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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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Posted on 12/23/2002 12:10:46 AM PST by SAMWolf
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are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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The Battle for Wake Island As of 6 December 1941, the defensive status of Wake was far from ideal. Intended primarily as a patrol-plane base for Catalina clippers, the island had no scouting aircraft yet, and only the most primitive facilities for any type of aircraft operations. Its squadron of 12 Grumman Wildcat aircrafts, VMF-211, was learning on the job how to operate wholly new aircraft which had no armor and on which the bomb racks did not match the local supply of bombs. On the entire atoll, there were 449 marines of all ranks, detachment of the 1st Defense Battalion, therefore equipped and trained for combat. The ground defenses, embodying the complete artillery of a defense battalion (5-inch seacoast batteries and 3-inch antiaircraft guns), had by dint of unceasing 12-hour working days been emplaced, and some protective sandbagging and camouflage accomplished. To man all these weapons, 43 officers and 939 enlisted were required, but only 15 officers and 373 enlisted were available. Furthermore, there were 1,200 unarmed civilian contract employees on the island.  Word of war came around 7am on 8 December 1941. At 11am, several planes drop through the clouds : this was japanese Air Attack Force of 34 Nell bombers, based at Roi, 720 miles to the south. The fortuitous rain squall masked the enemy let-down and approach, but the complete lack of any type of early warning was a matter which pointed squarely at Wake's most critical shortage: the want of radar. The results of the Japanese attack were devastating. Using 100-pound bombs and 20 mm cannon, the air strike destroyed seven F4F fighters on ground. The island's main aviation gas tank took a direct hit, exploded and set everything ablaze, including the squadron's tentage, tools and spare parts. VMF-211 suffered nearly 60-percent casualties and there were 84 dead or dying on Wake. Across the Pacific it was a similar story : in Pearl Harbor, Guam, Philippines, North China. In his first message after the Pearl Harbor disaster, President Roosevelt had warned the American people to be prepared for word of the fall of Wake. With the core of the fleet on the bottom of the seas, there could be little question, for the time being, of a sustained and aggressive fleet defense. Wake would stand or fall largely by its own strength.  By next morning, the Japanese bombers returned, methodical almost to a fault : the hour, altitude and pattern did not vary. The air combat patrol (or what was left of it) flanked them, opened fire and sent one bomber careening down in flames. The antiaircraft batteries opened up : five bombers were belching smoke, one burst into flames and exploded. Over the next two days, they would shoot down at least two more planes and score damaging hits on numerous others that disappeared over the horizon in a trail of smoke. The second raid hit hard the camp and the naval air station. They destroyed the hospital, the Navy's radio station, and the civilian and naval barracks, killing 55 civilians and four Marines. The aerial raids had been directed at the airstrip and the various supporting establishments. But, as events would shortly prove, the three days' bombing, while inflicting considerable damage on Wake, had been insufficient. Admiral Inouye, commanding the Imperial Japanese Fourth Fleet, was charged by current war plans with capture of Wake, but, more important, that of Guam, Makin and Tarawa. By dark on 10 December, Guam had fallen. Earlier that same day, Makin and Tarawa had surrendered. Wake alone remained : conduct of this last operation was delegated to Rear Admiral Kajioka. His naval force comprised one flagship light cruiser, the Yubari, two other light cruisers (Tatsuta and Tenryu), six destroyers (Mutsuki, Kisaragi, Yayoi, Mochizuki, Oite, and Hayate), two destroyer-transports, two transports, and two submarines. The plan was to have 150 men land on Wilkes Island, and 300 men on the south side of Wake Island to capture the airfield, covered by the guns of the naval force. If those numbers proved insufficient, supporting destroyers were to provide men to augment the landing force. At 3am, on 11 December, lookouts reported ships in sight. At 5am, Kajioka's ships began their final run. Because of the unfavorable weather and heavy seas, boating progressed slowly and unsatisfactorily, with some landing craft being overturned. Soon after, the boats opened fire at area targets along the south shore of Wake. The coastal guns, however, remained silent and hidden behind a brush camouflage. At 6am, as the boats were closer, the Marines commenced firing. Although they had unavoidably revealed their location, the ships' counterfire proved woefully inaccurate.  A battery sent two shells into Yubari at the waterline and two more shells caught her slightly aft. Badly hurt, Yubari retired over the horizon. Another battery fired and caused a violent explosion in the destroyer Hayate : she broke in two and sank. The Oite was next and took a direct hit : she threw up a smoke screen and limped away. Then, the gunners shifted fire to the Japanese transports Kongo Maru and Konryu Maru : one shell hit the leading transport, causing both to flee. Next they turned their efforts to a cruiser off the west end of the island : she took one shell in the stern and retreated out of range. The destroyer Yayoi take a shell in the stern and be set afire. Then went a smoke screen, and the ships made their escape. Kajioka ordered a withdrawal : plans for a landing were forgotten and damage control on burning and smoking ships became priority. The fleet had no air cover and the remaining Wildcats found it little more than an hour's sail from Wake : the destroyer Kisaragi, suffering from an earlier hit, just blew up, and another destroyer suffered heavy damage. The defeat was total : two ships were lost, seven were damaged, and probably about 500 japanese died while four Marines were wounded in action.
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My Dad was a WWII Marine. I recognize many of the islands he spoke of - Tarawa, particularly. He never said anything beyond the name...Tarawa...followed by a lapse into silence and a period of deep melancholy.
I am only now realizing what horrors our men must have faced.
Can we ever repay them?
At the Quebec conference in August of 1943, the Allied high command announced it's intention to launch an offensive in the Central Pacific, in the drive towards Japan. A prime objective of this drive, to be undertaken as a Navy-Marines operation, was to take the Marshall Islands. The Marshall Islands would serve as an air base from which further operations could be launched against the Marianas, and from there against the Japanese home islands. But 500 miles to the southeast of the Marshalls, an archipelago of atolls called the Gilberts stood between U.S. forward ground air bases and the Marshalls. The Gilberts had only one workable airstrip for refueling American aircraft and that was on the island of Betio in the western Gilbert Island atoll of Tarawa. The Japanese commander in charge of the defense of Tarawa, Rear Admiral Keiji Shibasaki, said "A mission men cannot take Tarawa in a hundred years." He commanded 2,600 imperial marines, the best amphibious troops in the Japanese armed forces. With the importation of 1,000 Japanese workers and 1,200 Korean laborers the island airstrip of Betio had been transformed into one of the most formidable fortresses in the world, boasting 14 coastal defense guns(four of which were taken from the surrendered British garrison at Singapore), 40 strategically located artillery pieces, covering every approach to the island, a coconut-log sea wall four feet high lining the lagoon and over 100 machine gun emplacements behind the wall. All this was concentrated on an island only a mile long and a few hundred yards wide. Meanwhile an armada of 17 carriers, 12 battleships, eight heavy and four light cruisers, 66 destroyers and 36 transports carrying the 2nd Marine Division and a part of the 37th Infantry Division- some 35,000 soldiers and Marines headed for Betio in early November of 1943. In the moments before pre-invasion bombardment began, the task force naval commander, Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman announced to the landing troops "Gentlemen, we will not neutralize Betio. We will not destroy it. We will obliterate it!" Neither Shibasaki nor Kingman knew what they were up against.
On November 20th at 2:15 A.M. the marine transports went to General Quarters. Last minute landing preparations were made and the marines received their last rites. At 5:05 A.M. the first battleship let loose a salvo on Betio's coastal batteries, followed shortly thereafter by the other battleships and destroyers in the task force. The shelling stopped only for enough time to let the dive bombers from the escort carriers pound the island. The first wave of amphtracks and Higgins boats moved in on the lagoon side of Betio. The formation was jolted to a stop 500 yards out by a reef which the amphtracks could climb over only with great difficulty. Simultaneously, a hail of fire opened up from the island, incinerating the lodged and incoming boats as well as mowing down the marines wading ashore. Few of the first wave survived. But a few got through, and with the help of four successive waves the marines established a beachhead up to a four foot sea wall. By nightfall, the marines were pinned down on a stretch of beach 100 yards long and 20 feet inland. And rather than being obliterated, the Japanese marines had barely been scratched by the naval and air bombardment. While a brief respite between bombardment and the landings had occurred, the Japanese rushed to their gun posts and had delivered devastating fire. But because their communication lines had been cut, none of them knew what was going on. Therefore, according tot the Bushido Code, each isolated soldier or group of soldiers was obliged to either fight to the death or commit suicide unless ordered otherwise. Consequently, Japanese resistance was fanatical. Some Japanese swam out to disabled amphtracks that night and poured fire onto the marines from the rear- silenced only at great cost to the marines. And a lone Japanese seaplane-turned-bomber easily inflicted casualties on the concentrated beachhead. In all, the first day on Betio had been very costly for the 2nd Division- amphtracks and Higgins boats littered the lagoon, wounded marines everywhere, and dead bodies and parts of bodies everywhere: out of 5,000 men, 1,500 were dead or wounded.
At the beginning of the second day, three marine battalions held a small foothold on Betio's lagoon beach. They were ordered to attack at 6:00 A.M. while the 2nd Division reserves, the 1st and 3rd battalions of the Eighth Marines were brought up to the reef. As the Japanese defenders opened up on the wading-in marines, Colonel Shoup of Major Crowe's battalion at the far east side of the lagoon ordered a desperate attack to halt the slaughter of incoming marines. Only 450 of the 800 incoming men made it to the beach. But with this fresh reserve, the central battalion punched its way inland, across the airstrip, and seized a part of the island's sough shore. Meanwhile a high tide flooded the lagoon, allowing reinforcement boats to pass over the reef and come directly up to shore. The arrival of tanks in support of all three battalions on the beachheads proved critical that day. The tanks rolled up to the front lines, taking out Japanese pill boxes and other fortifications at close range. By dusk, the 6th Marines, after having secured the nearby island of Makin, paddled over the reef in rubber boats and landed on the western beach. There, they met up with Major Ryan's ravaged western lagoon assault battalion. Reinforced, and having gained ground, the second day came to an end. Marine Colonel Shoup radioed the daily situation report back to the command ships: "Casualties: many. Percentage dead: unknown. Combat efficiency: we are winning." Meanwhile, Admiral Shibasaki was sending his last radio message to Tokyo: "Our weapons have been destroyed. From now on everyone is attempting a final charge. May Japan exist for ten thousand years!"
On the third day, all three battalions moved inland, with the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines sweeping up the southern shore of Betio. With infantry and flame thrower support, tanks blew apart the remaining fortifications in the central and western part of the island. Taking out pill boxes, machine gun nests and snipers took up much of this third day. But by nightfall, the marines held western and central Betio. At twilight, Shibasaki's troops made one final courageous 'Banzai' suicide charge. They rushed the 6th Marines, Company B in almost overpowering numbers. The marines began to break. Lieutenant Thomas phoned Major Jones, saying "We are killing them as fast as they come at us, but we can't hold much longer; we need reinforcements." Jones replied, "We haven't got them to send you; you've got to hold." In the face of heavy losses, the 6th Marines wavered, but didn't break. When dawn appeared, the marines still held their positions.
On the morning of November 23rd, the 6th Marines counted 300 Japanese bodies scattered around their positions. As it turned out, this group of Japanese had been the last large contingent on Betio with only small pockets of resistance remaining. And following a painstaking mop up of the eastern side of the island, Japanese resistance, with the exception of a few snipers who would continue to take pot shots at marines for the next several days, came to an end. For at 1:12 P.M., after 76 hours of fighting, Betio was declared 'secure'. Upon arriving at Betio that day, General Holland Smith ordered both the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack to be raised over Betio(for Betio was to revert to the British as a Pacific trust after the war). The general then toured the island west of the airport. He noted that only seventeen Japanese had surrendered while only 129 Korean laborers had survived out of a total of 4,700 troops and construction workers.
In the 76-hour fight for Betio, 1,056 marines and sailors were killed, died of wounds or were missing and presumed to be dead. Some 2,300 men were wounded, but recovered. Meanwhile, at home, Americans were appalled by the losses at Tarawa, flooding Admiral Nimitz's mail with angry letters. But Tarawa had taught the navy and the marines some vital lessons in amphibious warfare which in the near future, would save thousands of lives. More amphtracks were to be built with better armor, including side protection for marines. Higgins boats were removed from landing operations. Landing craft were converted into supporting gunboats, able to come in close on the beach. Underwater demolition teams were organized to destroy natural and artificial obstacles before future atoll landing would take place. Precision rocket and naval attacks had proven their worth against the near impregnable fortifications. And the role of the tank in turning the tide of battle proved critical. All these lessons would be applied to future campaigns with great success. The price for Betio had been relatively high, but within days, Betio was converted into a forward base for the assault on the Marshalls, with bomber and fighter sorties flying out within hours of the marines victory. And within nine weeks of the battle, an invasion task force under Admiral Nimitz left Tarawa to take the Marshall Islands.
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