Replies

By one means or another the advance kept moving. Evidence that it was disrupting Chinese plans for a fighting withdrawal came in the form of an intercepted radio communication early on 15 March. "We cannot fight any longer. We must move back today. We will move back at 1400. Enemy troops will enter our position at 1300 or 1400. Enemy troops approaching fast." Late that afternoon the lead elements of Major Webb D. Sawyer's 1/7 entered Hongchon without a fight.

It was a different story north of Hongchon, where for the next three days the Chinese fought bitterly, battling for every lump and bump in the ground. The division plan called for 5th Marines to pass through and relieve the 7th Marines on the left. The 1st Marines on the right had their hands full with Chinese fighting from a succession of skillfully sited bunkers and trenches. In a series of bloody hand-to-hand encounters, up close and personal, Marines had to shoot, blast and burn the defenders from their strongholds. On the infrequent occasions when the weather lifted, the treetop-level strikes of Marine close air support provided the element that turned the tables.

The 1stMarDiv's running gun battles with the Chinese continued to follow the pattern of alternately fighting and withdrawing. Slowly but surely, however, the Chinese were being forced backward, until on 20 March the advance had reached Phase Line Buffalo. Before darkness fell the 5th Marines, with the 1st Marines on the right and aided by deadly accurate air strikes by Marine Fighter Squadrons 214 and 323 (VMF-214, VMF-323), overran the Chinese main line of resistance with no friendly casualties.

If anyone had the urge to celebrate, there was no time for it. The drive northward resumed almost without pause with the 1st Korean Marine Corps (KMC) Regiment once again attached to the 1stMarDiv. The fighting qualities of the regiment could be summed up in the words of one of its young officers, 1stLt Kim Sik Tong. In his diary he wrote: "The KMC ideal is to complete the mission, regardless of receiving strong enemy resistance, with endurance and strong united power, and always bearing in one's mind the distinction between honor and dishonor." Men like that are handy to have around in a regiment that would have to fight its way through a virtual wilderness, devoid of the most rudimentary trails.

It was the KMC Regiment that ran up against the heaviest fighting in the advance to Operation Ripper's final objective, Phase Line Cairo. Sandwiched between the 5th and the 1st Marines, the Korean Marines worked their way through the tortuous jumble of ridges, gullies and ravines that fronted Hill 975, battling pocket after pocket of resistance in a continuing rattle and crash of point-blank fire punctuated by the detonation of grenades and mortar rounds. Supplied by airdrops and ably supported by Lieutenant Colonel William McReynolds' 3d Bn, 11th Marines firing in direct support, they slugged their way forward until the issue was decided on 24 March.

All the objectives of Operation Ripper were now controlled by the 8th Army, which had been attacking continuously since 21 Feb. Still, with evidence mounting that the CCF had not abandoned plans for a major offensive, LtGen Ridgway wanted to keep the pressure on.

Moving forward relentlessly, on 4 April the 1stMarDiv was among the first 8th Army units to recross the 38th parallel and enter North Korea. It was also on that day that LtCol Joseph L. "Moose" Stewart, the executive officer of the 5th Marines, began his journey back to the United States. Of all the original members of the 1stProvMarBrig to land at Pusan on 2 Aug. 1950, he was the last to leave Korea.

As in Operation Killer, the primary objective of Operation Ripper was to destroy enemy forces and equipment and hamper his efforts to conduct a new offensive. Also, rather than make a direct assault across the Han to re-capture Seoul, Ripper was to outflank Seoul and the area north as far as the Imjin River. Then, Ridgway hoped to take Seoul by a flanking attack from the east or by sufficient threat to induce the enemy to withdraw.

In the event during Ripper, with 1st Cavalry Division providing cover, the 7th Marines took Hongchon which did indeed result in the CCF abandoning Seoul which was reoccupied by the ROK 1st Division, supported by the US 3rd Division, on March 15.

Hiya Sam. Good thread as usual.

Set to jump off on 7 March 1951, Operation Ripper had two primary objectives. The first was to inflict maximum casualties on CCF forces and by means of constant pressure all along the line keep them off balance and disrupt their offensive buildup. The second and lesser objective was to outflank Seoul, leaving the CCF with the choice of withdrawing or defending the city under unfavorable circumstances.