I have a couple of questions about that action and the subsequent events -
1. Was there a dedicated reaction force to support your teams as they were employed? I was in the Marines and we had specific units -company through battalion - that were assigned the mission of rescuing recon or CAP units when the enemy overwhelmed them. They had detailed plans for movement and essentially stood by for immediate movement if they were called. You mentioned that the Division CG didn't come to the rescue. Did they have units that were supposed to do that?
2. Did you or anyone else elevate the request for award for Hunt or any of the others through the army chain to bypass whatever roadblock you ran into? Any correspondence with Congress? Is it still possible? Even though many witnesses have passed on, any written testimony would be strong evidence.
3. I found it crazy that the only artillery support you could bring into action was that 155mm SP battery - and that they did that unbelievable night road march through enemy controlled areas! Why weren't arty units already in direct support of your teams? 155s were GS weapons back then and decidedly not rapid fire weapons. What happened to the DS 105s?
It just seems to me that your units were left hanging out in the breeze with the assumption from Day One that you were expendable.
I will attempt to answer your questions, but first you need to understand that attempting to compare U.S. Army Special Forces units with U.S. Marine units in Vietnam just isn’t possible for a number of reasons.
1. 5th Special Forces Group Headquarters, commanded by a Colonel, was in Nha Trang with its four Companies, A, B, C, and D, assigned to the four Corps areas, I Corps, II Corps, III Corps, and IV Corps. Each Special Forces Company was a C-Team, commanded by a LTC, with four B-Teams, commanded by Majors, under it. These four B-Teams were assigned to Province Capitols throughout the Corps area, and each B-Team had four twelve man A-Teams, commanded by Captains, serving under it. These four A-Teams were assigned four areas of responsibility throughout the Province where they constructed A-Camps, recruited and trained Montagnard Tribesmen, and led them in combat operations.
2. Special Forces units in Vietnam had no assigned or attached Aviation units or Artillery units to support us, but, instead, we “depended upon the kindness of strangers.” The only fire support we could depend on was our own 60MM, 81MM, and 4-2 in. mortars.
3. At each C-team in each Corps Area, Special Forces kept a Mike Force Battalion consisting of three Mike Force Companies of Chinese Nungs or Montagnards led by Special Forces NCOs as a reaction force for A-Camps when they came under attack. A Mike Force Battalion of Chinese Nung Mercenaries led by Special Forces NCOs was based at 5th Special Forces Group HQs in Nha Trang as a country wide reaction force to assist any Special Forces unit under attack.
4. The three Nung Mike Force Companies borrowed by the 1st Infantry Division in the November 5, 1966 operation in Tay Ninh Province was the reaction force for all Special Forces units conducting operations in III Corps. The loss of these three Nung Companies curtailed Special Forces combat operations throughout III Corps until three Mike Force Companies of Cambodians could be recruited and trained. Lessons learned: I don’t think Special Forces ever again loaned out any of our Mike Force Companies.
I hope this answered your questions.
We haven’t given up yet, and as long as even one of us remains alive we will continue through channels with the MOH recommendation for MSG William B. Hunt and his recovery.
And, yes, we were expendable.
DJ Taylor