suggesting a General War Plan with Scott's Indorsement
General McClellan sent this letter to Winfield Scott, commander of the U.S. Army during the earliest stages of the war. In it he proposed a series of plans which he suggested would bring a speedy end to the war. It ran entirely counter to Scott's own "Anaconda" plan, as Scott points out in the attached indorsement.
HEADQUARTERS OHIO VOLUNTEER MILITIA,
Columbus, Ohio, April 27, 1861.
Lieut. Gen. WINFIELD SCOTT,
Commanding U. S. Army:
GENERAL: Communication with Washington being so difficult, I beg to lay before you some views relative to this region of country, and to propose for your consideration a plan of operations intended to relieve the pressure upon Washington and tending to bring the war to a speedy close. The region north of the Ohio and between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies forms one grand strategic field, in which all operations must be under the control of one head, whether acting offensively or on the defensive. I assume it as the final result that hostilities will break out on the line of the Ohio. For two reasons it is necessary to delay this result by all political means for a certain period of time: First, to enable the Northwest to make the requisite preparations, now very incomplete; second, that a strong diversion may be made in aid of the defense of Washington and the eastern line of operations.
First urging that the General Government should leave no means untried to arm and equip the Western States, I submit the following views: Cairo should be occupied by a small force, say two battalions, strongly intrenched, and provided with heavy guns and a gun-boat to control the river. A force of some eight battalions, to be in observation at Sandoval (the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi and the Illinois Central Railways), to observe Saint Louis, sustain the garrison of Cairo, and if necessary re-enforce Cincinnati. A few companies should observe the Wabash below Vincennes. A division of about 4,000 men at Seymour to observe Louisville, and be ready to support Cincinnati or Cairo. A division of 5,000 men at or near Cincinnati. Two battalions at or near Chillicothe. Could we be provided with arms, the Northwest has ample resources to furnish 80,000 men for active operations, after providing somewhat more than the troops mentioned above for the protection of the frontier. With the active army of operations it is proposed to cross the Ohio at or in the vicinity of Gallipolis and move up the valley of the Great Kanawha on Richmond. In combination with this Cumberland should be seized and a few thousand men left at Ironton or Gallipolis to cover the rear and right flank of the main column. The presence of this detachment and a prompt movement on Louisville or the heights opposite Cincinnati would effectually prevent any interference on the part of Kentucky. The movement on Richmond should be conducted with the utmost promptness, and could not fail to relieve Washington as well as to secure the destruction of the Southern Army, if aided by a decided advance on the eastern line.
Attributed to Mathew B. Brady
(American, 1823?-1896)
General Winfield Scott (1786-1866)
Half-plate daguerreotype, ca. 1848
Gift of William Macbeth Gallery
I know that there would be difficulties in crossing the mountains, but would go prepared to meet them. Another plan would be, in the event of Kentucky assuming a hostile position, to cross the Ohio at Cincinnati or Louisville with 80,000 men, march straight on Nashville, and thence act according to circumstances. Were a battle gained before reaching Nashville, so that the strength of Kentucky and Tennessee were effectually broken, a movement on Montgomery, aided by a vigorous movement on the eastern line toward Charleston and Augusta, should not be delayed. The ulterior movements of the combined armies might be on Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans. It seems clear that the forces of the Northwest should not remain quietly on the defensive, and that under present circumstances, if the supply of arms is such as to render it absolutely impossible to bring into the field the numbers indicated above, then offensive movements would be most effective on the line first indicated; but if so liberal a supply can be obtained as to enable us to dispose of 80,000 troops for the active army, then the second line of operations would be the most decisive. To enable us to carry out either of these plans it is absolutely necessary that the General Government should strain every nerve to supply the West with arms, ammunition, and equipments. Even to maintain the defensive we must be largely assisted. I beg to urge upon you that we are very badly supplied at present, and that a vast population eager to fight are rendered powerless by want of arms, the nation being thus deprived of their aid.
I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, yours,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN.
Major-General, Commanding Ohio Volunteers
MAY 2, 1861.
As at the date of this letter General McClellan knew nothing of the intended call for two years' volunteers, he must have had the idea of composing his enormous columns of three-months' men for operating against Nashville and Richmond--that is, of men whose term of service would expire by the time he had collected and organized them. That such was his idea appears from a prior letter, in which, although the Ohio quota is but about 10,000 men, the general speaks, I think, of having 30,000, and wants arms, &c., for 80,000. Second. A march upon Richmond from the Ohio would probably insure the revolt of Western Virginia, which if left alone will soon be five out of seven for the Union. Third. The general eschews water transportation by the Ohio and Mississippi in favor of long, tedious, and break-down (of men, horses, and wagons) marches. Fourth. His plan is to subdue the seceded States by piece-meal instead of enveloping them all (nearly) at once by a cordon of posts on the Mississippi to its mouth from its junction with the Ohio, and by blockading ships of war on the seaboard. For the cordon a number of men equal to one of the general's columns would probably suffice, and the transportation of men and all supplies by water is about a fifth of the land cost, besides the immense saving in time.
Respectfully submitted to the President.
WINFIELD SCOTT
describing his general war plan
(The Anaconda Plan)
General Winfield Scott, commander of the U.S. Army, sent this letter to George McClellan during the earliest stages of the war. It was in reply to a letter from McClellan which set forth several proposals for the prosecution of the war. In this reply Scott gives his ideas on the subject, which were to become known as the Anaconda Plan.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, May 3, 1861.
Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,
Commanding Ohio Volunteers, Cincinnati, Ohio:
SIR: I have read and carefully considered your plan for a campaign, and now send you confidentially my own views, supported by certain facts of which you should be advised.
First. It is the design of the Government to raise 25,000 additional regular troops, and 60,000 volunteers for three years. It will be inexpedient either to rely on the three-months' volunteers for extensive operations or to put in their hands the best class of arms we have in store. The term of service would expire by the commencement of a regular campaign, and the arms not lost be returned mostly in a damaged condition. Hence I must strongly urge upon you to confine yourself strictly to the quota of three-months' men called for by the War Department.
Major General Winfield Scott. (Library of Congress)
Second. We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence. In connection with such blockade we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points, and the capture of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip; the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan. I suppose there will be needed from twelve to twenty steam gun-boats, and a sufficient number of steam transports (say forty) to carry all the personnel (say 60,000 men) and material of the expedition; most of the gunboats to be in advance to open the way, and the remainder to follow and protect the rear of the expedition, &c. This army, in which it is not improbable you may be invited to take an important part, should be composed of our best regulars for the advance and of three-years' volunteers, all well officered, and with four months and a half of instruction in camps prior to (say) November 10. In the progress down the river all the enemy's batteries on its banks we of course would turn and capture, leaving a sufficient number of posts with complete garrisons to keep the river open behind the expedition. Finally, it will be necessary that New Orleans should be strongly occupied and securely held until the present difficulties are composed.
General Winfield Scott, 1851
Oil portrait by Minor Kellogg, 1851
Courtesy The New York Historical Society
Third. A word now as to the greatest obstacle in the way of this plan--the great danger now pressing upon us - the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant and vigorous action, regardless, I fear, of consequences - that is, unwilling to wait for the slow instruction of (say) twelve or fifteen camps, for the rise of rivers, and the return of frosts to kill the virus of malignant fevers below Memphis. I fear this; but impress right views, on every proper occasion, upon the brave men who are hastening to the support of their Government. Lose no time, while necessary preparations for the great expedition are in progress, in organizing, drilling, and disciplining your three-months' men, many of whom, it is hoped, will be ultimately found enrolled under the call for three-years' volunteers. Should an urgent and immediate occasion arise meantime for their services, they will be the more effective. I commend these views to your consideration, and shall be happy to hear the result.
With great respect, yours, truly,
WINFIELD SCOTT.
Additional Sources:
www.amherst.edu
www.mariner.org
www.swcivilwar.com
www.americaslibrary.gov
www.army.mil
archives.ashland.edu
www.humanities-interactive.org
www.etsu.edu
www.pbs.org
www.sfmuseum.org
www.wildwestweb.net
freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.com
