Contrary to popular beliefs, the Allies and the Germans possessed roughly the same number of tanks in May 1940.31 In fact, the French SOMUA S-35 tank was widely regarded as the best tank on the battlefield of May 1940. The key difference between the two countries was not in the quantity or the quality of their tanks, but rather, the tactical employment of these tanks. S-35 Although the French recognised the tank as one of the most important weapons indroduced since WW I, they firmly believed that the primary function of the tank was to augment the firepower of the infantry. The employment of tanks in the French Army during the inter-war period was mostly aptly described in the following extract from the French Military Review (December 1938): "Not even the most modern tanks can ever lead the fighting by themselves and for themselves. Their mission must always to be to participate along with the fire of the artillery and heavy infantry arms in the protection and the support of attacks..." It was only during the Polish Campaign in September 1939, when the awesome might of the German panzer divisions finally convinced France of the need to establish her own independent armoured divisions. The first two divisions were created in January 1940, while a third was only added in April 1940. Unfortunately, these hastily formed divisions suffered a lack of equipment and training, and were simply no match for the well-organised panzer divisions.  Char B1 Bis As with the tanks, the French failed to develop a viable doctrine for the deployment of airplanes. Little thought had been given to air co-operation with the ground forces. Probably, the most serious fault with the French air doctrine during the inter-war period was its failure to appreciate the importance of dive-bombers despite the lessons from the Polish Campaign. As at May 1940, France possessed a mere 50 dive-bombers.  In terms of equipment, the French Air Force was also inferior to the Luftwaffe, in both quantity and quality. The French Air Force entered the 1940 Campaign with only 1,200 aircraft against the German total of 3,200 aircraft. Moreover, the bulk of France's aircraft were obsolete equipment, accumulated from the 1920s and early 1930s, and were inferior in both speed and range to those manufactured in Germany. Unlike the German aircraft, the bulk of the French aircraft were not equipped with radio communication: once the aircraft were air-borne, they were beyond contact. Excerpted from "France's Defeat in the 1940 Campaign" by MAJ Tan Teck Guan |
