The FReeper Foxhole Presents the Saturday Symposium July, 1940 A Different Option? August 6,2005

Airpower Magazine: September 2002 | alfa6's vivid imagination

[snippy_about_it]

Hope all goes well Monday.

[w_over_w]

I'm a student today also.

Wanna pass notes? ;^)

[w_over_w]

PE is turning 40 tomorrow? May I pitch in with a few words of encouragement?

You're so old that when you're asleep, others think you're dead.

You're so old your back goes out more than you do.

You're so old you quit trying to tuck your stomach in no matter who enters the room.

You're so old you bought a compass for the dash of your truck.

You're so old you're proud of your lawn mower.

You're so old you sing along with elevator music.

You're so old you enjoy hearing about other people's operations.

You're so old you take a metal detector to the beach.

You're so old when you talk about "good grass" you're talking about someone's lawn.

You're so old you have a party and the neighbors don't even realize it.

You're so old you get into arguments about pension plans.

You're so old people call you at 9PM and ask, "did I wake you?"

You're so old you no longer think of speed limits as a challenge.

You're so old your best friend is dating someone half their age and isn't breaking any laws.

And with that . . . welcome to forties! ;^)

[snippy_about_it]

:-)

Boy do I remember those days.

[PzLdr]

I have to respectfully disagree. As for the Italians, in the summer of 1940, their military incompetence had only been demonstrated in France, for a brief period. They still thought of themselves as independent players. Remember, Mussolini attacked Greece without telling Hitler to make that very point. Second, Rommel was, initially, under Italian command. What transpired was done by him, in circumvention of German orders, not because of them. Militarily, the Italian fleet had no air arm worthy of the name, and more critically, insufficient merchant shipping, in numbers of ships and tonnage, to support ongoing operations of the type and size envisaged.

As for the Vichy French, the Germans never had control of their fleet, and had no guarantee the French would obey them. Remember the French scuttled ships that had escaped the British attack of 1940 when the Germans executed OPERATION ATTILA in 1942.In 1940, the Germans would have had, even with Vichy cooperation, to move troops to the Med for deployment to North Africa. They would have also had to establish the logistical net to support those troops.

As for the military situation a few comments. The Germans had air superiority in North Africa in 1941. Didn't do them any good. The Brits held Tobruk, and Rommel never got farther than the border with Egypt. While the Luftwaffe caused severe damage to the Royal Navy-mostly at Crete where they sailed into the Luftwaffe's teeth, they never, except temporarily exerted control over the sea lanes to Libya-even when they were pounding Malta. Then there were the British carriers. One cannot assume that the British would have operated their naval units in the same manner they did in the real war if the Germans move in the manner suggested. As it was, they largely took the only viable Axis fleet, the Italians, out of the war by 1941. One can assume they would have caused the Luftwaffe abed the Italians serious interdiction problems in the scenario envisaged.

I still say the Germans' best chance would have been a thrust down the Eastern side of the Med after Crete. Fairly constricted area of naval ops-which doesn't help the Brits. Shortest route to Alexandria and the Canal. Plus for the Germans, tactically and logistically. Favorable neutrals [Turkey] and potential allies [Iraq]. Plus the potential for Egyptian revolt. As they would say in the Korps, "Haya Safari!"

[SAMWolf]

Even though the military outcome of this scenario could have been very likely, the "political" incentive wasn't there. Hitler had no interest in a "Southern strategy", his attacks on Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and Africa were forced on him by his Italian Ally, those theatres were only a sideshow to him or a way of protecting his Romanian oil supplies. I doubt he even saw the strategic possibilites of a major campaign through Africa and the Mideast.

[Iris7]

I agree with the previous two posts by PzLdr and SAMWolf.

SAM's discussion of the Reich's political position, so much in Hitler's head, seems correct to me. "Protecting his Romanian oil supplies" indeed.

I think the oil situation is the single most useful factor when thinking through 3rd Reich logistics. The Caucasus - Stalingrad thrust concurrent with Moscow was because of oil as I see it.

Panzer Leader is correct in his theater level analysis, I think. An attack Bosporus - Aleppo - Damascus - Baghdad, then Suez - Tehran, then Barbarossa with an attack north through Iran to Baku - Volga maybe could have worked. Need some real diplomatic preparation, not the champagne salesman.

Logistics would have had to have been readied for some years previously, none of that horse drawn BS. Hitler understood logistics like John Kerry understands Honor.

Would need railroad troops about ten, maybe fifty times larger, trained properly, with plenty of stockpiled material, bulldozers and other sorts of heavy equipment (the secret weapon of WWII), real road building capability (they had none, as far as I can tell, except some "in name only" units), and something like what General Motors was in those days to build trucks. Ways to rapidly build large oil pipelines. And good grief, do something about that crypto.

The best chance the 3rd Reich had? Let Doenitz win the Battle of the Atlantic real early. Imagine three hundred Type VII-Cs available in September 1939 - hmmm? New construction running at one hundred a month? The war in the West might have been over by June 1941. Churchill just barely kept the English from surrendering the way it was. Remember that Hitler offered England autonomy in his peace proposals. Remember Rudolf Hess.

[Colonial Warrior]

Today marks the 60th Anniversary of the Hiroshima Bombing.

The sleeping Giant, awakened by the heartless attack on Pearl Harbor, brought the War back to the enemy. It is a lesson that should not be forgotten.

We must remember these lessons, so that they will never have to be repeated again.

[SAMWolf]

The reason I said that the military outcome was probable was that after the campaign in france and up to invasion of Russia, most of the German attacks, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the deployment of the Afrika Korps to Libya were quickly thrown together affairs. The total lack of preparedness by the Allies was the biggest help Hitler had. If he had decided on a Southern campaign and put off an invasion of Russia, IMHO the Germans could have pulled it off.

I agree that logistics would have been a major nightmare, unless Turkey came into the war on the Axis side opening up an overland supply route to the Middle East.

[alfa6]

The operative idea here of course is what SAM and I think others have brought up. Hitler's state of mind, Hitler thought of Africa as a side show, fotrunately for the British.

And SAM also hits it on the head, the lack of preparedness of the Allies. As I have mentioned previously, in July/August there was little to stand in the way of a German/Italian thrust into North Africa.

Also as I mentioned earlier Rommel, who was operating on less than a logistic shoestring, twice came within an eyelash of going to the Nile in 1941 and 1942. Had the Germans decided to take out North Africa in the summer or fall of 1940 and made a determnined effort to do so , the likely hood of success was very, very, likely.

England in the summer of 1940 was in despaerate straits. The Royal Air Force was forced to send pilots into combat almost straight out of flying school. The BEF had lost in France all of its heavy equipment. Some 20,000 vehicles, about 2500 artillery pieces and several hundred tanks were left on the fields of France.

The greatest liabilty that the Wehrmact would have faced in conquering North Africa would have been their Italian Allies :-)

But as has been mentioned Hitler was not interested and so it did not come to pass.

As mentioned at the beginning of todays post of the if you can find a copy of the September 2002 issue of Airpower magazine by Republic Press this scenario is the lead article.

Regards

alfa6 ;>}

[Valin]

PE is turning 40 tomorrow.
I guess that means that next year your age matches your IQ. :-)

[Iris7]

"an ultrasound Monday".....

Please let us know. Got to get some mileage out of you young ones!!!!

Seriously, do let us know.

[Iris7]

I personally find your points valid.

"...the troops would have been forced to rely on Italian ships for transit to Africa." Indeed. A weak reed with Alex and Gib in English hands.

Crummy supply lines, crummy logistics.

[Professional Engineer]

You're so old you quit trying to tuck your stomach in no matter who enters the room.

Snicker

[Professional Engineer]

pbbbbt

;-)

[Professional Engineer]

Seriously, do let us know.

youbetcha

[Iris7]

Have to rebuild the Turkish railroad to Aleppo, about 500 miles, which has to go through a rough pass called the "Cilician Gates", about thirty miles long with vulnerable topography, nice for Guards Minelayer types.

Germans did not have enough railroad troops. The 3rd Reich's logistics were not remotely ready for global war. Lots of anecdotal evidence of this, Guy Sajer, others. Sajer talked about retail logistics quite a bit, as he was in transport troops before the infantry. The "Rollbahn" stories are interesting.

WWII means trains for heavy transport, if not ships. Trucks were a great strain, like the Red Ball in Europe.

I have said before that the Germans meeting the Japanese in India is a valid scenario. This thread has fleshed this idea out well, I think. Maybe "they" should give us all stars on our shoulders, eh?!!!!!!!!!!! Hah.

Sajer's book. James Webb likes it.

[Iris7]

I think you have run a good thread. A little heavy on the air power angle - perhaps you have some affection for airplanes? (grin!!)

Although the "synthetic oil plant" project was the most important strategic bombing operation in Europe, my favorite air guy was George Kenney, a really very good man. Bismark Sea was his creation, brilliant, brilliant. The end of the Empire's ambitions as much as Leyte Gulf.

The 5th Air Force has a warm spot in my heart.

MacArthur was real hard to please. He thought the world of George Kenney. Those gunships were not "Pappy" Gunn's machines as much as they were Kenney's.

[alfa6]

Thanks for the kind words. George Kenny had a run in with MacArtur in the mid 30s when MacArthur was the Army Chief of Staff. MacArthur had Kenny banished to some infantry post IIRC.

Kenny was about the 4th or 5th choice to replace Brett and Kenny didn't figure MacArthur would take him. Of course we know that MacArthur and Kenny got along fine.

Kemmy asked MacArtur one day why he took himn on. MacArthur's reply was to the effect that...George, you were a rebel back then and in war you sometimes need a rebel.

If I can remember tomorrow I will look up the exchange and post it.

Regards

alfa6 ;>}

[snippy_about_it]

Thanks Colonial Warrior. We did a thread a while back about "Operation Olympic" showing just what was planned if we hadn't used the atomic bomb and would have had to invade Japan. It wasn't pretty.