As is true of every major decisionwhether military, corporate, or politicalone faction or person will not accept that decision as final. In April 1944, Spaatz was that person. Throughout March, ACM Charles Portal, the Royal Air Force (RAF) chief of staff and the officer charged with direction of the Combined Bomber Offensive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, had refused to allow Spaatz to order Fifteenth Air Force to attack the Ploesti oil complex, producer of 25 percent of Germanys oil. Portal did not want to draw the Fifteenth away from its duties to Operation Pointblank and its assistance to the Allied ground forces; further, Portal regarded the bombing of Balkan rail yards as more militarily effective than bombing oil fields. An attack on the Romanian fields would also strengthen Spaatzs hand in the oil-versus-transportation dispute. It made little sense to strike Ploesti, forcing a greater German reliance on synthetic oil, and then ignore that target system.
On 5 April, Spaatz resorted to subterfuge. Under the guise of attacking Ploestis main rail yard (each oil refinery also had its own such yard), the Fifteenth made its first raid on Romanian oil. As the official history of the AAF noted with some satisfaction, Most of the 588 tons of bombs, with more than coincidental accuracy, struck and badly damaged the Astra group of refineries. On 15 and 26 April, the Fifteenth returned, again somehow missing the main rail yard and unfortunately damaging more Axis refineries. As a result of this transportation bombing, German imports of finished petroleum products fell from 186,000 tons in March to 104,000 tons in April.
In the United Kingdom, the Eighth continued its duel with the Luftwaffe day fighters. On 18 and 19 April, however, the Germans offered little resistance to missions near Berlin and Kassel. Rather than elating Spaatz, this circumstance seemed to confirm one of his worst fearsthat the Germans had begun a policy of conservation in anticipation of the invasion. Also on 19 April, the British invoked the emergency clause in their agreements with the Americans. Specifically, Tedder informed Spaatz that the threat of the German V-1 rocket had caused the War Cabinet to declare the security of the British Isles at risk. Tedder thereupon moved Operation Crossbowbombing the V sitesto number-one priority, ahead of the Luftwaffe. The British move threatened to gut the AAFs entire bombing effort at precisely the time Spaatz needed to offer the Luftwaffe more provocation to fight. The Luftwaffe never bothered to resist Crossbow bombing.
Spaatz went to Eisenhower that evening and found the supreme commander upset with the AAF. First, in spite of the decision of 25 March in favor of transportation, the Eighth had yet to bomb a single transportation target, with the invasion only seven weeks distant. Second, on the previous evening, Maj Gen Henry Miller, a member of Spaatzs staff, had gotten drunk at a nightclub in London and had proceeded to take bets that the invasion would occur before 15 June. Spaatz responded promptly, phoning Eisenhower and placing Miller under house arrest. Eisenhower followed up by demoting Miller to colonel and returning him to the States. The discussion of policy matters took longer and generated more heat. Spaatz even may have threatened to resign.
![](http://images5.fotki.com/v54/photos/1/133612/633999/interogation-vi.jpg)
Gen Spaatz Attends The Crew Debrief of the First Atomic Bombing Mission
At last, Eisenhower agreed to allow the Eighth to use two visual-bombing days before the invasion to strike oil targets, in order to test the Luftwaffes reaction. For his part, Spaatz appears to have agreed to devote more energy to transportation bombing. The next morning, Spaatz visited Tedder. They agreed that on the next suitable day, the Eighth would raid Crossbow targets and that on the next two suitable days, the Americans would hit oil targets. That day, Doolittle sent almost nine hundred heavy bombers against Crossbow. On 22 April, Spaatz began to fulfill his other pledge638 bombers attacked Hamm, the largest rail yard in Europe. Not until 12 May did weather allow oil strikes.
The first oil strike vindicated Spaatzs judgments. The eight hundred attacking bombers hit six synthetic plants and lost 46 bombers. The Germans reacted strongly, and the American escort of 735 fighters claimed 61 destroyed in the air and five on the ground. Luftwaffe records confirmed 28 pilots dead, 26 wounded, and 65 fighters lost. Enigma messages revealed the Germans immediate and alarmed response. On 13 May, the Luftwaffe ordered the transfer of antiaircraft guns from fighter production plants and the eastern front to synthetic oil facilities. A week later, an order from Hitlers headquarters ordered increased conversion of motor vehicles to highly inefficient wood generators. When Tedder heard of the intercepts, he remarked, It looks like well have to give the customer what he wants. A week after the raid, Speer reported to Hitler that the enemy has struck us at one of our weakest points. If [he] persists at this time, we will soon no longer have any fuel production worth mentioning. Our one hope is that the other side has an air force General Staff as scatterbrained as our own. In that, he was disappointed. Once the invasion was established ashore, the Anglo-Allies moved oil targets to the highest priority, where they remained until the end of the war.
Spaatz possessed a good measure of the fourth necessary ingredient of a successful generalthe ability to inspire trust in both superiors and subordinates. His chief lieutenant, Jimmy Doolittle, in an oral-history interview with Ronald R. Fogleman, then a major, stated, I idolize General Spaatz. He is perhaps the only man that I have ever been closely associated with whom I have never known to make a bad decision. This praise, coming from a man of enormous physical and moral courage and high intellect, speaks for itself.
In the much smaller circle of his superiors, Spaatz also inspired great trust. He was Arnolds personal friend, confidant, and favorite. Arnold purposely placed Spaatz in positions that would increase the latters importance and influence, not so much because his actions would reflect favorably on Arnold, but because he knew that Spaatzs first loyalty was to the service. Arnolds abiding trust and confidence meant that Spaatz always had support in the highest areas of decision making.
Spaatz also earned Eisenhowers esteem. From June 1942 through May 1945, the two worked hand in hand, becoming close friendseven to the unlikely extent of Spaatz playing the guitar to accompany the supreme commanders singing when the two relaxed at parties. However, the friendship did not interfere with Eisenhowers judgment. In June 1943, he wrote of Spaatz, I have an impression he is not tough and hard enough personally to meet the full requirements of his high position.
By January 1945, Ike had changed his opinion. In urging Spaatzs promotion to a fourth star, he declared that no one could tell him that Spaatz was not the best operational air man in the world, [although] he was not a paper man, couldnt write what he wanted, and couldnt conduct himself at a conference, but he had the utmost respect from everybody, ground and air, in the theater.
![](http://images5.fotki.com/v54/photos/1/133612/633999/congrats-vi.jpg)
Gen. Carl Spaatz congratulates Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles as General of the Army Henry H. Arnold, left and Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker and Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenburg, extreme right look on
(U.S. Air Force Photo)
In February 1945, Eisenhower ranked Omar Bradley and Spaatz equally, calling them the two American officers who contributed most to the Allied victory in Europe. He described Spaatz as an experienced and able air leader; loyal and cooperative; modest and selfless; always reliable. That is an accurate and concise summary of the tongue-tied fighter pilot who became a successful general and was as responsible as anyone for the happy outcome of the Normandy invasion.
DR. RICHARD G. DAVIS
Additional Sources: www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil
www.budiansky.com
www.military.com
www.cmohs.org
40thbombgroup.org
www.majesticdocuments.com
www.stormbirds.com
www.legendsofairpower.com
www.afa.org
www.stelzriede.com
www.brooksart.com
Sorry about the delay.
I was swapping out a processor, and then tweaking a program that wasn't co-operating.
I'm up and running, but not sure what happened to the proggy.
It SEEMS fine now, but I'm not burning any CD's at the moment..
*chuckle*