Good morning crew members!
Breakfast is now being served! Would you care for some strong GI coffee and SOS? (No C-rats for us today! ;-))
Posted on 12/11/2002 5:40:07 AM PST by SAMWolf
Good morning crew members!
Breakfast is now being served! Would you care for some strong GI coffee and SOS? (No C-rats for us today! ;-))
My pleasure. Seems like a very worthy program for our troops fighting terrorism and keeping us safe.
Are there foxes in a foxhole? Hmmmmm? ;-)
I'm sure my coffee will be strong enough for you! Let me know when you can handle a refill. hahahaha
The targeting of civilians as a strategic objective in the World War II Western European Theatre had a rather absurd and tragic beginning.
At the start of the war, both sides carefully avoided civilian centers although collateral damage was seen as an unfortunate consequence of aerial bombing. During the Battle of Britain, during the night of 23 August 1941, a dozen German bombers made a navigational error and dropped their bomb loads in the center of London rather than on the oil farms and factories that they were ordered to hit. The British believed that this attack was deliberate and, the next evening, 81 R.A.F. bombers targeted civilian targets in Berlin. After a few more such raids, the Germans retaliated with a massive night bombing raids on London. Ironically, the switch from R.A.F. targets to civilian targets took pressure off the R.A.F. and eventually lead to the Luftwaffe’s defeat in the Battle of Britain.
After this series of events, the genie was out of the bottle and each side, to the best of it’s ability, targeted each other’s civilian population centers with whatever means were available to it. The Allies firebombed cities. The Germans, never having developed adequate four engine bombers to match the Allied bomber capabilities, eventually resorted to the V-1 and V-2 terror weapons.
Each side truly believed that, by causing massive civilian casualties, the other side would surrender. In reality, conventional bombing never achieved that kind of shock value which was only achieved with the advent of the atomic bomb. More civilians died in one Tokyo fire-raid than at Hiroshima.
In the European Theater, the bombimg of the population centers was conducted mainly by the RAF although the 8th Air Force also participated in such attacks, most notably at Dresden. The British bombers could not take the punishment that the American B-17's could and British daylight bombing resulted in substantial losses. As a result, the British bombed at night. World War II bombing accuracy was bad enough as it was and hitting relatively small targets such as specific factories or refineries was out of the question during the night. Night bombing required a target the size of a city center. The British reluctance to bomb smaller, high value targets had much to do with Bomber Command's reluctance to give up the protective cover of the night.
After the war, the morality of massive conventional bombing of civilians came into question. It is always easier to ponder such questions with 20/20 hindsight than during the passions of a World War. The British, it seems, did not feel very comfortable with what had occurred. While all other British senior military leaders were lionized, Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris of Bomber Command became somewhat of a quiet embarrassment just as Sir Alexander Haig had become after World War One. Both men were seen by many as having wrought much more death than was necessary to achieve victory.
Well, I never served in the military, so I can't qualify. (But you can!) : )
The Brits listed Oil targets even in 1940. They realized that --they-- didn't have the aircraft or doctrine to get them. Eearly on, the USAAF planners (along with the Brits) settled on a priority that was not very good. Heavy industry and U-boat pens proved very robust. But it wasn't until the bases in Southern Italy were captured and Ploesti could be savaged, that hitting Oil would be crippling. But the Americans missed the boat on targeting priorities and escort fighters. The bigs thought the B-17 combat boxes could go it alone and be flying buzzsaws on which to wreck the German day fighters. Seems like it was some assistant Secretary of War who came to visit in the middle of 1943 and was just appalled at what was happening. He got the ball rolling faster for the Merlin engine Mustang and just a general awareness that unescorted strategic bombing was NOT going to work.
There was a P-38 group in England in the summer of 1942, but Eaker or --somebody-- allowed it to be shifted to North Africa. That is a real shame. EVERY P-38 should have gone to England and its technical problems given the highest priority. Even a few dozen escorts made a big difference in breaking up German attacks. So the Americans had a steep learning curve. But at least they learned.
Harris learned nothing. He was practically a criminal.
Even in May, 1944, in just THREE DAYS the 8th AF cut German oil production 50%. Then they were switched on to invasion targets.
Had the enormous power of Bomber Command been added to the USAAF's, the war could have ended maybe in September, 1944.
Harris pretty much refused. He'd plead bad weather for precision bombing and wreck a city center.
Walt
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