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Posted on 11/30/2003 12:00:39 AM PST by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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| Our Mission: The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans. In the FReeper Foxhole, Veterans or their family members should feel free to address their specific circumstances or whatever issues concern them in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, brotherhood and support. The FReeper Foxhole hopes to share with it's readers an open forum where we can learn about and discuss military history, military news and other topics of concern or interest to our readers be they Veteran's, Current Duty or anyone interested in what we have to offer. If the Foxhole makes someone appreciate, even a little, what others have sacrificed for us, then it has accomplished one of it's missions. We hope the Foxhole in some small way helps us to remember and honor those who came before us.
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23 July 1942-23 January 1943 On 7 December 1941, Japan turned its war on the Asian mainland eastward into the Pacific. Simultaneous attacks on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, the Malayan peninsula, and other places surprised Allied governments and exposed serious weaknesses in Allied dispositions in the Pacific. At the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, Australia had sent most of its ground units to the British Commonwealth Forces in the Middle East. During the next two years the U.S. Pacific Fleet sent one-quarter of its ships to the Atlantic, and the U.S. Army continued mobilizing, although it would not be ready for an offensive mission until late 1942. Hastily gathering scarce units, the Allies tried to halt the Japanese at the Malay Barrier, the mountainous chain of islands stretching from Malaya through the Netherlands East Indies to New Guinea. But the pace and extent of Japanese conquests soon overran these preparations. The fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 and the bombing of the Australian city of Darwin four days later shattered the Malay Barrier. Australia and New Zealand lay virtually undefended.  The arrival in Australia on 17 March of General Douglas MacArthur, ordered from the Philippines by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, signaled the start of a new phase in the defense of the Pacific. Instead of supplying and supporting its Allies, the United States would commit its own troops to the effort to halt the Japanese. A major area command, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), was created in April with General MacArthur commanding. An international command, SWPA had separate land, air, and naval forces, with commanders drawn from the two major contributing nations: Australian General Sir Thomas A. Blamey for Allied Land Forces, American Lt. Gen. George H. Brett for Allied Air Forces, and American Vice Adm. Herbert F. Leary for Allied Naval Forces. Allied Land Forces would consist of two Australian and two American divisions. Recalled from the Middle East, the 7th Australian Infantry Division arrived home at the end of March; the 6th Australian Infantry Division, the next month. Most of the U.S. 41st Infantry Division arrived in Australia in early April. The U.S. 32d Infantry Division, originally slated for Northern Ireland, received new orders to join SWPA in mid-May with the rest of the 41st Division. Allied Air Forces would eventually consist of eight aircraft groups. Allied Naval Forces began with twenty-one surface warships and thirty-one submarines and could expect augmentation by American carrier task forces. Resupply of the Southwest Pacific Area would come from Hawaii through a line of island bases secured in February: Palmyra, Christmas Island, Canton Island, Bora Bora, Samoa, and the Fiji Islands.  Japanese Dead near Buna Mission, 3 January. Working with the Australian Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur prepared a joint estimate of the situation. The Allies agreed that the Japanese advance would continue and that it would soon threaten the Australian supply line as well as the island nation itself. As General MacArthur viewed the situation, the best way to defend Australia was to meet the Japanese on New Guinea, and the way into New Guinea lay through Port Moresby, a harbor on the southeast Papuan coast lightly garrisoned by Australians. Accordingly, in early April MacArthur directed the reinforcement of Port Moresby. While the Allies rushed to strengthen Port Moresby, the Japanese acted on their own strategic assessment. They also considered Port Moresby the key to Australia. But before approaching the port city, the Japanese moved to finish a naval mission begun earlier. The Imperial Japanese Navy saw its strike against Pearl Harbor as only half of a two-part strategy. To secure exploitation of Burma, Malaya, and the Indies, the Japanese had to neutralize the British Eastern Fleet. For that purpose, a large Japanese naval task force left the southwest Pacific for the Indian Ocean in April. The Japanese succeeded in disabling the British Eastern Fleet, but in doing so they also gave SWPA an extra month to reinforce Port Moresby.  General Blamey tours the battle area with General Eichelberger (left). (DA photograph) By 4 May, when a Japanese landing force embarked at Rabaul for Port Moresby, Allied air an) naval forces had grown to decisive strength. The result for the Japanese was a major setback. As enemy troopships and an escorting carrier task force approached the eastern end of New Guinea, they were met by two American carrier task forces. In the ensuing Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese Navy lost so many ships that the landing force had to return to Rabaul. Though they lost more ships than the Japanese, the Allies won a strategic victory in the Coral Sea: the enemy had to reschedule its Port Moresby landing for July. The Japanese had barely counted their losses in the Coral Sea when they met a much more costly defeat. In an effort to take Midway Island and the Aleutians, the Imperial Japanese Navy put together a huge task force centered on four fast carriers. A unique message-interception effort code-named MAGIC enabled the Allies to learn of the enemy move toward Midway, and three American carriers were sent to intercept. In the sea-air battle that followed on 4 June, the Japanese lost all four of their carriers and hundreds of aircraft and pilots. The stunning defeat at Midway was more than a temporary setback. The Japanese Navy never replaced its carrier losses, and as a result its land operations thereafter suffered from a chronic shortage of naval and air support.  But two defeats in rapid succession did not end the threat to Australia. On 22 July a Japanese landing force under Maj. Gen. Tomitaro Horii slipped ashore at Basabua and made its way to Buna on the northeast coast of New Guinea. The landing itself came as a shock to SWPA headquarters, then considering the very same move. Even more disquieting was the discovery that the enemy had landed without air cover. Anxious to take advantage of the victory of Midway, Allied staffs drew up an operations plan. Called the 2 July Directive, the plan laid down three tasks: 1. seizure and occupation of the Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and adjacent areas; 2. seizure and occupation of the remainder of the Solomon Islands, Lae, Salamaua, and the northeast coast of New Guinea; and 3. seizure and occupation of Rabaul and adjacent positions in the New Guinea-New Ireland area. The U.S. Navy's South Pacific Area commander assumed the first mission; General MacArthur took up the latter two tasks. To support the Navy in the first task and to execute its own two tasks, SWPA created new commands, moved units closer to target areas, and continued airfield construction and reinforcement, especially at Port Moresby and at Milne Bay on the eastern tip of New Guinea. The U.S. 32d and 41st Infantry Divisions began jungle training, organized in a new corps under the command of Maj. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger.  A Fox Hole on Giruwa Beach. Men of the 127th Infantry holding a position reached on 20 January. Short of aircraft carriers after Midway, the Japanese decided to attack Port Moresby by an overland advance from Buna instead of around Milne Bay by sea. This plan dictated a push through some of the most forbidding terrain in the world. The Papuan peninsula of eastern New Guinea is dominated by the Owen Stanley Mountains, a saw-toothed jungle range reaching a height of 13,000 feet. High temperatures and humidity near the coasts contrast with biting cold above 5,000 feet. Rainfall is typically torrential and can amount to as much as 10 inches per day during the rainy season. Tangled growth requires a machete to cut through it. Knife-edged kunai grass up to 7 feet high, reeking swamps full of leeches and malarial mosquitoes, and a slippery ground surface under dripping vegetation add to the formidable obstacle course. For the advance out of Buna the Japanese assembled a force of about 1,800 men augmented by 1,300 laborers from Rabaul and Formosa and 52 horses. This force proposed to cross Papua through the village of Kokoda, some 50 miles from Buna and over 100 miles from Port Moresby. Next to the village lay a facility highly valued by both sides: an airfield. Quickly moving inland, the Japanese met their first opposition late in the afternoon of 22 July. During the next two weeks, General Horii's troops defeated several Australian and Papuan units and took over the entire Kokoda-Buna Trail. When Horii received reinforcements on 18 August, he headed a well-supplied force of 8,OOO Imperial Japanese Army troops and 3,450 naval troops.  Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger Commanding General, I Corps, United States Army By mid-August the two adversaries were inadvertently helping each other by relying on poor intelligence assessments. Caught off-guard by U.S. Marine landings in the Solomons, General Horii had to spread his resources over two fronts, Guadalcanal and Buna. But the Allies underestimated the Japanese determination to build up a large force at Buna and push overland to Port Moresby. Brig. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's intelligence chief, repeatedly discounted an enemy attack through the mountains because of the difficult terrain and climate. As a result, the Allies continued reinforcing small units on the trail, and the enemy continued overrunning them. With the Japanese well established at Buna and Kokoda, SWPA reorganized to counterattack on two fronts: along the Kokoda Trail and 200 miles east at Milne Bay. Three Australian brigades with American reinforcements strengthened the two fronts. At Milne Bay the Allies assembled a force of some 7,500 troops, including three companies of U.S. engineers and a battery of U.S. airborne antiaircraft artillery. Named Milne Force, this two-brigade concentration took positions around two Allied airfields. On the night of 25-26 August the Japanese landed 1,500 men six miles east of the airfields. Spearheaded by two light tanks, the Japanese mounted night assaults on the 26th and 27th, and reached Airstrip No. 3. Milne Force stiffened its line and then pushed the enemy into a general retreat. On 4 September the Japanese called in the Navy for evacuation. In this first Allied ground victory—and first significant American action in Papua—Milne Force killed 600 of the enemy, while losing 322 dead and 200 wounded.  On the Way to Buna: The Inland Route. Men of M Company, 128th Infantry, on the trail between Dobodura and Buna. Along the Kokoda Trail the Allies found a different situation. Instead of continuing their drive toward the certain capture of Port Moresby, the Japanese stopped at the village of Ioribaiwa, thirty miles short of their objective. Surprised at the sudden halt, the Allies soon learned that the Japanese agreed with their own strategic view: that success on New Guinea was directly related to success on Guadalcanal. The Japanese drive against the U.S. Marine beachhead in the Solomons had been repulsed, and on 18 September General Horii received orders to withdraw to Buna for a possible reinforcement of the Imperial Japanese Army forces on Guadalcanal. Once again the enemy had given the Allies time to regroup. General MacArthur took advantage of the victory at Milne Bay and the enemy withdrawal from the Kokoda Trail to draw up a comprehensive plan to clear New Guinea of the enemy. SWPA's 1 October plan called for a series of sweeps and envelopments along three axes of advance that would position Allied forces for an attack on Buna in mid-November. On the first axis, the 7th Australian Infantry Division would move up the main trail from Port Moresby, cross the Owen Stanley Range through Kokoda, and occupy Wairopi, only twenty-five miles from Buna. On the second axis, the American 2d Battalion of the 126th Infantry, setting out from Port Moresby, would turn inland at Kapa Kapa and move through the mountains to Jaure on a track parallel to, but thirty miles southeast of, the Australians. On the third axis, the 18th Australian Infantry Brigade, fresh from victory at Milne Bay, would sweep the north coast of the island and meet the U.S. 128th Infantry, airlifted from Port Moresby, at Wanigela. The two units would then cross Cape Nelson and stage at Embogo for the assault on enemy lines less than ten miles away.  The Old Strip, Buna, Showing Japanese Fortifications. The 1 October plan was marked by the innovation which would characterize MacArthur's leadership throughout the Pacific War: resupply by air. Once units entered the jungled mountains, resupply became a major problem. The Australian practice of relying on the strong backs of New Guineans did not solve the problem, since the bearers usually deserted when they suspected enemy presence. The Allies settled on the airdrop. Expanding its range as fast as new airfields could be constructed, the Fifth Air Force proved invaluable in overcoming the obstacles of sea distance and rugged terrain. Crates of food and supplies were pushed out the hatches of low-flying C - 7s over breaks in the jungle ceiling. Though not perfect—hungry, diseased troops sometimes saw crates of food, medicine, and ammunition fall down mountainsides just out of reach—the airdrops continued and improved as aircrews gained experience. An innovation in resupply by sea also helped. Despite Japanese command of the seas in the Solomons-New Guinea area—the U.S. Navy had withdrawn from the area in late October after losing an aircraft carrier and seeing another badly damaged—the Allies were asked to take advantage of the shallow coastal waters of New Guinea. In their advance from Milne Bay the Allies moved troops and supplies by fishing boats, tuggers, rowboats, and even outrigger canoes.
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A captured Sanrinsha of the Imperial Japanese Navy--Papua
One of the Port Moresby airfields. B-24 bombers and
C-47 transports are parked in splinter-proof revetments.
Lae airfield on 4th January, 1943. Japanese Betty
bombers, Val dive-bombers and Zero fighters are visible.
A typical perimeter, known as "Q," which was on the west side of the road between Huggins and Fisk, is illustrated in Sketch No. 5 (above)
Sananda Point
A few days later after the capture of Buna Mission US General Berryman, 32 Division, wrote down his thoughts, and concluded; "We have air superiority and are superior in numbers, guns, mortars and tanks. The problem is to use them to the best effect in the jungle." For the AIF & AMF formations, US Army and the remaining deployable tanks of 2/6AR there was another task, the reduction of the beachhead at Sanananda, as all organised Japanese resistance east of Buna was now at an end. The Japanese command were deploying as many mixed troop formations as possible, including hospital patients, in the beachhead sector. During the Japanese defensive operations the strength of the besieged was increased by about five hundred whom Colonel Yazawa brought in, about eight hundred more fresh newcomers of the 170 Regiment and possible 200 to 300 escapers, stragglers from the Buna area and the sick, tired and wounded. Cape Killerton track junction was the most forward position defended by the remaining strength of 144 Battalion, a detachment from 41 Battalion, some of the skilled 15 Independent Engineers, a battery of mountain gunners and anti-aircraft weapons all under the commanded of Colonel Tsukamoto. In the Sanananda fortification quadrant the acting commander Colonel Yokoyama set up his HQ with the balance of the 41 Regiment, the main force of the engineers, mixed troops, service conscripts and hidden artillery pieces manned by obstinate gunners.
General Herring defined his plans to resume intensive operations against Sanananda - Cape Killerton positions with the AIF 7Division, was allotted a third formation the AMF 4th Brigade (Bde), joining the 18Bde and 30Bde, and the US 163IR. Only three Stuarts moved overland to participate in the planned smashing of a roadblock on Cape Killerton track, so by the evening of the 7 January they arrived at the bivouac area about three miles south of Supota and with a fourth tank soon to arrive at Popondetta. The rest of the AFV’s were weather bound at Cape Endaiadere by incessant rains and were to move as soon as possible. The same rains prevented planned artillery placement of 25pdrs and 4.5inch guns belonging to the artillery mettle of the 2/5 and 2/1FldRgts. The Australians, with a company from the 2/10Btn to strengthen the attack onto the road from the east, and at the same time limiting the movement of the Stuarts to the track, the 2/12Btn would drive down the artery. The track ahead was a confined defile and the track so narrow there seemed no hope of turning and the only way for the Stuarts was straight on, the tank crews had also been told that there were no anti-tank guns to hinder their advance. On 12 January 1943 in the morning mist through the thick jungle and soggy ground two attacking companies of the 2/9Btn, Lieut’s Jackson and Lloyd both killed in action during the day, started the flanking move. The day started to go wrong from the beginning when the tanks began to cross the start line at one minute past 8am, where they were subjected to an intense Japanese reception of firepower from machine-guns, mortars and various calibre guns.
Lieut Heap led his troop of Stuarts out in line ahead receiving the clinking and clatter of fire-arms and stopped after going sixty yards, traversing his turret slowly to the left where he’d been told of a suspected bunker, a shell struck the front of the tank and ricocheted onto the drivers flap with a fiery clang stunning him. Heap glimpsed the gun flash while wielding round his own weapon to aim, a second shell hit the tank tracks, and he briskly engaged the target. A third shell hit the tank, sprung the hull gunners flap stunning him too and a fourth shell smashed through the AFV bursting inside it. Heap wounded therefore wirelessed Corporal Boughton he was getting off the track and that he was to come forward. Boughton’s tank was in turn hammered badly before it could retaliate and he was mortally wounded, but the driver, Lance-Corporal Lynn remained brave and cool while peering through the gaping hole performed the seemingly impossible feat of turning the broken vehicle about on the narrow track limping out of the fight. Undaunted Sergeant McGregor next closed in, he was not long engaging the enemy, was struck many times by a Japanese ballistic barrage and had halted then flames exploded around his Stuart, probably by a explosive charge pushed beneath it on the end of a forked stick.
The Australian commanders were bitterly disappointed at the apparent failure of this misfortune stamped day. Maj-General Vasey, commander of the AIF 7Division, himself had decided, "To attack these (entrenched Japanese defensive positions) with infantry using their own weapons is repeating the costly mistake of 1915-17 and, in view of the limited resources which can be, at present, put into the field in this area, such attacks seem unlikely to succeed." In the meantime two Stuarts had arrived on the 15 January from Cape Endaiadere, and Lieut McCrohon in command of the tanks was sent forward to liaison with the Americans later that afternoon and to reconnoitre the area of operations. It was at once clear to him that no tanks could outflank through the morass of bog and swamp along this part of the track. American Army Colonel Doe’s newly arrived 163IR, gaining operating experience behind the enemy roadblock, was ordered to clear the track of remaining Japanese soldiers between objectives Huggins and James, harass the line of communications and block the road leading to Sanananda as well. Thus without tanks the American battalions in the immediate wake of fifteen minutes of intense heavy artillery and 81mm mortar bombardment took all day to complete the reduction of the enemy pocket defended to the last by feeble Japanese in this sector and opening the path to the enemies coastal fortress. Back at Rabual General Adachi was most anxious about the worsening plight of his determined forces gripping the Papuan coast. The Japanese had been ordered to withdraw all of its fit men back to the coastal garrison for eventual evacuation through the nights ahead, or by going bush through the dark green jungle escaping the net AMF 14Bde cast for them and leaving only the starving invalids to defend the beachheads to the last.
Bren Gun Carrier has top down signifying "elected to receive"
M-5A1 Stuart Light Tank
Photo: Courtesy of Frank Robertson.
This early M3 Stuart features a riveted turret and hexagonal commander's cupola. This vehicle is powered by a gasoline engine, as evidenced by the pipes from the air cleaners going immediately into the rear deck. The driver's and assistant driver's doors are open, and it is evident that the assistant driver would have a very tough time exiting the vehicle under duress, since the bow machine gun takes the place of a second door in the hull. The driver could open a door in the front hull plate as well as the door with his vision devices, but the assistant driver must exit through the turret. This tank has not been fitted with machine guns. (Picture taken 18 Dec 1941; available from the 9th Engineer Battalion homepage.)
Rank and organization: First Sergeant, U.S. Army, Company 1, 127th Infantry, 32d Infantry Division. Place and date: Buna, New Guinea, 24 December 1942. Entered service at: Menasha, Wis. Birth: Neenah, Wis. G.O. No.: 66, 11 Oct. 1943.
Citation:
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action above and beyond the call of duty. During an attack near Buna, New Guinea, on 24 December 1942, 1st Sgt. Burr saw an enemy grenade strike near his company commander. Instantly and with heroic self-sacrifice he threw himself upon it, smothering the explosion with his body. 1st Sgt. Burr thus gave his life in saving that of his commander.
Rank and organization: Sergeant, U.S. Army, Company L, 127th Infantry, 32d Infantry Division. Place and date: Near Buna, New Guinea, 24 December 1942. Entered service at: Helenville, Wis. Birth: Helenville, Wis. G.O. No: 66, 11 October 1943.
Citation:
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action above and beyond the call of duty. On 24 December 1942, near Buna, New Guinea, Sgt. Gruennert was second in command of a platoon with a mission to drive through the enemy lines to the beach 600 yards ahead. Within 150 yards of the objective, the platoon encountered 2 hostile pillboxes. Sgt. Gruennert advanced alone on the first and put it out of action with hand grenades and rifle fire, killing 3 of the enemy. Seriously wounded in the shoulder, he bandaged his wound under cover of the pillbox, refusing to withdraw to the aid station and leave his men. He then, with undiminished daring, and under extremely heavy fire, attacked the second pillbox. As he neared it he threw grenades which forced the enemy out where they were easy targets for his platoon. Before the leading elements of his platoon could reach him he was shot by enemy snipers. His inspiring valor cleared the way for his platoon which was the first to attain the beach in this successful effort to split the enemy position.
Forward Bunker observer squawks coordinates
Captain Napalm responds with the smell of victory
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