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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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Posted on 12/29/2002 12:03:19 AM PST by SAMWolf
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are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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On November 13, 1942, Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan was patrolling near Ironbottom Sound in an unusual formation. The destroyers Cushing, Laffey, Sterett, and O’Bannon were in the lead, followed by the Atlanta, San Francisco, Portland, Helena, and Juneau, with the remaining ships trailing. What was odd about this force was that the majority of the ships with the best radar systems equipped were in the center or rear of the formation. However, this would form Task Group 67.4, which would be responsible for patrolling the entrance to Ironbottom Sound that night. The Japanese force didn’t look any better either. The ships were arranged in a diamond formation with the main striking force in the center, which consisted of the battleships Hiei and Kirishima as well as several cruisers, leaving the destroyers to form the corners of the diamond. Once the forces neared Guadalcanal, the Hiei and Kirishima loaded their 14-inch guns with Type 3 shells, designed to bombard Henderson Field. At 1:24 a.m., the Helena picked up the Japanese ships. Twenty minutes later, Cushing visually sighted a pair of enemy destroyers and made a left turn, followed by the other three leading destroyers. In order to avoid hitting the turning destroyers, the Atlanta turned left as well. The battle then began, and for the next 40 minutes, many ships on both sides would be sunk or damaged. The battleship Hiei spotted the Atlanta directly ahead and once the searchlights homed in on the incoming cruiser, the Atlanta opened fire on the battleships searchlights and several other destroyers nearby. The Atlanta hit the Akatsuki before being damaged by several torpedoes and shells from Akatsuki started fires raging throughout the ship. The crippled Atlanta drifted away from the battle.  Next, the destroyer Cushing came as the lead attacker. The Cushing fired 6 torpedoes and several 5-inch shells at Hiei and Amatsukaze, but none of them hit the enemy ships. The Hiei then crippled Cushing with 10 direct hits from 14-inch guns. The Laffey was next, and began hitting Hiei with machine guns. One of these hits killed Hirokai Abe’s chief of staff, Masakane Suzuki. Laffey then fired a torpedo at Hiei, but the torpedo didn’t arm and bounced harmlessly off Hiei's hull. The Laffey was then sunk by a torpedo fired from the destroyer Teruzuki, which blew off the stern, and a 14-inch shell from Kirishima that exploded in the boiler room. The order to abandon ship was given, and many of the crew were in the water when the Laffey exploded, killing most of the crew both on the ship and in the water. Several more ships charged the Japanese formation. The Sterett lined up to hit Nagara before it lost its radio and radar capabilities. The Sterett then used its last torpedo to destroy the Akatsuki before drifting away. Next came the destroyer O’Bannon, which passed Sterett and open fire on Hiei. The San Francisco switched to engage another Japanese destroyer. However, the drifting Atlanta drifted near the enemy destroyers and the shells from the San Francisco exploded on the Atlanta's superstructure, destroying it and killing Admiral Scott. After seeing this, Admiral Callaghan ordered a cease fire to re-group. Then, once all ships were regrouped, Callaghan ordered his ships to focus on the larger ships first. The San Francisco advanced on the Hiei, and the ships exchanged fire. The Hiei’s first salvo were Type 3 shells, which were high explosives and not designed to penetrate armor, and as a result, did little damage except for killing most of the crew on the deck. The third salvo hit the bridge, killing Admiral Callaghan and most of the bridge crew. While damage crews worked on repairing the damaged ship, Lieutenant Commander Bruce McCandless turned the ship to rejoin the battle, knowing that if the flagship San Francisco left, the rest of the force may follow.  The Portland was next in line, following the San Francisco. Portland was hit in the propeller by a torpedo that locked the cruiser in a right turn. After the Portland’s first loop, the Hiei was waiting and the two ships exchanged fire. The Portland hit the battleship several times before continuing around on its loop. The Helena followed Portland, with the Juneau afterwards. Helena engaged the Akatsuki, which was too busy firing at the disabled San Francisco to see the Helena approaching. The Helena pummeled the Japanese destroyer until the cruiser was driven off by three other Japanese destroyers. Next came the cruiser Juneau. The Juneau attempted to engage enemy ships. While searching for a target, the cruiser was hit by a torpedo that removed the cruiser from the battle. The four trailing destroyers came next. The Aaron Ward was hit 9 times by enemy shells while trying to avoid the crippled Sterett. The Barton also had to avoid a wreck, and was almost immediately sunk by two torpedoes, one of which was launched from Amatsukaze After Barton sank, the Monssen took on two destroyers . Two starburst shells exploded, lighting the area. The captain of the Monssen, believing that the shells were fired from American ships, turned on the recognition lights and was sunk by 47 Japanese shells. Fletcher managed to escape damage altogether.  The Japanese also took heavy damage. Yudachi, like the Monssen, lit the regonition lights, but stayed afloat until survivors get picked up. Akatsuki was sunk after severely damaging the Atlanta. The Amatsukaze was damaged by the Helena while the Japanese crew was busy firing at the crippled San Francisco, which had lost all of the weapons aboard and couldn’t fire back. Hiei took over 85 hits and stayed afloat. It took an additional torpedo and three bombs before the Hiei was ordered sunk by Admiral Isoroku Yamaoto. The destroyers Amatsukaze, Ikazuchi, and Murasame were also damaged. Admiral Hara and the Amatsukaze made a safe return, although Hara was deeply disturbed by the deaths aboard his ship. Four sailors from the San Francisco were awarded the Medal of Honor, more than any other ship would receive in a single battle yet today. All ships returned for repairs in their home ports. The undamaged forces would again collide in Ironbottom Sound the next day.
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Bazillions. Consider all those shoeboxes in attics that are "just grampa's old stuff".
It was perhaps the best torpedo of the war. What made it so good? Several things made the oxygen type "Long Lance" torpedo "so good."
Size: while the difference between a 21" and a 24" torpedo in diameter is not that much, the warhead on the larger one varies by the ol' "pi" ratio. The Japanese warhead was also longer in relative terms, making for a much more deadly load on the target.
Simplicity: The development of the Japanese oxygen torpedo started in earnest back in the 1920's, and it was a "mature" weapon by the 1940's. Other nations tried to produce them as well (England and France, for example), but gave up as they felt the hazard was not worth the benefits. The Japanese continued in their efforts, and partially succeeded. The IJN also did not flirt with the magnetic exploder as did the US, Germany and Great Britain.
Speed: Oxygen torpedoes have two benefits: lack of combustion byproducts that leave a wake (most notably nitrogen; air torpedoes have less oxidizer (oxygen) and more inert gasses (nitrogen primarily) in their air flasks), and range (pure oxygen takes up less space than the same amount of oxygen as a component of air (tops of 20% by volume); more space for fuel and oxidizer. Oxygen oxidized flames also burn hotter (better combustion), so a given amount of fuel could stretch farther. All this translated out into going further faster.
I don't have the figures with me, but I think that the top speed on our torpedoes (which only allowed a very short range) was well below the lower speed on the Japanese torpedo (which allowed a range that was so great we had trouble believing that it actually could occur). At their top speed, the things zipped along near 50 knots (compared to a top ship speed of 37 knots or so) out to a distance that was greater than our "close range". Faster to the target means less time to evade, hence more accurate. Longer range meant that we found ourselves surprised by Japanese torpedo attacks on at least three occasions, thinking that we ran over mines as there was no way that the nearest Japanese forces could have torpedoed us. We were, of course, wrong. The sinking of the USS Wasp, damage to the USS North Carolina, and fatal damage to a destroyer (don't recall the name; USS Edsall perhaps?) all by _one_ torpedo salvo from a single Japanese submarine, remains the greatest monument to Japanese torpedo systems (and to the American refusal to believe that someone else could do something better than us).
Skads of them: Japanese ships were heavy on torpedo tubes, and even heavier on reloads. Some Japanese destroyers could reload twice, and could complete the reload cycle in twenty minutes or so. This tends to put more torpedoes in the water, increasing the likelihood of hits
Systems: The Japanese put a lot of effort into their torpedo warfare, much moreso than the rest of the world. They saw the torpedo as an equalizer for the inferiority of size that they were persuaded to accept as part of the naval treaties entered into post WWI. They integrated the torpedo attack at both the destroyer and the cruiser levels (whereas most other nations made the destroyer use a "second function" and pretty well ignored the cruiser level (although some early US cruisers had tubes, they were almost completely abandoned by World War II (and for some pretty good reasons, see below). Torpedo directors were a major part of surface ship fire control systems, not a addon as found elsewhere.
Skills: They practiced their doctrine, firing real torpedoes all the while, and not in the fairy tale conditions of the Caribbean Sea, either. Japanese training was intensive, brutal (the North Pacific during the winter is not a tranquil place) and all encompassing. Unlike shells, torpedoes could be fired and recovered to fire again in a training situation. The IJN had a whole class of torpedo support craft (covered in post war intelligence reports by the USN, by the way).
Stupidity (American): A lot of the IJN's success was due to the USN fighting a war that fit the IJN's doctrine. Early on, we persisted in using radar like it was eyesight, maneuvering in formations that suited the Japanese proclivity for torpedo attacks, and misusing one of the American "secret weapons" (the automatic loading 6" light cruiser) to almost a criminal extent. Once we got things sorted out, we did a lot better. The Japanese did a lot of stupid things too; somewhere in 1943 or thereabouts both sides straightened themselves out and the good aspects of both navies produced some interesting surface combats. At that point, the torpedo was nowhere near as dominant as it was when we were feeling our way early on.
In short, there were a number of factors that combined to make the Japanese torpedo threat so effective during World War II. The torpedoes themselves were only one of many such factors that made it a success (from the Japanese point of view, of course).
The "all torpedo approach" to light forces has its disadvantages. One is time on target for the weapons system; the torpedo can be avoided while the 6" shell cannot. Another is the massive concentration of explosives outside of the warship's protective systems. This is why the US gave up on torpedoes on cruisers. The Japanese lost one ship (don't remember which one) when the torpedoes were touched off by otherwise minor gunnery damage, and they did jettison torpedoes on more than one occasion when this was threatened. Torpedoes are also expensive compared to main gun rounds, even when you compare the number of the shells that have to be fired to get the same effect.
One more thing: not all Japanese torpedoes were of the "Long Lance" variety. They also had 21" torpedoes on many of their submarines and some older surface ships. All of their torpedoes were well made (albeit mostly hand fabricated) and functioned well, according to post war tests by the Naval Intelligence Mission to Japan. The report (available on cheap microfilm from the Naval History Center in Washington DC) will tell you more than you ever want to know about the subject...
I'll be in touch, my FRiend...MUD
It occured to me last night that in the face of all the anti-Western, anti-American hatred leveled at the good citizens who run this country ie the businessmen, the families, the middle class etc., what may need to be resurrected is a good bit of old fashioned American defiance in the form of music.
I was reading a book to my daughter last night called "Emma's Journal" which is a very good little book written in first person about a fictional ten year old girl living in Boston at the time of the Amer. Revolution, with many detailed accounts of what life was like and the hardships they faced and the different attitudes people had about the war.
The author included two songs that were popular at the time, one of them being 'Yankee Doodle.'
"Every day there is a new song mocking the British - now 'tis 'Yankee Doodle,' which was their song insulting us, the Yankees. Now 'tis their turn to be insulted by it."
AND (this one is a bit ribald)
"How brave you went out with your muskets all bright
and thought to befrighten the folks with the sight,
But when you got there, how they powdered your pums,
and all the way home how they peppered your bums,
And is it now, honies, a comical farce, to be proud in the face and be shot in the a*se."
I just thought wouldnt it be wonderful to breathe new life into an American classic and make our point through music. We already have the melody in 'Yankee Doodle'...it was a song to put Americans down, and in our fine spirit, we turned it around and used it against the British.
I don't see why we could not still use it to fly in the face of all the Euroweenies and Leftists who today still parrot the elitist snobbery against us. I see it as a way of thumbing our noses at the elitists who call Americans 'dumb' and 'cowboys.' Cowboys have an excellent sense of humor. And it wouldnt be necessary that the elitists get the joke. We know who we are talking about in singing 'Yankee Doodle
I also think our wonderful military men and women are the best ones to come up with new lyrics for "Yankee Doodle" making fun of the Islamofascists and sing it in their faces every time we defeat them!!
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