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Posted on 02/12/2004 12:00:13 AM PST by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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Captured in the First Place? The Allied objective was Rome and there were three main approaches going northward to the capital from southern Italy: Highways 5, 6, and 7.  HIGHWAY 5, a winding route through the Apennines on the Adriatic (eastern) side of Italy, was in the operational sector of the British 8th Army, which was weakened by the transfer of the 1st Division to the U.S. 5th Army and demoralized by the transfer of their long-time commander, General Montgomery, back to England on January 1, 1944 for the planning of the "Second Front" in France. Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese took over command on this date. Moreover, the 8th Army faced four strong German divisions, which held them in check south of Chieti. To add to this miserable situation, the weather in the winter of 1943-44 was atrocious and windchill, snow, and freezing rain hampered offensive operations. Clearly, the route to Rome along Highway 5 was not possible. The Adriatic sector was in stalemate.  One of many tanks knocked out by doubled anti-tank mine near Mas Albaneta. HIGHWAY 7 WAS THE old "Appian Way," which ran straight down the western coast of Italy from Naples to Garigliano. Why wasn't this route used? The major problem with this route was that any army crossing the Garigliano and heading northward would soon find itself penned into the narrow coastal strip near the Gulf of Gaeta. Furthermore, the Germans would've constantly attacked the invaders from the nearby Auruncian Mountains. Additionally, in the area near Terracina, the Germans had flooded the Pontine Marshes, thus making the Highway 7 route to Rome completely impractical.  HIGHWAY 6, WHICH PASSED NEAR the Liri Valley, was obviously the only clear route for the Allies fighting their way northwards towards Rome. The problem here, however, was that entrance to the Liri Valley was blocked by a chain of mountains: Monte Cairo, Monte Castellone, Passo di Corno, Colle Mao, Colle San Angelo, Monte Albaneta, and (of course) Monte Cassino. If the Allies could break through the formidable Gustav Line defences located within these mountains, then they would be able to break into the Liri Valley and, eventually, reach their final prize: Rome. Monte Cassino had to be captured.  Another victim of the powerful mines. Allied strategy in Italy during World War II centered on keeping the Wehrmacht fully committed so that its veteran divisions could not be shifted to help repel the cross-Channel invasion. However, the Allied high command mistakenly believed that the determined German defense of the invasion beaches of Salerno in September 1943 masked their preparations for retreat to the north. They never reckoned that the Germans would effectively use the weather and the terrain to turn the Italian campaign into a costly stalemate at the Gustav Line.  Air photos graphically depict the destruction of the abbey of Monte Cassino in southwestern Italy. Monte Cassino was the target of several concentrated Allied air strikes and assaults in the early months of 1944. Mark Clark's disastrous attempt to split the Gustav Line in the Liri Valley died on the banks of the Rapido River ("the bloody Rapido") in January 1944, and when the Allied end run at Anzio also failed, there was now a stalemate on two fronts. In early February the U.S. Thirty-fourth Infantry Division failed to capture the western anchor of the Gustav Line, and one of the holiest shrines of Roman Catholicism, the abbey of Monte Cassino. A second offensive in mid-February again failed and resulted in one of the most hotly debated incidents of the war—the destruction of the abbey by Allied bombers. The Third Battle of Cassino in mid-March was preceded by a thunderous artillery barrage from nine hundred guns and a massive aerial bombardment of the town. Follow-up ground attacks by New Zealand troops once again ended in failure. Only with the launch of Operation Diadem in May 1944 did the Gustav Line finally collapse when the Second Polish Corps succeeded in capturing the abbey on May 17, thus ending one of the longest and bloodiest engagements of the Italian campaign.  Polish Shermans approaching the Gustav Line. In three previous battles, select Allied divisions - the USA 34th and 26th, the New Zealand 2nd, the British 78th and the Indian 4th -could not seize those mountains which blocked the possibility of the Allied advance toward Rome. Finally, in a seven day battle, the Polish Second Army Corps did it, at a loss of 860 dead and 2,182 wounded, of which 10 percent were officers. General Ander's plan was to attack from the the north-west because previous attacks had run into either thick scrub brush or steep, difficult climbs. The Poles felt that if they captured Hill 593, Hill 575, and Colle San Angelo all at the same time, this would prevent the Germans from shifting their forces from sector to sector and counter-attacking. The Germans used these tactics in the three previous attacks to successfully repel the Allies. Capturing all three objectives simultaneously would seriously disrupt the Germans' tactics.  Wladyslaw Anders, Lieutenant General, Second Polish Corps The Polish plan was to attack from a northwestern direction starting from Colle Mao and Monte Castellone towards Hill 593, Hill 575, and Colle San Angelo, along a broad front. Once these three objectives fell, then they could concentrate on the Monastery itself. Both Divisions were to attack along separate, but equivalent axes. General Ander's plan was as follows: (1) Phase 1: (a) Isolate the Monastery Hill-Cassino complex from the north and north-west and then to advance to Highway 6 to link up with the British 13th Corps and (b) to capture the Monastery Hill. In Phase 2, the objectives was to gain contact with the Adolf Hitler Line north of Highway 6 and to develop offensive operations with the aim of turning it from the north.  Polish tank getting ready to support the infantry during the second part of fighting General Anders himself stated his objectives thusly, "A simultaneous attack against Hill 593 and Colle San Angelo would prevent them [the Germans] from effectively coordinating their fire and would cause the enemy to disperse their reserves. The remaining strongholds--Monte Cassino Monastery to the south and Passo Corno to the north were to kept under overwhelming fire and blinded by smoke to prevent them from bringing their fire to bear on the area of the attack. It is necessary to use our full strength, for we shall have no men to spare for reserve."  Mortar Team of the 3DSK. The Polish Second Corps could depend on a total of 294 guns of all types, including an additional 16 heavy guns (to shell the Monastery) under the command of the British 13 Corps. The basic plan was to assign a heavier assortment of guns to one division's attack, and later switch to the other division's objective. In this way, the maximum use of artillery was expected. May 11: At 11 pm, 2000 guns open fire from Aquafondata all the way to the Tyrrhenian Sea. At 11:45 pm, British troops on the Rapido advance to the attack. May 12: At 1:00 am, the Polish 2nd Corps north-west of Cassino, the French Expeditionary Corps in the Auruncian Mountains, and the Americans in the coastal sector all advance to the attack.  Monte Cassino: In the Big Bowl… Preparing for the May 1944 Attack on the Abbey of Monte Cassino. At daybreak, swarms of fighter-bombers drop high explosives over their targets. The German Tenth Army headquarters in Avezzano, as well as the XIV Corps headquarters, are both buried under a carpet of bombs. In the south, the French attack the 71st Infantry Division on the upper Garigliano. Raapke's Grenadiers fight desperately, but by 3:00 am Monte Faito is firmly controlled by the Moroccan 4th Mountain Division.  In the center, the 6th Lemberg Brigade (2nd Polish Corps) attacks the Passo Corno, but are stopped by the von Ruffin Battle Group. Further south of Monte Castillone, the 5th Vilna Brigade moves forward against Colle Santo Angelo. They reach Height 517, where they are caught by heavy machine gun fire and driven back with heavy losses. German artillery also takes a heavy toll of the attackers. By evening, General Anders is forced to withdraw the 5th Division back to its assembly areas.  CREST OF THE 3DSK (3rd Carpathian Division) The 3rd Carpathian Division of the 2nd Polish Corps attacks Albaneta and Height 593. They capture the Cavalry Mount and set up positions on the northern slopes of Height 569. The Germans respond by sending reinforcements in an attempt to recapture it. The Germans launch four counter attacks that fail, but the fifth attempt is successful and the Cavalry Mount is back in German hands by late evening. The U.S. II Corps (in the coastal sector) gets into a furious fight at Santa Maria Infante and Sollaciano with Steinmetz's 94th Infantry Division. Both the 85th and the 88th Divisions are repulsed.  CREST OF THE 5KDP (5th Kressowa Division) The British XIII Corps' task is to form bridgeheads between the Cassino railway station and Santo Angelo and between Santo Angelo and the Liri and then to move toward the Via Casilina in the vicinity of Piedmonte. Kirkman's troops experience great difficulties setting up the bridgehead and one brigade, the 28th, is flung back across the river. The Indian 8th Division has better luck and manages to put up two thirty-ton bridges into position. May 13:  5KDP trooper with a captured MG-42. The Moroccans capture Monte Girofano by morning, Monte Feuci by noon, and Monte Maio by 4 pm. The northern wing of the German 71st Division is breached. The French I Division presses northward to capture Sant' Andrea, Sant' Ambrogio, and Sant' Appolinari and eventually reaches the Liri Valley. Castelforte and Damiano are now both in French hands. The Moroccans and Algerians together capture Monte Ceschito. This was the decisive blow. The Gustav Line is now punctured on the Garigliano, south of Cassino.  CREST OF 2 SBP (2nd Independent Armoured Brigade) Elsewhere along the front, the situation is not so rosy. On the coast, the U.S. 88th Division captures Santa Maria Infante after a whole day of very slow advances against determined enemy resistance. General Ward's British 4th Infantry Division launches a fresh attack south of Cassino. This time the attack succeeds in extending a bridgehead to within a mile northwest of Santo Angelo. The Poles continue to suffer heavy losses attacking the Cavalry Mount. The Germans also suffer casualties, as illustrated by the comments made in Major Veth's diary, "Great number of dead on the slopes--stench--no water--no sleep--amputations being carried out at battle headquarters." May 14:  After penetrating through the German 71st Division's positions, General Juin decides to push the Moroccan mountain warfare experts through the Auruncian Mountains towards the Itri-Pico road twelve miles behind the Gustav Line. After the fall of Monte Ceschito, General Guillaume's men advance towards Petrella. By nightfall of the 14/15, the French Goumiers are clambering up Monte Fammera, north of Spigno.  2SBP tankers digging in on Mas Albaneta. During the night of May 14/15, the German 94th Infantry Division is forced to withdraw to a position on either side of Castelonorato. The French troops have torn wide gaps in this sector of the German defense lines. The Poles under General Anders continue to engage in heavy fighting around the Cavalry Mount. The 94th Fusiliers push the U.S. 88th Division out of Santa Maria Infante and capture an entire American battalion. The Americans counter attack later in the evening and reoccupy this place once more. The German Tenth Army decides to throw all its available reserves into the battle. The 305th Infantry Division is brought back from the Adriatic to bolster the crumbling Bode Battle Group. Two battalions of the 114th Rifle Division and grenadiers, pioneers, and anti-tank units from various divisions arrive to plug up the holes in the defensive lines.  Members of the Polish Independent Commando Company German artillery continues to concentrate its fire on the bridges over the Rapido, but as soon as a battery opens fire, a swarm of Allied fighter-bombers quickly bombs it. May 15: The British 78th Division reaches the Pignataro-Cassino road. The Indians attack and capture Pignataro during the night. While the Indian 8th Division advances quickly, the British 4th Division on the right wing can only move forward with great difficulty. Further to the west, the British make little headway towards the Via Casilina. In Cassino town itself, the British make no ground at all, despite the fact that the German 1st Parachute Machine gun Battalion is completely destroyed. The right wing of the LI Mountain Corps begins to crumble as a result of the French attacks. General Alexander orders the Canadian I Corps under General Burns to cover General Kirkman's left flank. The Canadian objective is Pontecorvo.  NATIONAL PATCH WORN BY ALL SERVICES As a result of French successes elsewhere, General Steinmetz's 94th Infantry Division has to fight desperately to hold Formia against the American 88th Division. The 8th Army Commander later decided to postpone the 2nd Polish Corps' attack until more progress had occurred in the sector occupied by the British 13th Corps. The British 13th, however, ran into formidable resistance and did not reach the line of Matronola-Casa Petrarcone until May 13th and did not reach the highway and Pignataro area until the evening of May 15th. Casualties were heavy and General Leese committed the 78th Division, until then in reserve, directly into the battle. It was decided not to recommit the Polish troops until the 78th Division had engaged the enemy. Before the second battle, the Polish artillery battered the German positions and Allied fighter-bombers attacked the Atina gun emplacements and the mortars in the gullies beyond Massa Albaneta.  On May 14, two squadrons of tanks from the 4th Armoured Regiment attacked the gorge, allowing the sappers to clear a path through the minefield. Thereafter, the enemy was prevented from planting more mines because of the armoured presence. The German 1st Parachute Regiment was withdrawn and sent to bolster the defence against the British 4th Division. Interrogated POWs furnished the Poles with plenty of useful information: the Colle d' Onofrio-Massa Albaneta promontory was defended by the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Parachute Regiment; the 2nd Battalion, 100 Regiment was operating further north on Hill 575 and Phantom Ridge; and the 1st Battalion of that same Regiment occupied San Angelo and Hill 608. On May 13 and 14, conferences were held and a second Operational Order was issued on the 14th. The Corps' objectives remained the same. Additionally, the Corps commander knew that Allied successes in the Liri Valley were sure to draw some of the enemy forces away from the Monte Cassino massif. He further knew that the Germans had only two weakened battalions and roughly one reserve battalion with which to carry out a counter-attack. Against these troops, the Allies could assemble the 2nd Polish Corps, the British 13th Corps, and the French Expeditionary Corps.  Soldier of the 12th Podolski Lancers Regiment The Poles' plan was to gain control of Colle San Angelo and Hill 575 and link up with the right flank of the British 13th Corps. On May 16, the 5th Kressowa Division would capture the San Angelo-Hill 575 ridge and establish defensive positions. The 3rd Carpathian Division would capture the 593-569-476 ridge and prevent the enemy from withdrawing unmolested. "H" hour was set for 4 am on May 16. An hour later, the 5th Kressowa would attack the Phantom Ridge, while the 3rd Carpathian would seize Massa Albaneta. Later, the "H" hour was changed to 7 am, in order to coincide with the start time for the British 13th Corps' attack.
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LOL. That's allright Matt, as long as it's a Foxhole thread I'm sure to be found!
Hi Sam. I aim to please!
But that is another story
And a sad one it is. What a fiasco that operation of Montgomery turned out to be.
The 1ST Polish Independent Parachute Brigade was formed in England and was originally intended for use in support of the Polish Underground during its uprising. Before the Warsaw Uprising, in the summer of 1944, the British felt that they would be unable to support the brigade once it was dropped into Poland and insisted that the brigade be used to support operations in western Europe. The Poles had little choice but to accept. It was decided that the parachute brigade would drop during Operation Market-Garden {Arnhem) in September 1944. Yet it should be mentioned that the Polish commander of the brigade, General Stanis³aw Sosabowski, was aghast when informed of the details of the British drop; he felt that Operation Market-Garden was too hastily planned and poorly conceived.
The plan called for the Polish brigade to be dropped on day D+2 to support the British 1ST Airborne Division which was assigned to capture the bridge over the Lower Rhine at Arnhem. The American 82ND and 101ST airborne divisions were dropped south of Nijmegen and north of Eindhoven. The Dutch Underground had not been informed of the drops, and therefore could not help by way of intelligence and support. The Polish brigade's drop was postponed for three days because of bad weather. Finally, in the late afternoon of September 21, the Polish brigade was dropped near the village of Driel, on the south side of the Lower Rhine - not on the side where the British 1ST Airborne was holding the bridgehead. The drop itself was a disaster. One battalion of the brigade was ordered back to England because of bad weather. There was no air cover for the Dakotas carrying the paratroopers, and twenty-five German Messershmitt fighters were blasting the defenseless transport planes out of the sky with complete impunity. To make matters worse, the Germans had tracked and timed the formations as they flew from Dunkirk, and now, with reinforcements, the area bristled with firing anti-aircraft guns. In the Oosterbeek perimeter of the British-held bridgehead 2.5 miles away, the drop caused a momentary halt in the battle: every German gun was now concentrated on the swaying Polish paratroopers. Though shocked by the savagery of the combined air and antiaircraft fire, most of the Polish brigade miraculously made the drop zone. Even as they landed, flak and mortar shells fired from the German tanks burst among them. Disregarding the fire, Dutch Red Cross teams ran to help the wounded Poles.
According to the plan, the brigade was to cross the Rhine by ferry to get to the British; but, the ferry had been destroyed in the fighting. Therefore, the Poles attempted to cross the 400-yard river at night, under the cover of darkness, in four rubber dinghies on a hawser. Each dinghy could accommodate up to six men at a time. Under German fire, the Poles were slowly getting across, but were suffering heavy casualties. At 3:00 A.M. the operation was stopped. Only fifty men had been ferried across the river. At midnight on September 23, under heavy fire and suffering heavy casualties, some of the Polish paratroopers crossed the river in sixteen boats left over from the 82ND United States Division assault on the Waal River. Only 250 Poles made it to the northern bank, and 200 reached the beleaguered British 1ST Airborne Division at Arnhem. The Polish remnants withdrew together with the remnants of the British 1ST Airborne Division. The lost battle and heavy casualties were particularly hard on the survivors: they knew that the Warsaw Uprising, which had began on August 1, was dying and they could do nothing to help.
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