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GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
and the
ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN

General George C. Marshall was the U.S. Army Chief of Staff during WWII, the highest ranking U.S. Army officer. He had known of the atomic bomb project at least as far back as Oct. 1941, when he was appointed to the small group which would oversee the project, the Top Policy Group.

In 1942 the a-bomb project was turned over to the Army and became the Manhattan Project. It now fell under Marshall's chain of command as Army Chief of Staff. But his role in the atomic bomb project and the atomic bombing of Japan was largely indirect. He delegated most of the work to the general in charge of the Manhattan Project, Leslie Groves, and he deferred to civilians on decision-making.

For his part Marshall, along with Sec. of War Henry Stimson, obtained the enormous amounts of money necessary for the secret project. This was no easy task, since Congress could be told little about where the money was going.

Marshall's main task in 1945 was to prepare for a possible invasion of mainland Japan, scheduled to begin that year on Nov. 1st. He felt the decision to use the atomic bomb - to introduce a new and more dangerous level of warfare to the world - was a political rather than military decision. Assistant Sec. of War John McCloy recalled:

"[Marshall's] insistence to me that whether we should drop an atomic bomb on Japan was a matter for the President to decide, not the Chief of Staff since it was not a military question... the question of whether we should drop this new bomb on Japan, in his judgment, involved such imponderable considerations as to remove it from the field of a military decision." (quoted in Gar Alperovitz, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 364).

McCloy said Marshall told him, "Don't ask me to make the decision."
(Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman 1945-1959, pg. 550, note 30).

But Marshall had been thinking about the atomic bomb. He didn't press his ideas, probably because he felt this was more of a political matter than a military matter. Here are some of Marshall's ideas, documented at the time:

The minutes from a May 29, 1945 meeting of Marshall with Sec. of War Stimson and Assistant Sec. of War McCloy note that "General Marshall said he thought these weapons [atomic bombs] might first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived from the effect of that, he thought we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which the people would be warned to leave - telling the Japanese that we intended to destroy such centers. There would be no individual designations so that the Japs [sic] would not know exactly where we were to hit - a number should be named and the hit should follow shortly after. Every effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear. We must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill considered employment of such force." (RG 107, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Sec. of War Stimson ("Safe File") 7/40 - 9/45, S-1 folder, Memorandum of Conversation With General Marshall, May 29, 1945 - 11:45 a.m., National Archives).

At a May 31, 1945 Interim Committee discussion of the atomic bomb, scientist and Manhattan Project administrator Arthur Compton was present. He recalled, "General Marshall stated that from the point of view of the postwar safety of the nation he would have to argue against the use of the bomb in World War II, at least if its existence could be kept secret. Such use, he said, would show our hand. We would be in a stronger position with regard to future military action if we did not show the power we held." (Arthur Holly Compton, Atomic Quest, pg. 237). Scientists at the meeting then explained that the scientific knowledge was already too widely known to keep the a-bomb a secret. (Microfilm 1108, RG 77, Harrison-Bundy Files, file 100, Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting, Thursday, 31 May 1945, National Archives).

Later at the May 31 meeting, Marshall supported J. Robert Oppenheimer's suggestion that we tell Russia we were working on the atomic bomb. The meeting notes show that Marshall also "raised the question whether it might be desirable to invite two prominent Russian scientists to witness the test." Any approach to Russia was quickly vetoed at the meeting by soon-to-be Sec. of State James Byrnes. Byrnes feared Stalin would ask to become a partner in the a-bomb project, causing us to lose our lead over Russia in nuclear weapons. (Ibid.).
Arthur Compton later wrote, "At this meeting... Marshall was careful to avoid any statement that might prejudice the thinking of the civilian committee." (Compton, Atomic Quest, pg. 238).

Marshall went along with the Interim Committee's recommendation to use the atomic bomb on Japan.

There is no evidence from this point on that Marshall objected to the use of the atomic bomb on Japan. After WWII, Marshall was a staunch defender of the atomic bombings (Larry I. Bland, editor, George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue).

But Marshall probably did not think the atomic bombs would end the war. After a talk with Marshall about the atomic bomb on June 12, 1947, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman David Lilienthal quoted Marshall in his diary as saying:

"There is one point that was missed, and that, frankly, we missed in making our plans. That was the effect the bomb would have in so shocking the Japanese that they could surrender without losing face. ...we didn't realize its value to give the Japanese such a shock that they could surrender without complete loss of face." (David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Volume Two: The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950, pg. 198).

THOMAS MCAROY
George Marshall was named TIME's Man of the Year in 1943 and 1947

Though the a-bomb might not end the war quickly, Marshall felt the atomic bomb could be useful in his primary area of responsibility, the proposed invasion of the Japanese mainland.

On Aug. 13, after two a-bombings had failed to bring surrender from Japan, one of Marshall's assistants, Lt. Gen. John Hull, telephoned one of Gen. Groves' assistants, Col. L.E. Seeman. Hull said Marshall felt we should consider holding off on further atomic bombings so as to save the a-bombs for tactical use as part of the November invasion. (Marc Gallicchio, After Nagasaki: General Marshall's Plan for Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Japan, Prologue, Winter 1991).

In 1957, Marshall gave some details of his invasion plans for the atomic bomb:

"There were three corps to come in there [to invade Japan], as I recall. ...there were to be three bombs for each corps that was landing. One or two, but probably one, as a preliminary, then this landing, then another one further inland against the immediate supports, and then the third against any troops that might try to come through the mountains from up on the Inland Sea. That was the rough idea in our minds." (Bland, George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue, pg. 424).

It was characteristic of Marshall that while others were celebrating the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Gen. Groves recalled that "General Marshall expressed his feeling that we should guard against too much gratification over our success, because it undoubtedly involved a large number of Japanese casualties." (Leslie Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pg. 324).

- Doug Long

A Summary of the Marshall Plan

Even now a model for positive economic diplomacy, the Marshall Plan was a rational effort by the United States aimed at reducing the hunger, homelessness, sickness, unemployment, and political restlessness of the 270 million people in sixteen nations in West Europe. Marshall Plan funds were not mainly directed toward feeding individuals or building individual houses, schools, or factories, but at strengthening the economic superstructure (particularly the iron-steel and power industries). The program cost the American taxpayers $11,820,700,000 (plus $1,505,100,000 in loans that were repaid) over four years and worked because it was aimed at aiding a well-educated, industrialized people temporarily down but not out. The Marshall Plan significantly magnified their own efforts and reduced the suffering and time West Europe took to recover from the war. The program--whose official title was "European Recovery Program"--aimed at: (1) increasing production; (2) expanding European foreign trade; (3) facilitating European economic cooperation and integration; and (4) controlling inflation, which was the program's chief failure.

U.S. postage stamp issued in 1997 to commemorate the Marshall Plan

The idea of massive U.S. loans to individual countries had already been tried (nearly $20 billion--mainly long-term, low interest loans--since the war’s end) and had failed to make significant headway against Europe's social and economic problems. The plan that Marshall enunciated at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, was revolutionary in that it required the recipients to organize to produce a rational, multilateral approach to their common economic problems. Another innovative feature was its limited duration: four years maximum, thereby assuring American taxpayers and their representatives that the program would not be an indefinite commitment.

The economic problems in 1947-48 included not only the lack of capital to invest, but also the need for Europeans to overcome a U.S. trade surplus with them so massive as to imperil further trade and to encourage unmanageable inflation. Marshall Plan money helped stimulate the revival of European trade with the world and increased trade among European countries.

Americans were reluctant to invest in Europe because their profits were available only in local currencies that were little desired by U.S. businesses and investors. The Marshall Plan guaranteed that these investors would be able to convert their profits earned in European currencies into U.S. dollars. Grants and loans in U.S. dollars enabled managers in Europe to purchase in America specialty tools for their new industries. Marshall Plan money also paid for industrial technicians and farmers to visit U.S. industries and farms to study American techniques. Plan funds even paid the postage on privately contributed relief packages.

Many people in Washington helped to implement and manage the European Recovery Program that Marshall first outlined at Harvard; this is why, in addition to his normal modesty, Marshall refused to call the idea the "Marshall Plan." He always believed that his greatest contribution to the program was his 1947-48 nationwide campaign to convince the American people--and through them the Congress--of the its necessity; he likened his efforts in scope and intensity to a campaign for the presidency.

Over its four-year life, the Marshall Plan cost the U.S. 2.5 to 5 times the percent of national income as current foreign aid programs. One would need to multiply the program's $13.3 billion cost by 10 or perhaps even 20 times to have the same impact on the U.S. economy now as the Marshall Plan had between 1948 and 1952. (Most of the money was spend between 1948 and the beginning of the Korean War (June 25, 1950); after June 30, 1951, the remaining aid was folded into the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.)

A shipment of U.S. wheat arrives in the Netherlands.

On December 10, 1953, George C. Marshall received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway. He accepted it, not as his individual triumph, but as the representative of the American people, whose efforts and money had made the program a success.

Additional Sources:

www.marshallfoundation.org
www.doug-long.com
www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk
libimage.lib.clemson.edu
www.army.mil
www.trumanlibrary.org
www.nhc.rtp.nc.us:8080
www.libraries.psu.edu
news.bbc.co.uk
i.timeinc.net
www.marshallfoundation.org
www.vw.vccs.edu
home.wanadoo.nl

Today's classic ship, USS Baltimore (CA-68)

Baltimore class heavy cruiser
Displacement. 13,600
Lenght. 673’ 5”
Beam. 70’ 10”
Draft. 26’ 10”
Speed. 33 k.
Complement. 1142
Armament. 9 8”; 12 5”; 48 40mm; 24 20mm; 4 Aircraft

The USS BALTIMORE (CA-68) was launched 28 July 1942 by Bethlehem Steel Co., Fore River, Mass.; sponsored by Mrs. Howard W. Jackson, wife of the Mayor of Baltimore; commissioned 15 April 1943, Captain W. C. Calhoun in command; and reported to the Pacific Fleet.

Between November 1943 and June 1944 BALTIMORE was a unit of the fire support and covering forces at the Makin Islands landings (20 November-4 December 1943); Kwajalein invasion (29 January-8 February 1944); Truk raid (16-17 February; Eniwetok seizure (17 February-2 March); Marianas attacks (21-22 February); Palau-Yap-Ulithi-Woleai raid (30 March-1 April); Hollandia landing (21-24 April); Truk-Satawan-Ponape raid (20 April-1 May); air strikes against Marcus Islands (19-20 May) and Wake Island (23 May); Saipan invasion (11-24 June); and the Battle of the Philippine Sea (19-20 June).

Returning to the United States in July 1944, she embarked President Roosevelt and his party and steamed to Pearl Harbor. After meeting with Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, the President was carried to Alaska where he departed BALTIMORE 9 August 1944.

Returning to the war zone in November 1944, she was assigned to the 3rd Fleet and participated in the attacks on Luzon (14-16 December 1944; and 6-7 January 1945); Formosa (3-4, 9, 15, and 21 January); the China coast (12 and 16 January); and Okinawa (22 January).

On 26 January she joined the 5th Fleet for her final operations of the war: Honshu Island attacks (16-17 February); Iwo Jima operation (19 February-5 March); and the 5th Fleet raids in support of the Okinawan operation (18 March-10 June).

After the cessation of hostilities BALTIMORE served as a unit of the “Magic Carpet” fleet and then as a part of the naval occupation force in Japan (29 November 1945-17 February 1946). Departing the Far East 17 February 1946 she returned to the United States and went out of commission in reserve 8 July 1946 at Bremerton, Wash.

BALTIMORE was recommissioned 28 November 1951 and assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. She was deployed with the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean during the summers of 1952, 1953, and 1954. In June 1953 she represented the United States Navy in the Coronation Naval Review at Spithead, England. On 5 January 1955 she was transferred to the Pacific Fleet and was deployed with the 7th Fleet in the Far East between February and August 1955.

BALTIMORE commenced pre-inactivation overhaul upon her return from the Far East and went out of commission in reserve at Bremerton, Wash. 31 May 1956.

Just under fifteen years later, in February 1971, USS Baltimore was stricken from the Naval Vessel Register. She was sold for scrapping in May 1972.

BALTIMORE received nine battle stars for her service in the Pacific during World War II.

On a personal note, some of you may have noticed that I haven't been posting lately. When I retired from the Navy, I thought I would have more time on my hands. I decided to take it easy and take an easy job, and do only what was required of me. However it seems that what would be considered marginal performance in the Navy is considered outstanding performance in the civilian world, and, and after only 8 months I was offered a promotion over people who have been with the company 8 years. Like a fool I accepted. Now it seems I have less time than when I was in the Navy. I will continue to post "Today's classic ship" when I can. Y'all will just have to do without occasionally. :-)