General George C. Marshall was the U.S. Army Chief of Staff during WWII, the highest ranking U.S. Army officer. He had known of the atomic bomb project at least as far back as Oct. 1941, when he was appointed to the small group which would oversee the project, the Top Policy Group.
In 1942 the a-bomb project was turned over to the Army and became the Manhattan Project. It now fell under Marshall's chain of command as Army Chief of Staff. But his role in the atomic bomb project and the atomic bombing of Japan was largely indirect. He delegated most of the work to the general in charge of the Manhattan Project, Leslie Groves, and he deferred to civilians on decision-making.
Marshall's main task in 1945 was to prepare for a possible invasion of mainland Japan, scheduled to begin that year on Nov. 1st. He felt the decision to use the atomic bomb - to introduce a new and more dangerous level of warfare to the world - was a political rather than military decision. Assistant Sec. of War John McCloy recalled:
"[Marshall's] insistence to me that whether we should drop an atomic bomb on Japan was a matter for the President to decide, not the Chief of Staff since it was not a military question... the question of whether we should drop this new bomb on Japan, in his judgment, involved such imponderable considerations as to remove it from the field of a military decision." (quoted in Gar Alperovitz, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 364).
McCloy said Marshall told him, "Don't ask me to make the decision."
(Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman 1945-1959, pg. 550, note 30).
The minutes from a May 29, 1945 meeting of Marshall with Sec. of War Stimson and Assistant Sec. of War McCloy note that "General Marshall said he thought these weapons [atomic bombs] might first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived from the effect of that, he thought we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which the people would be warned to leave - telling the Japanese that we intended to destroy such centers. There would be no individual designations so that the Japs [sic] would not know exactly where we were to hit - a number should be named and the hit should follow shortly after. Every effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear. We must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill considered employment of such force." (RG 107, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Sec. of War Stimson ("Safe File") 7/40 - 9/45, S-1 folder, Memorandum of Conversation With General Marshall, May 29, 1945 - 11:45 a.m., National Archives).
At a May 31, 1945 Interim Committee discussion of the atomic bomb, scientist and Manhattan Project administrator Arthur Compton was present. He recalled, "General Marshall stated that from the point of view of the postwar safety of the nation he would have to argue against the use of the bomb in World War II, at least if its existence could be kept secret. Such use, he said, would show our hand. We would be in a stronger position with regard to future military action if we did not show the power we held." (Arthur Holly Compton, Atomic Quest, pg. 237). Scientists at the meeting then explained that the scientific knowledge was already too widely known to keep the a-bomb a secret. (Microfilm 1108, RG 77, Harrison-Bundy Files, file 100, Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting, Thursday, 31 May 1945, National Archives).
There is no evidence from this point on that Marshall objected to the use of the atomic bomb on Japan. After WWII, Marshall was a staunch defender of the atomic bombings (Larry I. Bland, editor, George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue).
But Marshall probably did not think the atomic bombs would end the war. After a talk with Marshall about the atomic bomb on June 12, 1947, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman David Lilienthal quoted Marshall in his diary as saying:
"There is one point that was missed, and that, frankly, we missed in making our plans. That was the effect the bomb would have in so shocking the Japanese that they could surrender without losing face. ...we didn't realize its value to give the Japanese such a shock that they could surrender without complete loss of face." (David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Volume Two: The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950, pg. 198).
On Aug. 13, after two a-bombings had failed to bring surrender from Japan, one of Marshall's assistants, Lt. Gen. John Hull, telephoned one of Gen. Groves' assistants, Col. L.E. Seeman. Hull said Marshall felt we should consider holding off on further atomic bombings so as to save the a-bombs for tactical use as part of the November invasion. (Marc Gallicchio, After Nagasaki: General Marshall's Plan for Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Japan, Prologue, Winter 1991).
"There were three corps to come in there [to invade Japan], as I recall. ...there were to be three bombs for each corps that was landing. One or two, but probably one, as a preliminary, then this landing, then another one further inland against the immediate supports, and then the third against any troops that might try to come through the mountains from up on the Inland Sea. That was the rough idea in our minds." (Bland, George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue, pg. 424).
It was characteristic of Marshall that while others were celebrating the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Gen. Groves recalled that "General Marshall expressed his feeling that we should guard against too much gratification over our success, because it undoubtedly involved a large number of Japanese casualties." (Leslie Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pg. 324).
- Doug Long
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Today's classic ship, USS Baltimore (CA-68)
Baltimore class heavy cruiser
Displacement. 13,600
Lenght. 673 5
Beam. 70 10
Draft. 26 10
Speed. 33 k.
Complement. 1142
Armament. 9 8; 12 5; 48 40mm; 24 20mm; 4 Aircraft
The USS BALTIMORE (CA-68) was launched 28 July 1942 by Bethlehem Steel Co., Fore River, Mass.; sponsored by Mrs. Howard W. Jackson, wife of the Mayor of Baltimore; commissioned 15 April 1943, Captain W. C. Calhoun in command; and reported to the Pacific Fleet.
Between November 1943 and June 1944 BALTIMORE was a unit of the fire support and covering forces at the Makin Islands landings (20 November-4 December 1943); Kwajalein invasion (29 January-8 February 1944); Truk raid (16-17 February; Eniwetok seizure (17 February-2 March); Marianas attacks (21-22 February); Palau-Yap-Ulithi-Woleai raid (30 March-1 April); Hollandia landing (21-24 April); Truk-Satawan-Ponape raid (20 April-1 May); air strikes against Marcus Islands (19-20 May) and Wake Island (23 May); Saipan invasion (11-24 June); and the Battle of the Philippine Sea (19-20 June).
Returning to the United States in July 1944, she embarked President Roosevelt and his party and steamed to Pearl Harbor. After meeting with Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, the President was carried to Alaska where he departed BALTIMORE 9 August 1944.
Returning to the war zone in November 1944, she was assigned to the 3rd Fleet and participated in the attacks on Luzon (14-16 December 1944; and 6-7 January 1945); Formosa (3-4, 9, 15, and 21 January); the China coast (12 and 16 January); and Okinawa (22 January).
On 26 January she joined the 5th Fleet for her final operations of the war: Honshu Island attacks (16-17 February); Iwo Jima operation (19 February-5 March); and the 5th Fleet raids in support of the Okinawan operation (18 March-10 June).
After the cessation of hostilities BALTIMORE served as a unit of the Magic Carpet fleet and then as a part of the naval occupation force in Japan (29 November 1945-17 February 1946). Departing the Far East 17 February 1946 she returned to the United States and went out of commission in reserve 8 July 1946 at Bremerton, Wash.
BALTIMORE was recommissioned 28 November 1951 and assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. She was deployed with the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean during the summers of 1952, 1953, and 1954. In June 1953 she represented the United States Navy in the Coronation Naval Review at Spithead, England. On 5 January 1955 she was transferred to the Pacific Fleet and was deployed with the 7th Fleet in the Far East between February and August 1955.
BALTIMORE commenced pre-inactivation overhaul upon her return from the Far East and went out of commission in reserve at Bremerton, Wash. 31 May 1956.
Just under fifteen years later, in February 1971, USS Baltimore was stricken from the Naval Vessel Register. She was sold for scrapping in May 1972.
BALTIMORE received nine battle stars for her service in the Pacific during World War II.
On a personal note, some of you may have noticed that I haven't been posting lately. When I retired from the Navy, I thought I would have more time on my hands. I decided to take it easy and take an easy job, and do only what was required of me. However it seems that what would be considered marginal performance in the Navy is considered outstanding performance in the civilian world, and, and after only 8 months I was offered a promotion over people who have been with the company 8 years. Like a fool I accepted. Now it seems I have less time than when I was in the Navy. I will continue to post "Today's classic ship" when I can. Y'all will just have to do without occasionally. :-)