Posted on 12/20/2003 12:03:24 AM PST by snippy_about_it
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are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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The Battle for Wake Island As of 6 December 1941, the defensive status of Wake was far from ideal. Intended primarily as a patrol-plane base for Catalina clippers, the island had no scouting aircraft yet, and only the most primitive facilities for any type of aircraft operations. Its squadron of 12 Grumman Wildcat aircrafts, VMF-211, was learning on the job how to operate wholly new aircraft which had no armor and on which the bomb racks did not match the local supply of bombs. On the entire atoll, there were 449 marines of all ranks, detachment of the 1st Defense Battalion, therefore equipped and trained for combat. The ground defenses, embodying the complete artillery of a defense battalion (5-inch seacoast batteries and 3-inch antiaircraft guns), had by dint of unceasing 12-hour working days been emplaced, and some protective sandbagging and camouflage accomplished. To man all these weapons, 43 officers and 939 enlisted were required, but only 15 officers and 373 enlisted were available. Furthermore, there were 1,200 unarmed civilian contract employees on the island. Word of war came around 7am on 8 December 1941. At 11am, several planes drop through the clouds : this was the Japanese Air Attack Force of 34 Nell bombers, based at Roi, 720 miles to the south. The fortuitous rain squall masked the enemy let-down and approach, but the complete lack of any type of early warning was a matter which pointed squarely at Wake's most critical shortage: the want of radar. The results of the Japanese attack were devastating. Using 100-pound bombs and 20 mm cannon, the air strike destroyed seven F4F fighters on ground. The island's main aviation gas tank took a direct hit, exploded and set everything ablaze, including the squadron's tentage, tools and spare parts. VMF-211 suffered nearly 60-percent casualties and there were 84 dead or dying on Wake. Across the Pacific it was a similar story : in Pearl Harbor, Guam, Philippines, North China. In his first message after the Pearl Harbor disaster, President Roosevelt had warned the American people to be prepared for word of the fall of Wake. With the core of the fleet on the bottom of the seas, there could be little question, for the time being, of a sustained and aggressive fleet defense. Wake would stand or fall largely by its own strength. By next morning, the Japanese bombers returned, methodical almost to a fault : the hour, altitude and pattern did not vary. The air combat patrol (or what was left of it) flanked them, opened fire and sent one bomber careening down in flames. The antiaircraft batteries opened up : five bombers were belching smoke, one burst into flames and exploded. Over the next two days, they would shoot down at least two more planes and score damaging hits on numerous others that disappeared over the horizon in a trail of smoke. The second raid hit hard the camp and the naval air station. They destroyed the hospital, the Navy's radio station, and the civilian and naval barracks, killing 55 civilians and four Marines. The aerial raids had been directed at the airstrip and the various supporting establishments. But, as events would shortly prove, the three days' bombing, while inflicting considerable damage on Wake, had been insufficient. Admiral Inouye, commanding the Imperial Japanese Fourth Fleet, was charged by current war plans with capture of Wake, but, more important, that of Guam, Makin and Tarawa. By dark on 10 December, Guam had fallen. Earlier that same day, Makin and Tarawa had surrendered. Wake alone remained : conduct of this last operation was delegated to Rear Admiral Kajioka. His naval force comprised one flagship light cruiser, the Yubari, two other light cruisers (Tatsuta and Tenryu), six destroyers (Mutsuki, Kisaragi, Yayoi, Mochizuki, Oite, and Hayate), two destroyer-transports, two transports, and two submarines. The plan was to have 150 men land on Wilkes Island, and 300 men on the south side of Wake Island to capture the airfield, covered by the guns of the naval force. If those numbers proved insufficient, supporting destroyers were to provide men to augment the landing force. At 3am, on 11 December, lookouts reported ships in sight. At 5am, Kajioka's ships began their final run. Because of the unfavorable weather and heavy seas, boating progressed slowly and unsatisfactorily, with some landing craft being overturned. Soon after, the boats opened fire at area targets along the south shore of Wake. The coastal guns, however, remained silent and hidden behind a brush camouflage. At 6am, as the boats were closer, the Marines commenced firing. Although they had unavoidably revealed their location, the ships' counterfire proved woefully inaccurate. A battery sent two shells into Yubari at the waterline and two more shells caught her slightly aft. Badly hurt, Yubari retired over the horizon. Another battery fired and caused a violent explosion in the destroyer Hayate : she broke in two and sank. The Oite was next and took a direct hit : she threw up a smoke screen and limped away. Then, the gunners shifted fire to the Japanese transports Kongo Maru and Konryu Maru : one shell hit the leading transport, causing both to flee. Next they turned their efforts to a cruiser off the west end of the island : she took one shell in the stern and retreated out of range. The destroyer Yayoi take a shell in the stern and be set afire. Then went a smoke screen, and the ships made their escape. Kajioka ordered a withdrawal : plans for a landing were forgotten and damage control on burning and smoking ships became priority. The fleet had no air cover and the remaining Wildcats found it little more than an hour's sail from Wake : the destroyer Kisaragi, suffering from an earlier hit, just blew up, and another destroyer suffered heavy damage. The defeat was total : two ships were lost, seven were damaged, and probably about 500 japanese died while four Marines were wounded in action.
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Indeed.
We should have kept it in codominium (as Jerry Pournelle might have put it) with the Japanese as a war memorial.
From what I can find it's all ours. I like that idea.
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