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Posted on 10/21/2003 12:02:11 AM PDT by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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The Solomon Islands campaign began with the taking of Guadalcanal in December 1942. In February 1943 the Russell Islands fell, and the New Georgia group followed in August 1943. At the end of 1943, the campaign reached its goal when American troops gained a solid foothold on the island of Bougainville. The Russells, New Georgia and Bougainville were objectives because of their value as air bases.  The objective of the Solomon Islands campaign was to cut off Japan's major forward air and naval base at Rabaul, on the island of New Britain. Rabaul was the hub of Japanese air power in the south Pacific--a stopping point for planes coming from New Guinea in the southwest and Truk, the home of the Japanese Combined Fleet, in the south central Pacific. Bougainville was key to neutralizing Rabaul. The first attack on Bougainville occurred Aug. 15, 1943. Eight Corsairs from Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (later known as the Black Sheep) flew up from the Russell Islands to strafe the Kahili airfield during American amphibious landings on the island of Vella Lavella. The lightning strike--a surprise so complete the Japanese did not have time to shoot back--damaged aircraft and refueling equipment on the ground and forestalled a night attack on the American amphibious force.  The Solomon Islands air defenses (AirSols), including units from the Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Royal New Zealand Air Force, made many air strikes in October on Bougainville and nearby islands. Although some strikes were designed to keep the enemy guessing as to the Marines' intended landing point, most were planned to reduce air opposition to the Bougainville landings when they finally occurred. Two diversionary amphibious landings were made the night of Oct. 27-28: the 2nd Marine Parachute Battalion landed on Choiseul; and New Zealand's 8th Brigade, together with Navy Seabees (U.S. Naval Construction Battalions), made an unopposed landing on the Treasury Islands on Oct. 27. Both operations served their primary purpose of drawing Japanese troops away from Bougainville, but the positions gained in the Treasuries, including valuable Blanche Harbor, were held and strengthened to provide staging for the landings on Bougainville. The Marines left Choiseul by landing craft after a week of harassing Japanese troops and damaging barge and supply bases. Admiral William F. Halsey, Commander South Pacific, ordered Task Force 39 (which included four cruisers and the eight destroyers of Captain Arleigh Burke's Destroyer Squadron 23), under Rear Admiral A.S. Merrill, to bombard airfields on Buka and Bonis northwest of Bougainville. He intended the bombardments to keep the enemy off-balance and prevent air harassment of the landing force. The task force then steamed more than 200 miles to strike at the Shortland Islands, while Rear Admiral F.C. Sherman's Task Force 38 took over the bombardment of Buka, eliminating the threat from those airfields.  U.S. troops go over the side of a Coast Guard manned combat transport to enter the landing barges at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, as the invasion gets under way. The actual landing by the 3rd Marine Division at Empress Augusta Bay took place at dawn Nov. 1. The bay, located at some distance from the heavily defended airfields at either end of the island, had what appeared to be the most suitable beaches for a landing. The plan was to establish a beachhead, then bring in supplies and equipment to build a landing strip for fighters. Invasion forces consisted of 14,321 troops (including the 1st Marine Dog Platoon with their 24 Dobermans and German shepherds) in 12 transports, preceded by a minesweeper group. Destroyer Squadron 45, four minelayers and two salvage tugs provided further support. The landing met with several obstacles. The Japanese defense of the beaches was stronger than anticipated. The 40,000 troops on the island had been reported stationed mainly around the airfields, and aerial reconnaissance photos did not reveal the extensive system of bunkers in the jungles above the beaches. The Marines who landed west of the mouth of the Koromokina River encountered steep slopes and shoals on which more than 80 of their amphibious craft foundered. Those landing east of the Koromokina were caught in crossfire from machine guns on the offshore islet of Puruata and on Cape Torokina east of the beach. A small contingent of Marines knocked out the gun emplacement on the cape after it had destroyed or damaged 14 landing craft; the 3d Marine Raiders captured Puruata.  A typical Japanese pillbox The landing force drove away the rest of the Japanese defenders, while the dog platoon, moving ahead of the main body, sniffed out snipers along the trails of the bog-ridden jungle. In spite of the resistance, and two Japanese air assaults launched from Rabaul bases during the day (which were driven off by AirSols fighters), the Marines succeeded. By nightfall, all 14,000 troops, together with 6,200 tons of fuel, rations, and ammunition, were landed along a 200-yard perimeter. The evening of the landing, Army reconnaissance aircraft reported that a large Japanese surface force was heading for Bougainville. Task Force 39 intercepted it about 2:30 the following morning 45 miles west of Empress Augusta Bay. The American ships, executing maneuvers at breakneck speeds in the darkness to avoid Japanese long-range torpedoes, sank two enemy ships after three hours of heavy fire. With two other ships damaged in collisions while trying to avoid American torpedoes, the scattered Japanese chose to retreat. The American force had only two ships hit, both of which sustained moderate damage. The initial Japanese reaction to the Bougainville landing was to send a force of 19 ships to strengthen Rabaul. However, a Nov. 5 air attack from Task Force 38 heavily damaged seven cruisers and two destroyers, prompting the withdrawal of the cruisers and eliminating worries about surface attacks on the Bougainville amphibious forces.  Even so, the night of Nov. 6-7, four Japanese destroyers eluded the Americans and landed 475 troops west of the Marine beachhead. The Japanese hoped to catch the Marines between them and the other troops on the island, but the enemy forces never coordinated their actions. The Marines routed out the counter-landing detachment after two days of artillery barrages. Fewer than 100 Japanese escaped into the jungle; the rest were killed. The Marines sustained under 50 casualties. Another punishing attack from Task Force 38 on Rabaul Nov. 11 cost the Japanese 68 fighters and three ships. Nevertheless, Japanese carrier air groups from Rabaul made repeated attacks on the American landing force and the U.S. Navy ships, which continued to ferry in reinforcements, supplies and munitions. The strikes did little damage to the American forces, but the Japanese lost so many planes--121 out of 173--that the remaining carrier-based squadrons were withdrawn Nov. 13. By that time, the Americans had landed nearly 34,000 troops and over 23,000 tons of cargo on Bougainville, widened the beachhead 7,000 yards, and moved 5,000 yards inland through dense, difficult mangrove swamps.  Blood plasma literally puts new life into the veins of a wounded Marine at Bougainville. Donated in the United States, and often flown to the front, plasma saves countless lives that would be lost without it. Even though two airfields were under construction and the Marines were expanding their perimeter in search of a site to build a bomber strip, the Japanese army commander on Bougainville still believed that the landing was a feint. He continued to think that the primary targets were Buka to the north and the Buin section of the island to the southeast. Thus, no Japanese forces were withdrawn from either end of the island to root out the American invasion, and the Americans had the opportunity to solidify their positions. On Thanksgiving Day, Nov. 25, Burke's DesRon 23 fought the Battle of Cape St. George, sinking three Japanese vessels out of five sent with troops to reinforce Buka. The American ships suffered no hits at all. The same day, the Marines pushing inland along the Piva River virtually destroyed the 23rd Imperial Infantry in the Battle of Piva Forks. This was the last major Japanese ground resistance on Bougainville. On Christmas Day, the Army's Americal Division arrived on Bougainville to relieve the 3rd Marine Division. Marine Major General R.J. Mitchell, ComAirSols, moved his headquarters to Bougainville to direct the final air campaign against Rabaul, only 220 miles away. Within a month, the base at Rabaul was of no further use to the Japanese.  Negro troops of the 24th Infantry, attached to the Americal Division, wait to advance behind a tank assault on the Japanese, along Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville. American troops continued to occupy Bougainville, and contain dwindling Japanese troops, until relieved by Australian II Corps troops in late 1944. The Australians attempted to clear the entire island of Japanese, incurring heavy casualties. The end of the Pacific war brought and end to action on Bougainville. The Bougainville campaign remains one of the most resounding successes of the war in the Pacific in terms of the smooth coordination between the Navy and Marine Corps. The capture of Bougainville successfully isolated Rabaul. In the fight for Bougainville, the Japanese expended more of their air units than they could afford to lose. The Bougainville airstrips constructed at Torokina and Piva by Seabees and engineers made possible fighter-escorted bomber attacks against Rabaul, and other Japanese bases on New Ireland and New Britain.  Navajo Codetalkers on Bougainville In December 1943, AirSols began a massive attack on Rabaul. The ensuing two months of constant air strikes, made possible by the possession of Bougainville, caused the Japanese to withdraw. The capture of Bougainville caused Marine casualties of 423 dead and 1,418 wounded.
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Bump for a later read . . . have a blessed day!
Moving was successfully accomplished and with only minor injuries. However, I do not as yet have broadband access from my home. This is a bad thing.
Just lettin' you know I'm alive and more or less well :)
Oh my goodness Dark you should see my fabric closet! I am a quilter! Well I don't do much of it now.
I have so much fabric it's taking over my 4 room apt. Not LOL!!
Major Gregory "Pappy" Boyington
C.O. VMF-214, Black Sheep Squadron
"Just name a hero, and I'll prove he's a bum." - Pappy's self-assessment
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Air Power |
Originating in a 1938 Navy spec, when the need to replace the F2A and F4F could already be foreseen, the Vought Corsair was designed around an engine that also didn't exist yet: the Pratt & Whitney R-2800 Double Wasp, a monster 18 cylinder double radial, eventually capable of 2250 horsepower. (During the Corsair's development, corporate reorganizations brought the Vought company into Vought-Sikorsky and then Chance Vought, all part of United Aircraft, along with Pratt & Whitney and Hamilton Standard.)
The huge engine dictated much of the plane's design. Such a powerplant needed a comparably big propeller to absorb all that horsepower. Thus the 13' 4" diameter Hamilton Standard prop, the largest fitted to a fighter at that time. The Corsair's fuselage had to be high in the air, to give the prop clearance, But ordinary, straight wings at that height would have implied long (and weak) landing gear. The distinctive bent wings were developed to permit a reasonably short undercarriage.
The XF4U first flew in May 1940, and in October flew faster than 400 MPH, a record for a production fighter. A major re-design pushed the cockpit back 32 inches, which resulted in poor forward vision for the pilot, at least on take-off and landing. Development continued into 1942, when Vought delivered the first production F4U-1 to the Navy, which didn't like what it saw, especially when compared to the easier-handling, and very capable F6F Hellcat. The F4U had dangerous stall behavior, had tendency to yaw suddenly when landing, and, worst off all, bounced when it hit the deck. For use on carriers, these problems caused the Navy to insist that they be fixed, while it went ahead equipping with the Hellcat.
But the Marines, operating from land bases in the Solomons, needed capable new fighters to replace their aging F4F Wildcats. By late 1942, the first USMC squadron, VMF-124, took delivery of the Corsair F4U-1. In early 1943, they began to see combat, and were a huge success - with speed, maneuverability, firepower, and ability to absorb battle damage. By the summer of 1943, most of the Marine fighting squadrons had transitioned to the F4U-1, the first operational model, fitted with a distinctive "birdcage" canopy, as shown in the detail of a plane flown by Ed Olander (number 576). Boyington's squadron, VMF-214, switched over to Corsairs before they started their September 1943 combat tour.
The F4U is regarded by many as one of the greatest combat aircraft in history, and was in production for a longer period of time than any US fighter other than the F4 Phantom. As conceived it was intended to mount the most powerful engine, and biggest propeller, of any fighter in existence, and the prototype was the first US combat aircraft to exceed 400mph. However, early experience suggested that the design was in fact a disastrous failure, especially for carrier operations. The extraordinarily long nose interfered with visibility ahead in a way which particularly caused problems during landing and take-off. The undercarriage had a tendency to break, and the aircraft also had an inclination to bounce alarmingly on landing. As a result the US Navy at first rejected it for shipboard operation. Nonetheless the F4U was adopted by the Marine Corps and quickly demonstrated its effectiveness. Although its low rate-of-turn made it a very limited dogfighter its merits more than compensated for this and its other faults. Its great power, speed and rate of climb, its capacity to roll very rapidly, combined with a powerful armament - and large ammunition supply - and a quite exceptional resistance to battle damage, meant that in early 1943 ( in the Solomons) it quickly demonstrated its great superiority over the enemy fighters. By the end of hostilities in the Pacific War it had established an 11:1 "kill" ratio against Japanese aircraft.
At a time when the US Navy still considered it unsuitable for carrier use it was provided to the British Fleet Air Arm under Lend-Lease. The British Navy was desperately short of suitable high-performance fighters and therefore persevered with the Corsair, despite its problems, and the Fleet Air Arm's pilots quickly learned to cope with some of the aircraft's idiosyncracies. In any event improved versions, which amongst other things corrected the faults in the undercarriage, were later to became available.
The US Navy finally adopted the F4U as a shipboard fighter-bomber in November 1944, and by early 1945 large numbers were operating from the fast carriers of the Pacific Fleet - although the longer-established and very capable Grumman F6F Hellcat remained somewhat more numerous aboard the carriers right up to the war's end.
However, while the F6F was phased out shortly after World War Two the Corsair continued in service, and new versions were developed. The F4U was used extensively in the Korean War, and production continued until December 1952, by which time 12,571 had been built.
Specifications
Contractor:Chance Vought Division of United Aircraft Corporation (also built by Brewster and Goodyear)
Type: Single-seat Land and Carrier based fighter-bomber
Engines used:
(F4U-1) 2,000 hp Pratt & Whitney R-2800-8 (B) Double Wasp 18-cylinder two-row radial
(F4U-1A) 2,250 hp R-2800-8 (W) with water injection
(F4U-4) 2,450 hp R-2800-18 (W) with water-methanol
(F4U-5) 2,850 hp R-2800-32 (E) with water-methanol
Dimensions:
Span: 41' (12.48 metres) British version 39' 7"
Length: 33' 8" - 34' 6" according to version
Weight: (F4U-1A) 8,873 lb (4,025 kg)
Performance:
Maximum Speed: (F4U-1A) 395 mph (F4U-5) 462 mph
Initial Climb: (F4U-1A) 2,890 feet per minute (F4U-5) 4,800 feet per minute
Service Ceiling: F4U-1A) 37,000 feet (F4U-5) 44,000 feet
Range: (on internal fuel): 1,000 miles (1,609 kilometres)
Armaments:
Guns:
(early versions) 6 x 0.5" Browning MG53-2 machine-guns in outer wings, with 390 rounds per gun
(F4U-1C onwards) 4 x 20mm. cannon in wings
Bombs/Rockets:
(F4U-1D and most subsequent versions) 2 x 1,000 lb bombs or 8 x 5-inch rockets under wings
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