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The FReeper Foxhole Remembers Pearl Harbor (12/7/1941) - Dec. 7th, 2003
www.microworks.net ^ | Tim Lanzendörfer

Posted on 12/07/2003 12:03:16 AM PST by SAMWolf



Lord,

Keep our Troops forever in Your care

Give them victory over the enemy...

Grant them a safe and swift return...

Bless those who mourn the lost.
.

FReepers from the Foxhole join in prayer
for all those serving their country at this time.


...................................................................................... ...........................................

U.S. Military History, Current Events and Veterans Issues

Where Duty, Honor and Country
are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.


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The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans.

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The FReeper Foxhole hopes to share with it's readers an open forum where we can learn about and discuss military history, military news and other topics of concern or interest to our readers be they Veteran's, Current Duty or anyone interested in what we have to offer.

If the Foxhole makes someone appreciate, even a little, what others have sacrificed for us, then it has accomplished one of it's missions.

We hope the Foxhole in some small way helps us to remember and honor those who came before us.

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The Alpha: Pearl Harbor,
December 1941


It was just another Sunday, which had begun like all other Sundays in the previous year. It was not long until Christmas, and many had already planned for their spare time to go into Christmas shopping, no doubt. It was still warm, as usual for any month, and there could have been, on the Sunday in December, little to report that was out of the ordinary. Could have been, but for the plumes of oily smoke hanging low and piling high in sky. Could have been, but for the sputter of machine-guns and the crash of heavy guns and bombs, but for the water columns in the harbor, raised by the detonations of high-explosives. Could have been, but for the torn wreckage of proud warships, and the bleeding soldiers and seamen, and the dead, lying about the decks of their vessels and on the airfields and docks around the harbor.

It was Sunday, December 7th, 1941, just after eight in the morning. The raid that would shake America out of its peacetime mindset with a shock that was comparable to little in its history was in progress. For another hour still, Japanese planes would dump bombs on ships and airfields, strafe machine-gun emplacements and grounded planes, and wreck as much havoc they could. Then, swiftly as they had come, they would return to their carriers, and aboard them, depart Hawaiian waters, never to return.



This essay will not deal with the political aspects, huge as they were, of the raid; the Japanese road to war; the American public's sudden experience of the horrors of war at their own doorstep; or the political maneuvers in Washington leading to the outbreak of war. It will confine itself to the military aspects.

A Plan


It was early in 1940, with the outbreak of war still two years away, that the man most responsible for it first broached the idea to a subordinate. Just a few casual words, then uttered, led the foundation for a plan of grave importance later on.

The man who said them was no common man. He was the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, Japan's naval force. He was Admiral Yamamoto Isoruku, and the man whom he confided his plan to was his Chief-of-Staff, Rear-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru. This short mention was all that Yamamoto led slip out of his plans, for the better part of the year.


Japanese Combined Fleet Staff


The idea itself was hardly new. American forces had exhibited the possibility in two exercises in the 1930s, and the concept had featured in many Japanese studies as well. At every instance, however, it had been evaluated as a technical impossibility, for various reasons.

With that background in mind, it seems natural that Yamamoto progressed slowly. It was in autumn of 1940, half a year after his casual suggestion to Fukudome, that Yamamoto again, in earnest, proposed to do something about the idea. He had just witnessed Japan's air arm in spectacular exercises. It seemed that here was a weapon capable of inflicting the telling blow which an attack on Pearl Harbor would require to be entirely successful. Soon thereafter, he proposed to Fukudome to address the issue to Rear-Admiral Onishi Takijiro, Chief-of-Staff of the 11th Air Fleet, whom he wrote a letter in December, at about the same time that the Naval General Staff began to draw up its plans for operations against the Dutch.

Onishi received the three-page letter which Yamamoto wrote to him on that issue in early January. Shortly thereafter, he met the Commander-in-Chief on his flagship, the battleship Nagato, to discuss a number of questions with the Admiral himself. Whilst the two men were dealing with the outline of a tactical plan, there was already considerable effort going into making the plan technially feasible. At Yokosuka Air Station, technicians were working on an effort to modify aerial torpedoes for use in Pearl Harbor's shallow water. Whilst this problem was undergoing evaluation, Onishi settled back on his base, ticking off one by one his ideas and his opinions. On February 2nd, Commander Genda Minoru, Air Officer aboard the carrier Kaga, received a letter from the Admiral, requesting Genda to come to Kanoya to visit Onishi. Once arrived, Genda was handed Yamamoto's letter, and Onishi requested him to study the aerial aspects of the problem in detail. Genda returned to Kaga, returning to Onishi two weeks later with a study elaborating on what Genda thought were the main problems, the necessary tactical emphasizes, in five points. Onishi accepted Genda's scheme as his own proposal to Yamamoto. Onishi's part was the safe movement of the Task Force, which plans he added to Genda's air plan, and submitted to Yamamoto in March.


Nomura Kurusu


In April, Yamamoto began preparations necessary for the operation. Following Genda's call for maximum carrier striking power, he assembled the available carrier strength of the Combined Fleet into the new First Air Fleet, commanded by torpedo specialist Vice-Admiral Nagumo Chuichi. Not by coincidence was Genda now appointed staff officer for air on Nagumo's staff - he would have a critical role to play. At the same time, Yamamoto's chief-of-staff Fukudome was transfered to be chief of the First Bureau (Operations) of the Naval General Staff. He could be an important ally in convincing the conservative NGS of the wisdom of the Pearl Harbor plan.

Certain points of the plan were still open to debate. Onishi's draft had emphasized dive-bombing as the only reliable method of injuring the enemy fleet at Pearl Harbor. Torpedo-bombing seemed unlikely to be effective, given the space constraints of the harbor and the shallow waters. High-level bombing appeared to offer very little prospect of success, given the past record of the bombers.

It was during the summer, the tentative plans having been accepted by Yamamoto, that the problems were worked out. Air units from the 1st Air Fleet continously practiced all that was asked of them in the upcoming operation, not even realizing why they were asked to do what they did. The accuracy of the horizontal bombers improved as bombardier and pilot became a better team; and the Yokosuka-based Air Technical Depot did its immense part in making working weapons. Under the guidance of the depot, 406mm shells from the battleship Nagato's stock were manufactured into armor piercing bombs; this was a feat by itself. But the real success of the depot was the creation of a torpedo capable of dropping safely into the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor and run accurately to its target without sinking into the mud.


Cordell Hull


Simultaneously with the hard training and experimenting going on among the air units, the Combined Fleet staff was working on the details of its Pearl Harbor plan. The senior staff officer, Captain Kuroshima Kameto, and Yamamoto's favorite junior officer, Commander Watanabe Yasuji, were chosen to elaborate on Onishi's and Genda's draft. Whilst the two were working on the details of the plan, Kuroshima had another task before him: inform the Naval General Staff of the preparations the Combined Fleet was undertaking for the attack.

The Naval General Staff, once filled in, was unenthusiastic, citing the myriad to problems, from fueling the ships to risking the entire naval air force in one battle, that spoke against it. It was just an initial briefing, and the issue never even left the realms of the First Bureau (Operations), and was not at first addressed to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Nagano Osami. But it was an auspicious start.

At the end of April, Kuroshima and Watanabe being still well loaded with their share of the work, official word of the Pearl Harbor plan reached the 1st Air Fleet when its chief-of-staff Ryonosuke Kusaka was briefed on it (briefly) by Fukudome, with orders to study the plans more carefully. Kusaka informed his boss Nagumo, and then dropped the issue into the hands of the one man best suited to follow up on it: Genda. Kusaka would support him in the issues related to fleet movements and logistics, but it would be upon Genda to solve the air attack problems.

And solve them he did. Not alone, certainly, for a great number of people helped him, especially among the staff and air crew of the 1st Air Fleet. While the First Bureau of the NGS was still non-comittal to another plea to include the Pearl Harbor plan in its general War Plan, Genda's fliers were steadily increasing their proficiency. And meanwhile, Kusaka was doing his best to work out a solution for the navigational problems of the journey.

A Target



Pearl Harbor 1941


There were many men who would have given their right hand and more for knowing the details of just what Genda and Kusaka were working out that summer, and the man who would certainly have been first to wish these plans revealed was Admiral Husband Kimmel, CinCUS. His fleet, anchored in sunny Hawaii, had been his since February. He had received command from Admiral James O. Richardson, "J.O.", which in itself was not a happy thing for him. "J.O." had lost his command because he had quarreled with Roosevelt about the relocation of the fleet to Hawaii, which he considered dumb, and then of all things to Pearl Harbor, which he found to be a "goddamned mousetrap". Kimmel shared these sentiments, but knew just as well that there was nothing for him to do but say "Aye, Sir", and get on with business.

Not that Roosevelt was really making his tasks easy. He had been promoted over the heads of a great many seniors to the supreme command afloat that the Navy offered. That was a slight problem. And the major problem was, to Kimmel in any event, Washington's obvious reluctance to realize that they could not move the fleet to Hawaii to deter the Japanese, and then remove parts of his fleet and tell him nothing about what he was to do.



In May, Roosevelt had ordered Kimmel to transfer three battleships and a carrier, plus assorted supporting vessels, including oilers, to the Atlantic to strengthen Admiral Ernest J. King's Atlantic Fleet in its efforts to protect convoy lanes and assert U.S. neutrality.

It was only natural that Kimmel would try to get the best for his command. He carefully noted the problems which his force had to contend with, and that he desired them solved as quickly as possible. He detailed what the situation was and what he needed, how he felt about Pearl Harbor as a base. In his correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark, a curious trend was established. The forceful Kimmel demanded answers, and the careful Stark replied in diplomatic and non-commital wordings that left, to Kimmel, much to be desired.

In June, Stark summoned Kimmel to Washington to talk about this and that problem. Kimmel also briefly met the President, who assured him that there would be no more transfers of heavy ships from his command. Pleased, Kimmel returned to Hawaii, to put his fleet in order.


Lord Louis Mountbatten, center, Lt. General Walter Short, left, Admiral Husband Kimmel, right.


Back there, several others were also concerned with the safety of the fleet. These were, especially, Major-General Frederick L. Martin and Rear-Admiral Patrick N.L. Bellinger, respectively the commanders of the Hawaiian Air Force and the land-based Navy aircraft. The two officers were responsible for a report that in shocking openness showed one thing very clearly: for an attacker determined and clever enough, there was always a way of sneaking in an surprise air raid. Bellinger and Martin recommended an increase in strength in bombers and patrol planes to cover a 360° arc around Hawaii; and even then, they stated, it was entirely possible for an enemy to be out of range of the search planes on an evening and within range of their planes by the next morning. Since both realized that their role was to protect U.S. Fleet, this analysis was put them in a difficult situation; one in which their chance of successfully executing their mission depended entirely on the enemy failing to understand what they had understood.

If this was Kimmel's situation as of the summer, sitting in a mousetrap of an harbor with a very good idea that if the enemy was capable of bringing his carriers over the Pacific, Kimmel stood no chance of intercepting him, then it must have seemed ironic enough that the Japanese were still unable to agree to bring it off.



TOPICS: VetsCoR
KEYWORDS: anniversary; freeperfoxhole; hawaii; japan; michaeldobbs; pacific; pearlharbor; usnavy; veterans; wwii
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To: SpookBrat
Good Morning Spooky. Hard to believe it's been a year, it just flew by.
41 posted on 12/07/2003 9:29:29 AM PST by SAMWolf (The cost of living is killing me.)
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To: Light Speed
Good Morning Lightspeed.

If the carriers had been in Pearl Harbor on the 7th, the Japanese would have had a longer run in the Pacific. In the end though the US would have won anyway, it just would have taken a lot longer, IMHO.
42 posted on 12/07/2003 9:32:30 AM PST by SAMWolf (The cost of living is killing me.)
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To: SAMWolf
LOL! Don't you hate it when that happens.

ROTFLOL.

I thought everyone knew that the USS Minneapolis made a Richard Simmons video.

You were close. The movie was The Shores of Tripoli.

43 posted on 12/07/2003 9:34:15 AM PST by Samwise (There are other forces at work in this world, Frodo, besides the will of evil.)
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To: Matthew Paul
Friends then. Friends now.

Thanks for the picture of your granddad.
44 posted on 12/07/2003 9:37:49 AM PST by Samwise (There are other forces at work in this world, Frodo, besides the will of evil.)
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To: Samwise
I thought everyone knew that the USS Minneapolis made a Richard Simmons video.

LOL!

45 posted on 12/07/2003 9:40:38 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)
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To: Light Speed
Thank you Light Speed. Good morning.
46 posted on 12/07/2003 9:41:14 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)
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To: Valin; SAMWolf
2002 SAMWolf begins FReeper Foxhole!

I know I sure have learned a lot this past year! Thanks Valin.

Thank you SAM!

47 posted on 12/07/2003 9:43:13 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)
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To: bentfeather
Good morning feather.
48 posted on 12/07/2003 9:43:39 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)
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To: The Mayor
Good morning Mayor.
49 posted on 12/07/2003 9:44:01 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)
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To: Valin
USS Ward - December 7th

"A Shot for Posterity -- The USS Ward's number three gun and its crew-cited for firing the first shot the day of Japan's raid on Hawaii. Operating as part of the inshore patrol early in the morning of December 7, 1941, this destroyer group spotted a submarine outside Pearl Harbor, opened fire and sank her. Crew members are R.H. Knapp - BM2c - Gun Captain, C.W. Fenton - Sea1c - Pointer, R.B. Nolde - Sea1c - Trainer, A.A. De Demagall - Sea1c - No. 1 Loader, D.W. Gruening - Sea1c - No. 2 Loader, J.A. Paick - Sea1c - No. 3 Loader, H.P. Flanagan - Sea1c - No. 4 Loader, E.J. Bakret - GM3c - Gunners Mate, K.C.J. Lasch - Cox - Sightsetter." (quoted from the original 1942-vintage caption)

This gun is a 4"/50 type, mounted atop the ship's midships deckhouse, starboard side.

She was one of hundreds. Numbering two-hundred and seventy three, the flush-deck destroyers were built during World War One and the years immediately following in shipyards all over the United States. They served the US Navy for many years and despite their age by the time World War Two neared they were still in service and many more were being returned to service after decades spent sleeping in the mothballed fleets. The flush-deck four stack destroyers were already a type of ship considered to be a jack of all trades, but they would push this definition farther, becoming minelayers, seaplane tenders, and troop transports while retaining their destroyer heritage and missions. From the beginning the USS Ward was a ship that was destined to be special. Long before she fired the first US shots of WWII, the USS Ward took part in the first transatlantic airplane flight when she served with other destroyers as guides for the aircraft, and before that she set a record that stands still, being launched a mere 17 and a half days after the shipyard began to build her.

In early 1940 Japanese Admiral Yamamoto began to mull over the possibility of attacking the US fleet in Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto did not believe it was possible for Japan to win a war against the United States, but if she did have to go to war, the first step would be an attack to wipe out the US fleet so that it would not be able to block Japanese operations. Although not ordered to plan for war, Yamamoto began to assemble a staff to plan the raid. By mid 1941 most of the ideas were in place. However, mere months before the daring air raid was to happen it was decided to add submarines into the attacking forces. Spearheading this would be five tiny "Type A" mini subs, each eighty feet long and armed with two torpedoes.

In late November escalating tensions and aggressive Japanese behavior led the US Government to issue a "War Warning" to certain US Forces. Admiral Kimmel, (CINCPAC) was one of those notified, and in response the Inshore Patrol command was given the order to attack unknown submarines found within the approach zones to Pearl.

On December 5th Lieutenant William Outerbridge took command from Lieutenant Commander Hunter Wood Jr, who had commanded the Ward since her reactivation. The next day, the Ward left her anchorage at berth X-5 for a weekend patrol of the approaches to the Harbor. Originally the USS Chew (Seen HERE moored with the Ward in July of that year) was slated for duty but a mechanical difficulty forced her to return to base and the Ward was sent out in her place. Like other days before her, December 6th passed by eventlessly and she patrolled into the night. No one knew of the Japanese forces approaching from the North or the submarines that lay in wait around the islands. Between 0042 and 0333 that night, as the Ward quietly made her figure 8's at the mouth to the channel, one of five japanese submarine mother ships launched what has been identified as Midget A, whose mission was to sneak into Pearl Harbor and attack the warships inside or attack them as they came out the channel.

Early the next morning two mine sweepers, the USS Condor AMC-14 and the USS Crossbill AMC-9 headed out from the harbor to begin their daily sweep for mines. At 0342 a crew member of the Condor spotted a suspicious object in the water about 150 feet away. He and another crew member watched it for a couple minutes before deciding it was a submarine conning tower and veering the ship away to avoid a collision. By this point it was after 0400, and the Ward received a blinker signal from the Condor stating "Have sighted submerged submarine on westerly course, speed 9 knots."

General Quarters was called and the Ward raced to the scene but nothing was found. This was partially due to the fact that Condor's transmission indicated the submarine was heading in a westerly direction, where in fact the sub had turned in a westerly direction to avoid the Condor. Additionally, due to the Condor's mine sweeping equipment, which streamed out behind the ship, the Ward was limited in where she could search. By the time the confusion was settled over an hour and a half had passed since the initial contact and there was no point in searching further. The Ward had already secured from General Quarters at 0430 after a half hour of fruitless searching.

Things remained quiet until the USS Antares AKS-3 hove into view; she was a supply ship with a 500-ton steel barge in tow. The Antares was steaming in from Palmyra to meet the tug USS Keosanqua to transfer her tow to her. The Keosanqua was running late, however, the Antares slowed down to wait for the tug's arrival, making a slow turn towards the harbor entrance.

About that time a lookout on the Ward, Seaman Ambrose Domagall, spotted a suspicious object near the Antares. The bridge crew examine the object but held different opinions as to what and where it was. Lt JG Goepner, who was the Officer of the Deck (OOD), ordered the Ward to come to starboard to close in on the object for a better look. As she closed in the crew could see that the object was small and moving towards the harbor at a fast rate. Lt Outerbridge was called from his makeshift bunk in the chartroom just as a message came in from the Antares stating that they'd seen a suspicious object in their wake.

The OOD quickly explained what was happening, and Outerbridge quickly called for General Quarter again. "General Quarters! General Quarters! All hands man your battle stations. Man all guns. Prepare depth charges. Prepare to ram," rang out over the ship's PA system. The USS Ward again leapt into action. About this time a PBY-5 from VP-14 arrived overhead and spotted the midget submarine. Thinking it was a US sub in distress and seeing the Ward charging in, the aircraft dropped two smoke floats to mark the position. The ship turned to a course of 125 true to intercept the submersible and increased her speed up to 20 knots. Outerbridge had second thoughts about ramming the submarine with an old, thin-skinned destroyer however and changed course quickly to 110 to head off the submarine and give her depth charges a perfect plot.

At 0645 the first shots of the Pacific War were fired by the number one gun as the midget sub was taken under fire. The course change that the captain had just ordered caused the ship to roll and bounce faster than the old guns on the destroyer could compensate for and the first round sailed just over the conning tower of the submarine. The Ward's speed had her past the submarine before the gun crew could fire again. By this time however the number three gun crew on the starboard side of the ship had a perfect shot and opened fire. This round flew true and hit the small submersible at the base of the conning tower. Midget A heeled over with a jagged hole in her sail before righting herself and beginning to submerge.

As the submarine wallowed deeper in the water the Ward passed close and with four blasts from the ship's whistle, dropped four depth charges directly in the path of the wounded submarine. The depth charges were set to explode at only one-hundred feet and they soon exploded, surrounding the wounded midget sub in circles of foamed water and falling spray. The depth charges had sealed Midget A's fate; her bow popped to the surface before she quickly disappeared from view and began her final dive to the bottom nearly 450-500 feet below.

Things were still happening fast. Three minutes after she'd fired her first shot the crew of the Ward spotted a motorized sampam in the restricted area, a place it should not be in. Scared because of the gunfire and depth charges, the Sampam started running, not even coming to a halt when ordered to do so via bullhorn. Lt. Outerbridge ordered a gunner's mate to fire a couple of rifle shots across her bow in warning and the sampam quickly came to a halt, her captain wildly waving a white flag in surrender.

At 0652, over an hour before the air attack began, Lt. Outerbridge radioed 14th Naval District headquarters the following message, "We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in the defensive sea area," but this message did not seem to convey the severity of the situation to Outerbridge, so two minutes later her transmitted, "We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped depth charges on a submarine operating in defensive sea areas." Contrary to what some people have stated the Ward never claimed she had sunk a submarine, however the PBY-5 that was flying overhead did; she had dropped two depth charges on the submarine after the Ward did and radioed, "Sunk one submarine one mile south of Pearl Harbor." Due to slow message channels and a reluctance to believe the report no warning was passed to the rest of the fleet slumbering in the harbor. The Ward then notified the Coast guard of the sampam she had in two and requesting they send out a boat to take it in. Lacking any further orders, the Ward continued to patrol; at 0703 her SONAR operator reported a positive contact and the Ward once again turned and increased speed, dropping five depth charges on the contact at 0705. The only result, however, was a large black bubble that rose to the surface.

Soon her patrol time was up and she headed back into port, arriving at the mouth of the harbor at 0800, just as the sound of gunfire and explosions began to cross the water. Initially the crew thought it was blasting for a new road connecting the harbor and Honolulu, but soon a Japanese Val dive bomber flew by and dropped a bomb that missed the Ward by only 300 yards. Immediately the ship began a series of racetrack figure 8 turns and began to bring all of her boilers on line for maximum speed and maneuverability. The Ward was in a bad spot; her 3" guns were designed for surface to surface engagements and could not elevate high enough or more fast enough to effectively fight against aircraft. She had another 3" gun, but it was mainly for shooting star shells at night, most of which turned out to be defective anyway. Lastly, her .30 cal water cooled machine guns soon jammed after her water filled jackets clogged from salt-water build up. Thankfully she was never directly targeted again.

She patrolled the rest of the morning, and came in quickly to the West Lock in the afternoon to take on more depth charges. Later that night, she and some other naval ships were ordered to race at high speed to a point where an incoming invasion fleet was reported to be. There was no such force and the task force returned early the next morning. Returning to her station, she patrolled the approaches to Pearl Harbor for the next three days, dropping over 170 depth charges in attacks on suspected submarines. In fact, Ward dropped so many depth charges that her supply of them was rationed. It should be noted that Ward was one of the few ships in the offshore patrol that had SONAR, which was still new and producing many false positives for operators who had been rushed through the training.

In two separate incidents the Ward discovered bodies of Japanese personnel and retrieved them for delivery to shore; these were either crew members of a midget submarine that had been abandoned in the area or a Val dive bomber that had been shot down nearby. The first body was discovered on December 13th and was brought to shore by a PT boat so that Ward could remain on station. The second was discovered the next day and was brought to shore by a Coast Guard ship.

50 posted on 12/07/2003 9:45:13 AM PST by SAMWolf (The cost of living is killing me.)
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To: Prof Engineer
Good morning Prof Engineer.
51 posted on 12/07/2003 9:45:58 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)
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To: Valin
2002 SAMWolf begins FReeper Foxhole!

Thank you Valin. Thanks to AntiJen and MistyCA for the help in getting the Foxhole started and up and running.

52 posted on 12/07/2003 9:47:17 AM PST by SAMWolf (The cost of living is killing me.)
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To: bentfeather
Good Morning Feather.
53 posted on 12/07/2003 9:47:40 AM PST by SAMWolf (The cost of living is killing me.)
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To: The Mayor
HI Mayor!
54 posted on 12/07/2003 9:47:57 AM PST by SAMWolf (The cost of living is killing me.)
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To: snippy_about_it

Howdy snippy!!
Just having my second pot of coffee!
55 posted on 12/07/2003 9:47:57 AM PST by Soaring Feather (poet)
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To: Prof Engineer
Morning Prof Engineer.

Time flys when you're doing something you love.
56 posted on 12/07/2003 9:48:43 AM PST by SAMWolf (The cost of living is killing me.)
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To: snippy_about_it; SpookBrat
...my sister's birthday is also 9/11...terrible associated with your birthday but you can always find good things too.

This is exactly the reason Msdrby and I got married on 9/11/03.

57 posted on 12/07/2003 9:49:32 AM PST by Prof Engineer (Labrador Retriever~from The Latin, meaning~ Affection Sponge)
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To: bandleader
Morning bandleader.

We just have to make sure the revisionists and apologists never get their way.
58 posted on 12/07/2003 9:50:13 AM PST by SAMWolf (The cost of living is killing me.)
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To: bandleader
Good idea about getting those transferred to CD.

It's interesting to compare the news coverage of Dec. 7th to the coverage of Sep. 11th. Now times have changed.
59 posted on 12/07/2003 9:53:19 AM PST by SAMWolf (The cost of living is killing me.)
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To: Prof Engineer
Awww. Excellent example! Thanks Prof.
60 posted on 12/07/2003 9:54:45 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)
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