just DID'NT LIKE BEING IN THE FIELD...
The North may have got routed by U.S. Firepower...but they saw the ARVN in their form in the field;
I'm sure headquarters in Hanoi could smell blood..and knew it was only a matter of time.
I guess you like the Matrix a lot, huh?
PT-76
ZSU 57/2
SA-2
SA-7
Ignoring enemy fire, SSG Oscar C. Gallegos, Co B, 2nd Bn, 327th Inf, 101st Abn Div, takes careful aim with the M-72 LAW (light anti-tank weapon).
AC-119 on the East ramp at Cam Ranh Bay
AC-119K "Stinger" Gunship
The "K" model of the AC-119 gunship was modified from the "G" with the addition of two J-85 jet engines and two 20mm gatling guns, complementing the four 7.62 minis. It was named"Stinger"
In addition to the armament, and some radar equipment, the old four-bladed Aeroproduct propellers were replaced with the Hamilton Standard three-bladed props. The reason was for safety and reliability. No Stinger with the three-bladed propeller was ever lost due to propeller failure.
The "K" model was the final version of the AC-119 gunship. They were turned over to the Vietnamese in l973.
The last USAF AC-119 gunship unit was the 18th Special Operations Squadron. During "Vietnamization", about 40 USAF crewmembers were selected to train the VNAF on the Stinger gunship. The program was named "Project Enhance Plus". Training was abruptly ended in March 1973 and the USAF training crews were, for the most part, returned to the States.
B-57C, 53-3840 in SEA camo.
A-37
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