The FReeper Foxhole Studies The Decision That Launched The ENOLA GAY - April 23rd, 2004

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[snippy_about_it]

Advice About the Bomb



As discussions continued, US authorities made preparations for the decision that seemed most likely. In May, a special committee in Washington nominated four urban industrial centers -- Kokura, Hiroshima, Niigata, and Kyoto -- as targets. Secretary of War Stimson struck Kyoto (Japan's capital for more than 1,000 years) from the list. The military picked Nagasaki as the fourth potential target.


Einstein and Szilard

The Interim Committee on S-1 (a code term for the Manhattan Project) told the President that the bomb should be used against Japan and that a demonstration explosion would not be sufficient. Reasons included the possibility that the bomb might not work, that the Japanese might think the demonstration was faked, and that there was no way to make the demonstration convincing enough to end the war.

Military leaders accompanied the President to the Big Three meeting at Potsdam in July, and discussions continued there. In his memoirs, Truman said that Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Mr. Stimson, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, and General Arnold reached a consensus at Potsdam that the bomb should be used. In fact, the advice was not so clear-cut. Although Arnold supported the decision, he repeated his view that use of the bomb was not a military necessity.



Casualties were increasing with every day that Japan refused to surrender. Truman's biographer, David McCullough, writes, "Had the bomb been ready in March and deployed by Roosevelt, had it shocked Japan into surrender then, it would have already saved nearly fifty thousand American lives lost in the Pacific in the time since, not to say a vastly larger number of Japanese lives."

During the Potsdam conference, Truman received word that the "Fat Man" bomb had been tested successfully at Alamogordo, N.M., on July 16. On July 25, the War Department relayed Truman's order that the 509th Composite Group should deliver the first "special bomb" as soon after August 3 as weather permitted on one of the four target cities.


"Fat Man"

Among those at Potsdam staunchly supporting the decision to use the bomb was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Years later, Churchill still believed that Truman's decision had been right.

The Potsdam Proclamation, issued July 26 by the heads of government of the US, UK, and China, warned of "utter devastation of the Japanese homeland" unless Japan surrendered unconditionally. "We shall brook no delay," it said. The same day, the cruiser Indianapolis delivered the U-235 core of the "Little Boy" bomb to Tinian.


"Little Boy"

On July 28, Prime Minister Suzuki declared the Potsdam Proclamation a "thing of no great value" and said "We will simply mokusatsu it." Literally, mokusatsu means "kill with silence." Suzuki said later the meaning he intended was "no comment." The Allies took the statement as rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki



The unit that would deliver the atomic bombs, the 509th Composite Group, had been organized in 1944. Crews were hand-picked by the commander, Col. Paul W. Tibbets, Jr. In the early morning hours of August 6, the Enola Gay, flown by Tibbets, took off from Tinian. The primary target was Hiroshima, the seventh largest city in Japan, an industrial and military shipping center on the Inland seacoast of Honshu. At precisely 8:16 a.m., the atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima. More than half of the city was destroyed in a flash, and about 80,000 people were killed.

Reaction by the Japanese Cabinet was split between the war faction and the peace faction. With the cabinet at an impasse, Hirohito took a more assertive position. On August 8, the Emperor instructed Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to tell Prime Minister Suzuki that Japan must accept the inevitable and terminate the war with the least possible delay and that the tragedy of Hiroshima must not be repeated.

Anami could not bring himself to flatly defy the Emperor, but he continued to argue his position passionately. Hard-liners in the military were plotting to kill Suzuki and others of the peace faction. Anami was not part of the plot -- although his brother-in-law, Masahiko Takeshita, was a ringleader.

The Soviet Union, seeing an opportunity for easy pickings with limited risk, declared war on Japan August 8. Despite the desperation of a war suddenly active on two fronts, the Japanese were not quite ready to capitulate.



The primary target for the second atomic bomb mission on August 9 was Kokura, but the aimpoint was obscured by smoke drifting from a nearby city that had been bombed two days earlier. Bockscar diverted to Nagasaki on the western coast of Kyushu. Nagasaki was heavily industrialized. The Mitsubishi conglomerate operated a shipyard, electric equipment production facilities, steel factories, and an arms plant there. The aimpoint for Bockscar was the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works. The bomb exploded on Nagasaki at 11:02 a.m., killing 40,000.

In his radio address August 9, President Truman said the United States had used the atomic bomb "against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare. We have used it to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans. We shall continue to use it until we completely destroy Japan's power to make war. Only a Japanese surrender will stop us."

"Bear the Unbearable"

Japanese deliberation on August 9 lasted all day and into the night. At a cabinet meeting that began at 2:30 p.m. -- hours after the second atomic bomb had fallen -- Anami said, "We cannot pretend to claim that victory is certain, but it is far too early to say the war is lost. That we will inflict severe losses on the enemy when he invades Japan is certain, and it is by no means impossible that we may be able to reverse the situation in our favor, pulling victory out of defeat." Finally, at 2:00 a.m. on August 10, the Emperor told the Big Six meeting (the Supreme War Council) that "the time has come to bear the unbearable" and that "I give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied Proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister."



At 4:00 a.m., the cabinet adopted a message for radio transmission to Allied powers, saying in part: "The Japanese Government [is] ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26th, 1945, by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and China, and later subscribed to by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler."

The Allied response August 11 said that the "authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers" and that "the Emperor shall authorize and ensure the signature by the Government of Japan and the Japanese General Headquarters of the surrender terms."

V-J Day

The Anami faction continued to haggle, but at noon on August 14, the Emperor asked the cabinet to prepare an Imperial Rescript of Surrender. He said that "a peaceful end to the war is preferable to seeing Japan annihilated." The plotters engaged in various disruptive actions in the hours that followed, but it was over. At 11:30 p.m. the Emperor recorded his radio message for broadcast the following day. General Anami, preferring to die rather than see Japan surrender, committed seppuku at 5:00 a.m., August 15.

In the Imperial Rescript of Surrender, broadcast at noon on August 15, Emperor Hirohito said, "Despite the best that has been done by everyone -- the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people -- the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.



"Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. [Emphasis added.]

"Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers."



V-J Day was celebrated August 15. General MacArthur accepted Japan's formal surrender September 2 on the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. The atomic bomb did not win the war. Japan had been defeated already by the land, sea, and air campaign that went before. It is reasonable to conclude, however, that the bomb did force the Japanese surrender -- and considerably sooner than it would have occurred otherwise.

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Today's Educational Sources and suggestions for further reading:
www.afa.org

Air Force Magazine - April, 1994, Pg. 30

[snippy_about_it]

Veterans for Constitution Restoration is a non-profit, non-partisan educational and grassroots activist organization.

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Tribute to a Generation - The memorial will be dedicated on Saturday, May 29, 2004.

Thanks to CholeraJoe for providing this link.

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Actively seeking volunteers to provide this valuable service to Veterans and their families.

Thanks to quietolong for providing this link.

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Iraq Homecoming Tips

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[snippy_about_it]

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It's Friday ~ Good Morning Everyone.


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[SAMWolf]

Good Morning Snippy.

Back when we had the political will to crush our enemies.

[snippy_about_it]

Good night Sam. Wish we'd get the will back!

[GATOR NAVY]

Ha! I'm the first!

[GATOR NAVY]

Continue the firebombing and blockade. After the war, the Strategic Bombing Survey would conclude that without the atomic bomb or invasion, Japan would have accepted unconditional surrender, probably by November and definitely by the end of the year.

Many critics of the bomb who would have preferred this route don't realize how close to starvation Japan was. If we had prevented the 1945 harvest from getting to the cities, the death toll throughout the country would have been much higher than those killed by the bombs.

[snippy_about_it]

Ha! I'm the first!

Ha ha! That you are. Good morning Gator Navy. It's not often you and I see each other this time of night/morning. I'm posting and running...of to catch some shut eye. ;-)

[E.G.C.]

Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the Freeper Foxhole.

[radu]

Good morning to all at the Foxhole!
T.G.I.F.!!!

To all our military men and women, past and present, and to our allies who stand with us,
THANK YOU!

[The Mayor]

A Storm Is Coming! It is appointed for men to die once, but after this the judgment. —Hebrews 9:27

Those who reject Christ as Savior will face Him as Judge.

[StayAt HomeMother]

To restate what Snippy has presented, none of the other other options to end the war, including diplomacy, blockade, warning the Japanese with a demonstration of an atomic bomb, invasion, and/or bombing Japan with other than nuclear attacks on cities, would have satisfied three key issues: (1) the Japanese held hundreds of thousands of prisoners and had proven they had no scruples against executing POWs, (2) millions of Japanese were preparing for suicidal attacks that would kill many Allies, and (3) surrender was unacceptable in Japanese culture, as proven by the coup attempt after the surrender was announced.

It is also important to note that critical information on the effects and spread of radiation was not yet known. Some accounts convey the impression that Americans knew beforehand the effects radioactive fallout on cities, but they did not. Studies before and after the Trinity test indicated that the radiation threat was minimal. Not until after the war did the full horror of persistent and spreading radiation become known even to scientists. Blast and heat were terrible (but expected) immediate effects, but it was not anticipated that people would suffer and die from radiation for years afterwards and make radiation this new weapon’s most memorable and horrific effect for many people.

Snippy mentions the POWs. Prisoner of the Japanese suffered a horrendously high death rate: 35% of US soldiers died in Japanese captivity compared to less than one percent of those held by Germans. At islands already liberated, Japanese were known to kill prisoners rather than allow them to be liberated. An entry in the journal of the Japanese Formosa headquarters stated “Extreme measures [to be taken against POWs in] urgent situations: Whether they are destroyed individually or in groups, or however it is done, with mass bombing, poisonous smoke, poisons, drowning, decapitation, or what, dispose of the prisoners as the situation dictates. In any case, it is the aim not to allow the escape of a single one, to annihilate them all, and not to leave any traces.” Japanese awareness that they would be held accountable for their mistreatment of hundreds of thousands of prisoners and internees made them even more resistant to surrender. Many Allied prisoners were saved because of atomic bombs including about 70,000 POWs who remained in Japan itself at the end of the war. As former POW and later English diplomat John Fletcher-Cooke wrote, “Few, if any POWs would have got out of Japan alive if the atomic bombs had not been dropped.”

Why bomb Nagasaki? After Hiroshima, the Japanese atomic physicist Nishina told them they had been hit with an atomic weapon, but when senior Japanese military finally acknowledged the existence of atomic weapons, they still minimized the damage they could cause. As Snippy points out, the casualties and devastation from the first atomic bomb were not as great as the fire-bombs which Tokyo and other cities had already withstood. Based on their own difficulty in producing atomic weapons, Japanese leaders felt that even if atomic weapons were “city killers,” Americans probably only had only one such bomb. A POW pilot fabricated a story that many atomic weapons were available, but in fact, after Nagasaki, no more atomic bombs were immediately available. Japanese leaders refused to surrender after Hiroshima. They knew the terms they wanted regarding the actual surrender, occupation, and treatment of war criminals were not acceptable to the Allies. Delay might enable Japan to obtain better terms. MAGIC intercepts indicated Japanese still were seeking a negotiated peace through the Soviets even after Hiroshima was bombed. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria didn’t convince them to surrender either.

After two atomic bombs and the Soviet invasion, the Japanese still did not surrender unconditionally and the surrender date and terms remained uncertain. As negotiations in Moscow crumpled, Nagasaki burned, and Soviet troops poured over the border into Manchuria, Foreign Minister Togo realized Japan had no options, but hard line military leader still proposed “Ketsu Go” which would activate every Japanese over age 17 to defend the homeland. Militants still hoped a final battle, costly to the Allies, would allow them to retain the emperor, limit occupation, control their own disarmament, and preside over any war crimes trials.

After Japan agreed to the Allied surrender terms on August 14th, a coup was attempted with one commander saying, “There is still a huge Japanese army on the Chinese mainland, and Japan still holds 350,000 Allied prisoners of war. Why should Japan surrender?” After the Emperor prepared his first ever-recorded speech to the nation, one in which he never used the words “defeat” or “surrender,” coup members tried to find and destroy the recording before it was finally played on August 15th.

That Japanese hard-liners resisted surrender even after the Soviet invasion and after a second city was bombed enforces the argument that nothing short of the shock and horror of atomic warfare on cities would have ended hostilities so quickly. This quick ending saved the lives of hundreds of thousand of Allied prisoners and military personnel. The swift ending also saved the lives of millions of Japanese military and civilians who would otherwise have been lost to a hopeless cause. In addition, the two atomic bombs caused much less damage to the Japanese infrastructure than conventional bombing or invasion would have caused. As much as the United States has been chastised for using atomic weapons against cities, this action helped limit the Cold War from becoming a full blown “hot” war.

More references:

Allen, Thomas B, and Norman Polmar Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

Harper, Stephen. Miracle of Deliverance: The Case for the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. New York: Stein and Day, 1985.

Kurzman, Dan. Day of the Bomb: Countdown to Hiroshima. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986.

Maddox, Robert James. Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1995.

Moskin, J. Robert. Mr. Truman’s War: The Final Victories of World War II and the Birth of the Postwar World. New York: Random House, 1996.

[Soaring Feather]

Good morning everyone!

[SAMWolf]

Morning Gator Navy. You and Iris7 having a contest to see who can get in first?

[SAMWolf]

The fire bomb raids on Japan killed more people than did the atomic bomb. It just took more planes and a little longer to do it. Russia probably would have been able to get into the war earlier and overrun more of Japanese occupied China and been in a position to grab the Northern Islands of Japan.

[SAMWolf]

Morning E.G.C.

[CholeraJoe]

"Iron on target. In the final analysis, that's all that matters."

Brigadier General Albert D. Jensen, Commander, 96th Bomb Wing (Heavy) Dyess AFB, TX, 1988.

[SAMWolf]

Good Morning Radu. Always nice to see your "Troop Thank You"

[SAMWolf]

Good Morning Mayor. Coffee, AHHHHHHHHHHH!

[SAMWolf]

Excellent Stayat Homemother. Unless one is reading revisionist history, it's hard to dispute the reasons for using the atomic bombs. All the European Vets that I talked to, who were on their way to being shipped to Japan have always backed the decision.