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Posted on 07/22/2004 12:00:11 AM PDT by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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| Our Mission: The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans. In the FReeper Foxhole, Veterans or their family members should feel free to address their specific circumstances or whatever issues concern them in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, brotherhood and support. The FReeper Foxhole hopes to share with it's readers an open forum where we can learn about and discuss military history, military news and other topics of concern or interest to our readers be they Veteran's, Current Duty or anyone interested in what we have to offer. If the Foxhole makes someone appreciate, even a little, what others have sacrificed for us, then it has accomplished one of it's missions. We hope the Foxhole in some small way helps us to remember and honor those who came before us.
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July through August 1779; Penobscot Bay, Maine In June 1779, Royal Navy transports escorted by three sloops of war landed 700-800 soldiers and marines at Majabagaduce, a peninsula near the mouth of the Penobscot River. From this location, which was then in Massachusetts territory, the British intended to protect their possessions in eastern Canada from American incursions, raid the colonists' coastal shipping, and launch forays against New England cities and towns farther south. In addition, British commanders hoped to establish a colony of American loyalists.  Map of Penobscot Bay showing location of Fort George and the initial position of three supporting Royal Navy frigates. Source: Allen, A Naval History of the American Revolution. Upon learning of the British incursion, the Massachusetts General Court, then in session in Boston, authorized an expedition to destroy the Penobscot base. The General Court also petitioned the Continental Congress for assistance from three Continental Navy warships anchored in Boston harbor. Congress agreed, and Commodore Dudley Saltonstall, commander of the squadron, was picked to lead the naval portion of the expedition. Armed vessels from the Massachusetts and New Hampshire state navies joined Saltonstall's force, as did 12 privateers cajoled into state service for the expedition. Overall, the amphibious task force boasted 19 armed ships mounting 344 guns and 24 transports. The latter vessels carried a landing force of approximately 1,200 men under Brigadier General Solomon Lovell. The bulk of these troops were Massachusetts militia, joined by 300 Continental Marines. Ultimately, the Penobscot expedition turned into the largest American naval expedition of the Revolutionary War. Saltonstall's orders directed him to completely eliminate the British presence in the Penobscot. To do so, his superiors emphasized, he would have to "preserve the greatest harmony with the commander of the land forces, that the navy and army may cooperate and assist each other." It was guidance that the commodore would discount, to the detriment of the entire mission.  After delays in loading the transports - caused in part by reluctance among the privateer captains to partake in such an unremunerative operation - the task force sailed from Boston on 19 July. It first proceeded to the area of modern Boothbay to pick up reinforcements that never materialized. Underway once again, the American warships entered Penobscot Bay on 25 July. By this time, British naval commanders had good intelligence of the American force's composition and destination, and were preparing to find and destroy it. When the Saltonstall's expedition first arrived in Penobscot Bay, British forces had only partially completed a dirt fortification, named Fort George, on the heights of the Majabagaduce peninsula. However, the three Royal Navy sloops, each mounting 18 guns, remained anchored in the bay nearby. A small party of British troops also had established a minor fortification on Nautilus Island just to the south of Majabagaduce peninsula. Hence, British gunners on land and on board the warships were able to engage in a desultory two-hour duel with the American expeditionary task force as it entered the bay, which inflicted little or no damage on either side. Initially, things went well for the revolutionary forces. On the 26th, Marines and militiamen, under covering fire from the American warships, took Nautilus Island and captured several British cannon. Two days later, a U.S. landing force stormed ashore on the southwest end of the Majabagaduce peninsula after two privateers had shelled the heavily wooded area above the landing beach. The initial echelon landed in three divisions, with approximately 200 militiamen on the left and in the center and 200 Continental Marines on the right. The Marines faced stiff resistance from several companies of British troops atop a steep bluff overlooking their landing point. Nevertheless, they cleared the bluff in less than 20 minutes, suffering 30-35 dead and wounded in the assault. Ensconced ashore, the American troops moved their artillery to a position only 600 feet from Fort George.  At this point, the American force began to move more cautiously, taking time to first build its own fortifications. Militia and marines next launched a night attack, conceived by Saltonstall, to seize a part of the British breastworks closest to the bay where the Royal Navy frigates had taken shelter. This would, the commodore believed, cut Fort George's garrison off from communication with their naval support, allowing the Americans to finish off each force individually. The assault on the breastworks succeeded initially, but the British men-of-war eventually opened fire on the position, causing the American forces to retreat to their own fortifications. The results of the night-time action reinforced Brigadier General Lovell's reluctance to commit his mostly green troops to an attack on Fort George while they remained exposed to potentially heavy land- and sea-based cannon fire. He urged Commodore Saltonstall to attack the sloops, which his fleet outgunned, and thus remove that threat. Once this had been accomplished, the fleets guns could be used to suppress artillery fire from the fort during a subsequent American ground attack. Saltonstall, however, insisted that this course of action was too risky, continuing the pattern of ultra-cautious behavior that he had exhibited since the start of the operation. In the ensuing days, Lovell and his militia commanders - and even some of Saltonstall's subordinates - pleaded with the commodore to attack the British sloops, but to no avail. Reports that a Royal Navy force had sailed from New York to relieve the Pensobscot defenders, and that Fort George was becoming stronger by the day, still could not persuade the timid commodore. The continuing impasse poisoned interservice relations between the land and sea forces, all the way down to the unit level.  Continental Marines storm the heights at Dice Head, Castine, Maine in August 1779. Courtesy US Naval Historical Museum. Meanwhile Lovell and his men had been sending messages back to Boston on board fast ships - something the Commodore Saltonstall saw no need to do. The latter's superiors on the Navy Board of the Eastern District eventually supported Lovell's position and ordered Saltonstall to attack the British sloops and complete the operation before the Royal Navy relief force could arrive in his area. Reluctantly, Saltonstall made plans to take some sort of action on 13 August. But by then it was too late. On the 13th, two American warships acting as pickets spotted a task force under the command of Sir George Collier approaching the bay. Collier's force consisted of six warships, including a 64-gun ship of the line and four frigates. Saltonstall's warships still outnumbered the British and carried more guns, but the armament on board the Royal Navy ships outranged that of the Americans and their gun crews were far superior to their American counterparts. Nevertheless, Saltonstall still had the opportunity to engage the British, damage some of their ships, and perhaps allow part of his own force to escape. At first, that appeared to be what he might try to do, as the American forces formed a defensive crescent across the bay. However, as the British moved closer, Saltonstall and his captains concluded that they could not overcome the enemy force. The entire American fleet turned tail and fled up the Penobscot River. Most crews ran their ships aground and set them afire.  One part of Tory doctor John Calef's two part map of the retreat. Castine is in the lower left hand corner and the map is oriented with north pointing to the right. The American fleet's difficulty getting up river is clearly depicted. From the Journal of Dr. John Calef, in Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution, 1779 Reprint (New York:The New York Times and Arno press, 1971). Lovell's men fared little better. At word of Collier's approach, they evacuated their positions and reembarked their transports. These vessels ultimately joined their warship counterparts on the banks of the Penobscot. What was left of the American expedition - soldiers and sailors - had to travel overland through the dense wilderness to make their way back to Boston. In all, the Americans lost 43 ships and approximately 500 men. Massachusetts, which incurred a heavy debt outfitting the expedition, also suffered a major financial blow. The committee of inquiry looking into the Penobscot fiasco placed most of the blame on the "want of proper spirit and energy on the part of the commodore," and Saltonstall was subsequently discharged from the naval service. Fundamentally, the expedition's failure highlighted problems with ambiguous command arrangements during amphibious operations. It also underscored the difficulty of mounting a large, complex expeditionary operation with a cobbled-together, untrained, and mostly nonprofessional force. In addition, the palpable mistrust and lack of communications between the naval and ground commanders - and their respective subordinates - demonstrated the importance of building a sufficient level of confidence and mutual understanding between land and sea warriors before an amphibious operation commenced.
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Very cool. ;-)
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Air Power |
Produced to meet a joint Anglo-French requirement in 1965 for a dual-role advanced/operational trainer and tactical support aircraft, the Jaguar has been transformed into a potent fighter-bomber. The RAF originally intended to use the aircraft purely as an advanced trainer, but this was later changed to the offensive support role on cost grounds.
Starting in the early 1960's, the French Air Force began looking for aircraft to replace its Lockheed T 33 and Fouga Magister trainers as well as its Mystère IV tactical fighters. In April 1964, the Aeronautics Technical Bureau invited French aeronautics companies to respond to a preliminary design in a programme for a twin-engined aircraft to equip ECAT (Ecole de combat and d’appui tactique, or School of Combat and Tactical Support). The ECAT programme resulted in the companies Dassault, with the Cavalier, and Breguet, with the Br 121, entering into competition. On 30th June 1964, the engineering offices of Breguet, headed by Georges Ricard, submitted to the competent authorities the project Br 121, a version of the Br 1001 Taon, with twin Rolls Royce RB 172-45 engines. The project Cavalier was finally abandoned following the choice of the Breguet aircraft.
It quickly became apparent that the RAF also needed an aircraft that corresponded rather closely to the characteristics of the Br 121. On 17th May 1965, the two countries concluded a protocol agreement for the study and joint manufacture of a low-altitude combat and training aircraft. Responsibility fell to Breguet Aviation and the British Aircraft Corporation, under the management of the Franco-British joint-company SEPECAT (Société européenne de production de l’avion d’école de combat and d’appui tactique, or European Company for the Production of Aircraft for the School of Combat and Tactical Support). Breguet Aviation was acquired by the company Dassault in 1967.
The first prototype, Jaguar A, flew from Istres (Bouches-du-Rhône, France), on 08 September 1968.
Difficulties in cooperation, due to the lack of a true main contractor, and changes in the definition delayed the Jaguar entering service until 1972. Originally a program for a trainer aircraft, it ended up as a ground attack aircraft with little in common, either in terms of size or cost, with the model initially foreseen. The French and British versions also were not identical, since each country had imposed, for its own models, nationally-sourced equipment.
In the end, a total of 573 aircraft were ordered. France and Britain purchased 403 to which were added 54, exported to three countries (Oman, Ecuador and Nigeria), and 116 to India of which 70 were produced under license in that country.
The first RAF aircraft took to the air in October 1969, and each air force placed orders for 200 aircraft - the RAF opting for 165 single-seat and 35 two-seat aircraft. Deliveries to No 226 OCU at Lossiemouth began in 1973, and at its peak the Jaguar equipped 8 front-line and 1 training squadron; Nos 14, 17, 20 and 31 Sqn at Bruggen (strike/attack), II(AC) Sqn at Laarbruch (reconnaissance) as well as the three Coltishall based squadrons (6, 41 and 54) and Lossiemouth based 16(Reserve) Sqn.
India acquired the Jaguar strike fighter to meet the IAF's Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA) requirement to replace the Canberra and Hunter aircraft. After many years of evaluation and negotiation, the Anglo-French fighter was contracted for, an interim batch of ex-RAF Jaguars being accepted to re-equip No. 14 Squadron. IAF pilots and technicians received conversion training with the RAF and British Aerospace in Lossiemouth, Coltishall and Warton before ferrying the first Jaguars to India in July 1979. These were followed by a batch of U.K. built Jaguars to re-equip No. 5 Squadron even as simultaneously, HAL prepared for production of the aircraft, its powerplants, avionics and accessories in India. By the mid-1980s, the Jaguar was in service with Nos. 5, 14, 16 and 27 Squadrons while a flight of No.6 Squadron was equipped with the Maritime Jaguar carrying the new generation Sea Eagle anti-ship sea-skimming missile. The Jaguar strike fighter was equipped also with Magic air-to-air missiles on unique overwing pylons, featured advanced attack systems and able to carry formidable warload till the far ends of the sub-continent.
The Jaguar has a long sleek fuselage with a large swept tail fin and rudder. The fuselage features a long, pointed, chiseled nose, and the body widens at the air intakes rectangular to the exhausts. Relatively short-span swept wings are shoulder-mounted on the fuselage. The internal jet engines, mounted to the rear of the cockpit, have rectangular air intakes either side of the fuselage behind the cockpit, with their top surfaces forming an extension of the wing. The engine exhausts show prominently under the forward portion of the tail. The rear jetpipes are located forward and below the tailplane which has marked anhedral. The raised bubble canopy is set above the sharply-pointed nose. The twin mainwheels of the undercarriage retract into the fuselage.
A variety of weapons including cluster, freefall, retard and laser guided bombs, as well as rockets can be carried on the four wing and one fuselage stations. Two 30mm cannon are mounted internally. To mark targets for laser-guided weapons, the aircraft carries the thermal imaging and laser designation (TIALD) pod. For self-defence, overwing Sidewinder infra-red missiles are carried and the aircraft is fitted with a comprehensive suite of electronic countermeasures. Perhaps the Jaguar's most impressive feature is its navigation and attack system. With mission data fed into the computer, all the necessary information for a pinpoint attack is relayed to the head-up display. From the display, the pilot knows exactly where the target is located and precisely when to release his weapons for maximum effect.
The RAF fleet is currently undergoing an upgrade program, and this will see aircraft fitted with new cockpit displays, helmet-mounted sights, the ability to carry the new Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM) and other system improvements to further extend the life of the aircraft well into the next century.
The Jaguar has been with the RAF for over 25 years and yet, in terms of technology growth, the late 1990s have seen the aircraft expand its operational capability by a greater degree than during any other period of its lifetime. In fact, today's RAF Jaguar actually merits respect as a weapons platform and allows its operators the opportunity to produce the kind of results that they have long deserved. For those of you who have missed the recent advance of this often ridiculed Anglo-French machine, read on; you may be pleasantly surprised to discover that the curvature of the earth will shortly be surplus to requirements!
'Jaguar 97' is the UK Jaguar Force fleet standard machine and, at first glance, only the finest enthusiasts would recognise the differences between a '97' model and the trusty steed that first appeared in RAF livery in 1973. There are no design or aerodynamic changes but enhanced engines, offering a potential 25% thrust increase, will eradicate pilots' concerns during take-off in hot and high locations! It is inside the cockpit that the new toys will be most obvious to those familiar with the 'old machine'. A new stick top and hand controller have brought true HOTAS functions to the Jaguar pilot, reducing time spent 'head in cockpit' dealing with navigation button-pressing and weapon aiming facilities. A 1:1 ratio wide-angle Head Up Display (HUD) and associated up-front controller has replaced the peculiar 5:1 geared version of old and with this new HUD comes the capability to display a multitude of real-time information. Out goes the microfilm fed moving map display and in comes Multi-Purpose Colour Display (MPCD). The MPCD displays a digitally generated map or the image seen through the newly acquired TIALD pod by displaying TV/IR imagery in video style format.
The introduction of Ferranti's FIN 1064 Inertial Navigation system in 1985 allowed the Jaguar to be operated accurately and reliably at low level. This excellent INAS has now been updated by integrating a GPS receiver and a Terrain Profile-matching system (TerProm) to give outstanding accuracy and performance with weapon aiming and navigation; no more excuses for missing any targets! An in-built Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) also utilises the Digital Terrain Elevation Database (DTED) of TerProm warning of an impending collision with either granite or significant man made obstructions! All the new hardware is linked by a 1553 databus plus imagery from both the HUD and TIALD can be recorded onto S-VHS compact videocassettes for debriefing purposes.
On the ground, planning a sortie is now done on the Jaguar Mission Planner (JMP), a PC-based system using a similar database to that of TerProm. It allows pilots to choose very careful routes through known Surface-to-Air Missile threat areas and minimise aircraft exposure in hostile territory. Now that the new hardware is in place, in both aeroplane and on the ground, future upgrades can be easily implemented through upgrades of software and databases. Self defence was enhanced during the Gulf Conflict by arming the Jaguar with overwing mounted AIM-9L missiles; it will soon be possible to launch these missiles via a helmet mounted sight system, something that will significantly improve the respect given to a Jaguar in an air-to-air engagement.
In terms of operational capability, the Jaguar is currently a day/VFR medium and low-level ground attack/recce aircraft with an ever-expanding arsenal of weapons in its inventory. The Night Vision Goggle (NVG) re-equipment programme should soon produce enough aircraft to allow limited 'night combat ready' to be declared by the Jaguar Force. It is not yet a Harrier GR7 or Tornado GR1/4 competitor but it may not be long before the addition of a Forward Looking Infra Red system creates yet another 'electric aeroplane' to add to the RAF nocturnal inventory. Fortunately, there have not been any more attempts to produce a maritime Jaguar and, within the latest modification programme, there is still space to stow one's golf clubs for those well-earned relaxing moments in exotic locations.....
Finally, in a world of tight finances and knotted purse strings, the Jaguar is regarded favourably. The upgrade to the RAF Jaguar fleet will be completed within a diminutive budget and within a commendable timescale; true value will be gained from using state-of-the art equipment when it is most useful, now! Yet, despite undergoing major avionics and engine upgrades, this 25 year-old aircraft remains an inexpensive, reliable and highly deployable commodity that can deliver a modest punch in virtually all scenarios that could be expected of a rapid reaction force.
Specifications:
Builder team: Anglo-French co-operation Dassault / BAe
Primary Function: Close Air Support (CAS), Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI)
Powerplant: Two Turbomeca/Rolls-Royce Adour 104 turbofans of 7,305lb st.
Crew: GR1B pilot only
Dimensions:
Span: 28ft 6 in (8.69m)
Length: 55ft 2.5in (16.83m)
Height: 4.80 m
Weight: empty / maximum at takeoff : 7.5 t / 15 t
Fuel capacity: 4,200 l internal / 7,800 maximal / In-flight refuelling
Performance:
Max Speed: Mach 1.35 990mph (1,593km/h) at 36,000ft (11,000m).
Operational ceiling: 40,000 ft
Armaments:
Two 30mm Aden / DEFA 553 guns
up to 10,000lb (4,500kg) stores including
Matra Magic R550 air-to-air missile ;
AS 30 laser air-to-surface missile,
laser guided bombs
Martel rockets
laser-guided bombs.
Special equipment:
Electronic counter measures,
photo recce capacity with Omera 40 camera,
gyroscopic guidance
We call it "cowardise in the face of the enemy"
The trouble with polls is that they're like statistics, they can be manipulated to get the results you want.
As long as you stay away from Socialist policies you'll catch up with Germany even faster as their economy keeps sliding downhill.
Save for Mainiac grandsons.
Hey I'll get back to you later on this article. It seems that last night while I was sound asleep "someone" opened the floodgates of miticulous research and bombarded me with "posts" on yesterdays thread (USS Franklin). I've got some reading to do before I jump into today's thread. Maybe "someone" should yell "INCOMING" before they answer my questions. ;^)
The plan was for Poland to hold the Germans long enough for the french to mobilize and attack from the West. Their lack of action and then the Russian invasion from the East doomed the Poles. Their defensive posture and military structure was based on the alliance with france and England. IIRC, the Poles also mobilized late at the request of france not to "antagonize" Hitler.
Evening larryjohnson. How's the summer been way up in Maine?
Evening w_over_w.
LOL! I wasn't me!! "Someone" got carried away.
Is that supposed to be a dog? ;-)
This is a dog!
How's it going? I had a good day today.:-)
I'm doing great, thanks.
Ha!
Good evening tanker.
Hey there larry. good to see you.
Evening Victoria.
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