The FReeper Foxhole Remembers U.S. Marine Air Power in Nicaragua (1927-1933)

Expanding Air Power:
Observation and Reconnaissance Missions

By l928, the Marine aircraft inventory included twelve Falcon and Corsair observation-bombers, as well as seven Loening amphibian observation-bombers. Five trimotor Fokker transports also supported Marine operations. All of these were based at Managua initially, but several of the Loenings were later transferred to an airfield at Puerto Cabezas on the east coast.

Fokker trimotor with experimental NACA cowlings, 1929

This aircraft inventory played several vital roles throughout the occupation. In addition to ground-attack operations, the pilots also conducted observation, communication, and transportation missions. Observation, or aerial reconnaissance, missions met with some difficulty as a result of the terrain and Sandino's guerrilla tactics. Many of the Marine operations were conducted in the northern Department of Nueva Segovia, along the Honduran border. Cover and concealment provided opportunities for Sandino's forces to move or set up ambushes without being noticed from the air. A New York Times correspondent flew over the area in 1928 and described the terrain as "thickly wooded mountains . . . tortured into a patternless wilderness of peaks, ridges, and rock-strewn cliffs.... Its infrequent trails are almost invisible from the air."

Sandino's new tactics added to the terrain problems for those conducting observation missions. Bernard Nalty, author of the U.S. Marine Corps historical study on the Nicaraguan campaign, points out that "Sandino's men were adept at camouflage. Seldom did they move in large groups, and, if at all possible, they marched at night." Carleton Beals, a correspondent visiting Sandino's forces in March 1928, made similar comments. Beals noticed that Sandino's forces traveled in the early morning before the planes made their patrols or late in the afternoon/evenings after the planes returned to base. Sandino's troops learned the habit patterns of the Marine aerial reconnaissance flights and took advantage of them; when his forces moved at other times during the day, they used the jungles for concealment.

The Marine aviators refined their techniques of reconnaissance to achieve the best possible results. Usually flying patrols with two planes, the pilots would "throttle their engines and glide in over suspicious places from behind hills or mountains, flying low enough to look into windows and doors." The Marines looked for signs of Sandino's forces, "taking into account the proportion of men to women visible, the amount of wash on clotheslines, the number of animals present, and the general bearing of the people."

Four Marines posing for photo, Nicaragua

Air observation missions provided essential support for both ground patrols and isolated outposts. Marine aircraft could sometimes detect ambushes for ground patrols, but the planes also alerted the Sandinistas to the possibility of Marine patrols in the area. In addition, the planes flew over every outpost almost daily. Since Sandino's forces would not expose themselves to air attack in a prolonged siege of one of these outposts, if "a garrison could hold out for twenty-four hours, it was usually safe."

Combat aerial patrols for supply trains made up of bull carts also played an important role. For example, in February 1928 officials in Ocotal sent supply trains (one consisting of 185 oxcarts) to support Marine operations farther to the north in Nueva Segovia. The airplanes accompanied them until nightfall to watch out for ambushes after the trains cleared the outskirts of the city everyday.

At times, these patrols were dangerous. On 8 October 1927, two planes were patrolling near Quilali when they discovered and attacked one of Sandino's pack trains. The rebels returned fire with rifles and hit one of the planes. It crashed, but the pilot and gunner survived and the other plane dropped them a map and notified several garrisons to send help. Search parties looked for the two men, but they were too late. Sandinista forces had captured and shot the aviators the same day of the crash. The rebels had also hanged the body of the pilot from a tree and photographed it; the picture was later published in Mexican and Honduran newspapers.

Communication Missions: "On the Fly"

Amphibian plane and long boat on shore, with apparently Marine oarsmen in Miskito longboat, in Nicaragua

The airplanes also played an important role in facilitating communication between dispersed units and headquarters. During the early phases of the occupation, when an aircraft was unable to land, air-to-ground communication usually consisted of messages that pilots dropped from their airplanes. Ground-to-air communication involved several methods. White cloth signal panels laid out on the ground indicated the status of the unit or requests for supplies, air support, or medical assistance. Hand semaphore and catching messages "on the fly" were also used. "On the fly" meant that an airplane with a line suspended from its fuselage would pick up a message that was suspended in a pouch on a wire or string between two poles. Later in the occupation, both the amphibian and transport planes used radios, but radios were not used in the observation-bombers because of their unreliability.

Transportation Missions:
The First Air Ambulance and "Autogiro" Tests

Aviation made the difference in transportation as well. The rough terrain, dense brush, and possibility of ambush made transportation and supply difficult in "this impenetrable jungle where bull carts, the normal means of transportation, often make three to six miles a day." Initially, the pilots were unable to provide much help in transport missions because their de Havillands were not big enough. In December 1927, however, they received a trimotor Fokker transport that was capable of carrying either two thousand pounds of cargo or eight fully equipped soldiers. By August 1928, the Marines were flying five Fokkers on supply and transport missions. According to Bernard Nalty, "everything from cigarettes to mules was delivered by air; in fact, some remote outposts received payrolls by airdrop."

Another "first" in aviation occurred in the field of airborne transportation in January 1928. Never before had a pilot used his aircraft as an air ambulance in combat. First Lieutenant Christian Schilt became one of the aviation heroes of the Nicaraguan campaign and was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his air evacuation of wounded men under fire from a makeshift airfield in Quilali. After an attack by Sandino's forces, the Marine commander at Quilali requested an airplane to evacuate the wounded. Quilali had no airfield, however, so the necessary tools had to be air-dropped in. In three days, the Marines constructed a landing field 200 yards long in Quilali by cutting down trees and burning some of the Nicaraguan residents' houses.

Anastasio Somoza

Between 6 and 8 January, Lieutenant Schilt made ten trips in a Vought Corsair to bring in medicine and supplies and pick up the wounded, while another plane acted as an escort, flying figure eights to suppress rebel fire. The landings were risky because Schilt's plane had been reequipped with wheels from a de Havilland and had no brakes. Each time the plane landed, the Marines ran forward to seize the wings and slow the plane down with their weight to prevent it from crashing off the runway. For takeoffs, the Marines would hold the plane in place until Schilt reached full throttle and then let go, enabling him to achieve short takeoffs.

By 1931, the Nicaraguan National Guard had replaced the Marines throughout the country, but the Guard still relied on Marine aviation for supplies and transporting troops, especially when Sandino intensified his operations. Entire units were occasionally moved by air. In 1931, for example, the entire cadet corps of the Nicaraguan Military Academy was airlifted from Managua to reinforce Estelí.

A basic problem for aerial transportation in Nicaragua was that adequate landing strips were not always available where they were needed. Recognizing this problem, the Marines started field-testing the predecessor to the helicopter in Managua in 1932. The "autogiro" had short wings and a forward propeller in addition to the rotor. On takeoff, the pilot would switch the engine from the rotor to the forward propeller after the rotor was spinning. While the takeoff was not vertical, it used much less runway than conventional aircraft. When the pilot disengaged the forward propeller, the rotor would autorotate and the pilot would land. The Marines were disappointed, however, because the aircraft could carry only two people and fifty pounds of cargo efficiently.

Special Operations Missions:
Long-range Patrols and Leaflets

The role of aviation in assisting transportation and supply overlapped into what can be called special operations missions. In 1928, First Lieutenant Merritt Edson conducted several long-range reconnaissance ground patrols from the east coast into central Nicaragua. His objective was to plan for an operation to catch Sandino's forces in a pincers movement. Edson and his patrol operated for several months behind enemy lines, with planes occasionally bringing him reinforcements, supplies, and the mail from their new east coast air base at Puerto Cabezas. Initially, some of Major Rowell's Corsairs operated from this base. In May, however, five amphibian planes arrived on station. Amphibian planes were preferable because sudden rain squalls were common in the northeast and these planes could land on one of the lakes or rivers in the region to ride out the storms. They could also use these waterways to evacuate the "sitting wounded."

In another aspect of special operations, the Marines conducted leaflet drops to influence the will of the Sandinistas. In November 1928, Marine aircraft dropped thousands of leaflets over the area of Sandino's headquarters. Some leaflets carried the message that preparations were under way to finish off the Sandinistas, while others were signed by Sandino's father and asked Sandino to go see his sick mother before she died.

End of the Occupation:
A Legacy of Ironies

When the last contingent of Marine aviators left Nicaragua in January 1933, they left behind a legacy of ironies about the Marine occupation. The Marines had supervised the 1932 presidential election and the 1 January 1933 inauguration of Liberal President Juan Sacasa. Sacasa had been the popularly elected vice-president in the 1926 elections, whose opposition to the Conservative takeover of the government had sparked the civil war that provoked the second U.S. intervention. There is speculation that the entire civil war and Sandino's insurrection could have been avoided if the United States had supported Sacasa's efforts to prevent the Conservative takeover in 1926.

Marines fording Coco River in Nicaragua

Another irony was the buildup of the National Guard to replace the Marines when they left, with the objective of making this military force a professional, nonpolitical institution. Since the U.S. ambassador pushed for Anastasio Somoza (who was also Sacasa's nephew) to be designated as the National Guard commander, President Sacasa appointed him as such after winning the election. Somoza then subverted U.S. efforts to make the Guard nonpolitical. He developed the Guard as his power base and, in 1936, consolidated his control over Nicaragua to begin the forty-three-year Somoza family dynasty.

The final irony is the legacy of Sandino. As Richard Millett has pointed out, after five years of fighting Sandino, the Marines left him "as great a threat in January 1933 as he had been at any previous point in his career." A month after the Marines left, however, he met with Sacasa and agreed to end the insurrection. In February 1934, Sandino was killed by members of the National Guard, apparently acting under Somoza's orders.

Sandino's assassination and legacy served as inspiration to the new Sandinistas who fought Somoza's son and National Guard in the 1970s. The National Guard's indiscriminate use of air power against civilians increased popular support for the Sandinistas and played an important part in the July 1979 Sandinista victory. Today, the counterrevolutionary insurgents (contras) are confronting the Sandinista air and ground forces by using many of the same strategies and operating in the same areas as Sandino did.

Benefits of Marine Air Activities:
Experience for World War II

Front end shot of Marines and Miskitos crowded into length of pitpan, in Nicaragua

What were the benefits of air power during the Nicaraguan intervention? Lejeune Cummins asserts a theme that several other observers echo: while there was a loss to U.S. military prestige in failing to catch Sandino, the armed forces received invaluable training in "such significant developments as the 'invention' of dive bombing and large-scale aerial logistical support." Bernard Nalty concludes his Marine study on the same note, mentioning the importance of the Marines' gaining experience, but adding that more important ". . . was the fact that Marine aviators and infantrymen functioned smoothly as a unified team."These observations, written some thirty years after the conflict, are interesting when compared to those of a correspondent writing in the New York Times on 21 January 1928; he points out that, from a tactical standpoint, the operations "furnish the first practical laboratory for the development of postwar [World War I] aviation in coordination with ground troops."

Results of Marine Air Power:
Impact on Sandino's Strategy

What impact did air power have on Sandino's insurgency strategy? The airplane saved the day at Ocotal, but it also convinced Sandino to start using innovative tactics in the face of this new weapon. As a result, he initiated hit-and-run attacks, operating in small patrols, utilizing cover and concealment, and building support among the local populace.

Group of Marines at ease sitting under lean-to made from leaves, Nicaragua

In addition, the air attack on El Chipote demonstrated that "Sandino had learned at last the rudiments of antiaircraft defense." During the El Chipote bombings, the pilots faced not only rifle and machine gun fire but also a "barrage of incendiary sky rockets," which Sandino's troops called dynamite rockets; these were probably launched from the iron pipes affixed to tripods they had reportedly been making. Realizing the folly of fighting the planes, Sandino ordered his men to gather piles of wood on his fortress so that large fires would cover their escape during the bombing. Several days after the air attack, aerial observers reported that there were no signs of life at the mountain stronghold "except two men and a mule, where formerly the place was swarming with men." In a 1928 interview with Sandino after he escaped from El Chipote, Sandino asserted that his strategy was to sit and wait for the Marines to mobilize and come to him––and then to slip out of the trap into another part of the country.

Lessons Learned:
Central America Today

What are the lessons to be learned about air power in the campaign against Sandino, and how do they relate to today's counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua? The first lesson is that a combined effort of both sufficient air and ground forces, with a program designed to win the allegiance of the people, is required to conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign.

Vought O2U Corsair

Despite the fact that Sandino was still a threat, the United States reduced its ground forces during the latter stages of the occupation in an attempt to disengage from the prolonged conflict. By 1931, there was an overdependence on the Marine air assets to support the remaining U.S. and Nicaraguan ground forces. The result was a stalemate: the air assets restricted Sandino's activities, but there were not enough ground troops to defeat Sandino's insurgency. Critical of President Hoover's Nicaraguan policy, Senator Hiram Johnson from California asserted in 1931 that the United States "should pursue one of two courses: either withdraw the Marines entirely, or send enough there to do the job."

In addition to relying on air assets to make up for not employing sufficient ground forces, there was not enough done during the campaign to attract popular support to the Nicaraguan government. Sandino's major asset was popular support. Sandino recognized the value of good public relations early during his struggle: "The people of the countryside kept him supplied with provisions, sheltered his soldiers, and, most important of all, kept him informed of every move the Marines and Guard made." As a result, Sandino "proved to the world that a 'people's army' could resist every effort of the most modern military machine." Sandino's effort of using old rifles, machetes, and even bombs made from discarded Marine sardine cans to confront U.S. machine guns and dive bombers was "one of the first modern examples of what a guerrilla army with mass popular support could do against a technologically superior army."

Christian Franklin Schilt

This lesson is still important, as demonstrated in the 1979 Sandinista Revolution. Somoza's heavy emphasis on air assets, along with inadequate ground forces and few attempts to improve the legitimacy or popular appeal of his government, contributed to his downfall. Today the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are using air power to combat their insurgents, but as yet they have been unable to translate their superior firepower into a total victory. Additional ground forces and greater efforts to secure popular loyalty are required to consolidate the advantages that their air power provides them on the battlefield.

The second lesson learned from the campaign against Sandino is that air assets must be employed selectively to avoid creating popular support for the insurgents. Thomas Walker, a political scientist and authority on Nicaragua, illustrates this point: "Practices such as the aerial bombardment of 'hostile' towns and hamlets and the forced resettlement of peasant populations only intensified popular identification with the guerrilla cause." George Black, an author on Nicaragua, follows Walker's line of reasoning and points out that Marine airstrikes "only served to swell Sandino's forces, by increasing peasant hostility to the U.S. presence and failing miserably in their military objectives." Black asserts that Sandino specialized in diversionary attacks to provoke useless bombing raids as "the only American response to the impotence of their ground forces, bogged down in unfamiliar territory." As historian Richard Millett points out, in the final analysis, the counterinsurgency campaign against Sandino "clearly demonstrated that the Guardia, even with Marine air support, was hard pressed to contain, let alone destroy, Sandino's forces."

In recognition of the responsibility for protecting civilian populations, rules of engagement did exist as guidelines for the Marine aviators. Orders prevented the aviators from attacking groups unless they were carrying weapons, were located in the vicinity of a recent guerrilla action, or behaved suspiciously by running for cover. Although under orders not to bomb towns, the aviators bombed and strafed houses and animals believed to be used by the Sandinistas. The "fog of war" no doubt caused some civilian casualties and created the basis for Sandinista charges of aerial atrocities. On the other hand, Major Rowell complained about the "restrictions of a political nature" that hurt the morale and efficiency of his air power forces, particularly given the fact that some towns were used as sanctuaries by the Sandinistas.

Fifty years later, Somoza isolated himself from both domestic and international support by bombing his own cities during the Sandinista Revolution. Today's guerrillas in each country have been effective at either criticizing actual attacks against civilians or lying about them through propaganda. While the ability to distinguish between civilians and guerrillas is very difficult at times in a counterinsurgency conflict, the insurgents capitalize on excesses in the use of air power. They publicize each occurrence not only to build popular support at home for their cause but also to exploit the propaganda value abroad against their country's government.

Additional Sources:

www.scuttlebuttsmallchow.com
www.latinamericanstudies.org
teachpol.tcnj.edu
memory.loc.gov
www.homeofheroes.com
www.sweetmarias.com
home.planetinternet.be
www.nodo50.org
www.sjd-die-falken.net
history.nasa.gov
www.wpafb.af.mil
1000aircraftphotos.com
www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk

The U.S. Marine occupation of Nicaragua made significant contributions to the development of air power. Marine aviators expanded the concepts of close air support and independent aerial bombardment. They refined other uses of air power by conducting reconnaissance, communication, transportation, and even special operations missions. In addition to these developments, the coordination between air and ground forces provided valuable experience prior to World War II. The Marine campaign against Sandino provided several lessons about the role of air power in counterinsurgency conflicts––lessons that are still applicable today to current and possible future turmoil in Central America. The governments of El Salvador, Guatemela, and Nicaragua can improve their chances of defeating the insurgents if they follow these lessons and use their air power both selectively and in conjunction with an integrated ground force and popular support campaign. While these lessons cannot guarantee success, Nicaraguan history has demonstrated that refusing to follow these lessons can result in failure. The results of today's conflicts will be determined in large part by how well the lessons learned in the Nicaraguan counterinsurgency conflict more than fifty years ago are applied to today's insurgencies.

SUPPORT FOR UPCOMING ELECTION

If you support the policies and character that our current President, George W. Bush, stands for, please drive with your headlights on during the day this coming Sunday.

If you support John Kerry, please drive with your headlights off at night.

John Kerry told the world we were war criminals who raped, tortured and murdered in Vietnam. Now, thirty-three years later, we will tell America the truth.

Join us at the rally we call:

What: A peaceful remembrance of those with whom we served in Vietnam - those who lived and those who died.
We will tell the story of their virtues and how that contrasts with the lies told by John Kerry.

When: Sunday, Sept. 12, 2004 @ 2:00 PM - 4:00 PM EDT

Where: The West Front of the U.S. Capitol Building, Washington, DC

All Vietnam veterans and their families and supporters are asked to attend. Other veterans are invited as honored guests. This will be a peaceful event--no shouting or contact with others with different opinions. We fought for their rights then, and we respect their rights now. This is NOT a Republican or a pro-Bush rally. Democrats, Republicans and independents alike are warmly invited.

Our gathering is to remember those with whom we served, thereby giving the lie to John Kerry's smear against a generation of fine young men. B.G. "Jug" Burkett, author of "Stolen Valor," will be one of our speakers. Jug has debunked countless impostors who falsely claimed to be Vietnam veterans or who falsely claimed awards for heroism. Jug recommends that we refrain from dragging fatigues out of mothballs. Dress like America, like you do every day. Dress code: business casual, nice slacks, and shirt and shoes. No uniform remnants, please. Unit hats OK.

Selected members will wear badges identifying them as authorized to speak to the media about our event. Others who speak to the media will speak only for themselves.

The program will be controlled in an attempt to stay on-message. Speakers are encouraged not to engage in speculative criticism of John Kerry but (1) to stick to known and undisputed facts about John Kerry’s lies while (2) reminding America of the true honor and courage of our brothers in battle in Vietnam.

Send this announcement to 10 or more of your brothers! Bring them by car, bus, train or plane! Make this event one of pride in America, an event you would be proud to have your mother or your children attend.

Contact: kerrylied.com

Veterans for Constitution Restoration is a non-profit, non-partisan educational and grassroots activist organization. The primary area of concern to all VetsCoR members is that our national and local educational systems fall short in teaching students and all American citizens the history and underlying principles on which our Constitutional republic-based system of self-government was founded. VetsCoR members are also very concerned that the Federal government long ago over-stepped its limited authority as clearly specified in the United States Constitution, as well as the Founding Fathers' supporting letters, essays, and other public documents.

Actively seeking volunteers to provide this valuable service to Veterans and their families.

UPDATED THROUGH APRIL 2004

The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul

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Good Night Snippy.

Good night Sam.

WOW! This is a pretty interesting presentation, Sam.
Wanted to say Howdy before going back to finishing the commentary.
BTW, I've got one of those campaign hats complete with the leather headband. The brim is still stiff as a board. It was my uncle's hat from his time in the Army in WWI. A real treasure.

University of Science, Music and Culture Airpower Bumperooni for the FR Foxhole

From a former NFO Wannabe

Regards

alfa6 ;>}

G'morning Snippy.

Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the Freeper Foxhole.

Good Morning, Foxhole

Another great thread, and another great day.

Chance Vought O2U-2 Corsair

"One of two O2U-2's given by the Navy to the Coast Guard in 1935. Based at a temporary Coast Guard installation in San Antonio, Texas. This particular aircraft was flown by Harry Logan with Huddler and Bolten as crew. Aircraft was fabric covered. Upon acceptance from the Navy, condition of fabric was so bad that the plane was stripped and recovered by personnel and their wives at a 'Sewing Bee.' Used briefly in patrolling the Canadian boarder for rum runners." [Copied from original photo in custody of LT Harry Logan, USCG (Ret.).]

I'm in.
Weird.
First diive bombing,and they don't get the credit for it.

THE ENGERGIZER US ARMY EOD BUNNY KEEP READING HIS COPY OF "UNFIT FOR COMMAND" OVER, AND OVER, AND OVER AGAIN.

I have of course got my copy of "Unfit For Command", and have read it from cover to cover the first day, BUT, when ever I go to any public place such as a restaurant, I take the book with me and hold it up so people can see the cover and appear to be reading it again.

You would be amazed the number of people that ask me about it, what is in it and where they can get their copy. Works for me, will work for anybody else using the same low life tactic of spreading right wing propaganda, heh, heh, heh.

Good morning ladies. Flag-o-gram.

PhotoID: 200312382014
Submitted by: MCAS Cherry Point

Caption: The Marine Aviation Support Squadron 1 mascot stands guard as the squadron's Marines run past for the last time. Photo by: Pfc. Rocco DeFilippis Read the story

Ooo-Rah sized version

Morning DD.

Thanks

It was my uncle's hat from his time in the Army in WWI. A real treasure.

Cool! When I was in the only one wearing the campaign hats where the DI's.

Morning alfa6.

Morning aeronaut

Morning E.G.C. Cloudy and rainy morning here. Almost looks like Fall has arrived.